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Abstract
The thesis focuses on the relationship between Sanskrit classical grammar, 
Abhidharma, and the debates between Madhyamaka and Yogcicara. In particular, 
it shows how the karaka system, and the idea of laksana, influence 
philosophical argumentation in the context of medieval Indian Buddhist thought. 
The karaka system is the way in which classical Sanskrit grammarians discuss 
syntax, and in particular, actions and agency. Laksana means a defining trait, or 
a definition, at once a scholastic tool and a fundamental way to identify existent 
entities.
There are five Chapters and two Appendices. Chapter One shows the close links 
between Sanskrit classical grammar and basic ideas in Buddhist thought, and 
isolates the karaka system as being most relevant in this regard. It also show-S' 
certain structural analogies between the karaka system and certain important 
features of Buddhist philosophy. Chapter Two is mostly based on Vasubandhu’s 
Abhidharmakosabhasya and its sub-commentary; it highlights and reconstructs 
the discussions on laksana and agency found therein. Chapter Three shows how 
Madhyamaka understands similar issues, and what is the proper context and 
significance of its refutation of laksanas. Chapter Four shifts the focus upon the 
Madhyamaka understanding of conventional truths, and the role of the laksanas 
of Abhidharma, as well as of the karaka system, within saririrti) Chapter Five 
compares the Yogdcdra views on the very same topics.
Appendix 1 is a translation of Prajnakaramati’s commentary to 
Bodhicaryavatara 9.1-34, a work where many of the philosophical debates 
discussed throughout the thesis are well represented. Appendix 2 is a 
photographic reproduction of a manuscript, containing an anonymous 
commentary to Nagarjuna’s LokatTtastava.
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Introduction
In this thesis, I intend to look at certain aspects of Indian Buddhist thought by 
showing their interrelatedness and continuity. The aspects I will focus upon are: 
defining traits, in the technical sense corresponding to the Sanskrit laksana; 
syntactical analysis as a presupposition and pivot for philosophical debate; and 
the issues of conventions, and levels of reference in philosophical language. In 
particular, I shall argue that classical Sanskrit grammar bears upon central 
concerns of Buddhism; and that the manner in which these are discussed in the 
Abhidharma, in turn, bears upon their handling in Madhyamaka, and its 
differences from Yogacara. The originality of this approach mainly lies in the 
consistent attention towards what is not always explicitly thematised by 
classical authors, and not fully drawn out in the secondary literature: which is, a 
good many debates within a wide range of Buddhist literature revolve around 
the proper formation and usage of defining traits (laksanas); and, they are 
closely intertwined with a specific understanding of actions and agency, in the 
grammatical sense embodied by the karaka system. It may come as a surprise 
that even central debates between Madhyamaka and Yogacara become more 
comprehensible against this background, and that this does help understanding 
their respecting positions (even putting into question the plausibility and 
comprehensiveness of certain available reconstructions). To explain in brief: I 
try in this thesis to bring to the fore recurring elements (laksana and karaka) in 
Buddhist thought, which I think the classical authors considered too obvious to 
spell out; these elements have also not been consistently analysed by modern 
secondary literature, perhaps for that very reason. What I have taken as my 
central concerns appears in much scholarly work solely within the marginal 
attention of very brief footnotes. The implication of this is, first of all, that much 
of Buddhist philosophical literature can be seen through an added light; and
more broadly, the thesis will suggest a link between language and 
sentiency/intentionality, which may be worth even further consideration.
The risk in this type of holistic approach is to start from certain generalised 
ideas and further speculate away from the actual concerns of the texts. In other 
words, one may start with a theory (‘grammar is important’) and confirm it 
through a self-referential string of arguments that loses sight of the basis it is 
supposedly engaged with.
To avoid this interpretive pitfall, I have as far as possible referred back to the 
primary sources and built my arguments around them. I do not claim to have let 
the texts ‘speak for themselves’, since my selection and specific reading is an 
act of inteipretation and is open to discussion and debate. Nonetheless, I have 
tried to respect the level of technicality employed in the Sanskrit sources, as I 
believed that any simplified re-telling of those arguments would run the risk of 
distorting their actual emphasis.
The thesis is divided into five Chapters and a lengthy translation, given as an 
Appendix. The first Chapter treats of classical Sanskrit grammar; the second of 
Abhidharma\ the third and the fourth focus on Madhyamaka and, partly, its 
relation to Yogacara. The fifth Chapter more specifically takes up Yogacara 
philosophy. The text translated in the Appendix is Prajnakaramati’s 
commentary to Bodhicaryavatara, 9.1-34.
In the first Chapter I argue for the importance of Sanskrit classical grammar 
(■vyakarana) in relation to central aspects of Buddhist thought. It will be seen 
that my argument is not so generic and comprises of multiple layers. First of all, 
grammar is identified as a set of laksanas (defining traits, a term that will be 
recurrently discussed), common basis for all streams of technical literature in
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ancient and medieval Sanskrit. Within vyakarana, a specific set of rules about 
syntax (the karaka system) is taken up as a starting point, and some arguments 
for its centrality are offered. Its importance is shown in two ways: in terms of 
structural and terminological parallels with basic elements of Buddhist thought, 
and by pointing out instances of its actual employment in Buddhist literature. In 
this Chapter, I wish to show that the connection between (a certain section of) 
classical Sanskrit grammar and Buddhist thought is significant and pervasive: 
this has far-reaching repercussions even in the later sections of the thesis, where 
I contrast this reading against, for example, Williams’ position.
Chapter 2 shifts to another set of laksanas, those of Abhidhanna, which are 
more specifically Buddhist. A section of the Chapter is devoted to how the 
Abhidhannakosa discusses laksanas themselves: which in one sense, is a 
discussion of the importance and proper significance of Abhidhanna as a whole 
(since, Abliidharma focuses on the laksanas of dharmas). Besides, I reconstruct 
some debates about agency, which have a direct link to the karaka system and 
are better understood against such background. I will try to show that looking at 
this Abhidharmic category by respecting the grammatical underpinnings 
brought out by the commentators, offers a more nuanced and complex reading 
of certain arguments. In this respect, my interpretation will occasionally differ 
from other scholars, like Duerlinger and Waldron (although not in all aspects).
Chapter 3 is about some Madhyamaka interpretations of the actual status of 
laksanas, and relies on Candraklrti as the primary commentarial source. I try to 
show how his discussions are closely linked to those found in the 
Abhidharmakosa, and how his specific manner of analysing laksanas offer a 
useful interpretive key to understand the doctrine of emptiness and dependent 
arising as a whole. It also helps to understand some fundamental differences 
between Madhyamaka and Yogacara philosphy.
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Chapter 4 is primarily concerned with the issue of how to relate the different 
sets of laksanas encountered so far: how they are employed by Mddhyamika 
philosophers, why, and how this fits their overall scheme of two truths. The 
reading I will offer suggests that even Candraklrti or Prajnakaramati would 
allow for different degrees of conventional truths, embedded within a 
specifically Buddhist language, and that this relation between Madhyamaka and 
broader Buddhist concerns is far from accidental. Some of these conclusions 
differ from previous interpretations: in particular, I will show how Garfield’s 
and Eckel’s exegesis contrasts mine.
In the last Chapter the same focal topics analysed in the context of Madhyamaka 
are applied to the Yogacara, highlighting a comparison with the formers’ views. 
The Chapter argues for a rather traditional interpretation of Yogacara as 
asserting mind-only, but from a new perspective.
The commentary translated in Appendix neatly contains most of the themes 
dealt with in the body of the Chapters. Prajnakaramati offers in this text ample 
discussions about the two truths, the issue of graded conventions, and the role of 
Abhidharma therein; and while he discusses Yogacara philosophy, he implicitly 
delineates his own position about the importance of the karaka system. In this 
way, this Appendix gives an authoritative and well-preserved source 
representing in a continuous stream of arguments the close connection between 
different areas of Buddhist thought; which is what I argued for, throughout the 
thesis.
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Chapter 1 
Sanskrit grammar and Buddhism
Just like a grammarian would even teach the syllables,
the Buddha spoke the Dharma according to the capacity of the trainees.1
Nagarjuna
Joined with verbal roots and affixes, 
a word effects the meaning of the Dharma.2
Mahjusrunulakalpa
[j ] Those who doe' not comprehend the meaning from a correct word,
are seen in this world to acquire knowledge just through incorrect words: 
hence, the ‘instruction about correct words’ has no purpose.3
[...] therefore, there is no such thing as a ‘Sanskrit’ word.4
Dharmaklrti
Indian classical authors employ language analysis as an all-pervasive and 
determinant method to understand, and debate, philosophical themes. 
Commentators will often offer a word-by-word gloss, where compounds are 
split through alternative analyses, and where the implications of certain affixes
1 yathaiva vaiyakarano matrkam api pathayet \ buddho ’vadattatha dharmarh vineyanam  
yathaksamam  || Nagarjuna, RatndvalT, 4.94.
2 dhatupratyayayogena sabdo dharmdrthayojaka |j ManjusrTmulakalpa, 23.6bc.
3 sabdad artham apradpadyamdna apasabdair eva jnanam vyutpadyamdna loke drsyante id 
vyartharh sabdanusdnam  || Vadanydya, 67.
4 tasmdn na samskrto nama kascic chabdah || Ibidem. This is a pun. In the discussion that 
precedes the quote, what is at stake is whether certain words should be considered refined, these 
words being in fact Sanskrit words. ‘Refined’ is the etymology o f the word sainskrta.
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are discussed at length. The exact historical reasons for this sensitivity to 
language, and hence to its grammar, are not easy to ascertain: nor will they be 
the main focus of this thesis. What it is also difficult to assess, though, is 
precisely how Sanskrit classical grammar affects philosophical argumentation; 
and whether any of its features could be said to be central in that respect. This 
thesis is more specifically concerned with how grammar may bear upon 
Buddhist philosophical themes.
As remarked in the introduction, a recurrent focus throughout these Chapters 
will be on laksanas. When laksanas are understood as verbalised definitions, 
their formation is ruled (in Sanskrit) by a system of regularised derivations that 
all literati are implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, asked to refer to. This 
(Panini’s grammar) is itself a set of laksanas: the one of broadest applicability 
and the basis for all other sets to be comprehensibly enunciated. Starting frorp
i
classical grammar reproduces the traditional gradation of a philosopher’s
/" \
training, including that of Buddhist philosophers, as even the Chinese travellers 
to Nalanda have, in ancient times, borne witness to.5 It also means beginning 
from the most basic and common foundation of their shared discourse.
Classical Sanskrit grammar, though, is an extremely broad assemblage of rules; 
bearing upon anything ranging from euphonic combination to the subtle uses of 
verbal tenses and moods. To say that it weighs upon philosophical 
argumentation is nothing new, and is too broad. The only hope to gain a more 
precise argument is to isolate a particular section of Panini’s system and show 
whichever features are most relevant to the present discussion. The karaka 
definitions, and the commentarial discussions they elicited, provide a 
particularly valuable framework.
5 J. Takakusu (tr.), A R ecord o f  the Buddhist Religion, by I-Tsing, Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal, 1982 pages 167-185. See also: S. Bael, The Life ofHiuen-Tsiang, Delhi:
Munshiram Manoharlal, 2003, pages 121-125.
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Kciraka rules deal with syntax: they regulate how the other elements in a 
sentence may be linked to the main action. It is expectable that a discussion of 
syntax may have deeper philosophical implications than other sets of rules 
bearing on mere morphology (like for example, the rules of euphonic 
combination). Karaka definitions are less bound to specific language 
morphology: they represent linguistic relations that may be found not just in 
Sanskrit. In effect, these rules have even been employed (with some 
modification) to describe languages very different from Sanskrit (like Tibetan).6 
Such feature makes this section of Panini’s grammar philosophically more 
relevant, as it implies a certain understanding of actions and agency that may 
not be merely determined by Sanskrit sentence structures.
Moreover, karaka definitions do not depend upon the distinction between ‘pure’ 
and ‘impure words’ (sabda and apasabda), often de-emphasised in Buddhist 
texts, and thus cannot be exclusively understood as a tool to preserve a perfect 
and sacred enunciation (the Veda). Lastly, the issue of agency and sentiency or 
intentionality, that will make a great bulk of the discussion in the later chapters, 
finds terminological and structural echoes in Panini’s karaka system. All this 
suggests that this section of vyakarana may offer a profitable focus.
I will propose a further specification: within the kdrakas, most of my discussion 
will only bear upon what I called ‘primary karakas\ This restriction allows to 
side-step a long debate about how to fit all the karaka rules as philosophically 
(and semantically) relevant categories. The frequency of the use of these 
primary kdrakas justifies this restriction for the purpose of the present analysis:
6 See for example, Tom J.F. Tillemans and Derek D. Helforth, Agents and Actions in Classical 
Tibetan, Wien: University o f  Wien, 1989.
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yet, I hope that a better rationale for this step will be made comprehensible 
within the relevant section of this chapter.
1.1 Language analysis: nirukti and vyakarana
Two distinct, albeit not unrelated approaches, are found throughout the 
exegetical commentaries of ancient and medieval India. The first depends on 
phonetic analogy, without resorting to any principled process; it is therefore 
open to a virtually infinite number of routes. This is a hallmark of the brdhmana 
literature , and is exemplified by Yaska’s Nirukta. There, the task of the author 
is to unfold the meaning of each term by relating it to a specific verbal root 
(■dhatu). For example, the word udakam, meaning water, is explained by Yaska 
as unatti iti, meaning 'it moistens, thus’ (it is called water).8 This type of 
analysis, being particularly open ended, allows authors to link preferred 
doctrinal contents to some important key-words; as such, it is found both in the 
commentaries and in the primary canonical sources, like the Buddhist Sutras.9
The second approach is exemplified by vyakarana, or grammar proper. This 
does not proceed by ad hoc phonetic matches, but purports to regulate the 
analysis of word-forms by identifying recurrent morphological changes, 
codified as rules or exceptions. Even the tools of vyakarana are elastic enough 
to allow doctrinally charged exegesis: see for example Yasomitra’s three 
different etymologies of the word ‘Buddha’. Nonetheless, the semantic change 
from the dhcitu to the actual word form is to be accounted for through 
established principles of derivation.
A common trait of both approaches is their value as mnemonic devices. The 
importance of orality and memorisation in ancient and medieval India must 
have been enormous, a feature that continues in traditional forms of education.
7 See Jan Gonda, Vedic Literature, Wiesbaden: Otlo Harrassowilz, 1975.
8 From the root Vud. See Nirukta, 2.24: udakam kasmat \ unattlti satah  ||
9 On this, see Ulrich Pagel, M apping the Path: Vajrapadas in Mahay ana Literature, Tokyo: The 
International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2007, especially pages 104-116.
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The structure of the texts suggests a long history within a predominantly oral 
milieu: in reference to Buddhist Suttas, this has been convincingly argued for by 
Lance Cousins 10 . Etymological expansion allows to employ the term 
commented upon as a series of phonetic indexes, that would create a mnemonic 
link with one’s doctrinal interpretation.11
When employed as an authoritative commentarial device, etymology (either in 
the style of nirukti or vyakarana) suggests a certain underlying (unseen) 
semantic pregnancy in the phonemes of the source text. This is understandable, 
when we look at systems that rely on the Veda and consider its language as 
perfectly referential of the things in the cosmos. Buddhists too, though, ascribe 
great importance to agama, and the ‘speech of the Buddha’ (buddhavacana). 
Although they are at times depicted as rejecting scriptural authority, this only 
applies to certain schools of Buddhism: as eminent an author as Candraklrti 
openly dismissed such restriction12. The parameters, which allow accepting as 
buddhavacana even what has either possibly, or surely, not been spoken by the 
Buddha, tell us something of a specific ontological bent. To be buddhavacana 
means (among other things), not to contradict reality, the way things are 
(dharmatd). It also means to counteract negative mental states.13 The rationale
10 Lance S. Cousins, ‘Pali Oral Literature’, in Paul Williams (ed.), Buddhism. Critical Concepts 
in Religious Studies, London: Routledge 2005.
11 Again, see Pagel’s comments, Note 2.
12 See the final section o f  Prasannapadd  to Mulamadhyamakakarikd 1.3, where Candraklrti 
includes agama  among the four means o f  valid knowledge {pratyaksa, anumana, agama  and 
upamdna). In the Abhidharmakosa too, the Sautrantikas are represented as accepting three 
means o f valid knowledge: direct perception {pratyaksa), inference (anumana) and tradition o f  
the apt (aptagama). See Bhdisya to Abhidharmakosa 2.55a: na hy esam dravyato ’stih>e kimcid  
api pramdnam asti - pratyaksam  anumanam dptdgamo vd, yatha rupadlndm dharmandm iti | 
‘Since for the ultimate existence o f  these there is not even one means o f  valid knowledge -  
direct perception, inference or tradition o f the apt -  as for the case o f dharmas like form and the 
rest’. The idea that all Buddhists do not rely on scripture as a valid means o f  knowledge is 
probably an overextension o f  Digriaga’s and DharmakTrti’s stance, taken as the Buddhist 
epistemologists par excellence. Even in their case, the situation is more complex: they would 
accept verbal authority, but just as a case o f  well-formed inference. What they would reject, in 
other words, is not that certain texts might give valid knowledge, but that verbal testimony 
should be given the status o f an independent pram dna , instead of being taken as a type o f  
inference. This issue is taken up at the very outset in the Pramanaviniscaya chapter o f  the 
Pramdnavarttika.
13 See on this Etienne Lamotte, ‘The assessment o f  textual authenticity in Buddhism’, in Paul 
Williams (ed.), Buddhism. Critical concepts in religious studies. London: Routledge, 2005.
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behind this may have something to do with the purported omniscience of the 
Buddha. Buddhist texts specify that all what the Buddha speaks is both 
meaningful and beneficial, and occasionally also that, whatever is well spoken, 
is the Buddha's word. The approach is probably eminently pragmatic, but 
ontological suggestions might be derived, by considering the exceptional 
qualities ascribed to Sakyamuni. The Mahasanghikas upheld the doctrine that 
the Buddha only spoke one letter (the letter A, also preserved as the Perfection 
of Wisdom in One Letter). In the Lalitavistards narration of Siddhartha's 
learning of the Sanskrit alphabet, each syllable is expanded to denote a cardinal 
Buddhist tenet. 14 Thus, Buddhist authors were inclined to regardJhe very 
.sounds of buddhavacana as pregnant with implicit significations. (Consider also 
some of Bhavya's remarks on the sense of Buddhist dharams) .15
Paradoxically, the apparent unhistorical character of certain etymologies might 
derive from being temporally determined expressions of a certain state of affairs: 
dharmata, believed to be the central intent of Sakyamuni's teaching. This claim 
may seem to contradict a commonly accepted Buddhist doctrine about the 
conventional character of the relation between word and meaning. The 
contradiction only arises if we take conventional to imply ‘arbitrary’. Such step 
is hardly necessary, and at any rate not in line with basic principles of Buddhist 
thought.
Within a widely accepted Buddhist perspective, the very structure of the world 
as a lived environment (bhajanaloka) is dependent upon a collective history of 
past intentions (shared karman). We may tend to understand a convention as an 
utterly arbitrary stipulation dependent from a set of historical accidents.
14 More precisely, the Lalitavistara  tells that when ten thousand youngsters were learning scripts 
together with the Bodhisattva, due to the latter’s influence (adhisthana), when they uttered each 
syllable, a meaningful phrase starting with that same syllable was heard. For example, the letter 
a is expanded as anityah sarvcisamskarah, ‘everything compounded is impermanent’; and so 
forth. See Lalitavistara , Chapter Ten: ‘The Chapter on the Display in the Script-Classroom’, 
Lipisdldsandarsanaparivarta.
15 In: Matthew T. Kapstein, Reason's Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan 
Buddhist Thought, Boston: Wisdom, 2001.
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Accepting the formative role of karman, though, gives a different bent to what a 
Buddhist author may understand as ‘history’: the arbitrary character of 
conventions is discarded, without necessarily considering them ultimately 
founded. It is in other words possible to be a convention, and yet to remain a 
reliable regularity (as in the case of causal processes). Hence, language too, and 
phonemes, may be treated as responding to and closely participating in the very 
fabric of the world and its sentient inhabitants.
This idea can be referred to two aspects, or two different senses in which a 
world is ‘made’. The first is the one just described, according to which a long, 
diachronic history of past karman shapes present experiences, including 
language. The second is the very basis to speak of such diachronic processes: 
language itself, and its structures. Here karman reappears, and surprisingly or 
not, its sense is still linked to a structure that resembles the intentionality of the 
first account. In this chapter, I start from the second sense of karman: hence, 
from vyakarana. 16
1.2 Panini
In eight books, comprising about 4000 aphorisms, Panini has given a near 
complete system to derive the forms of both Vedic and Classical (Jaukika, 
worldly) Sanskrit. Panini’s work is the type of systematic description that I had 
primarily in mind while employing the term 'grammar'. His vyakarana rules are 
by far the most commonly employed in Sanskrit commentarial literature.
Traditional accounts of Panini's life highlight the superhuman quality of his 
intellectual endeavour. His grammar begins with fourteen sutras, which would 
have been revealed by Siva, beating his kettle-drum. Or, if  Panini was a 
Buddhist, Avalolcitesvara, the Bodhisattva of compassion, should have inspired 
him (a certain similarity of roles between Siva and Avalokitesvara is not
16 For a reconstruction o f  further discussions about the nature o f Buddhavacana , Ensu Cho, 
‘From Buddha’s Speech to Buddha’s Essence: Philosophical Discussions o f  Buddha-vacana in 
India and China’, in Asian Philosophy, Vol. 14, N.3, November 2004, pp.255-276.
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uncommon, as in the case of Tamil grammar). Whatever one may make of these 
accounts, Panini commanded a level of respect and admiration, which owned 
him the epithet of bhagavan, employed for kings, gods, and, among others, the 
Buddha(s). Buddhist sources even state that he would attain awakening, as a
y — 17Sravaka.
That Panini was not the first grammarian is clear from the references to other 
authors scattered throughout his own work: he often quotes them as offering 
alternative regulations (see, for example lopah sdkalyasya). Yaska might have 
antedated Panini, but their respective chronology is not clear.
Panini organised his subject matter into sutras or aphorisms, and could well be 
the initiator of this style of composition. He employed a wide gamut of technical 
terms and devices, some of which must have been current by his time, while 
others should have been his own invention. This allowed for the extraordinary 
conciseness of the sutras, but also made Panini's own Sanskrit a coded language 
of sorts.
1.3 Buddhist grammarians
I have noted how certain sources make a direct link between Panini himself and 
Buddhism (namely, that his initial sutras were revealed by Avalokitesvara, and 
not Siva). Aside from this unascertainable biographical link, Panini’s system 
has had far reaching influence in all spheres of Sanskrit literature, and this 
includes the Buddhist. Many among the great grammarians, who followed 
Panini’s framework, have been traditionally associated with Buddhism.
About one thousand five hundred out of the four thousand sutras of the 
AstadhyayT (the ‘Work in Eight Books’, as Panini's main work is called) were
17 See E. Obermiller (tr.), The History o f  Buddhism in India and Tibet. Sri Satguru Publications: 
Delhi, 1986, pages 166-169.
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commented upon by Vararuci in his Vdrtikd. The relation, both historical as well 
as theoretical, between Panini and Vararuci is debated. Traditional accounts 
make them contemporaries, sometimes even co-students. Yet, it has been argued 
that the Vdrtikd records a different stage in the development towards classical 
Sanskrit, and must therefore be later. Vararuci is described as a 'Buddhist 
Brahmin' by Buddhist sources. He is credited with a number of other texts, more 
explicitly Buddhist in content, ranging from ‘good sayings’ (the Satagatha) to 
Tantric sddhanas.18
Patanjali commented upon Vararuci's own commentary, often defending Panini 
against the Vdrtikd's improvements. Together, Panini, Vararuci and Patanjali 
constitute the initial period of Panini's school of grammar. Patanjali has been 
occasionally identified with the author of the Yogasutras. Whether this 
identification is plausible or not, nobody directly associates Patanjali with 
Buddhism. His relationship to Buddhist literature, though, is arguably in terms 
of stylistic influence. Bhattacarya has pointed out that even Nagarjuna’s prose 
resembles that of Patanjali: plausibly, his commentarial style would have 
commanded great respect for its clarity and incisiveness.19 The Mahabhdsya is 
in the objection-reply format that will be the hallmark of philosophical writing 
in Sanskrit for many the many centuries that followed it.
The Candra school, initiated by Candragomin, is quite close to Panini's method. 
It purports to simplify the terminology of the AstadhyayT. Significantly, the 
object of the action is not there denoted by karman, but by dpya (‘something to
18 See the Introduction to the Satagatha in: Lobsang Norbu Shastri (ed. and tr.), Satagatha o f  
Acatya Vararuci, Sarnath: CIHTS, 2001.
19 ‘[...] Nagarjuna’s prose -  o f  which the commentary on the Vigrahavyavartam  is the only 
extant example -  is very similar to that o f  the Mahabhdsya. Among the ‘imitators’ o f Patanjali’s 
style [...] is therefore to be counted now Nagarjuna.’ Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya (tr.), The 
D ialectical M ethod o f  Nagarjuna, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998, page 98, note 1.
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be obtained’). Candragomin is considered to have been Buddhist, and traditional
— 70accounts would make him a lay contemporary, rival and friend, of Candraklrti.
A certain number of sutras (35) mark a possible improvement of the
Candravyakarana over Panini. These improvements were incorporated in the
next great commentary on the AstadhyayT, the Kasikci, and its sub-commentary, 
21the Nydsa. The first was authored by Jayaditya and Vamana, probably each 
one composing a different section. Jayaditya was possibly Buddhist. I-Tsing 
mentions that
He revered the Three Honourable Ones (i.e. Triratna), and constantly 
performed the meritorious actions.22
The same seems certain of Jinendrabuddhi, who composed the extensive Nydisa. 
Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary provides several valuable insights in the relation 
between karakas and sentiency/intentionality.
The next period of activity for Panini's school consist mainly of recasts, which 
purport to organise the subject-matter topically, so that word-derivation may be 
swifter than through the original order of the AstadhyayT. The first of such 
Prakriya grammars is the Rupavatdra of Dharmaklrti, who is plausibly not the 
same as the great logician, and could be a Ceylonese Bhiksu of the 12th
century.23 Although later prakriya type grammars surpassed Dharmaklrti’s work
in popularity, it is remarkable that this new and long lasting trend in Sanskrit 
grammar would have been initiated by a Buddhist author.
Other Buddhist grammarians could be quoted; but apart from the authors who
20 E. Obermiller (tr.), The H istory o f  Buddhism in India and Tibet, Sri Satguru Publications: 
Delhi, 1986, pages 132-134.
21 For a different account o f  the relationship between Candra and Kasika, see Johannes 
Bronkhorst, ‘The Candra Vyakarana: Some questions’, in: Madhav Deshpande and Peter 
E.Hook (eds.j, Indian Linguistic Studies. Festschrift in Honor o f  George Cardona. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 2002.
22 J. Takakusu (tr.), A Record o f  the Buddhist Religion, by 1-Tsing, Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal, 1982, page 176.
23 On the author o f  the Rupavatara  see the Sanskrit introduction to R ao’s edition.
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wrote separate treatises on grammar, Buddhist philosophical commentators also 
show interest and sensitivity to grammatical issues. Yasomitra, the commentator 
of the Abhidharmakosabhasya, is keen to give many possible grammatical 
interpretations of a term, and rarely fails to quote the relevant sutra. The author 
of the Vibhdsaprabhavrtti on the AbhidharmadTpa has written sections that 
could equally fit within a strictly grammatical treatise: in particular, I will show 
how this is true of his treatment of kdrakas. CandrakTrti is attentive to kdraka 
definitions, and offers some insights of his own on their role and significance.
Either as grammarians, or as philosophers writing in and about Sanskrit, 
Buddhist authors were active participants in the long debate that depended upon, 
and occasionally reshaped, the mainstream of Sanskrit vyakarana.
1.4 Defining ‘grammar’
The discussion so far, has already given a general idea of what, in the context of 
Sanskrit sdstras, is intended by ‘grammar’. Nevertheless, grammatical literature 
discusses its own nature in greater detail: in other words, it tries to give a 
definition (laksana) of itself, mostly by employing synonyms and expanding 
upon their sense. Grammar is the basic framework within which all other 
definitions become possible; and, it does define itself as such.
Cardona has isolated six terms employed in traditional sources: 'exposition of 
words' (sabdanusasana), 'analysis/explanation' (vyakarana), 'technical 
treatise/branch of knowledge' (sastra), 'aphorism' {sutra), 'rule' {yoga) and 
'characteristic, definition' (laksana).24 I shall follow the order (and partly the 
content) of his analysis, amplifying upon the areas of greater relevance for the 
present thesis. Lastly, I will take up a specifically Buddhist synonym for
grammar: the ‘science of words’ (sabdavidya).
24 George Cardona, Panini. His work and its traditions. Volume I. Background and Introduction, 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988, pages 655-671.
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V1.4.1 Sabdanusasana
The words expounded by the Astadhyayl fall in the two categories of Vedic and 
'worldly' usages. Anusasana has been mostly taken instrumentally, and would 
therefore indicate a means do distinguish words -  proper words (sadhavah 
sabdah) from the improper forms (apasabdah). It is important to highlight how 
this distinction is not drawn for the sake of comprehension. Commentators (like 
Patanjali) make it clear that correct and incorrect word-forms are equally 
capable to convey meanings. Moreover, the relationship between word and 
meaning (sabda-artha-sambhandha) is established (siddha) from acquaintance 
with usages in the world (lokatah).25 What is the purpose, then, of knowing 
correct word-forms?
The key answer is ‘a restriction for the sake of religious duty’ (dharma- 
niyamah). Similar restrictions are to be found in reference to ordinary actions, or, 
in reference to Vedic sacrifices. For an instance of the first type, Patanjali 
mentions that while, strictly speaking, one could satisfy hunger by eating 
anything (even a dog), there are prohibitions in reference to, say, village-hens. 
As far as Vedic sacrifices are concerned, there are specific indications for such 
details as the type of wood to be employed for a sacrificial pole. These cannot 
be immediately related to the functionality of the pole as a place to bind the 
animal to be killed. Similarly, we may convey meaning either with correct or 
incorrect words, but the latter are to be discarded for the sake of religious merit.
A further issue is the proper locus of relevance of this distinction: does it always 
matter whether we use proper expressions or ungrammatical expressions? 
Patanjali replies that it does not, and that the employment of correct forms is 
enjoined in respect to ritual usage {prayoga) only. He adduces the example of 
some great Sages, who would regularly mispronounce ‘yad va nah, tad va nab’ 
(‘come as it may’, in a free rendering) as yarvanah, ta r v a n a h so much so that 
‘yarvanah tarvanah’ became their nickname. Mispronouncing, though, was not 
a cause of disgrace or demerit, as this was not done during ritual usage of words.
25 See the M ahabhasya, Chapter 1.
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The role of grammar is therefore to draw a distinction between meritorious and 
non-meritorious verbal usages, and is patently connected with Vedic orthopraxis. 
The strong link between grammar and the Vedic lore becomes even more 
apparent when we observe the five primary reasons, for which grammar should 
be studied (following Patanjali).26
All of the five main purposes relate to the Veda and the traditional duties of a 
Brahmin. One could therefore wonder how grammar could became a common 
preliminary to the study of other branches of knowledge, and for practically all 
philosophical systems of medieval India (whether they accepted the authority of 
the Veda or not). In particular, the question of proper and improper word-usage 
is occasionally declared irrelevant in Buddhist texts: sabda or apasabda are a 
non-issue, as long as the desired meaning can be conveyed (compare the 
Lankavatarasutra and the Kalacakratantra). In the quote given at the 
beginning of this Chapter, Dharmaklrti specifically says that ‘the instruction 
about correct words’ (sabdanusasanam) has no purpose. In the same vein, he 
mentions that they cannot be the means of religious merit (dharma), and also 
that protection of the Veda and so forth (vedaraksadikam) is not at all a purpose 
for someone who is not following that system (atatsamayasthayinah). Overall,
26 One (strictly speaking, a Brahmin), should study grammar because:
i. it helps the preservation (raksa) o f  the Veda by ensuring that phonetic addition and 
modification (agama and vikara) is respected;
ii. Contextual grammatical changes (uha) are employed to fit Vedic mantras to 
specific ritual usages;
iii. Grammar is one o f  the ancillaries o f  the Vedas (veda-anga , lit. ‘limb o f  the Veda’), 
and it is a Brahmin duty (dharma) to study them all. In particular, in the metaphor 
o f  limbs, grammar is called mvkham , meaning face or mouth, but also the ‘main 
one’;
iv. Brahmins are, traditionally, teachers; teachers should know proper words. The 
fastest (laghu) method to leam correct usages is through grammar;
v. Occasionally, ritual injunctions contain ambiguities, and only knowledge o f  
grammar may dispel the doubts (asandeha). For example sthulaprsatTmay either 
mean that the required cow should have big spots, or that it should be big with 
spots. A grammarian will be able to decide about the fit interpretation, by knowing 
that the accentual position indicates the type o f compound.
All o f  this is explained in the first chapter o f  the Mahabhasya, which is also the source o f
the references that precede it.
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Dharmakirti makes a strong argument that, from the perspective of some who is 
not following the Veda, Prakrta or Apabhramsa languages could perform the 
same function as Sanskrit.27 It is obvious though that he is not making a definite 
statement against learning Sanskrit: he himself mostly wrote in that language! 
And although he does say that sabdanusasana is purposeless, 1 doubt this 
should be taken as implying that vyakarana as a whole is so. The choice of 
terms is here significant: of all the terms from grammar, sabdanusasana is the
one that indicates the teaching of pure, or ‘correct’, words. DharmakTrti’s 
argument could in fact imply that vyakarana is not primarily sabdanusasana.
Not the whole of grammar is directly or primarily concerned with the regulation 
of phonetic and morphological purity: the kdraka system, as mentioned above, 
is especially a case in point. Instead of using grammar as a prescriptive and 
proscriptive device, someone could employ it as an a posteriori exegetical tool. 
This is not so much to evaluate regularity, but rather to ensure precise and 
nuanced comprehension. The basic framework of the kdraka system is 
employed to understand passages, which do not form words ‘correctly’ in the 
sense of Panini’s derivational system: such as, Buddhist Sutras in various level 
of Middle Indie languages.28
With the increased popularity of Sanskrit as a pan-South Asian language of 
culture, grammar also ensured that it may remain regular enough to be 
effectively a shared language. Hence, despite the emphasis of commentators 
such as Patanjali, there are several other reasons for which a Buddhist author
27 See Vddanydya 66-67. In his commentary Santaraksita makes the references to Patanjali 
explicit. It is important to understand, in any case, that Dharmakirti and Santaraksita cannot be 
taken as representative o f an ‘official’ Buddhist stance, necessarily shared by all Buddhist 
authors. Compare for example the initial section o f the Nyasa, where Jinendrabuddhi quite 
faithfully follows Patantajali on the same issues.
28 Perhaps a very good example o f this apparent paradox is Chapter 23 o f the 
Manjusrimulakalpa, The Chapter on the Instruction on Words’ Knowledge, Counting and 
Names (sabdajndnaganandnamanirdesapatala). Here a strong case is made for the importance 
o f understanding grammar, yet the whole section is not in perfectly classical Sanskrit. It is 
therefore clear that morphological purity is not the intended focus when talking o f  grammar.
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may wish to study Sanskrit grammar, apart from ritual purity: I will discuss this 
further, from a specifically Mahayana perspective.
1.4.2 Vyakarana
The prefixes vi+d  attached to the verbal root kr (to do, make, create) suggests 
division, subdivision, parsing: Cardona has shown usages, which retain the 
sense of separating (cows and calves during rituals), discriminating (true from 
false), keeping apart, becoming differentiated (on the part of an originally 
simple entity), or dividing. Vyakarana can also mean to explain, to make clear. 
It may refer to the proper differentiation of speech into speech-parts. Vydkaroti 
is also found as meaning ‘he/she utters’.29
Most of the usages conform closely to the sense in which vyakarana is 
sabdanusasana, as one may gather from the partial overlapping between the 
meanings of the two terms. Vyakarana, though, is etymologically closer to 
‘analysis’, and in function and method resembles the science of correct 
argumentation or reasoning. It is appropriate to stress this point, as grammar is 
often employed while justifying the plausibility of an argument. Its functional 
closeness to tarka (the science of correct reasoning) is well captured by a 
traditional saying, that ‘the systems of Kanada and Panini help all branches of 
knowledge’ (kanadam pdninlyam ca sarvasdstropakdrakam). Grammar offered 
one of the first models of reasoned analysis, like mathematics or geometry may 
in a different context.
Significantly, the etymological sense of vyakarana is close to the idea of
29 This last meaning is the closest to a specifically Buddhist usage, where vyakarana means a 
prophecy. More specifically, vyakarana is often found as a Buddha’s prophecy in reference to 
someone’s future attainment, as in the case o f a bodhisattva’s future Buddhahood. The types of 
vyakarana in the sense of prophecy are discussed in Mahdyanasutrcilamkara 19.35-37. 
Moreover, vyakarana in a Buddhist context can also simply mean an answer or an explanation: 
see for example the Snvikrdntavikramipariprcchdsutra: aham te tasya tasyaiva prasnasya 
vyakaranena cittam drciclhayisydmi j| T will please your mind by answering that very question of 
yours’.
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pravicaya, determination or discreet grouping. The latter is the main objective 
of Abhidharma, which defines wisdom (prajna) as dharma-pravicaya.30
I-Tsing tells us that
The name for the general secular literature in India is Vyakarana, of 
which there are about five works, similar to the Five Classics of the 
Divine Land (China).31
On the face of it, this may be confusion about the actual sense of the term; or, it 
could be a usage of vyakarana available at his time, and not well attested, in 
either case, it is a good witness to the importance of grammar in early Medieval 
India: the section of I-Tsing’s text entitled The Method o f  Learning in the West, 
is mostly devoted to Sanskrit grammar.32
>*
1.4.3 Sdstra
Sdstra is a general term referring to any technical branch of knowledge, or to a 
specific treatise within a branch. Thus we may have: ndtyasdstra (dramaturgy), 
alamkarasastra (literary aesthetics), vdstusastra (architecture), arthasastra 
(policy making, or a specific treatise by Kautalya), kdmasdstra (erotics), and so 
forth. In this sense, sdstra could be used both in reference to the science of 
grammar as a whole, or to, in our context, the AstadhyayT. Cardona notices how 
even ‘individual sutras of the AstadhyayT are called sastra’.33
Definitions of sdstra are occasionally to be found in Buddhist literature.
30 See Abhidharmakosa 1.3. This definition is also employed by Mddhyamika authors. 
Prajnakaramati employs the expression while commenting on the 9lh Chapter of the 
Bodhicarydvatdra  (see Appendix), while Kamalasila refers to it in the Bhavandkrama.
31 J. Takakusu(tr.), A R ecord o f  the Buddhist Religion, by 1-Tsing, Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal, 1982, pages 169-170.
32 Ibidem, pages 167-185. See also: S. Bael, The Life ofHiuen-Tsiang, Delhi: Munshiram 
Manoharlal, 2003, pages 121-125.
33 See note 6.
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According to the Abhidharmakosabhdsya, a sdstra is so called because it 
instructs the students.34 Yasomitra expands and offers a brief discussion of what 
a sdstra truly is, from the perspective of the Abhidharma's ultimate elements of 
existence:
A collection of names elucidating specific meanings is a sdstra. If 
one says that due to momentariness, a collection is not fit, it is not 
so: because of constructing a collection in the form of an intellection
' i  c
that apprehends it.
This type of definition, although resting on specifically Buddhist doctrines, is 
broad enough to include any sdstra , and would fit grammar as well.
Sthiramati’s comments on what constitute a sdstra are elicited by the very first 
word in Vasubandhu’s commentary to the Madhydntavibhdga. 36 Sthiramati 
offers three types of definitions of sdstra: the first one is in the Abhidharmic 
sense of a collection of ultimate dharmas, and it rests upon a specifically 
Yogdcara perspective on Abhidharma. The first definition is still akin to
Yasomitra’s own, and could apply to any branch of knowledge.37 The second
restricts the term sdstra to only those treatises capable of eliciting cognition 
beyond the world {lokottarajndna)?%
34 sisyasasanacchastram \ Abhidharmakosabhdsyam  1.1.
35 arthavisesabhidyotako namasamuhah sastram  j  ksanikatvdt samuhanupapattir iti cet na 
tadgrahakabuddhirupasamuhakalpanat || Sphutarthatlkd, 1.1.
36 sastrasydsya pranetaram abyarhya sugatatmajam \ vaktdrarh cd ’smadadibhyo  
yatisye ’rthavivecane ||
37 What is the nature o f a sdstra? If one asks ‘What is a sastraV , vijiiapth  appearing as 
collections o f names and sentences constitute a sdstra.
kidrsam sdstrarupam \ sastram kirn iti cet namapadakayaprabhdsd vijnaptayah sastram \ On 
Madhyantavibhdgabhasya 1.1.
38 Or, vijiiapth  appearing as specific words capable of bringing a cognition beyond the world, 
constitute a sdstra.
atha va lokottarajnanaprapakasabdavisesaprabhasd vijnaptayah sastram \ Ibid.
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In respect to these two definitions, Sthiramati offers a brief discussion about the 
actual possibility of communicating a sdstra . The question is: ‘How can
vijnaptis be composed or spoken?’39
Vijnaptis are cognitive acts, and according to Yogdcara philosophy, the only 
real existents. Vasubandhu’s initial verse praises the composer {pranetaram) 
and the speaker (vaktaram) of the sdstra. It sounds awkward to state that a 
series of cognitive acts are composed 01* spoken. The statement suggests that 
something outside of cognitions does occur, whether a written 01* spoken text. 
To this Sthiramati replies that ‘Because imputations bring about the vijnaptis of 
a composer or a speaker, there is no fault’.40 In other words, it is a convenient 
and acceptable manner of speech to use terms like ‘to compose’ or ‘to speak’.
He also points out how a sdstra may be useful, by linking it to matters of 
dharma, within a Buddhist context and its terminology:
A student inclined towards dharma, due to the arising of special 
discipline, concentration and wisdom, turns away from karman that 
does not make the accumulation of body speech and mind arise, and 
turns towards the karman that makes the accumulation arise.41
The third definition is necessarily restricted to the sdstra being commented upon, 
and Sthiramati specifies that this means, to the Mahayana:
That which castigates (fasti) all the enemy afflictions, 
which protects (santrayate) from bad births and existence, 
is ‘'sdstra ’ due to castigation and the quality of protection.
And these two are not found in other systems.42
39 kathaiii vijnaptayah pramyanta ucyante va \ Ibid.
40 pranetp>aktrvijiiaptiprabhavatvbt prajnaptindm ndtra dosah \ Ibid.
41 sisyadharmiko hi sTlasamadhiprajnavisesotpaddt kdyavdhmanassambharotpattikarmano 
nivartate sambharottpatikarmani ca pravartate \ Ibid.
42 yacchasti vah klesaripun asesan santrayate durgatito bhavacca \ tacchdsandt trdnagundcca 
sastram etad dvayam cdnyamatesu ndsti | Ibid.
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Candrakirti also explains a sastra through this definition, but implies that only 
Madhyamaka (not Mahdydna in its entirety) fulfils the requirements stated in 
the verse. *
Among these definitions, the ones that may best help to understand how 
grammar fits a Buddhist context are, expectably, those written from an 
Abhidharmic perspective. They tell us how any sdstra (and thus, grammar) is 
placed within the Buddhist cosmos, by stating which types of dharmas 
constitute the whole that we may call a grammatical treatise. In the universe of 
Abhidharma, shared by all Buddhist writers, grammar is a collection of 
momentary dharmas, as both Yasomitra and Sthiramati clarify.
1.4.4 Sutra, yoga
A traditional verse defines a sutra as having few syllables, not liable to create 
interpretive doubts, with substance, wide applicability, without insertions, and 
blemish-less.44 Panini’s grammar is in form of sutras, maybe the first major 
work of this type. Its influence upon later philosophical literature is hence 
stylistic too: many of the foundational texts for the Indian systems are written as 
collections of sutras. Moreover, commentators often employ exegetical devices 
taken from grammar (see Yasomitra’s employment of anuvrtti in reference to 
the A bhidharmakosakdrika).
43 Candrakirti offers a brief discussion, analogous to the one found in Sthiramati’s text, but the 
wording suggests that he takes only Madhyamaka as a sdstra:
‘The master Nagarjuna composed the sdstra  out of compassion, to make others understand, as 
he had understood the way of the perfection of wisdom in an undistorted w ay.’
[...] achryandgarjunasya viditbvipantaprajnciphramitdmteh karunaydpardvabodhdrtharii 
sastrapranayanam  || Prasannapada 1.2.
Compare also Buston’s explanation o f a sdstra  in E,Obermiller (tr.), The H istory o f  Buddhism in 
India and Tibet. The Jew eliy  o f  Scripture by Bus ton, Delhi, Sri Satguru Publications, 1998, 
pages 41 -  49. Buston also treats o f grammar, prosody and lexicography.
44 alpaksaram asandigdham sdravad visvatomukham \ astobham anavadyah ca sutram  
sutravido viduh \ | See George Cardona, Pdnini. His work and its traditions. Volume 1. 
Background and Introduction , Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988, page 670.
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The first characteristic feature of an aphorism is brevity. A proverb says that for 
a grammarian, half a matra (which means, a very small unit of prosody, like a 
consonant) saved in composing a sutra is cause of greater happiness than the 
birth of a son. Consider that the word son (putra) is explained by Yaska as the 
one who protects (raksati) from the hell called ‘put’.45 The proverb stresses the 
importance of brevity in grammatical sutras, but also suggests the link between 
this veddhga and matters of dharma, religious merit and demerit.
Brevity facilitates memorisation, and the AstadhyayT is meant for that. Panini 
wrote his grammar in an order, which allowed the reader to supply a sutra with 
material from other (usually previous) ones, thus completing their sense without 
the necessity to repeat any word previously stated. Although it is hard to 
imagine anyone comprehending the intricacies of the AstadhyayT without further 
instruction, it is true that, in its original format, the work is self-sufficient.
Most of the sutras of the AstadhyayT are rules, and are called yoga  in this sense 
(not in the popular sense of yogic discipline). Patanjali justifies Panini’s system 
of exposition as the most effective manner to teach correct words. He tells us 
that one should proceed by stating a rule (utsarga), covering the most general 
(samdnya), while more specific variations (visesa) should be dealt with as 
exceptions (apavada). Sutra can occasionally refer to a group of rules, or even 
to the whole of the AstadhyayT, just as its next partial synonym.
The ordinary Sanskrit meaning of sutra is a thread, and we may be tempted to 
see in this a reason why the richly ‘woven’ Discourses attributed to the Buddha 
have been called such. Nevertheless, the Buddhist usage might be a 
Sanskritisation of a Middle Indie word akin to the Pali sutta and plausibly 
related to ‘well-said’ (su+ukta, used also for the Vedic hymns), rather than a 
‘thread’ {sutra). The choice is however significant, and testifies for the 
popularity of term siitra in the sense of an authoritative, seminal text. It is at 
times used to refer even to verses, when they are being commented up.
45 See N inikta , 2.11: punnarakarii tatas trayata iti va \
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Sthiramati notices that certain topics have not been ‘composed as sutra’ (na 
sutritani) when he wishes to indicate that they are not included in the stanzas of 
the Madhyantavibhaga.46
1.4.5 Laksana
I have pointed out in the introduction how laksana is a key term to understand 
Indian philosophical literature, including the Buddhist. The term laksana means 
a characteristic, or the stating of a characteristic, i.e. a definition. Its counteipart 
laksya, technically ‘that which is defined or characterised’, also has the primary 
meaning of a target, like the place towards which to aim an arrow (and is used, 
in modern spoken Sanskrit, to render the idea of ‘goaf: tava laksyam kirn? 
What is your goal? ).
All of the Indian theoretical systems offer different lists o f laksanas. The first 
and omnipresent system of laksanas, though, is grammar. It is the set of 
definitions upon which all the others depend, as it regulates linguistic usage in 
the first place. The last consideration explains the relationship between Panini’s 
rules and one of their usages in philosophy. Pointing out that an opponent’s 
argument is not consistent with vyakarana implies that the common, shared tool 
of debate (language) has been misapplied, making what is said, if not unsound, 
at least incomprehensible. A common grammar allows for the avoidance of 
one’s stance becoming self-referential. Indian scholasticism abounds in sets of 
shared formalities of exposition, and of debate, which serve a similar purpose.47
46 See Sthiramati’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s Bhasya to the Madhvantavibhagakarika.
47 The anubandhacatustaya, four things to be stated at the beginning o f any treatises, serve the 
purpose o f placing one’s work in a wider context o f philosophical, or perhaps just human, 
interests. They allow the work to be relevant beyond its technical specificity, and open it to an 
ongoing debate, which may even refute it. The first question that many philosophical works o f  
ancient India purport to answer is ‘why read this work’.
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1.4.6 Grammar as Sabdavidya, in the training of a Bodhisattva
The terms discussed so far are the common heritage of Indian philosophical
thought as a whole. One more term, though, appears in Buddhist texts, and
describes grammar as a necessary training for a Bodhisattva:
Without having applied oneself to the fivefold knowledge, 
the supreme Arya does not in any way reach omniscience.
Thus, to subdue or assist others,
or for the sake of omniscience, he surely applies oneself to those.
There are five types of knowledge: inner knowledge, knowledge of 
reasons, knowledge of words, knowledge of medicine and knowledge 
of topics in the arts and crafts. Here he shows the purpose for which a 
Bodhisattva should research them: all of them, without distinction, are 
for the purpose of obtaining omniscience. When we distinguish, 
moreover, he researches the knowledge of reasons and the knowledge 
of words in order to subdue others, who have no conviction towards 
that (omniscience). The knowledge of medicine and the knowledge of 
topics in the arts and crafts are for the sake of assisting others who 
need them. Inner knowledge is for the sake of directing oneself.
This passage from the Mahayanasutrdlamkara places grammar within the 
specific context of the Mahaydna path. The ‘knowledge of words’ is part of a 
list of five, without which it is impossible to achieve Buddhahood 
(omniscience).49 In this sense, it is an indispensable training within the
48 vidyasthdne pancavidhe yogam akrtva 
sarvajhat\>am naiti ka th am c it pa  ra m dry ah \ 
ity anyesam nigrahandnugrahandya 
svajnartham vd tatra karoty eva sa yogam  || 60 ||
pancavidham vidyasthanam \ adhyatmavidya hetuvidya sabdavidya cikitsavidya  
silpakarmasthanavidya ca j tadyadartham bodhisattvena paryesitavyam taddarsayati \ 
sarvajnatvapraptyartham abhedena sarvam \ bhedena punar hetuvidydm sabdavidyam ca 
paryesate nigrahdrtham anyesam tadanadhimuktanam \ cikitsavidyam silpakarmasthanavidyam  
canyesam anugrahartham tadarthikbnam \ adhyatmavidyam svayam djhdrtham  |j 
M ahaydnasutrdlamkdra, 11.60:
49 I-Tsing also remarks that ‘Grammatical science is called, in Sanskrit, Sabdavidya, one o f the 
five Vidyas; Sabda meaning ‘vo ice’, and Vidya ‘science’. J.Takakusu (tr.), A Record o f  the 
Buddhist Religion, by 1-Tsing, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 19S2, page 169. One remarkable
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Mahayana, as the passage tells us. In the specifics, it is for the sake of bringing 
towards the Mahayana those who have no conviction (adhimukti) towards it.
The last remark is significant, as it mentions a use of grammar which, however 
apparently obvious, is absent from the list of Patanjali’s main purposes: 
communicative success. In fact, Patanjali often implies that communication 
could well occur through improper word-forms (apasabda) and hence the issue 
of well-formed expressions is relevant only within the context of ritual, sacred 
activity (see above).
Not everyone may agree that grammar has no role outside of ritual merit.
Another passage, from Asanga’s Bodhisattvabhumi, provides a possible
rationale to defend the usefulness of grammar for the sake of communication:
The science of words has also two aspects: the aspect of clarifying the 
rules to establish roots and forms (or, the forms of roots) and the 
aspect of clarifying how to esteem the refinement of speech.50
The first aspect of sabdasastra quite obviously refers to vyakarana, however we 
decide to split the compound dhaturupa. The second aspect could well be 
alamkarasastra, the science of literary ornaments, or poetic beauty. Besides the 
wording of the expressions, this is in effect how the Tibetan tradition 
understands these two facets of the ‘science of words’.51
feature o f  l-Tsing’s account is his emphasis on the importance o f Sanskrit grammar, and 
encouragement to Chinese scholars to study it assiduously.
For another o f  the five vidyas, namely medicine, and its importance in Buddhist learning, see: 
Kenneth G. Zysk, Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India. Medicine in the Buddhist 
Monastery, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991.
50 sabdasastram  api dvyakaram \ dhaturupasadhanavyavasthanaparidTpandkaram  
vdlcsamskdrdnusamsaparidTpandkarah ca \ Bodhisattvabhumi 8, page 68.
51 See: F.D, Lessing, F.D. and Alex Wayman (trs.), Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systems, 
Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1998. About alamkarasastra, see also M.C. Shastri, Buddhistic 
Contribution to Sanskrit Poetics, Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1986. It contains valuable 
information, although it may be difficult to agree with some o f the arguments presented.
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Further support to the identification of the ‘science of words’ with grammar, is a
passage from Sthiramati’s sub-commentary on the Madhyantavibhaga, where
the term ‘grammar’ (vyakarana) does in effect replace the expected term ‘word’
(,sabda) in the usual list of five sciences. Incidentally, this passage also offers a
rationale for the idea that studying the five sciences is necessary to obtain
omniscience: the five sciences comprise all that should be known. Sthiramati is
explaining the meaning of ‘something to be known’ (jfieya), occurring in the
compound ‘obscuration to what is to be known’ (Jneydvarana):
Something that should be known is ‘something to be known’: and that 
is in its entirety the five loci of knowledge. Moreover, those are called: 
inner, grammar, reasons, medicine, and topics in all the arts and crafts. 
Un-afflicted ignorance, being an impediment to knowledge in respect 
to those, is the ‘obscuration to what is to be known’.
This explanation on the part of Sthiramati suggests that omniscience is here 
understood in a qualified sense, as it is spoken of only in reference of something 
which should be known, i.e. whose knowledge would have a purpose: rather 
than, in reference to any possible object of knowledge.53 Within this perspective, 
is becomes understandable how and why the five sciences may go towards the 
exhaustion of purposeful objects of knowledge. Nonetheless, it would be hard to
52 jhatavyam  jneyam  \ tac ca sarvatmana pahca vidydsthdnani tdni punar 
adhydtmavydkaranahetucikitsasai'vasilpakanrsasthdndkhydni \ tatra jnanavibandhabhutam  
aklistam ajnanam jheyavaranam  || Sthiramati’s sub-commentary on Madhyantavibhbgabhdsya 
3.12.
53 It is also in line with Sthiramati’s usual attention to Abhidharmic terminology, since he 
qualifies a complete Buddha as someone who has also undone un-afflicted ignorance. This 
position is identical to the one o f the Abhidliarmakosabhasya, where un-afflicted ignorance is 
the difference between an Arhat (who has it) and a Buddha (who does not). See the 
Abhidliarmakosabhasya  1.1.
I doubt that Sthiramati’s definition o f jneya is here in any way idiosyncratic, as it is found even 
in veiy different texts: Prajnakaramati, commenting upon Bodhicaryavatara 9.55 states that 
‘what is to be known is fivefold’ (Jneyam pahcavidham).
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think of grammar as being useful because of its ritualistic (Vedic) applications 
only.
One parameter that Asanga talks about and that Patanjali had not even 
mentioned is eloquence, refinement of speech. It is not difficult to see what 
Asanga’s remarks hint at: eloquence (and by Asanga’s time, eloquence in 
Sanskrit) is a mark of high education and possibly, rank: in Sanskrit plays from 
the Gupta age, only the ‘high’ characters speak Sanskrit.
Eloquence is particularly important in debate, and there are a few pointers in the 
first passage translated, which once more show a link between philosophical 
debate and grammar. First and obviously, they are ascribed to the same specific 
purpose: subduing others, those with different convictions (as opponents in a 
debate would be). And if we look at the term employed for ‘subduing’ (nigraha), 
we find that it is also a technical term in Indian philosophy, referring to an 
argumentative flaw ‘by which a disputant is put down’ in debate.54
In the context of the Mahayana, the study of grammar finds its place both as a
cause for the proximate result of eloquence, and as one of the necessary causes
that, eons later, will give rise to the ultimate result, Buddhahood. For the
ritualist Patanjali, the genuine purpose of studying grammar was the dutiful
avoidance of demerit within the context of sacred actions. Rather than due to a
different perspective on the nature of words and language (as it maJ. be ' / ^ t  t\
suggested)55, the role of grammar in the Vedic or Buddhist systems is bound to
54 Apte.
551 have earlier discussed this, while describing Buddhist ideas on what constitutes conventions. 
Yet, what I feel defeats this reconstruction is that, both for the Vedic and the Buddhist systems, 
perspectives on language and words are far from monolithic, and hence it is simplistic to just 
say the ‘the’ Buddhist and ‘the’ Vedic accounts are opposed. For example, Sautrdntika 
criticisms to the Vaibhasika view on language could well apply to non-Buddhist views: and
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differ due to an overall difference in the context of application. Besides, while 
ritual purity suggests the environment of homa and nityakarman, eloquence fits 
better with debates and, possibly, the court.56
1.5 The Karaka system
Whichever synonym we may use to call it by, grammar as a whole does 
therefore have a recognisable role in cultured communication of ancient and 
medieval Indian. This role is even recognised by Buddhist texts, as the 
immediately preceding section has shown. Nonetheless, as far as theoretical 
relevance is concerned, it is the kdraka definitions that offer the most recurrent 
set to regulate philosophical debates. The following sections will discuss 
kdrakas in general, and then show how they relate to some important areas of 
Buddhist thought.
1.5.1 Vibhakti and kdraka
Nominal declension is classified into vibhaktis, or inflexions. European scholars 
analysed them as ‘cases’ through analogy with Latin, and gave them names, like
possibly, the Vaibhasika, and not the Sautrantika, would have been the mainstream position for 
a long time.
561 must thank Daud Ali for bringing to my attention the many links between early medieval 
Indian courtly culture and Buddhism. Even debates (at least according to traditional accounts) 
often happened in front of kings, who may even have functioned as judges. In the case of 
Asanga’s text, it is also worth noticing how it was composed during Gupta age, a time which 
shows the emergence of Sanskrit as a language of culture to an extent difficult to account for.
It is also worth mentioning that even in a Tantric context, grammar finds its prominent place as 
one of the sciences that make for a qualified teacher. In the Kriyasaihgraha, it is listed first: ‘He 
is learned in different branches o f knowledge, such as grammar (vyakarana), poetry (kdvya), 
hymnology (chandas), astrological treatises ijyotisdstra), conversation (kathd), recitation 
(patha), different kinds of painting (lipi), and different dialectics (bhdsa).’ The list continues, 
and does indeed suggest a self-cultivation similar to that o f the courtier, or urbane man, as 
described in the Kdmasutra or Nagarasarvasva. See: Tadeusz Skorupski (tr.), Kriyasamgraha, 
Tring: The Institute o f Buddhist Studies, 2002, page 19. See also: Wendy Doniger and Sudhir 
Kakar (trs.) The Kam asutra , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
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'nominative', 'accusative', etc., which indicate the predominant syntactical 
function. Indian classical grammarians, on the other hand, simply numbered the 
vibhaktis (prathama, first, upto saptamt, seventh, and sambodhana, vocative, as 
a sub-type of the first), and thus avoided giving any indication of the syntactical 
function of each case through their names. The main advantage of such 
approach lies in the fact that there is no binary correspondence between 
vibhaktis and specific semantic roles, and therefore names like 'nominative', 
'accusative', etc., are not exhaustive in representing the manifold functions of 
each inflexional ending.
Classical Sanskrit syntactical analysis focuses on the action (kriyd). What 
vibhaktis express is thus explained through a parallel system of syntactical 
models, called kdraka. They refer to the role a referent plays in the 
accomplishment of the main action. Since the latter is expressed by the verb, 
each kdraka is a specific relationship that the noun might have with the verb. 
Thus, the function of most vibhaktis can be explained in terms of kdraka, except 
for the sixth, as it generally indicates a relationship (sambandha) with another 
noun, like possession and the like. One may briefly state that vibhaktis are the 
expression, while kdrakas are the expressed.
Even at this level, though, by ‘expressed’ one is not yet talking about specific 
referents in the world: we are still concerned with certain types of linguistic 
relations. On the other hand, these generalised relations are further specified as 
pertaining to certain referents, not directly by the vibhaktis, but by the nominal 
stems to which they are attached. While kdrakas are not yet sufficient as 
descriptions of the world, they offer the basic structural framework within 
which such descriptions may occur. To make this clearer, I will briefly discuss 
the basic features of a Sanskrit sentence, and how their analysis in terms of 
vibhakti and kdraka.
In active constructions, the verbal ending will already tell us the number and 
person of the agent. Thus gacchati will represent a complete sentence meaning
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‘he/she/it goes’. The agent (which in this case is also the grammatical subject) 
can be amplified by the first inflexion singular: ramah gacchati, Rama goes.
What is re-presented in this active sentence through the first case ending is the 
kartrkaraka, an agentive relationship between the noun ramah and the verb 
gacchati. Verb and noun concord in number (singular) and person (third, called 
first or prathama by Sanskrit grammarians). Strictly speaking, though, the first 
inflexional ending is not considered to present kartrkaraka anew, but to amplify 
upon it: the verbal ending is itself sufficient to indicate an agent with certain 
specifications (person and number). Thus, Panini's definition clarifies that the 
surplus information conveyed by the noun in the first inflexion is merely what 
the verb itself is not capable of expressing: like, a specific thing or living being, 
gender, etc. It is, in this sense, extra information attached to an agent already
57indicated by the verbal ending, not the very expression of the agent.
The object of the action is called karman and, in active sentences, is expressed 
through the second vibhakti'. ramah grham gacchati, ‘Rama goes to the house’, 
ramahphalam khadati. ‘Rama eats the fruit’.
In Sanskrit, aIgam (To go') and Vkhad ('to eat') are both transitive verbal roots. 
Thus, we could express the same actions with passive constructions: rdmena 
grham gamyate, ‘the house is reached by Rama’, rdmena phalam khddyate, ‘the 
fruit is eaten by Rama’.
Here the inflexional endings have changed: rdmena is the third singular, while 
grham and phalam  have become first singular (although the form is identical, as 
they are neuters). The kdrakas, though, remain the same: rdmena is kartrkaraka, 
grham and phalam  are the amplifiers of karmakaraka. In other words, the same
57 See BhattojT DTksita’s commentary on karmani dvitTyd for the difference between direct 
statement and amplification:
‘When the karman is not expressed there should be second (vibhakti): ‘he worships Hari’. On 
the other hand, when the karman is expressed, it is only the meaning of the specific word, and 
hence there is the first (vibhakti). ’
anukte karmani dvitTyd sydt \ harim bhajati \ abhihite tu karmani pratipadikarthamdtra iti 
prathamaiva \ SiddhantakaumudT, 537.
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kdraka is expressed by different vibhaktis according to whether the construction 
is active or passive. Here, the direct expression of the object, and not the agent, 
is through the verb, thus the noun in the first inflexion is again an amplifier of 
an indication already conveyed by the verbal ending. In other words, the same 
considerations about the agent in an active sentence and its relationship to the 
first case, apply to the object of a passive sentence.
Apart from vibhaktis, there are more ways in which Sanskrit can express the 
various kdrakas. Primary suffixes (krt), secondary suffixes (taddhita) and 
compounds (samdsa) are capable of representing certain agentive relations, even 
in nominal constructions, where the verb is absent or at least implicit.58 
Vibhaktis offer a very clear example of the relationship between expression and 
expressed, and referents in the world: the same model can be easily applied for 
the other possible expressions of kdraka relationships.
1.5.2 What a kdraka is
Cardona’s views on the role of kdrakas as ‘an intermediary between semantics 
and grammatical expressions derived by rules of grammar59’ seem to me the 
most convincing characterisation of the Paninian category. This is compatible 
with the idea presented above, that kdrakas, while being an underlying 
expressed structure of agency, are not yet sufficiently specified to describe the 
world.
A profitable analogy could be drawn between kdrakas and geometrical formulae. 
The latter cannot yet relate to the ‘outside’ world, unless their variables are 
further specified. Once this is done, though, geometrical formulae can tell us 
something more about the outside world, as the other unknown variables 
depends for their value upon those we already know.
58 For a brief and clear survey o f Panini’s grammar’s main features: Saroja Bhate, Panini, Delhi, 
Sahitya Akademi, 2002.
59 George Cardona, Panini. A Survey o f  Research, The Hague: Mouton & B.V. Publisher, 1976.
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This happens within a certain system of postulates, and even if it may be 
arbitrary to some degree, it works with regularity. Certain descriptions become 
incoherent with a system: a square circle is a self-contradiction, within a 
specific framework. That kdrakas may work similarly, means that certain 
expressions may be said to imply a ‘square circle’ of sorts. As we shall see, this 
consideration is central to assessing some important debates between 
Madhyamaka and Yogdcara. If the force of certain Madhyamika objections has 
not been satisfactorily understood or represented, I believe this is due to a 
disregard for the role of kdraka. When we understand them as formative and 
basic structures, with regularities that need to be respected, the arguments can 
be better assessed: this will be one of the tasks of Chapters 3 and 4.
Cardona’s stresses the non-ontological value of Panini’s analysis of kdrakas: for 
example, knowledge, or axes, or square circles, can be grammatically well- 
formed agents. This bears upon the kdrakas ample usability as regulatory 
conventions: not being committed to a definite ontology, they could be appealed 
to by all. Nevertheless, I would like to introduce some further considerations.
I have started by noting how the kdraka classifications do not strictly depend 
from the distinction between correct and corrupt or dialectal forms, implying 
that they could equally serve to regulate the syntax of a morphologically ‘loose’ 
Sanskrit. This would have been especially desirable for a Buddhist author: in the 
very sections, which discuss the nature of kdrakas, Candrakirti quotes Buddhist 
Sutras which, in Middle-Indic ’mixed Sanskrit’, corroborate his refutation of 
agency60. The force of the argument does not depend on the morphological 
regularity of the statements, and the latter can be applied to refute agency as a 
semantic ultimate. Kdrakas have also been employed to construe explanatory
60 See Prasannapada  to Mulamadhyamakakarika 8.13, quoting the AtyopdHpariprcchd: net ca 
kdraku kdranam santi yehi krta asitomarasastrah \ and also: tesv api kdraka nastiha kasci te ’p i  
ca sthdpita kalpavasena j 1 cannot think o f a better instance, where the very word kdraka is not 
given in the regular Sanskrit fonn (not through sabda  but as an apasabda, or perhaps one should 
say rsiprayoga). The same verses are quoted in the commentary to 1.3 (counting the 
introductory verses as 1 and 2), which is linked to a similar discussion.
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models for languages other than Sanskrit. This is comprehensible in the case of 
Pali, closely related and structurally akin to the language analysed by Panini. 
Even Tibetan, though, has been analysed through the same categories, which 
suggests the wide applicability of the kdraka system. It also suggests that 
kdrakas are broad structural categories without too close a link to any specific 
syntactical or morphological system (with any specific language, like Sanskrit). 
This seems at odds with Cardona’s own analysis and, since I have earlier 
accepted his views, some clarification may be necessary.
When we look at the discussions about what a kdraka is, we find that 
commentators explain it as either a causal factor {nimitta, hetu) or a power (sakti, 
samarthya), rather than a thing.61 Some of Panini’s rules would not make sense 
if we were to take the kdrakas to refer to things, and since the grammarians’ 
focus is on words (,sabda) rather than their intended referents in the world 
(iartha), a relational view of syntactic categories seems more appropriate: the 
notion of capacity fulfilled such explanatory role. Nonetheless, other rules could 
not be explained by understanding the kdraka as a capacity. In particular, we 
will see that the rule referring to continued agency (,samdnakartrkayoh 
piirvakdle) required that ‘agent’ should be understood as the possessor of the 
capacity, rather than the capacity itself. Or, as the commentators put it, the 
difference between capacity {sakti) and its possessor (,saktimat) should be
61 See the M ahabhasya, Kdsikd, Nyasa and PadamanjarT. For the explanation of kdraka as a 
causal factor, see the commentaries on karake, as also the Prasannapada on 
Mulamadhyamakakarika 8.1, which follows Patanjali: ‘In this context, what does is called 
kdraka, the agent’ (tatra karotTti kdrakah karta). The Kasika, Nyasa and PadamanjarT, though, 
argue that kdraka should not be treated strictly as an agent, but rather as a causal factor (nimitta 
or hetu).
For the explanation o f kdraka as sakti, see the commentaries on samdnakartrkayoh piirvakdle, 
and also the Prasannapada  on Mulamadhyamakakarika 2.6, where Candrakirti explicitly states 
that ‘a kdraka is a capacity, and not a substance’ (saktir hi karako na dravyam). CandrakTrti’s 
position has been analysed and compared to the grammarians in: Kamaleshvar Bbattacharya, 
‘Nagarjuna’s arguments against motion: their grammatical basis’, in: Kamaleshvar 
Bhattacharya, et al., A corpus o f  Indian studies. Essays in honour o f  Professor Gaurinath Sastri, 
Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980.
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overlooked. What this implies is that, in the second instance, we have a 
definition of kdraka with a stronger semantic bearing.62
Both in the sense of capacities or possessors of capacities, kdrakas are linked to 
the main action. Here again we have a semantic duplicity of the word kriyd: it 
can mean an action, but it can also mean an action-word (kriydpadam), that is, a 
verb in a sentence. As noticed by Matilal, in the latter case the kdraka is defined 
as ‘syntactically connected to the verb’ (kriydnvita) and the definition is thus 
removed from the world of things and actions. When the first sense of the word 
kriyd is employed, though, kdraka is defined as ‘that which brings about an 
action’ (kriydnirvartaka), ‘cause of an action’ (kriydnimitta) or ‘that which 
gives birth to an action’ (kriyajanaka). This is semantically more charged.63
We can therefore detect a double oscillation in the semantic relevance of 
kdrakas even when we look at the most general characterisations of the category: 
capacity or capacity-possessor {sakti or saktimat), connected to a verb or, cause 
of an action {hiyanvita  or kriydnimitta). This might be the fundamental reason 
why Matilal seems to sympathise with Bhavananda’s manner of defining a 
kdraka, which is: eminently non-committal and possibly a compromise. But not 
only kdrakas, as a whole, appear to have a semantic weight difficult to assess: 
different kdraka categories have considerable different weight — which gives us 
a possible interpretive key to their varied employment.
1.5.3 Primary kdrakas
Cardona himself notices that there is a difference in the semantic weight of what 
we could call the ‘primary definitions’ of kdrakas as opposed to the secondary 
rules (or, we may say, exceptions: like the karmapravacanlyas). Those accounts 
that stress the semantic value of kdraka categories fail to make sense of 
anything but the primary definitions, and remain unsatisfactory.
62 See George Cardona, ‘Panini’s “karakas”’, in Journal o f  Indian Philosophy, 2, 231-306. See 
also the Appendix to this chapter.
63 See Bimal Krishna Matilal, ‘Bhavananda on “What is a Karaka?”’, In Madhav Deshpande, 
and Saroja Bhate (eds.), Paninian Studies. Professor S.D. Joshi Felicitation Volume, Ann Arbor: 
University o f Michigan, 1991.
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Matilal has drawn a similar distinction between ‘initial’ or ‘primary’ meanings 
of the karakas and their ‘extended or secondary senses’.64 The context for the 
discussion is significant, since the author quotes from Vatsyayana’s 
commentary to Nyayasutra 2.1.26, where a relatively detailed explanation of the 
six definitions of kdrakas is given. According to Matilal, the commentator is 
here attempting a rebuttal of Nagarjuna’s arguments against the ultimate validity 
of pramanas, valid sources of knowledge.65
Vatsyayana’s analysis is eminently semantic and, as noted by Matilal, fails to 
account for cases where the same semantic instance is assigned a different 
kdraka. For example, although the substratum or locus of an action is normally 
called adhikarana, the same becomes karman if the prefix adhi precedes certain 
verbs. We have grame tisthati, ‘He stays in the village’, with ‘village’ (grdme) 
taking the 7lh inflexional ending, since it is the locus, defined as adhikarana 
(adhare’dhikaranam, 1.4.45). But, in grdmam adhitisthati again meaning ‘He 
stays in the village’, the same substratum is classified as karman (normally, the 
object of the action) and thus takes the second vibhakti.
Five points here should be noted:
i. there is a difference in the semantic weight of primary and secondary 
definitions of kdrakas (perhaps, rules and exceptions);
ii. there is a difference in the linguistic specificity of primary and secondary 
definitions of kdrakas (the latter being applicable only to Sanskrit);
iii. the kdraka categories employed to describe languages other than Sanskrit are 
usually only the defining rules (which corroborates the previous point with a 
factual instance);
64 See Bimal Krishna Matilal, The Word and the World, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990, 
page 43.
65 See especially the Vig?'ahavydvartam.
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iv. shorter grammars (see the Sarasvata), even in Panini’s own tradition (like 
the LagnsiddhantakaumudT) give only the primary definitions;
v. philosophical writers across the spectrum -  like Vatsyayana and Candrakirti — 
treat only of the primary definitions, and treat of them as semantically (and one 
would say, philosophically) significant.
All this suggests that there was a perceived difference in the importance of the 
primary and secondary kdraka definitions. Cardona and Matilal may be justified 
in stressing that to account for Panini’s entire system of kdraka, their semantic 
strength should not be overestimated. It seems, though, that a long tradition in 
India took the initial definitions as more representative and explained kdrakas, 
accordingly, as categories with a stronger theoretical bearing. This tradition 
starts, arguably, with Patanjali, whose discussion of kdraka has a greater 
cogency if we restrict it to the six major rules only.
Thus, to further delimit my initial claim, the section of Panini’s grammar that 
could most interest Buddhist philosophers is not the kdrakas as a whole, but the 
six primary kdraka rules. These are relatively independent of specific 
morphologic expressions, and can be discussed as significant theoretical 
structures. This explains both why Candrakirti employed them so profusely, and 
why Sthiramati found hardly a place for them in his Yogacara commentaries 
(where it is more difficult to place an ‘independent agent’).
These are the six main definitions of kdrakas: 
svatantrah karta (1.4.54)
‘The independent one is the agent’ 
kartur Tpsitatamam karma (1.4,49)
‘That, which is most desired by the agent, is the object of the action (karman)* 
sadhakatamam karanam (1.4.42)
‘The most instrumental is the instrument (karana)’ 
karmana yam abhipraiti sa sampraddnam (1.4.32)
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‘That which (the agent) intends through the object of the action is the recipient 
(,sampraddnd)'
dhruvam apdye’pdddnam (1.4.24)
‘What remains fixed when something is detached is the point of removal 
{apadcmay
adhare ’dhikaranam (1.4.45)
‘The substratum is the receptacle (adhikarancty
I have given the rules in the order corresponding to the successive inflexions, 
through which the different kdrakas would generally be expressed in active 
constructions. As the numbers between brackets indicate, this is not the same 
order followed in the original enumeration of the AstadhyayT, but it is the one 
found in most recasts (except that karman and kartr are inverted). The 
translation is, at the most, indicative, since, as we have seen, the kdrakas might 
not be sufficiently specified to allow for a meaningful and uniform rendering 
into English correspondents. They are, primarily, grammatical terms with a 
technical sense (as given through their definitions).
Among the six, not all appeared equally interesting to philosophers. Expectedly, 
most of the latter’s attention is devoted to the first two kdrakas, as the agent and 
the object of the action are both crucial and problematic categories. From now 
onwards, I shall focus my attention to these two, showing how they operate 
within the framework of certain foundational Buddhist ideas.
1.5.4 The autonomous agent
The lack of an agent and the lack of someone who causes to act on the 
part of form, feeling, notion, compositional factors and consciousness, 
is itself the Perfection of Wisdom.66
66 The entire quote: ‘Suvikrantavikramin, form has no agent, nor someone who causes to act; 
and so it is for feeling, notion and compositional factors. Consciousness has no agent, nor 
someone who causes to act. The lack of an agent and the lack of someone who causes to act on 
the part o f form, feeling, notion, compositional factors and consciousness, is itself the Perfection 
of W isdom .’
48
The kartrkdraka is the karaka expressing agency more than any of the others. 
All the kdrakas are participants in the action, and the very term karaka has been 
defined as ‘one who does’ (karoti iti).67 In this sense, all of them are agentive 
relationships to an extent: but the commentaries explain that karaka has the 
more generic sense of a causal factor (nimitta),68 The kartrkdraka corresponds 
more closely to what in English one may consider an agent. It may therefore 
appear as the most problematic, in a world where persons are mere imputations: 
and such world is shared by most Buddhist authors.
Yet, kartr is a technical term for a karaka, and as we have seen, its bearing on 
actual referents in the world must therefore pass through a certain degree of 
indirection. It is a flexible category, and the question of its compatibility with 
Buddhist ideas must take this fact into account.
The first sense in which the category is flexible is then that it is purely a 
grammatical relation. One may say that ‘a square circle won the marathon’ and 
the square circle would count as kartr in grammatically well-formed sentence. If 
one may further attempt to discuss whether and in which contexts such 
statement may be sensible, this is precisely because the sentence is 
grammatically well-formed, hence, comprehensible. In other words, the fact that
no hi suvikrantavikrdmin rupasya kascitkarta vd karayitd vd \ evam vedandsathjhasariiskdrandm  
| na vijhanasya kascitkarta vd karayita vd \ yd ca rupavedandsamjhasamskaravijhdndndm  
akartrta akarayitrtd iyam prajhdparamitd  || Suvikrdntavikrdmipariprcchd, Tathataparivarta.
67 See the M ahdbhdsya on kdrake.
68 This is the position o f the Kasikd:
The word karaka, moreover, is a synonym for a causal factor: ''kdrakas and ‘cause’ do not refer 
to something different. Whose cause? The cause o f the action.
karakasabdas ca nimittaparyayah \ kdrakaih hetur ity andrthdntaram \ kasya hetuh \ kriyayah ][ 
Kasikd on kdrake.
This position is defended by Jinendrabuddhi, who shows the many unwanted consequences in 
taking the word karaka to mean the same as the agent {kartr).
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‘square circle’ successfully expresses the agent makes it possible to wonder 
whether it may really be an agent.
The category kartr is also to be understood as rather flexible in the specificities 
of its definition. We have seen that Panini defines the agent as autonomous: 
svatantra, A well argued reconstruction of early Medieval Indian court life has 
focused on the tension between relative dependence (the state of paratantra) 
and the constant desire to increase independence (becoming svatantra) and thus 
social position.69 The significant feature of this account is that each of the 
elements at play is dependent and independent only in relation to certain 
respects. Such contextual character of independence helps to understand its 
syntactical sense, as well as Buddhist analyses of agency, which decide to rely 
upon, or do away with, classical Sanskrit syntax.
Both Patanjali and Jinendrabuddhi explicate the sense of dependent as 'the main 
one' (pradhdna), to avoid an etymological confusion with 'that which has strings 
(tantra)', a loom.70 Dr.Satyanarayana of the Orienal Research Library, Mysore, 
adduced a simple example to clarify the equation of independence with
69 Daud S. Ali, Courtly culture and political life in early medieval India, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.
70 Jinendrabuddi:
This word svatantra  exists as a bahuvrlhv. the one who has its own (sva/n) loom (tantra) is 
called svatantra. It also occurs as a word resting on convention, looking like a compound, 
functioning in the sense of ‘what is main’, as in: ‘this Devadatta is here svatantra  where it is 
understood as ‘the main one’. Among these two, if one takes up the first meaning, then it would 
only be for a weaving loom: because, tantra means stretched threads, and that is only found in a 
weaving loom. It could not refer to instances like ‘Devadatta cooks’. On the other hand, if one 
takes up the other meaning, it applies to all instances. Therefore, due to the propriety of such 
pervasion, that only is taken up. Having considered all this, he says '‘svatantra  means the main 
one’.
asty ayam svatantrasabdo bahuvrihih \ svam tantram yasya sa svatantrah j asti ca 
samasapratirupako rudhisabadah pradhdndrthavrttih yathd svatantro ’yam iha devadatta iti 
pradhanabhiita iti gamyate \ tatra yadi purvo grhyeta tadd tantuvdyasyaiva sydt vistrrta hi 
tantavas tantram tac ca tantuvdyasyavasti \ devadattah pacatltyadau na sydt \ itarasya tu 
grahane sarvatra bhavati \ tasmad vydpter nyaydt sa eva grhyata iti matvdha svatantra iti 
pradhanabhiita iti || Nydsa  on Svatantrah kartd.
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predominance. In a household, the 'lord of the house' (grhapati, which means, 
the husband) can give orders to everyone, but nobody else can order him about. 
Thus, he is independent {svatantra), because he is the main person {pradhana), 
while anyone who is not the main person cannot be called svatantra. When 
amplified, the example can also account for the contextual sense of 
'independent', since the same housemaster loses his independence in respect to, 
say, the king.
This relative character of dependence is further highlighted in the analysis of 
causative constructions, where one agent is prompted by someone else to
71perform an action. In these, the svatantra is also the one who performs the 
action, despite his dependence from a prompting superior. This is because he is 
still expressed as the main causal factor, and hence he will be svatantra in the 
technical sense of pradhana. Such discussion clearly debars the possibility of 
taking svatantra as absolute, actual autonomy.
Jinendrabuddhi offers another rationale, by which we must understand that 
svatantra means ‘main’, rather than factually independent. The content of the 
hypothetical objection has a remarkably Buddhist flavour (Jinendrabuddhi is a 
Buddhist author):
The accomplishment of an action is surely dependent upon an 
assemblage, wherein even if one part is absent (the action) is not 
accomplished. Then, who has here the quality of being 'main', for the 
sake of whose inclusion svatantra is mentioned?72
[...]
Even though all take part in the accomplishment of the action, still, 
only that, whose quality of being main is wished to be expressed, is 
called 'main' {svatantra)', not another. 'Devadatta cooks' - here
71 See the Mahabhasya, and also the Nyasa and the Padamanjan, on tatprayojako hetusca.
72
nanu ca samagryadhina hi kriyasiddhih, ekasyapy abhave na sidhyati, tat kasyatra 
pradhdnyam yatparigrahdya svatantragrahanam kriyate || Nydsa on svatantrah kartd.
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Devadatta is expressed by the agentive suffix in the verbal ending, 
because of its designation as an agent.73
The reply implies that one could possibly speak of any among the other causal 
elements in terms of kartrkdraka. It opens the way for philosophical debates, 
where the question of identifying an ‘agent’ is at stake; even when we are not 
concerned with persons, but with ultimate, momentary dharmas. The 
implications of these remarks find echoes in the Abhidharmic discussions 
reconstructed in Chapter 2. The author of the Vibhdsdprabhavrtti expands upon 
the ideas of Jinendrabuddhi, proposing parameters of his own to decide what 
causal factor is to be considered main (and thus, as the agent: the passage is 
translated in Chapter 2).
One more short, and intriguing, text presents a brief discussion about the 
possible autonomy of the agent. This is the Madhyamakasalistambasutra, 
whose latter part looks much more like a sastric discussion by an author who is, 
unfortunately, unknown. The Sutra is in many parts rather difficult to interpret, 
but the few comments about autonomy (.svatantiya) are quite comprehensible 
and show an obvious grammatical background:
Moreover, autonomy is a debatable issue: thus, dependence is 
logically pervaded by being incidental. What is incidental is dependent: 
like the seed towards the giving birth to a sprout, when the seed is 
covered by the roof of a granary.74
The example that this (and other sutras) give to exemplify causation is that of a 
sprout coming from a seed. If  one says that the seed produces the sprout, the 
seed becomes the agent of the action of production. If the svatantrya of the
73 yady api kriyasiddhau sarvesam vyaparah tathdpi svantatryam yasya vivaksyate sa eva 
svatantra ity ucyate ndnya iti \ devadattah pacatity atra devadattah kartrsamjnakatvdt 
kartrpratyayenocyate lakdrena || Ibidem.
7 4
svatantryam ca vivadapadam  | tasmat kadacitkataya paratantrata vyapta \ yatkadacitkam tat 
paratantram  yatha kusiilatalanimllitam bijam a h kurajananam prati \ 
Madhyamakasdlistambasutram
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agent were to be taken too literally, it would not work in the case of a seed, 
since the production of the sprout depends on certain conditions (thus, the seed 
is not completely autonomous).
1.5.5 What the agent most wishes for: karman
The term karman is central to Buddhist philosophy, as the most basic tension 
which projects an entire cosmos up to its very fine details. Both Vasubandhu
and CandrakTrti concur about the formative role of karman, while disagreeing on 
much else.75
Buddhists understand karman in terms of intention, the most significant 
parameter to define the projective quality of actions. Such appeal to intention is 
absent in the philosophy of many Vedic thinkers: Patanjali makes it clear that 
unintentional transgressions are as bad as conscious ones.76 Vasubandhu, on the 
other hand, quotes a scriptural passage that defines it as: cetana karma, 
cetayitva karma, as an intention and what comes after an intention.77
Prima face, the philosophical senses of karman may be easily distinguished 
from its grammatical homonym, referring to the object of the action. Yet, the 
use of karman in its grammatical sense is not infrequent in Buddhist sastras, 
and there are cases where both readings could be possible (as in Nagarjuna's 
verses on agency).78 In other cases, it is to be understood contextually, and in
75 karmajam lokavaicitryam cetana tatkrtam ca tat \ cetana manasam karma tajje 
vdkkayakarmam  j| Abhidharmakosa 4.1. Compare with the following from CandrakTrti: 
sattvalokam atha bhajanalokam cittam eva racayaty aticitram  j karmajam hi ja g a d  utktam 
asesam karma cittam avadhuya na cdsti || Madhyamakavatara  6.89, quoted in the Sanskrit by 
Prajnakaramati, while commenting on Bodhicaryavatara  9.73, right after he quotes 
Vasubandhu.
76 See M ahabhasya , l sl Chapter.
77 See Abhidharmakosa 4 .1 and Bhasya on the same.
781 am here referring to Lokatltastava 8, which w ill be discussed in Chapter 3, and also to 
Mulamadhyamakakarikd 8.1. Commenting on the word karman occurring in the verse, 
CandrakTrti uses both a more general, and also a specifically grammatical sense:
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other instances the grammatical interpretation is the only sensible one. It is quite 
important to be careful not to interpret all occurrences of karman in Buddhist 
texts as perfect synonyms. Differing translations, though, tend to obscure what 
my considerations so far would suggest: Buddhist authors perceived a 
relationship between the two senses.
What is most counterintuitive, though, is that the two senses may be treated as 
actually one. Apparently, the Abhidhannic sense refers to intention or acting 
after an intention, while the grammatical sense does not. CandrakTrti offers an 
important example of treating the two as synonyms (as noticed by May).79 It is 
therefore important to look back at the grammatical explanations of this karaka, 
and then once more try to understand the link between the two senses of karman.
Panini defines karman as 'that which the agent desires the most'. If we look at 
the commentaries, though, this is a deficient translation: the word which we 
translated with 'desires' conveys the additional meaning of'pervading, reaching'. 
Therefore, that which the agent most desires to reach, or to pervade through the 
action, is karman.
Not all cases of grammatical agency, though, seem to allow for an desire, or for 
an actual reaching out. Jinendrabuddhi clarifies that in such instances we have
‘It is done, therefore it is karman, what is most wished for by the agent’. 
kriyata iti karma kartur Ipsitatamam  || Prasannapada  on 8.1.
This is quite significant, considering that the rest o f the commentary to the same verse makes it 
clear that he also takes karman in the specifically Buddhist sense o f ‘morally’ charged action o f  
body, speech or mind. In other words, CandrakTrti shifts with ease from the Abhidharmic to the 
grammatical sense o f the word, as if  it were self-evident that they are indeed the same. See on 
this Kamaleshvar Bhattacharya, ‘The grammatical Basis o f Nagarjuna’s arguments. Some 
further considerations’, in Indologica Taurinensia, 8-9, 1980-81, pages 35 -  43. The article 
contains a translation o f the relevant sections of the Prasannapada.
79 See Jacques May (tr.), CandrakTrti: Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti (Commentaire limpide 
an Trade du Milieu), Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959, note 413 page 144. The most perceptive 
o f M ay’s remarks are perhaps those regarding the fact that ‘En fait, les divers sens du terme 
karman ne se separent pas dans 1’esprit de nos autors[...]’ and despite its brevity in comparison 
to Gerow’s discussion, the argument he makes for their identification is similar and highlights 
certain crucial points. Especially, May marked that the ‘object-directs’ are nothing but 
‘specifications {yisesan a ) de son acte’, which is not very different from Gerow’s reproduction o f  
the late grammarians’ argument for the ultimate identity betweenphala  and vydpdra.
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to rely either solely on the pervasion, or solely on the desire. The parsimonious 
gradual approach of Sanskrit grammarians allows to include cases where the 
agent appears to have no sentiency, since the specification of the agent as 
insentient through the first vibhakti (in active constructions) is a second degree 
amplification upon the most general conveyance of an agent on the part of the 
verb. Two terms are sufficient to make up a sentence with an object, i.e., verb 
and object - since the verb itself designates an agent. In which case, analysis in 
terms of intention may well absolve itself from considering additional 
information about the non-sentiency of the agent. In this sense, karman is a 
structural relationship between the term in the second vibhakti and the agency 
represented by the verbal ending: it does not concern itself with the specified 
referent ‘in the world’, what the first vibhakti conveys.
It is also significant that intention is taken as the defining trait of karman. 
Intention here has to be understood in a more technical sense of one element of 
sense tending towards the other, not as anything to do with real sentiency. 
Grammatical ‘intention’ is therefore structurally akin to Abhidhannic intention 
(cetana), but is a relation occurring within the context of sentential meaning, 
not yet a force between referents ‘in the world’.80
80 See the following section o f  Jinendrabuddhi’s discussion:
O pponent | Nonetheless, in instances like 'the river draws the bank1 how can there 
be designation as karmctnl
Reply j And why should it not be there?
O pponent | Because, the river has no intention/sentiency (cetana); because non- 
sentient things cannot have 'desire to reach out' {ipsa).
Reply | That is not so. Here, absence o f 'desire to reach out' (Tpsti) and the presence 
o f a non-sentient thing are understood due to a relation to the additional word ‘river’. 
Yet, while explaining a word a sense, which is to be understood through relation to 
another word, is not to be employed.
Therefore, the pervasion (reaching out, vyapti) is in reference merely to desire in 
sections like 'draws the bank'. And karman is here being explained. Even though 
afterwards, due to the relation with 'river', lack o f sentiency and absence o f desire 
may be understood, still, since this is an extrinsic part, it cannot ward o ff the work o f  
designating the relevant part. By the same logic, wherever there is no pervasion 
(vyapti) and there is only mere desire, even in such instances there is designation as 
karman, as in '1 want to go to the village, yet 1 have no power to go'.
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This structural analogy is the first link between the two usages of karman, and 
regards more specifically the first o f Vasubandhifs definitions: karman as 
cetana. Another set of considerations brings the grammatical karman closer to 
cetayitva (acting after an intention) as well.81
Gerow has offered a rather elaborate discussion about the proper sense of 
karman. As pointed out by Gerow, the difference between vydpara (operation) 
and phala (result, fruit), being no other than the difference between the two
QO ♦ .  * >senses of karman , is interpretive. In the classic example of odanam pacati (he 
cooks rice) cooked rice marks a stage in a process, and that stage is taken as the 
object of the action or process. The object is a specific point in the process, to 
which corresponds a certain name.
What Gerow does not notice, though, is that the action is also understood in 
relation to the expected fruit. To speak of an action like cooking, construes a
atha nadt kulam karsatityadau katham karmasamjha? kathan ca na sydt ? nadyader acetanatvat, 
acetananam Ipsaya asambhavdt \ naitad asti \ atra naditi padantarasambandhad Tpsdya 
abhdvo 'cetasydpi bhavah pratlyate \ na ca padasamskdre padantarasambandhagamyo ’rtha 
upayujyate, tena kulam karsatitydddv icchdmatram asrita vyaptih, karma ca samskriyate | 
yadyapi pascan nadya saha sambhandhdd acetanatvam icchaya abhdvas ca pratiyate tathapi ca 
tadbahirahgatvdd antarahgasamjndkdryam na saknoti nivartayitum \ anenaiva nydyena yatra  
vyaptir nasti, iccliamatran ca kevalam, tatrapi karmasamjna bhavati, yatha gramam gantum  
icchami na ca me gamanasaktir astTti || Nyasa  on kartunpsitatamam karma.
Even more relevantly, though, see 1.5.6.
81 karmajam lokavaicitryam cetana tatkrtam ca tat \ cetana manasam karma tajje 
vdkkdyakarmam \\ Abhidharmakosa 4 .1.
82 E. Gerow, ‘What is karma (kirn karmeti)? An exercise in Philosophical Semantics’, in 
Indologica Taurinensia, Volume X, 1982 page 87-116. Interestingly, Gerow concludes by 
suggesting that a Buddhist philosophical framework is more in accordance with the 
grammatical sense o f karman , rather than, as one may initially suppose, a framework derived 
from Vedic philosophies.
83 That is, when we taken the second definition quoted by Vasubandhu, as cetayitva , it accords 
with vydpara: one could say, though, that even cetana counts as vydpara. From the point of 
view of the Vaibhdsika, a present cetana is necessarily a karitra (activity), since being present 
means to be functional. From the Sautrdntika standpoint, without efficiency there is not even 
existence.
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link of sense between a present condition, and a future one: without this 
teleology, the action would not be understood in the same way. For example, if 
the expected and desired result would be burnt rice instead of cooked rice, the 
same present situation would be described as ‘he is burning the rice’ as opposed 
to ‘he is cooking the rice’. Actions are, in this sense, dependently imputed on a 
particular teleology: karman as vydpara can only be understood in respect to a 
certain phala (result). Intentionality (and often, intention) towards a probable 
future, informs all speaking of actions (all sentences). When we bring kriyd and 
karman closer to each other, cetana surfaces as interpretive act. In this sense, 
the structure of Abhidharmic cosmology mirrors the construction of sentential 
meaning within the karaka system.
1.5.6 Kasikd, and Jinendrabuddhi: tathdyuktam cdmpsitam
One more section of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on the Nydsa supports my 
analysis of grammatical karman as being akin to intention only in terms of its 
structure: not in terms of an actual description of sentient events within the 
world.
The following sutra is closely linked to the previous one. It ensures the 
applicability of ‘karman’ to cases where it cannot be said to be ‘desired’, or 
even desirable. Among other things, this section of Jinendrabuddhi’s 
commentary introduces a discussion of the two types of negations, prasaj’ya  and 
paryudasa , an important distinction in Madhyamaka:
‘And what is not desired, linked in the same way’ (tathdyuktam 
cdmpstitam)
(Kasikd:)
If that, which is not desired, is linked in the same way as the way 
through which that, which is most desired by the agent, is linked to the 
action, its designation as karman is enjoined. Whatever is other than 
the desired is ‘not-desired’, either detested or other. ‘He eats poison’.
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‘He sees thieves’. ‘Going to the village, he passes by the roots of 
trees’.84
(Jinendrabuddhi:)
The syllable ‘and’ (ca) is in the sense of limitation (avadhdrana). That 
is why, in the commentary, he says: ‘in the same way’.
If ‘not desired’ were to be a simple negation {prasajyapratisedha), 
then, in instances like ‘going to the village, he passes by the roots of 
trees’, there would be no designation as karman for the roots of trees 
and the like. Since, a simple negation being there, the designation of 
karman would be only enjoined for something ‘not-desired’. On the 
other hand; the roots of trees are not ‘desired’, because of coming 
about without prior intention. Nor are they ‘not-desired’: since, they 
are not unfavourable. Therefore, the designation as karman being 
enjoined for what is ‘not-desired’, it would not apply to those who are 
not ‘desired’, in the sense of other than the desired.85
When we say ‘not desired’ the negation can be taken in two distinct senses. One 
sense refers to something, which we do not desire (prasajyapratisedha). The 
other refers to something, other than what we do desire (paryudasapratisedha). 
If the first type of negation were to be applied to the definition, the latter could 
not cover instances, where the object of the action cannot be termed undesirable 
(un-wished-for), despite one’s absence of desire towards it.
On the other hand, an implicative negation being there, in this way the 
designation of karman is enjoined for that, which is other than the 
desired. And the roots of the trees, in the manner stated above, are 
other than the desired. Therefore, for them also the designation as 
karman is established.
yena prakarena kartur Xpsitatamam kriyaya yujyate tenaiva cet prakarena yad ampsitam  
yuktam bhavati tasya karmasamjha vidluyate \ ipsitad any at sarvam ampsitam dvesyam itarac 
ca | visam bhaksayati | cauran pasyati | gramam gacchan vrksamulany upasarpati || Kasikd on 
Tathdyuktam cdmpsitam.
85 cakaro ’vadharane \ ata eva vrttdvdha tenaiveti \ ampsitam iti \yady apy ayarii 
prasajyapratisedhah sydt tada gramam gacchan vrksamulany upasarpatttyadau  
vrksamuladmam karmasamjha na sydt \ tatha hi prasajyapratisedhe saty anena 
yogendnlpsitasyaiva karmasamjha vidluyate; vrksanuddni ca na tavadipsitani purvam  
anabhisandhaya pravrtteh, napy ampsitani, apratikulatvat; tatas cdm psitasya karmasamjha 
vidhTyamdna tesam Tpsitdd anyatvendnlpsitdn na sydt || Nyasa on Tathdyuktam cdmpsitam.
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The type of negation, which positively refers to something other than what we 
desire, can cover all the instances at hand. What is other than the desired can be 
either positively un-wished-for, or also simply not intended.
Having observed this, to show how this is an implicative negation, he 
says
‘other than the desired’, and so on. And what is meant by ‘and so on’?
It means something detestable, and so on. ‘Detestable’ is something 
unfavourable: like, poison, thieves and so on. ‘Otherwise’ means not 
unfavourable: the roots of trees, as stated above. 86
In this discussion, the most relevant point is that karman has nothing to do with 
the actual intention of an agent in the world: in fact, it is a relation which 
accrues even in the absence of intention, or when the intention is opposite. 
Hence, it has to be understood as a structural relationship between sentential 
elements.
1.6 The primary kdrakcis and Buddhism
There are many areas of Buddhist philosophy where karaka definitions may be 
observed to have an influence. Some of them are the intricate debates, either 
within Sautrdntika and Vaibhasika or between Yogdcara and Maclhyamaka, 
which I shall try to reconstruct in the next Chapters. In this section, though, I 
wish to analyse certain ideas, that constitute a widely shared common ground; 
and to show how kdrakas play an important role even in understanding such 
more foundational ideas.
86 patyuda.se tu saty anena yogenepsitdd anyasya karmasamjnd vidluyate \ bhavanti ca 
yathoktaprakdrdni vrksamidanlpsitdd anyani; atas tesdm api karmasamjnd sidhyatity etad  
alocya paryuddso ’yam iti darsayitum aha Tpsitad anyad ityddi \ kith punas tad ity aha dvesyam  
ityddi \ dvesyam pratikulam yathd visacaurddi \ itarad apratikulam yathd uktaprakardni 
vrksamuldni || Ibidem.
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1.6.1The karaka system and basic Buddhist thought: selflessness
It is not rare to characterise the distinguishing trait of Buddhist thought as 
nairatmya, the doctrine of the absence of a ‘self’. This sets the Buddhist systems 
apart from other schools of Indian philosophy, and arguably is a common view 
shared by all Buddhist philosophers, despite remarkable differences in its 
interpretation.
A clear link between this doctrine and the karaka system could be taken as a 
sufficient corroboration of the latter’s importance for Buddhist thought as a 
whole. One philosopher has provided such a link, while commenting upon a 
popular and influential text of the Mahdydna. KamalasTla’s unique position as 
an Indian acarya at the peak of medieval scholastic culture, who also acquired 
legendary status in Tibetan Buddhist literature, makes his remarks most relevant 
and worth analysing.
Kamalaslla has composed a detailed commentary on the
Vajracchedikaprajndpdramitdsutra, where we find a discussion about
selflessness, between the Buddha and Subhuti:
What do you think, Subhuti, does a Stream-Enterer think: ‘The fruit of 
entering the stream has been obtained by me’? Subhuti said: no, 
Blessed One. The Stream-Enterer does not think: ‘The fruit of entering 
the stream has been obtained by me.’87
The discussion continues in the same vein, applying an analogous structure to 
the other stages of Buddhist realisation. But the mention of the Stream-Enterer 
is particularly significant, because ‘entering the stream’ means realising the path
87 tat kim manyase subhute api nu srotaapannasyaivam bhavati mayd srotadpattiphalam  
prdptam iti \ subhutir aha no ludam bhagavan \ na srotaapannasyaivam bhavati mayd 
srotadpattiphalam prdptam iti ||
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of seeing: in other words, realising selflessness for the first time. It is at this
juncture that KamalasTla’s takes the phrasing of the Sutra very seriously, and
offers some of his most useful comments:
Here, the stream is defined as the path of seeing, which brings to the 
great city of nirvana. ‘Enterer’ is one who has reached, one who has 
entered the stream which destroys all the afflictions to be destroyed 
through seeing. And it is shown that, since he has destroyed any 
attachment towards an agent, object of the action, or action, due to 
having realised that one thing depends on another, he has realised 
selflessness. ‘By me’ is attachment towards an agent. ‘The fruit’ is 
attachment towards the object ojthe action. ‘Has been obtained’ is 
attachment towards the action.88
Apart from the crucial juncture at which these comments appear -  between 
being an ordinary person and a ‘Noble One’ -  some specific features of the 
Sutra's terminology make Kamalaslla’s choice of exegesis appropriate. The 
same analysis, in terms of karaka, could apply to several other actions: but here 
we are specifically concerned with the action of prapti, obtaining or reaching.
The object of the action (karman) was defined by Panini and his commentators 
primarily as something to be obtained by the agent, through the action (as we 
have seen in this chapter): to the extent that a Buddhist grammarian, 
Candragomin, redefined karman as dpya, ‘that which is to be obtained’.89 The 
rest of KamalasTla’s commentary on this passage centres upon the ultimate 
impossibility of a relation between something to be obtained and something
88 tcit rci srotah nirvanamahdnagaraprdpakadarsanamdrgalaksanam apannah praptah  
darsanapraheyasamastaklesaprahayakah srota dpanna iti tasya ca kartari karmani kriyayam  
cdbhinivesaprahdnena idampratyayatadhigamdn nairdtmyadhigamo darsitah \ maya iti kartary 
bhinivesah \ phalam iti karmany abhinivesah | praptah iti kriyayam abhinivesah || I feel some 
confidence in using this Sanskrit re-translation, especially regarding the last three sentences, 
where the possible variation is more limited and hence less relevant to the present discussion. 
Since my interest is in the understanding of the analysis in terms of Sanskrit syntax, I would 
anyhow have to provide my own Sanskrit re-translation, even if I were to use the Tibetan text.
89 Consider that vyapti and prdpti are partial synonyms, derived from the same root Vdp.
which obtains: prapya and prapaka. This is the object-agent relation par- 
excellence, and Kamalaslla explicitly mentions that his analysis should be 
extended to all other analogous cases: ‘Through this, all the usages such as 
object of the action, agent and so forth, should be clearly understood’.90 The 
paradox of a selfless action, like the ‘obtainment’ of the path of seeing, is that it 
is an action, with an object and an agent, only from an outsider’s perspective.
1.6.2 The karaka system and the Mahdyana: the purification of the 
three spheres
The Mahdyana is at times termed paramitayana, the Vehicle of the Perfections. 
This highlights that, in brief, engaging in this Vehicle means to practice the six 
(or, ten) perfections until the attainment of Buddhahood.
Among the perfections, the perfection of discriminative knowledge or 
prajndpdramitd plays a special role, as both sutras and sastras explain. It is 
stated that without applying prajndpdramitd, the other five could not even be 
called ‘perfections’, being no more than causes of ‘worldly’ merit’91. Yet, how 
to apply the perfection of prajna to the others? It is here, that the role of karaka 
system should be observed.
When any of the other five perfections are practiced, they become joined with 
the prajndpdramitd only if the aspiring bodhisattva applies the ‘purification of 
the three spheres’ or ‘does not apprehend the three spheres’. In the case of the 
perfection of giving (the first) this means ‘not apprehending triads like a giver, a
90 anena tavat sarvah karmakartrddivyavahdrah spastam avaboddhavyah \ Ibidem.
91 On this, see especially Prajnakaramati ’s commentary to Bodhicarydvatara  9.1, translated as 
an Appendix in this thesis.
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gift and a recipient’92: in terms of kdrakas, an agent {kartr), object of the action 
{karman), and recipient {upadana). In other words, when even the most 
fundamental yoga of a practitioner in the Mahdyana is explained, it is in terms 
of non-apprehending ordinary and foundational categories of syntax, the 
kdrakas. This may be because it is the most fundamental syntax, through which 
a world and actions within a world are conventionally perceived.
There is a slight variation in regards to the karakas actually referred to in the 
case of the perfection of giving, and the triad of karakas which was analysed in 
Kamalaslla’s commentary. This is probably due to the fact that upadanakdraka 
(the recipient) is bound to appear only in the case of giving, and will not fit the 
context of the other perfections. This variation justifies the appearance of the 
word adi (etc., and so on) attached to both lists: we can safely say that in both 
cases ‘etc.’ means ‘or any of the other karakas’ (since what appears in one list 
and not in the other is just an alternative karaka relation). And of course, the 
‘non-apprehension of the three spheres’ is a realisation of emptiness, the 
selflessness seen by the Stream-Enterer on the path of seeing.
1.7 Continued agency and dependent arising
A way in which Sanskrit can express two consecutive actions is through the 
suffix ktva, or it substitute lyap (when the root has a prefix). Its usage is 
regulated by the sutra: samanakartrkayoh purvakale, which literally means: ‘In 
reference to a preceding time, for two things with the same agent’ these suffixes 
are employed.
What this means is that, in a sentence like grham gatvd rdmah khadati, gatva 
(having gone) represents a chronologically anterior action and must have the
92 datrdeyapratigrahakaditritciyanupalabhayogena ||
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same agent as khaclati (he eats). Hence the sentence can be translated as: 
‘having gone home, Rama eats.’
This constructions show how an analysis in terms of agents better suits the 
structure of Sanskrit. We could have the sentence: grham gatvd rdmena sitci 
drsta. Here, the agent is still Rama: although, he is no more the subject. In 
English, we may try to translate the sentence as: ‘having gone home, Slta was 
seen by Rama’, but the sentence would actually suggest that it was Slta who has 
gone home. This is because, these English constructions tend to imply sameness 
of the grammatical subject; while, in Sanskrit, the ktva suffix unambiguously 
has to refer to the same agent.
This sutra, though, offers an interesting interpretive problem. We have seen that
karakas are to be understood as capacities, syntactical relations rather than
actual referents. On the other hand, when we talk of the same agent in different
actions, we cannot be talking of the same capacity, since capacities differ for
different actions. Jinendrabuddi offers the following hypothetical objection:
A karaka is a capacity, and the capacity of the action in the anterior 
time is other from that of the action in the subsequent time. Then, how 
is it that sameness of agent is acknowledged?93
This view of karakas, incidentally, is the same as CandrakTrti’s own (as shown 
and discussed by Bhattacarya).94 It is in tune with understanding karakas as 
structural categories, thus of fundamental importance and broad applicability, as 
opposed to more specified stances on agency. Yet, in this case, ‘agent’ cannot 
just mean a capacity.
93 nanu saktih karakam anya ca purvakdlakriyayah saktih anya cottarakalakriyayah tat kutah 
samdnakartrkatvam vijhdyate || Nydsa on Samdnakartrkayoh piirvakdle.
94 Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, ‘Nagarjuna’s arguments against motion: their grammatical basis’, 
in Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya et al., A corpus o f  Indian studies. Essays in honour o f  Professor 
Gaurinath Sastri, Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980.
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The Kasika offers the following solution: for once, we have to disregard the
distinction between a capacity and a capacity-possessor, so that the expression
‘agent’ may apply even for the same element through different actions.
Jinendrabuddhi explains:
The one who is the substratum of the capacity and the capacity itself -  
here the difference between these two is not wished to be expressed. 
Therefore, the substratum of the capacity is only one, Devadatta the 
agent, and he is one and the same for both the actions, so, sameness of
i"  95agent is fit.
The question here is whether this sutra gives to the category ‘agent’ a stronger 
semantic weight than it usually has. It is plausibly the case: and this may make 
it less flexible than the primary karaka definitions so far discussed.
Anna Radicchi has pointed out how this rule clashes with basic premises of 
Buddhist ontology, since most of the Buddhist schools reject the idea of a 
permanent agent in the first place.96 Most Buddhist authors, though, solve the 
apparent difficulty by ascribing it to different levels of discourse. I will offer 
some specific examples linked to the proper analysis of the term ‘dependent 
arising.’
The latter is one of the best candidates for the title of the central doctrine of 
Buddhism.97 The Sanskrit word for dependent arising is pratTtyasamutpada, a
95 _  _  , _  _
ycis ca saktyadharo ya ca saktis tayor ilia bliedo na vivaksitah \ tena saktyadhara eka eva
devadattah kartta sa cobhayor api kriyayor eka eveti yuktam samdnakartrkatvam  || Nyasa  on 
Samdnakartrkayoh purvakale.
96 See: Anna Radicchi, ‘Two Buddhist Grammarians: Candragomin and Jayaditya’, in Madhav 
M. Deshpande and Peter E. Hook (eds.), Indian Linguistic Studies. Festschrift in Honor o f  
George Cardona . Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2002.
97 As the Salistambasutra puts it: ‘One, who sees dependent arising, sees the Dharma; one, who 
sees the Dharma, sees the Buddha’.
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compound, where the element prat tty a is commonly understood as ending in 
lyap.
1.7.1 The Abhidharmakosabhasya on pratityasamutpada
Vasubandhu analyses the problems in interpreting the term pratityasamutpada 
in his commentary to karika 3.28. The first alternative that he proposes is that, 
in fact, the word pratHya should be taken as a lyap, and that its meaning should
be identical to ‘having obtained’ (prSpya). Hence, the overall meaning of
pratityasamutpada should be: arising after having obtained a condition.95
This interpretation, though, gives rise to an apparent paradox. The suffix lyap, 
as we have seen, refers to the same agent performing two consecutive actions. 
In this case, the same agent should first perform the action of obtaining 
conditions (pratitya) and then, the action of arising (samutpada). But if it has 
not yet arisen, how could it perform an action?
This objection is brought out rather clearly by Vasubandhu, who even quotes an 
unidentified verse criticising this interpretation of pratityasamutpada'. which
suggests that the debate was well-known at his tim e." Yasomitra identifies the 
objectors as Sautrdntikas, and explains the link with Panini’s syntactical rules:
‘Because the suffix ktva is employed in reference to an action at a 
preceding time’: this is because it has been said that it is for ‘the
98 pratyayam  prapya samudbhavah pratityasamutpadah  || Abhidharmakosabhasya 3.28.
99 I f ‘it obtains before arising’, this is not fit; i f ‘together’, the suffix ktva is not established in 
reference to such a meaning, since it is employed in reference to anterior time.
pratyeti purvam utpdddt yady asattvdn na yujyate \ saha cet ktva na siddho ’tra 
purvakdlavidhdnatah  || Quoted in Abhidharmakosabhasya 3.28.
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preceding time, with same agents’, and according to the Sautrdntika 
opinion, nothing whatsoever exists before its own arising.
‘And there is no action without an agent’: because an action is 
established when an agent is there.100
The first solution offered to this qualm is that the agent of ‘obtaining’ 
(expressed by pratitya) is a future dharma about to arise
(utpadabhimukho’nagatah), a solution available to the Vaibhasika, who 
upholds the existence of dharmas in the three times.
In this context, Vasubandhu also explains that the grammatical explanation of 
agency cannot apply literally:
Moreover, the following is incomplete: the grammatical way to 
explain an agent and an action as ‘something exists’ being the agent 
and ‘existence’ being the action: here we do not see any action of 
‘existence’ other from the referent of ‘the one who exists’. 101
This possibility is also strengthened by quoting a verse, where it is shown that
the suffix ktva (or lyap, by extension) can also be used in reference to
simultaneity, as when saying that ‘reaching a lamp, darkness is gone’ (clipam 
102prapya tamo gatam).
The last point is particularly important, as grammarians themselves accept that 
the meaning of words is to be ascertained from ‘the world’, and in certain cases
100 purvakdlayam kriyayam ktvavidher id  \ samdnakartrkayoh purvakale iti vacanat j na casau 
purvam utpadat kascid astlti sautrdntikamatena \ na capy akartrkdsti kriyeti kartari sati kriydyd 
vyavasthapanat || Sub-commentary on Abhidharmakosabhasya 3.28.
anispannam cedam yaduta sabdikiyam kartrkriya vyavasthdnam bhavatlty esa kartta bhutir 
ity esa kriya \ na catra bhavitur arthat bhutim anyaih kriyam pasyamah  || 
Abhidharmakosabhasya on 3.28.
102 Even in reference to simultaneity, moreover, there is ktva: ‘having obtained a light, the 
darkness is gone’; ‘having opened the mouth wide, he sleeps’. If you say that the last refers to 
something happening after, how would it not refer to it (the mouth) being closed? 
sahabhave'p i ca ktva ’sti dipam prapya tamo gatam  | dsyam vydddya sete vd pascac cet kirn na 
samvrte || Quoted in Abhidharmakosabhasya 3.28.
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later grammarians have had to add to the usages listed by Panini (whose lists 
are therefore, in principle, not normatively exclusive).
The second solution, ascribed by Yasomitra to Bhadanta SrTlabha, is to take 
Itya in pratitya not as a lyap, but as a noun meaning ‘things which are bound to
go, to vanish’. Vasubandhu, though, points out that in instances other than the 
compound pratityasamutpada, this interpretation does not fit with available 
usages of pratitya , as in ‘in dependence upon {pratitya) the eye and visible 
forms, the eye-consciousness arises’. 103
1.7.2 The debate in  the Prasannapada
The proper understanding of the term pratityasamutpada is the subject matter of 
a lengthy debate in CandrakTrti’s commentary on Midamadhyamakakdrika l . i -  
1.2. Here too, the issue at stake is the proper grammatical understanding of the 
first member, pratitya . The discussions seern^ to be mostly derived from the 
one in the Abhidharmakosabhasya, and CandrakTrti’s stance is very close to 
Vasubandhu’s own.
CandrakTrti proposes that pratitya is a lyap form, meaning ‘having reached’ and 
by extension ‘depending upon’. To support his claims, CandrakTrti quotes the 
same passage quoted by Vasubandhu (‘in dependence upon the eye and visible 
form, eye-consciousness arises’). 104 He also criticises Bhavaviveka’s 
interpretation, claiming that it shows a Tack of skill in repeating other’s 
positions’ (parapaksdnuvaddkusalatvam). The primary reason is that
103 caksuh pratitya r  updni cotpadyate caksurvijndnam  || Quoted in Abhidharmakosabhasya on 
3.28. '
104 caksuh pratitya rupam ca utpadyate caksurvijndnam
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Bhavaviveka states that even those who accept the first interpretation of 
pratitya as a lyap take prati in the sense of dispersion or vanishing (vipsd): 
which, CandrakTrti states, is not the case. This point becomes more 
comprehensible if we take the debate in the Abhidharmakosabhasya as the 
background, where, in effect, those who take prati in the sense of dispersion or 
vanishing (yipsa) are only the second group. CandrakTrti’s objection has force 
only inasmuch as it takes for granted that his opponent is also reconstructing the 
various positions of the Abhidharmakosabhasya: incidentally, this supports my 
claim, that several Madhyamaka debates are continuations of the debates in the 
Kosa, as it will be fully demonstrated in the next three Chapters.
CandrakTrti, not unlike Vasubandhu, offers a less literal understanding of the 
underlying Paninian rule, by stating that pratitya means ‘in dependence upon 
causes and conditions’ (hetupratyayapeksa). The chronological sense of lyap 
(enjoined in Panini’s sutra) is lost: yet we must remember that this sutra offers, 
even from a grammarian’s stance, a unique and less technical handling of the 
kdrakas.
1.7.3 Madhyamika authors: more on the same issue
Pratityasamutpada applies to a wide variety of contexts and can be used to 
analyse either virtually any dharma. Nonetheless, the ‘twelve limbs of
dependent arising’ are more specifically concerned with the topic of the cycle of
birth and death, and are arguably the most recurrent focus of analysis 
throughout Buddhist philosophical literature.
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Even in Maclhyamaka, as I shall more extensively argue, the primary locus of 
dependent arising is between successive lives. This is the topic of the last 
chapter of the Mfdamadhyamakakarika, the Examination of Views.
It is in that context, that CandrakTrti employs an expression containing a ktva 
form:
kusalam karma krtvci devagatim gacchati \
Having done virtuous karman, he goes to the gods’ realm.105
By the rule samanakartrkayoh purvakale, the one who does the karman and the 
one who goes to the gods’ realm must be the same. Yet, CandrakTrti is bent on 
refuting such sameness of the agent, following the gist of Nagarjuna’s verse 
upon which he is commenting.
This may not be a serious philosophical problem for the Madhyamika. The two 
consecutive assertions (the same agent does good karman and goes to the gods’ 
realm, vs., there is no sameness of agency) can be distributed into two different 
levels of truth (conventional and ultimate). Thus, conventionally there is the 
same agent performing karman and reaping the fruit, but ultimately the one who 
act and reaps the result cannot be established as identical or as different.
Haribhadra offers a variant of the same problem, where the discussion is 
restricted to two consecutive instants. He is commenting upon a passage in the 
Astasahasrika, where it is stated that first one rejoices, then, one dedicates the 
merit. Yet, the sameness implied by the usage of ktva seems at odds with the 
Buddhist premises that mind is momentary:
105 Prasannapada  on Mulamadhyamakakarika 27.15.
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By accepting their succession, it is accepted that the two thoughts 
of rejoicing and dedication are not there in one and the same 
instant. Therefore, if one were to say that, since the affix ktva is 
employed when we have the same agent, the very same mind 
having first rejoiced (anumoclya) successively dedicates: this 
would make no sense. Since there is no efficiency of what is 
permanent either gradually or at once, due to its momentariness 
the rejoicing mind is not there in the instant of dedication. 
Therefore, how could it then dedicate?106
Haribhadra’s solution seems fairly straight forward: the rule has no force in 
terms of more fine analysis, and considerations about the actual quality of mind 
take precedence. Again, this is not dissimilar from Vasubandhu’s and 
CandrakTrti’s stances.
The relatively weak authority of this sutra in the instances presented so far may 
seem to contradict my argument for the importance of the kdrakas. Moreover, it 
may misleadingly suggest that Buddhist authors had troubles specifically with 
rules about continued agency, merely because of their specific philosophical 
stance about impermanence.
Yet, it must be remembered that the sutra itself employs the category agent in 
an exceptional, technically ‘loose’ sense, different from its sense in the main 
definition: hence this does affect the considerations made about the main 
karakas. As we have seen, moreover, the occurrence of this extended sense of 
kartr (as capacity-possessor rather than capacity itself) was used because this 
instance of continued agency posed a difficulty even to the grammatical 
commentators, for reasons not ascribable to a specific view of impermanence. 
The difficulties arise, in effect, because the sutra employs the term agent {kartr)
[...]  purvaparyapratipadanan naikasmin ksane dvclv 
anumodandparindmandmanaskdrau bhavata iti pradipaditam \ tasmdt samcinakartrtve 
ktvdpratyayavidhanad ekam eva cittaih purvam anumodya pascdt parindm ayatity uktam 
cet/ tac ca ayuktam | ya to  nityasya kramayaagapadydbhydm arthakriydvirodhat, 
ksanikatvena anumodakam cittam parindmandksane ndsti \ atas tena kathaih 
parindm ayaati || Abhisamaydlamkardlokd on the Punydnumodand Chapter.
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in a way more charged and less flexible than its ordinary karaka sense: which 
poses a difficulty not only to Buddhist Abhidharma, but also to grammarians.
1.8 Conclusion
The apparently contingent and negligible fact that a Sanskrit text is bound to use 
karaka structures and terminology, carries important implications. This can be 
evinced from all of what is lost, and added, once we translate the ideas found in 
the Sanskrit texts into English.
If one chooses a looser rendering, by translating kartr as ‘subject’ and karman 
as ‘object’, this obscures the way in which the texts understand and speak of 
actions (the ‘subject’ of English grammar does not always correspond to the 
agent:) when in a philosophical context, it may amount to a modification of the 
arguments presented.107
The word ‘agent’ may carry the unwanted suggestion of a person, while we 
have seen how this category is far more flexible and inclusive: this will become 
clearer in the next Chapter, where its usages in the Abhidharma will be 
discussed at some length. The usage of karakas, as opposed to a subject- 
grammar analysis, has a definite bearing on the content of the texts, and cannot 
be taken as a replaceable linguistic accident. The expectable implication is that a 
greater sensitivity to the underlying karaka syntax must result in a more precise 
and nuanced comprehension of the arguments presented in the Sanskrit. If for 
one reason or another one glosses over the subtlety of the grammatical analysis
107 This is particularly noticeable in the presentation o f  Yogdcdm  found in most secondary 
sources, where the system is often depicted as doing away with the ‘subject-object’ dichotomy. 
On the other hand, what Yogdcdm  denies is the reality o f grdhya and grdhaka, karman and karrt 
respectively. It is the ‘absence o f  the two’ (advaya) as opposed to ‘non-dualism’, a rendering 
which carries the unwanted suggestion o f  a position o f  oneness.
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involved, it is likely that the arguments themselves will be reconstructed in a 
simplistic manner, that does no justice to their intended sophistication.
In the next Chapters, I will show more technical and intricate ways in which the 
karaka system influences philosophical argumentation, in Abhidharma, 
Madhyamaka and Yogdcdra. While in the present Chapter I have focused the 
discussion on certain premises shared by practically all Buddhist systems, in the 
rest of the thesis I will try to show how the karaka system influences further 
debates among the various schools and authors.
Vydkarana, and the karaka system in particular, help understanding and 
forming conventions: one could even say that they constitute their underlying 
structure. Even comprehending the selflessness or emptiness of conventions 
passes through kdrakas, and in this sense their double role in the world of 
dependently arisen dharmas and empty imputations resembles that of laksanas 
and laksyas: as we will see in the next Chapters.
73
Chapter 2 
Abhidharma as a dictionary: 
the world, in Buddhist terms
Abhidharma is stainless prajhd with its adjuncts, 
the other that helps acquire it, as also the sdstra.
Since here we enter its meaning and since this
supports it, we call it ‘Sheath’ (or ‘Treasury’) of Abhidharma.m
Without grouping the dharmas,
there is no means to pacify the afflictions,
and due to the afflictions, a person roams here in the sea of existence: 
thus, for that reason, this has indeed been spoken by the Teacher.109
These two stanzas are from the opening verses of Vasubandhu’s 
Abhidharmakosa. They carry two implications: Abhidharma resembles 
grammar and, it resembles a dictionary. It resembles grammar, because it is 
analysis, grouping of the dharmas. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the 
etymological sense of vydkarana brings it close to dharmapravicaya (grouping 
the dharmas), a synonym of prajhd, and hence, of Abhidharma. The 
etymological similarities mirror an actual analogy in the procedures of classical 
grammar and Buddhist Abhidharma: they are not mere accidents of word- 
formation.
Moreover, a Kosa of any type is, primarily, a dictionary: the image of a treasury 
suggests a repository, from which valuable knowledge may be extracted. This 
knowledge consists in the ascertainment of something meaning something else,
m prajfid 'maid sdnucard ’bhidharmas tatprdptaye ydpi ca yacca sdstram \ tasydrthato ’smin 
samanupravesdt sa cdsrayo ’syety abhidharmakosah || Abhidharmakosa 1.2.
109 dharmdndm pravicayamantarena nasti klesdndm yata upasdntaye ’bhyupdyah | klesais ca 
bhramati bh avdm ave’tra lokas taddhetor ata uditah kilasa sdstra || Abhidharmakosa 1.3.
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in learning synonyms. Giving synonyms is what not only a writer of a 
dictionary, but also a philosophical commentator, is bound to do.
Such procedure does not only improve one’s command of a certain language, 
even a philosophical language: by teaching synonyms, a text may explicate its 
referents in the world. If the reader has no mental association between a word 
and its referent, this will be induced by employing another term sharing the 
same referent. We have seen that, by the grammarians’ own dictum, grammar is 
concerned with words (sabdas) and not referents (arthas). The same is not true 
of Kosas, dictionaries, which refer to a world outside the text. The Amarakosa is 
the prototype of a comprehensive thesaurus, and its study is taken as crucial for 
a proper grounding in Sanskrit: Panini and Amara are the ‘parents’ of one’s 
knowledge of the language. 110 The dictionary gives the meanings, grammar 
tells us the structure.
The Amarakosa is a good example of a generic lexicon: as such, we may find it 
employed by literary commentators to explain the sense of difficult words in a 
poem. Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosa plays a similar role, within a different 
context: it is a specialised, as opposed to a generic, dictionary. The definitions 
given in the Abhidharmakosa are quoted by Buddhist authors for the same 
purpose that a literary commentator may quote Amara: to refer the reader to a 
commonly accepted definition of a term. The parallel between the two Kosas is 
therefore not only structural: both were used to the same ends (and, both were 
very popular).
110 Incidentally, the author of the Amarakosa  is considered to have been Buddhist: the 
propitiatory verse strongly suggests a dedication to the Buddha, as it is dedicated to the ‘Ocean 
of knowledge and compassion’ (jhcinadaydsindhu). The earliest commentator, Jatarupa, 
identifies the latter as bhagavan, and since Jatarupa can be safely identified as a Buddhist 
author, here this must be taken as a synonym of the Buddha. See Mahes Raj Pant, (ed.), 
Jatarupa's commentary on the Amarakosa,  Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 2000.
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Root texts of Abhidharma, perhaps starting from mnemonic mdtrkas, are lists of 
the ultimately existent constituents of the cosmos. 111 They are, though, 
interpreting the Sfitras and often quoting them as support. If an utterance of the 
Sutras is preserved in Sanskrit, the first level of understanding will depend on 
the strictures of the language as regulated in the Astddhyayi, while the full 
implications of its meaning will have to be drawn out by relying upon the 
ultimate referents of the words. Thus, the Sutra's statements can be translated 
into a more ontologically accurate language, by providing synonyms and 
analytical expansions. This is what the Bhdsya and the sub-commentaries do, 
linking the root stanzas to passages in the Sutras, through the medium of 
Panini’s rules.
The first term to be explained in the Abhidharmakosa is abhidharma, a 
synonym of discriminating knowledge or prajiid. By grouping (pravicaya) the 
whole of existence into discrete dharmas, afflictions will be removed, and with 
them suffering. Deconstructing persons and things into fleeting constituents, the 
Abhidharma ascertains the absence of any permanent ‘self’; it counteracts the 
unknowing superimposition of a substantial core.
Grouping dharmas is possible only as far as the difference between them can be 
ascertained. Abhidharma is an exercise in clarifying distinctions: it is 
identification and analysis. What identifies a dharma, is called laksana.
111 For a discussion about mnemonic devices and oral transmission in the Pali tradition, see 
Lance S. Cousins, ‘Pali Oral Literature’, in Paul Williams, (ed.), Buddhism. Critical Concepts in 
Religious Studies,  London: Routledge 2005. For a more detailed account of the possible origin 
of Abhidharma  texts, see Collett Cox, Disputed Dharmas. Early Buddhist Theories on Existence, 
Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995, pages 7-10. And also: Leo 
Pruden (tr.), Abhidharmakosabhdsyam by Louis de La Vallee Poussin,  Berkeley: Asian 
Humanities Press. 1988, pages xxx-lxi.
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The sense of the word laksana oscillates between a characteristic and a 
definition. This is partly due to the derivational root ^llaks, which can mean to 
perceive or observe, to notice, to mark, to characterise, and also, to aim at. A 
laksana is both something noticed, as well as the notice of something else.
The Abhidharmakosa makes lists of dharmas and then, like a dictionary, 
provides definitions: the laksanas themselves are in this case the synonyms. 
Here we see a difference between this procedure and that of Amara. The latter 
was concerned with recording pre-existent usages; Vasubandhu intends to give 
(and, in the Bhdsya, to discuss), precise definitions of the ultimate existent 
dharmas. The lists of synonyms in the Amarakosa could hardly be called 
laksanas. In this sense, the Abhidharmakosa includes an element of analysis 
closer to vydkarana.
A dharma is itself defined as what upholds its own laksana 
(.svalaksanadharandd dharma). 112 This is what the Abhidharma is mostly 
concerned with: we could therefore expect that its authors should be termed as 
the experts on laksanas. Yet, even Vasubandhu employed the term laksanikah 
specifically for grammarians.113
The reasons could well be found in the predominant usages of his time. There is 
also an etymological justification, since as we have seen in Chapter 1, laksana is 
one of the synonyms of vydkarana. Perhaps, though, Vasubandhu implies that 
grammarians are the primary authority when trying to understand the sense of 
an expression; even while commenting on another set of laksanas. As far as 
their referents are concerned, the definitions found in Abhidharma may be the
112 Abhidharmakosabhdsya on Kdrikd 1.2.
113 svatantrah kartd iti kartrlaksancim acaksate laksanikdh || Pudgalaviniscaya section, see 
below.
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most precise: yet, as far as the forming of those very definitions is concerned, 
grammar is a more fundamental concern.
Here we find a rather complex situation: Abhidharma resembles both a lexicon 
and grammar, and moreover, it employs the latter to form and assess its own 
content. Grammar has a double role in the Abhidharma: it is a set of rules 
explicitly referred to, and it is a blueprint in style and analytical procedure. And 
of course it is the regulated articulation of the structure of the language 
employed. We may understand this is as a question of laksanas and the 
elaborate intersection of different sets of laksanas.114
The Kosa contains a few portions which are especially relevant in this respect. I 
will attempt to reconstruct Vasubandhu’s lengthy and rather technical 
discussion about the status and nature of laksanas themselves. There is 
moreover an explicit meeting point between grammar and Abhidharma, when 
the category agent is discussed in the Kosa. This reappears as a kdraka in the 
discussion, but not with the unanimous consent of all debaters.
The debates here represented have rather direct links to those between 
Madhyamaka and Yogdcdra that will be analysed in the next sections of this 
thesis. I hope to show that they are in fact a useful and relevant background, and 
the continuity between older and newer debates may help clarify the latter.
114 Ronkin has highlighted how definability is a central concern for the whole of the 
AbhidhammalAbhidharma  tradition, identifying it as a weakness that called for later critiques by 
Mahdycma  thinkers (specifically, she points to the metabasis  from epistemology to ontology 
wihin dharma  analysis). See Noa Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics,  Oxford: Routledge 
Curzon, 2005, especially pages 248-252.
78
2.1 Dharma: what upholds its own laksana
Dharma has been appropriately identified by Stcherbatsky as a cardinal concept 
in Buddhist thought.115 This is particularly true of the Abhidharma, and despite 
this fact, Stcherbatsky noticed how this term remains an elusive source of 
elaborate debates. A good starting point, though, is the definition of dharma 
quoted in the initial section of this Chapter.  ^A
The Kosa resorts to laksana even in its (etymological) expansion of the word 
dharma. The latter is derived from the root dhr, meaning to uphold or maintain: 
each dharma is so called, because it upholds its own characteristic 
(svalaksanadhdranat).116
Some of Yasomitra’s remarks clarify the sense of the definition.117 He tells us 
that:
i. there are two types of laksanas;
ii. the dharmas are not themselves laksanas, but laksya: not 
characteristics but characterised.
115 Theodore Stcherbatsky, Central Conception o f Buddhism,  Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass, 
1970.
116 svalaksanadhdrandd dhannah  | |  Bhdsya on Abhidharmakosa  1.2b. For an account of the 
Theravdda Abhidhamma  understanding of lakkhana,  see Noa Ronkin, Early Buddhist 
Metaphysics,  Oxford: Routledge Curzon, 2005, especially the Conclusion.
117 ‘Or the laksana  of dharmas ’: the specific and common characteristics, like ‘the earth element 
has the characteristic of hardness’, ‘impermanent, suffering’ and so on. dharmalaksanam veti \ 
svasdmdnyalaksanam 'kh a kkl tatala ks an all prthivTdhdtuh 'anityam duhkham‘ ityevahi ddi  | |  
Bhdsya  1,1, sub-commentary. And also:
it is not that this is a dharma  being the laksana  of another. What then? It is a laksya,  being in 
itself proximate.
na tv ayaih dharmo ’nyasya laksanam, kith tarhi? laksyah, svayam evdbhimukhydt  | j  Ibidem.
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The two types of laksanas are: specific characteristics (svalaksanas) and 
common characteristics (sdmdnyalaksanas). An example of the first is the 
hardness of the earth-element, while the second type is exemplified by traits like 
impermanence or pain, common to all compounded dharmas.118 From the point 
of view of fine analysis, specific characteristics are more important, as they 
allow distinguishing between various types of compounded factors. 
Nevertheless, a set of common characteristics came to be identified as the 
laksanas par excellence: so much so that, in this case, they constituted dharmas 
in their own right, laksyas as well as laksanas -  at least according to the 
Vaibhdsika view.
2.1.1 The four laksanas of all compounded factors119
Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosa oscillates between Vaibhdsika positions and 
their Sautrantika critiques.120 Traditional accounts record that first, the author 
composed the verses alone and sent them to his Vaibhdsika teacher in Kashmir. 
As the verses expounded their own position quite faithfully, the teacher was 
pleased. Next, though, Vasubandhu sent his commentary, where he favours the
us The terminology of svalaksana  and sdmdnyalaksana  appears in pramanavada  texst also, 
from Dignaga onwards, but often in a different sense from its usage in the Abhidharma.
119 For another reconstruction of this section and an excellent discussion, focusing on different 
areas and on a comparison with the Theravada, see: Y. Karunadasa, ’The Theravada Version of 
the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness’, in Journal o f Buddhist Studies,  Volume 1, Centre for 
Buddhist Studies: Sri Lanka, 2003, pages 120-185.
120 I use the term Sautrantika  in its late sense of a recognisable group with a specific theoretical 
view, glossing over the problem of the reciprocal relation between Sautrantika  and Ddrstdntika. 
The latter has indeed some relevance in understanding Vasubandhu’s precise stance, but for the 
sake of simplicity I prefer to refrain from introducing a complex debate within the body of the 
text. For a discussion of this issue, see Collett Cox, Disputed Dharmas. Early Buddhist Theories 
on Existence, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995, pages 37-41.
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Sautrantika criticism of many Vaibhasika tenets: this angered the scholars, 
some of whom set to the task of rectifying his deviations.121
The section on the four laksanas is especially in tune with the spirit of this 
account, since we see a marked difference between reading the kdrikd in 
isolation, or reading it with the commentary.122 The stanzas of the Kosa accord 
with the Vaibhdsika stance on the laksanas, while the commentary points out 
their futility. Those who accept them are compromising on cogency for the sake 
of tradition: ‘Do we not eat sweets, just because of a few flies?’123
The discussion on the four characteristics takes a Sutra passage as its starting 
point:
These are the three characteristics of the compounded: which three?
For something compounded, Monks, arising is cognised, passing away 
is also cognised, and also, the modification of its abiding.124
The Sutra speaks of only three characteristics: arising (utpdcla), passing away 
(yyaya) and modification of abiding (sthityanyathdtvam). Vaibhdsikas, on the 
other hand, accept four laksanas: birth (jati), decay (jard), abiding (sthiti), and 
impermanence (anityatd). The third seems to have been left out in the Sutra
121 E. Obermiller (tr.), The History o f  Buddhism in India and Tibet, Delhi: Sri Satguru 
Publications, 1986, pages 142-147.
122 The following discussion in based on Abhidharmakosa  2.45b-46, together with the Bhdsya 
and Yasomitra’s commentary. I have for the most followed the order of the arguments as they 
appear, although I have highlighted and expanded upon what seemed most relevant to the 
concerns o f this thesis.
123 ‘It is not that, thinking that flies are falling on them, one does not eat sweets. Therefore, one 
should counteract the faults and follow the established tenets.’ na hi maksikdh patantlti modakd 
na bhaksyante \ tasmdd dosesu pratividhdtavyaih siddhdntas cdnusartavyah  | |  Bhdsya  to 
Abhidharmakosa  2.46.
124 As quoted in full by Yasomitra: trinundni bhiksavah samskrtasya samskrtalaksandni \ 
katamdni truii ? samskrtasya bhiksavah utpddo ’p i prajiidyate, vyayo ’p i prajhdyate, 
sthityanyathdtvam. api  | |
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passage.125 Two solutions are offered to reconcile the Abhidharmic position 
with their source.
According to the first, ‘abiding’ (sthiti) has actually been left out. Only those 
characteristics, which are linked to bringing compounded factors into the three 
times, have been mentioned: birth brings the samskdras from the future to the 
present time, decay and impermanence bring them from the present to the past. 
This is according to the Vaibhdsika doctrine that dharmas exist in the three 
times, but their activity (kdritra) is actualised in the present moment alone: thus, 
the three laksanas mediate between supra-temporal existence and the 
instantiation of a momentary activity.
In the nature (svabhdva) of dharmas, Vaibhdsikas distinguish between existence 
(bhciva) and activity (kdritra). An existent dharma whose activity has yet to 
occur is future. When causes and conditions assemble and the same dharma 
becomes active, it is present, while when the activity has ceased, it becomes an 
existent past dharma. The three characteristics deliver dependent origination 
through time, as activity.126
125 Notice that Nagarjuna’s Millamadhyamakakdrikd, Chapter 7, speaks only of three laksanas 
(utpcida ,  sthiti ,  bhariga),  not four. On the other hand, an argument based on the secondary 
laksanas  is introduced, the latter being a feature of Vaibhdsika Abhidharma  (possibly, if  we 
accept Candrakrrti’s identification, taken from the Sammitlya).  Although most o f Nagarjuna’s 
arguments seem to take their starting point from Vaibhdsika-like categories, the type of 
Vaibhdsika  represented in the Kosa  is of course much later, and not necessarily completely 
representative of the positions scrutinised in the Mrdamadhyamakakdrikd.  Nonetheless, it 
constitutes the most detailed account of mainstream Abhidharma  available in Sanskrit, and thus 
I feel that using the Kosa  (albeit with some caution) is the preferable option for this thesis: 
especially considering that Chapter 3 looks at Nagarjuna through Candraklrti and through his 
Madhyamaka successors (Santideva and Prajnakaramati), for whom the Kosa  was possibly a 
reference work on Abhidharma.  Candraklrti’s Prasannapadd  quotes the views of several 
schools o f Abhidharma,  and shows familiarity with a wide literature now unavailable in its 
originals, while Prajnakaramati seems more heavily dependent on the Kosa  and later Sdslras.
126 On this issue, see especially Paul Williams, ‘On The Abhidharma Ontology’, in Journal o f  
Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981), 227-257.
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The usage of the word karitra is significant. It is here translated as ‘activity’,
197and Vasubandhu glosses it as ‘the operation of a person’ (purusakdra). This
gloss is obviously by analogy: it is what we understand as kdritra in the world,
while in the Abhidharma the operation must be ascribed to dharmas (in this case,
to the laksanas). There is, therefore a kdra, some ‘doing’, without there being a
‘pu n tsa \ a person. Vasubandhu indicates as much in his gloss to the word
purusakdra in another section:
Something alike the operation of a person, is the ‘operation of a 
person’. As in: the ‘crow’s feet herb’ or the ‘drunken elephant
This is better understood in the light of Yasomitra’s sub-commentary:
When for a dharma there is a karman, an action, the latter is its 
‘operation of the person’. (Objection): Indeed, as no ‘person’ 
prompting from inside exists, a ‘person’ is merely dharmas: therefore 
shouldn’t it become ‘the operation of dharmas* t rather than ‘the 
operation of a person’? Because of all this he says ‘something alike 
the operation of a person is “the operation of a person’” . Just like in 
the world for an imagined person there is ‘the operation of a person’, 
in the same way it is for a dharma as well: therefore, something alike 
the operation of a person is ‘the operation of a person’. He gives 
examples: ‘the crow’s feet herb’, and so forth. Some herb, in the shape 
of crow’s feet, is called ‘crow’s feet’. A hero who is seen to be like a 
drunken elephant, that man is a ‘drunken elephant’.129
127 Dhammajoti also translates kdritra as ‘activity’, although he mentions some indecision in this 
respect. See KL Dhammajoti, Sarvastivdda Abhidharma, Sri Lanka: Center for Buddhist 
Studies, 2 0 0 2 .1 was also uncertain as to the most suitable translation of this term, but the gloss 
as purusakdra suggests that ‘activity’ may be a plausible option.
128 purusakdra iva hi purusakdrah \ tadyathd kdkajahghd osadhih mattahasti ntanusya iti ||
Abh idharmakosabhdsya 2.56.
129 yasya dhannasya yatkarma yd kriya sd tasya purusakdra ity arthah \ rtanu 
cdntarvydpdrapurusabhave dhannamdtram purusa ity ato dharmakdra iti prapnoti na 
purusakdrah evaih dharmasydpTti aha purusakdra iva hi purusakdrah \ yathd loke kalpitasya 
purusasya purusakdrah evam dharmasydpTti purusakdra iva purusakdrah  | drstdntam kathayati 
kdkajahghd osadhir ity adi \ kbkajahghdkdrd osadhih kdkajahghetyucyate \ mattahastlva yo  
drstah stlro vd sa manusyo mattahastiti || Yasomitra’s sub-commentary on 
Abhidharmakosabhdsya 2.56.
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In brief this is a case of metaphor or secondary usage (upacara), which I will 
discuss later in see a later in this Chapter.
Whatsoever possesses the ‘doing’ will be, etymologically at least, a kdraka: the 
Abhidhdrmikas avoided to speak of this as a case of agency (kartrtva), although 
the language of agency would lend itself to this extension towards the insentient 
-  following Patanjali’s own hint that all kdrakas are, in fact, agents. 130 
Yasomitra remarks, though, that for the Buddhists there is no difference
between the karman and those who perform it,131 and the section quoted above 
specifies that in this case karman is a synonym of activity (kriyd).
In this instance, Vaibhdsikas seem to side-step Sanskrit grammatical categories, 
to give a more ontologically grounded depiction of an activity, which is no 
‘agency’. This activity pertains only to three laksanas, and thus the Buddha did 
not mention sthiti.
An additional reason for not mentioning ‘abiding’ is that this characteristic is 
common to compounded and un-compounded dharmas alike: in other words, it 
is not helpful in identifying a dharma as compounded (and we are here 
concerned with the four laksanas of compounded dharmas). Hence, although all 
compounded dharmas are also characterised by ‘abiding’, there was no special 
need to mention this.
Alternatively, the compound ‘sthity-anyathdtvam ’ can be analysed as a dvanda, 
meaning ‘abiding and modification’ instead of a tatpurusa like ‘the
130 As discussed in Chapter 1.
131 na hi karma kannavadbhyo'nyad isyate baitddhaih [| Yasomitra’s sub-coinmentary on 
Abhidharmakosabhdsya 2.56.
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modification of abiding’. The joint mention of the two is explained on 
pedagogical grounds: ‘abiding’ is the locus of possible attachment, and as such 
is paired with what renders it unappealing -  its impermanence.132
Thus, conclude the Vaibhdsikas, there are four characteristics of the 
compounded factors {samskrta-laksandni). These are substantially existent: they 
are dravyasat, and not only conceptual occurrences, prajnaptisat. In other words, 
they are real dharmas.
The last point poses a difficulty. If the four laksanas are also compounded 
factors, they should in turn be characterised by another set of four 
characteristics, since the characteristics determine the quality of being 
compounded (samskrtatva). The four laksanas need to be laksyas as well: each 
of the primary characteristics needs to be characterised by other substantially 
existent birth, decay, abiding and impermanence. If this is granted, the 
Vaibhdsika position seems open to infinite regress, since the second set of 
sixteen (four for each of the primary four) will have to be further qualified by 
another set of four characteristics for each one, and so forth, in an exponential 
proliferation of existent dharmas.
The impasse is avoided by distinguishing between the efficacy of the primary 
and secondary characteristics. Each of the primary characteristics gives birth to 
eight dharmas, while each of the secondary characteristics gives birth only to 
one dharma. This is no great theoretical inconsistency: since, as Vasubandhu
i
puts it ‘some hens bear many chicks, some, only few’.133
1,2 esd liy esu sangdspadam atah sriyam ivaindm kdlakamisahitdm darsaydmdsa tasydm 
anasahgdrtham iti  | |  Abhidharmakosabhdsya  on 2.45.
133 tadycithd kilci kdcit kukkuti bcilutny apatydni pm jdyate, kdcid alpdni  |) The word kila  usually 
indicates that Vasubandhu does not personally accept the view he is depicting. Nonetheless, I 
think that rendering this explicitly while translating the root verses of the Kosa  does not do full 
justice to the pun employed by Vasubandhu. Kila  need not necessarily  be taken as a pointer of
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More specifically, when the primary characteristic ’birth’ (jati) comes about, it 
generates the dharma to which it refers; its abiding, decay and impermanence; 
and, lastly, birth’s own birth (jdtijdti), abiding, decay and impermanence. The 
same is to be applied to the other three characteristics. On the other hand, the 
birth of birth {jdtijdti) only generates the primary birth -  thus, it is a hen that 
bears only one chick. The same applies to the other three secondary 
characteristics, and this reciprocal relation averts an infinite regress.
For each dharma, we have thus the following scheme:
Secondary characteristic
jd tijdti 
jdtisthiti 
jdtijard  
jdtycmityatd
sthitijdti 
sthitisthiti 
sthitijam  
sthityanityatd
jardjdti 
jardsthiti 
jarajard  
jardnityatd
anityatdjdti 
anityatcisthiti 
anityatdjard 
anityatdnityatd
sarcasm, and it could be understood as mere emphasis, or even appreciation (‘indeed’). Only by 
reading the commentary, one would understand that this ‘indeed’ means the opposite of its 
literal meaning. To disclose this even when translating the verses deprives Vasubandhu’s work 
of its intended humour. See for example, Leo M. Pruden (tr.), Abhidharmakosabhasyam by 
Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988, where kila is rendered 
with ‘they say’ (page 57; see also page 133, note 16).
Primary characteristic
ja ti
'thiti
-jara
anityata
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2.1.2 The laksanas and sahabhuhetu
The Vaibhdsika position is further clarified in a later section of the Kosa, where 
the pair of laksya and laksana is explicitly taken to exemplify sahabhuhetu, the 
second in the list of ‘six causes’. 134
The sahabhuhetu covers instances of co-occurrence, where each element is the 
result of another and viceversa: it is a type of synchronic and reciprocal (mithah) 
causation. Other examples of this causal relation are the four great elements, or 
mind and associated mental events -  always occurring at the same time and not 
in succession.
Laksya and laksana are described according to this category of reciprocal 
causality. Since all compounded dharmas are laksyas in respect to the four 
samskrtalaksanas (as we have seen), it follows that they are always sahabhu 
hetus. But what is the status of the anulaksanas, like jdtijdti and so on?
For their case, and only for their case, the Vaibhdsika allows an exception: each 
dharma is sahabhu hetu for the anulaksanas, but they are not in turn sahabhu 
hetus for the dharma. In other words, the clause that this type of causal relation 
has to be reciprocal is removed, extending the nomenclature to a case where 
there is only synchronicity and one-sided causality.
We may be tempted to see a weakness in the invocation of such ad hoc 
extensions: arguing for the real existence of laksanas and anulaksanas,
134 ‘Things that are effects of each other are the sahabhu (co-occurring). Like the elements, like 
mind and mind-accompaniments, or characteristic and characterised.’ 
sahabhur ye mithah phaldh \ bhutavac cittacittdnuvartilaksanalaksyavat || Abhidharmakosa, 
2.50bcd. The following discussion also refers to the Bhdsya and the tlkd.
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Vaibhdsikas need to postulate a unique type of causation occurring nowhere else
in their accepted universe. Yet, Yasomitra remarks that:
Providing an exception shows the greatness of a sdstra: we see that
1
great sdstras, like grammar and so on, include exceptions.
Incidentally, grammar {vydkarana), is here taken as the first example of a ‘great 
sdstra\ Considering Yasomitra’s fondness for grammatical analysis, this may 
come as no surprise. Apart from authorial inclination, though, the example is apt 
due to grammar’s paradigmatic role as a way of speaking about laksanas (the 
topic of Chapter 1). Upasamkhydna (what I translated as ‘exception’) is after all 
a technical term in Panini’s system, used to refer to some of the Katyayana’s 
comments: Yasomitra seems to suggest that the Vaibhdsikasdstra is great since 
it uses the same devices (and terms) employed in vydkarana. The suggestion’s 
weight rests on the indisputability of grammar’s greatness.
Whether the employment of upasamkhydna constitutes a flaw or a sign of 
excellence, another, more fundamental problem compromises this account of 
sahabhuhetu. The Bhdsya reports a relatively long discussion about this 
Vaibhdsika category, where one of the objections is:
How can dharmas arisen together be in a state of cause and effect?135
The objector is not identified (not even by Yasomitra). However, this objection 
fits the Sautrantika strictly diachronic understanding of causality, and is often 
found in pramanavada type of texts, more in tune with the latter’s view.137
135 upasamkhydnakaranan ca mahdsdstratdpradarsandrtham \ sopasaihkhydnam hi vydkaranddi 
mahdxdstram dr.syate || I rendered this passage somewhat freely, as I felt that reproducing the 
original syntactical structure would have been particularly cumbersome in English.
136 kathahi sahotpanndndm dharmdndm hetuphalabhdva iti. ||
137 See, for example, Moksakaragupta’s argument in Tarkabhdsd, Pratyaksapariccheda: ‘And it 
does not hold good that mind and mental derivatives are illumined by another knowledge
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I may anticipate that this instance provides an argument by contrast in favour of 
a relative theoretical closeness between Madhyamaka (especially Candraklrti’s) 
and Vaibhdsika. A strictly diachronic understanding of pratltyasamutpada 
poorly squares with the Madhyamikas’ extended interpretation of the latter as a 
logical category, not temporally determined. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Candraklrti’s amplifications of Nagarjuna’s treatment of laksya and laksana 
provide for a case in point.
2.1.3 Sautrantika criticism of the four laksanas
The Vaibhdsika analysis of laksanas and anulaksanas is severely criticised by 
the Sautrdntikas. Vasubandhu introduces their objections with the remark ‘All 
this is like cutting space’ (tad etad dkasam pdtyate). Similar expressions appear 
elsewhere in the Kosa, whenever the Vaibhdsika ‘ontological excesses’ have to 
be curbed. Yasomitra explains that pdtyate can either mean to cut or to analyse, 
explicating a pun that is comprehensible only when we keep in mind a certain 
debate about existents, as the background.138
The Vaibhdsikas accepted space (dkdsa) as one of the three un-compounded 
dharmas, and defined it as absence of obstruction (andvrti) .139 Sautrdntikas
occurring at the same time. Because, those two are not in a state of benefiting and benefited, just 
like the right and left horns o f a cow .’
na tdvat samdnakdlabhdvind jndncintarena cittacaittam prakdsyata iti ghatate \ 
upakdryopakdrakatvdbhdvdt savyetaragovisdnayor iva \
More on the issue of sahabhuhetu is to be found in Y. Karunadasa, ’The Theravada Version of 
the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness’, in Journal o f Buddhist Studies, Volume 1, Sri Lanka: 
Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2003, pages 120-185. See also: K.L. Dhammajoti, ’The 
Sarvastivada Doctrine of Simultaneous Causality’, in Journal o f Buddhist Studies, Volume 1, 
Sri Lanka: Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2003, pages 17-54.
138 Or, as per Collett C ox’s wording, a debate about ‘disputed dharmas*.
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were quick to retort that a mere absence should not be taken as a real existent 
(.dravyasat), as it is a mere conceptual occurrence (prajhaptisat). Therefore, just 
like it is impossible to literally cut space into parts, it is equally inappropriate to 
analyse a mere conceptual occurrence as if it was a real existent dharma. This 
applies not only to space, but also to several other Vaibhdsika categories, 
criticised by Sautrdntikas as being merely concepts. The four characteristics 
(laksanas) are one such group: it is therefore hardly sensible to postulate 
another set of secondary characteristics to solve a theoretical problem that was 
never there in the beginning.
The Sautrantika criticism well exemplifies certain basic differences within the 
two schools. Vaibhdsika Abhidharma can be said to have a certain rationalist 
bent, in the sense that what looks no more than logically plausible is easily 
given existential status as dravyasat. In this sense, it did resemble the non- 
Buddhist Nydya and Vaisesika, and Vasubandhu effectively highlights this 
similarity on occasions, obviously as a shortcoming.140 Sautrdntikas, on the 
other hand, seemed more interested in epistemological clarity, as the later 
developments of this school testify for. This resulted in a more parsimonious 
ontology. The first reason for not accepting the four laksanas to be real existents
139 ‘The ones without outflows are the Truth of the Path and also the threefold un-compounded: 
space and the two cessations. Among these, space is absence of obstruction.’
andsravd mdrgasatyam trividham cdpy asamskrtam \ dkdsam dvau nirodhau ca tatrdkdsam  
andvrtih\\ Abhidharmakosakdrika 1.5.
140 For example, in the Bhdsya to 2.41a, Vasubandhu criticises the Vaibhdsika conception of 
sabhdgatd, pointing to its similarity to the Vaisesika sdmdnya *[...] how is the designation of 
sabhagata done as non-different? In this way, they show themselves to be Vaisesikas. The latter 
also uphold the following conclusion: there is indeed a category called ‘generality’, since the 
cognition of the same arises even in reference to diverse things.’
[ .. .]  katham abhedena sabhdgatdprajnaptih kriyate, vaisesikas caivam dyotitdi bhavanti \ tesdm  
api hy esa siddhantah j sdmdnyapaddrtho ndmdsti yatah samdnapratyayotpattir atulyarakdresv 
apTti |
On this see also Collett Cox, Disputed Dharmas. Early Buddhist Theories on Existence, Tokyo: 
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995, pages 107-112.
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((dravyasat) is none other than the absence of a pramana, a means of valid 
knowledge that could corroborate their existence.
This is on the face of the Sutra passage just mentioned, which speaks of ‘arising, 
decay and abiding-modificationk The Sautrdntikas, therefore, need to give an 
alternative explanation of the same passage: they claim that the Vaibhdsikas 
took the text too literally, while the Buddha warned that one should resort to the 
intended meaning (arthas ca pratisaranam uktarii bhagavatd).
For the Sautrdntikas, the first mistake on the part of their opponents is a wrong 
identification of the referent of the four characteristics. They should properly be 
taken to qualify a flow (pravdha) of samskdras, and not a momentary dharma, 
taken singularly. The word samskrta, compounded, refers only to a continuum, 
while the single momentary dharma is not compounded, but compounding 
(samskdira), being the basic unit from which the former is constituted as a 
conceptual occurrence.
A continuum of instants (ksanas) can be easily described in terms of the three 
laksanas: the beginning of the flow is its arising (utpada); its cessation is the 
passing away (vyaya)\ the flow itself, while occurring, is the abiding {sthiti)', 
and, the differences between its anterior and posterior moments is the 
modification of its abiding {sthityanyathdtvam). The laksanas are nothing over 
and beyond the continuum itself: they are only conceptual occurrences 
(prajhaptisat) characterising a specific behaviour of a group of real, momentary 
dharmas.
The Buddha taught in this way to highlight the fact that every continuum 
originates in dependence upon causes and conditions, and has no permanent
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core or self. 141 Here compounded {samskrta) is glossed as a synonym of
dependently arisen (pratityasamutpanna). Yasomitra amplifies:
‘The quality of being compounded’ and ‘the quality of being 
dependently arisen’ are synonyms. Compounded means made by 
conditions after they come together or join, dependently arisen means 
arisen after having met such and such condition.142
This understanding of the etymology of pratityasamutpada is identical to the 
one defended by Candraklrti in the Prasannapada, as it takes pratTtya as an 
absolutive, formed by prati with the addition of the root I and the suffix ktvci 
(the one regulated by the sutra on continued agency).143 The Sautrantika 
equation here is ‘dependently originated equals compounded’
(pratityasamutpanna equals samskrta), and is derived from a strictly temporal 
understanding of dependent origination as occurring between momentary 
dharmas in a flow. This restriction of dependent origination to an analysis of 
causation in time is, as we shall see, what Candraklrti would specifically oppose, 
despite the analogous etymological understanding.144
141 As the Bhdsya  puts it: ‘What is its meaning then? The immature, blinded by ignorance, 
trusting in and liking the chain of sathskdras  as a self or something belonging to the self, 
become attached. In order to remove that misplaced trust, the Blessed One wished to highlight 
that the chain of samskdras  is compounded and dependently originated, and said: ‘These are the 
three characteristic of the compounded for the compounded” .
kali punar asydrthah \ avidycindha hi bdldh saihskdraprabandham dtmata dtmtyatas 
cddhimuktdh krtarucayo'bhisvajante | tasya mithyddhimoksasya vydvarttandrthaiii bhagavduiis 
tasya saihskdrapravdhasya samskrtatvaiii pratTtyasamutpannatvani dyotayitukdma idam aha \ 
trmlmdni saiiiskrtasya samskrtalaksandni ||
142 samskrtatvam pratltyasamutpannatvam iti parydyav etau \ sametya sambhuya pratyayaih  
krtaiii samskrtam, tain tain pratyayaih pratTtya samutpannam pratTtyasamutpannaiii iti ||
143 See 1,7, 1.7.1.
144 This is the beginning of Candraklrti’s polemic against Bhavaviveka, occasioned by the 
Prasannapada  ’ s gloss on the word prat tty asamutpdda  appearing in Mulamadhyainakakdrikd 
1 .2 .
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Vasubandhu further points out that certain passages in Vaibhdsika texts (like the 
Jnanaprasthdna) make sense only if we understand laksanas as referring to a 
flow .145 Despite this, it is still possible to take laksanas to be conceptual 
occurrences, even if we understand them to qualify the momentary clharmas 
taken singularly:
How? For each instant, existence after not having existed is 
‘arising’, non-existence after having existed is ‘passing away’, the 
succession of subsequent instants to their precedent ones is 
‘abiding’ and their difference from them is ‘modification of its 
abiding’.146
Once more referring to a situation through time, we find here two expressions 
containing ktvd suffixes: abhutvdbhdvah, existence after not having existed and 
bhut\>dbhdh, non-existence after having existed.
In the first expression, following Panini, the same agent should be taken as the 
one who did not exist in the past and that exists later. In the second, the same is 
true of the one who existed and subsequently does not exist. This procedure, 
though, is merely analytical, as it refers an agent to an action that, being 
displaced in time, it could not have done (since the agent is here the momentary 
dharma, lasting only one moment). Moreover, non-existing is an action only in 
the grammatical sense, since for the Sautrantika, as we have seen, existence and 
activity are synonyms. Therefore, the very grammar describing the first two 
laksanas implies them being mere conceptual occurrences {prajhaptisat).
145 ‘Even what was said in the Jnanaprasthdna: ‘In reference to one mind, what is arising? He 
says: birth. What is disappearance? Death. What is the modification of abiding? Decay.’ In that 
context too a mind in the sense of nikdyasabhdga (i.e., a continuum throughout one life) makes 
sense’.
yaci api jnanaprasthdna uktam \ ekasmiths citte ka utpddah \ dha \ jdtih  \ ko vyayah | maranam  | 
kiiii sthityanyathdtvam \ ja m  \ iti \ tatrdpi nikdyasabhdgacittam yujyate j|
146 Katham iti? pratiksanam abhutvd bhdva utpddah, bhutvd’bhdvo vyayah, purvasya 
pilrvasyottarottaraksandnubandhah sthitih, tasydvisadrsatvam sthityanyathdtvam iti ||
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After defending this interpretation against possible objections, though, 
Vasubandhu goes back to assert that laksanas should more sensibly be 
understood as qualifying a flow, and not a single momentary dharma. He 
adduces a sutra passage, where the word prabandha (linked continuity) 
explicitly occurs in reference to ‘abiding’, in accordance to the interpretation of 
the four laksanas initially proposed by the Sautrantika (see above).
This discussion links the question of the four laksanas to central issues, like 
dependent origination and the momentary nature of all dharmas. The 
implications of the next objection to the doctrine of really existent laksanas are 
nonetheless broader, and make the few Sautrantika remarks that follow 
particularly important for the overall understanding of how definitions, and 
characteristics, may work.
2.1.4 On definitions and characteristics: beyond the four laksanas
Vasubandhu raises a possible Vaibhdsika rebuttal:
How, now, can the very same dharma be something to be 
characterised and its own characteristic?147
The Sautrdntikas’> reply appeals to three cases, where the laksana is shown to be 
the same as the laksya (in other words, only an analytic concept). The ‘marks of 
the Great Man’ (mahdpurusalaksandni) are not to be found anywhere beyond 
the group of dharmas called ‘Great Man’. The defining traits that make up for 
‘cow-ness’ (gotvalaksandni), namely, the ‘dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns’, 
are nothing but the cow. And, the laksanas of earth and the other elements, like 
hardness and so on, are no other than the elements themselves. As Yasomitra 
puts it:
147 Katham idcimm sa eva dharmo laksyas tasyaiva ca laksanaiii yoksyate ||
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that very element of earth, characterised as hard, is called hard- 
characteristic. In the very same way, the compounded, characterised as 
existing after having not existed, and not existing after having existed, 
is called compounded-characteristic, explaining the word as ‘it is 
characterised, thus it is called characteristic’. And one is not different 
from the other.148
This understanding of laksana takes it as an object {karman). The usual 
understanding of laksana is as an instrument, something through which 
something else is marked or characterised (laksyate anena iti laksanam). 
Identifying laksana and laksya will be particularly important for later 
Pramdnavada philosophers, like Dignaga and Dharmaklrti, for their 
comprehensive grouping of epistemological objects into svalaksana and 
sdmdnyalaksana. Candraklrti’s discussion and critique of this move 
acknowledges that laksana can be taken in the sense we just found, as an object: 
it is also clear that this is not the manner he employs the term, as the next 
chapter will show.
Besides the overall implication of the Sautrantika reply for their understanding 
of laksana, the three examples adduced should be marked for their occurrence 
in different contexts, which would not have passed unobserved to Vasubandhu’s 
contemporary readers.
The mahapurusalaksanas are exceptional marks on the body of a Buddha. They 
are explained in the Sutras as indications of past merit.149 Each of the marks,
148 sa eva prthivldhdtuh kathino laksyamanah kathinalaksana ucyate | etad eva samskrtam  
abluitvdbhavad bhutvdbhaval laksyamdnam samskrtalaksanam ucyate, laksyate iti laksanam iti 
krtvd 1 na ca tat tasmiid anyat ||
149See for example the Lakkliana Suttanta o f the Dlgha Nikdya, trans. as ’The Marks of the 
Superman’ in T.W. Rhys Davids, Dialogues o f  the Buddha, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000, 
Part 3, pp. 137 -167 . See also the Artliaviniscayasiitra , pages 55-62 and the same, with the 
Nibandhana, pages 283-307.
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like the long ear lobes or the forty teeth, is the direct result of virtues practiced 
for a long time in the Buddha’s previous lives. They are also one of the central 
subject matters of an important Mahdydna Sutra, the Vajracchedikd, where it is 
clearly stated that the Buddha should not be understood (as a Buddha) by the 
laksanas. This is because, otherwise, any universal monarch could be the 
Buddha.150 In fact, the marks of the Great Man are common to Buddhas and 
Universal monarchs. The further implication may in effect be a devaluation of 
laksanas, akin to what we find in the Heart Sutra, where dharmas are empty and 
thus ‘without characteristics’.151
The Sautrdntikas interpretation of laksana as no different from the really 
existent momentary dharmas they characterise can be taken as a response to this 
trend: and the Yogdcdra handling of three laksana is explicitly pitched as a
130 The Vajracchedikd gives both a general and a specific reason for not seeing the Buddha 
‘through characteristics*. The general reason is that characteristics are, in fact, non- 
characteristics; the specific reason is that these particular characteristics are common to Buddhas 
and Universal Monarchs. See Vajracchedika: 5. tat kirn manyase subhute laksanasampadd 
tathdgato drastavyah \ subhutir aha \ no liidam bhagavan \ na laksanasampadd tathdgato 
drastavyah \ tat kasya hetoh \ yd sd bhagavan laksanasampat tathdgatena bhdsitd 
saivdlaksanasampat | evam ukte bhagavan ayusmantam subhutim etad avocat | yd vat subhute 
laksanasampat tdvan mrsd ydvad alaksanasampat tdvan na mrseti hi laksandlaksanatas 
tathdgato drastavayah  || 13. bhagavan dim \ tat kith manyase subhute dvdtrimsan 
mahdpurusalaksanais tathdgato ’rhan samyaksambuddho drastavyah \ subhutir biha \ no hidaiii 
bhagavan \ dvdtrimsan mahdpurusalaksanais tathdgato 'rhan samyaksambuddho drastavyah \ tat 
kasya hetoh j  ydini hi tdini bhagavan dvdtrimsan mahdpurusalaksandni tathbgaena bhdsitdni 
alaksandni tdni bhagavams tathdgatena bhdsitdni \ tenocyante dvdtrimsan 
mahdpurusalaksandniti J j  20. bhagavan aha \ tat kith manyase subhute laksanasampadd 
tathdgato drastavyah \ subhiitir cilia \ no hidam bhagavan \ na laksanasampadd tathdgato 
drastavyah  | tat kasya hetoh | yaisd bhagavan laksanasampat tathdgatena bhdsitd 
alaksanasampad eshi tathdgatena bhdsitd \ tenocyate laksanasampad iti || 26. tat kith manyase 
subhute laksanasampadd tathdgato drastavyah \ subhutirdha \ no liidam bhagavan \ yathdham  
bhagavato bhdsitasydrtham djdndmi na laksanasampadd tathdgato drastavyah \ bhagavan aha \ 
shdhu sbdhu subhute evam etat subhute evam etad yathd vadasi j na laksanasampadd tathdgato 
drastavyah  | tat kasya hetoh | sa cet punah subhute laksanasampadd tathdgato 
drastavyo ’bhavisyat rdjdipi cakravarti tathdgato 'bhavisyat \ tasmdn na laksanasampadd 
tathdgato drastavyah \ dyusmdn subhutir bhgavantam etad avocat yathdham bhagavato 
bhdsitasydrtham djdndmi na laksanasampadd tathdgato drastavyah \ \
151 evam sdriputra sarvadhanndh sunyatdlaksand anutpannd aniruddhd amaldvimald anunbi 
asampurndh  | |  Hrdayasutram ,  long version (almost the same in the samksiptamdtrkd  version).
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corrective, employing the same grammatical analysis of the word. This may 
help explain Candraklrti’s unsympathetic glance at the alterative exegesis, and 
his preference for a non-identification between laksana and laksya. If they are 
accepted to be the same, the type of relational analysis towards emptiness 
favoured by Candraklrti, cannot be employed.
The next example of cow-ness is at least as old as Patanjali. In the Mahdbhdsya, 
it is asked whether, in fact, the ‘dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns’ are to be 
identified with the word ‘cow’. 152 This is the first given alternative in a series of 
possible explanations of what ‘word’ may mean: commentators clarify that this 
section is trying to introduce a distinction between word and referent.153 This 
distinction is not clearly understood in daily life, but is essential to grammar. 
That which has dewlap and so on is not the word ‘cow’, but its referent, the cow 
itself as a thing (dravya).
A sub-variety of this example also became popular to explain in general terms 
how a proper definition works. We find in Nydya manuals that a laksana needs 
to avoid three defects in order to be called so: non-pervasion, over-pervasion 
and implausibility. This is explained through a cow being definable as 
something with a dewlap, possessed by all cows and by cows only.154
152 gaitr ity a tm  kah sabdah \ 5. him yat tat sdsnalahgulakakiidakhuravisany artharupam sa 
sabdah || Paspasdhnikam , 4.
L53t‘This is a cow, this is white’: seeing that in the world there is a usage that does not 
distinguish between word and referent, in order to ascertain the nature of words, he asks ‘then’ 
and so on. ’
ayaiii gauk ayaih suklah iti sabddrthayor abhedena loke vyavahdradarsandc 
chabdasvarupaninlhdmndya prcchati atheti || PradTpa on the same section.
154 See for example, TarkasamgrahadTpika on Tarkasatiigraha I3:laksyaikadesdvrttitvam  
avydptih \ yathd goh kapilatvant \ alaksye laksanasya vartanam ativydptili j yathd goh smgitvam  
| laksyamdtrdvrttitvam asambhavah \ yathd gor ekasaphavattvam \ etad
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This second instance, therefore, brings in a common discourse on laksanas: the 
Sautrdntikas wish to show that their understanding of a characteristic is in line 
with a more widely employed technical usage, going beyond Buddhist 
Abhidharma.
Subsequently, the laksana of ‘earth’ is quoted. Yasomitra draws out the sense of
this quotation very well:
This example is established for both of us, being established in the 
Discourses. The earth element is called ‘hard-characteristic’, and it is 
not that hardness is anything other than the earth element.155
Here the context is restricted to a shared Buddhist tenet, reinterpreted to fit the 
Sautrantika's understanding of laksana as indicating an object. If in cases like 
the hardness of earth, the hardness is no other than earth, the expression 
kathinalaksatiah should be taken as a tatpurusa and not as a bahuvrlhi'. it is not 
that the earth has the characteristic of hardness, it is the characteristic of 
hardness. In this case, the instrumental interpretation of laksana is weaker, even 
in order to explain a commonly accepted definition.
All three laksanas can be employed by Buddhist authors, yet they do belong to 
clearly distinct levels of discourse. The mahdpurusalaksanas are part of worldly, 
non-technical usages, since the idea that some individuals may be marked as 
exceptional through recognisable physical characteristics does not necessarily 
belong to a theorised reflection on the nature of definitions: it belongs to 
ordinary speech. The same cannot be said of the attempt to circumscribe precise 
marks to distinguish cows from non-cows, a technical operation which is
dusanatrayarahitadharmo laksanam || The ‘dewlap’ appears in the translation and, strangely 
enough, not in the text o f the Dipikcr it is nonetheless a sort of stock-example.
153 ubhayasiddho ’yam drstdntah, pravacanasiddhatvdt \ katlunalaksano hi prthividhatur ucyate, 
na ca prthividhdtor anyat kdthinyam ||
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already within the realm of sdstric debate. Lastly, the laksanas of Abhidharma 
constitute a privileged set, since they are able to explicate the ultimate referents 
of any other level of speech, in order to neutralise all the terms that may suggest 
the permanence of a substantial core. The Sautrdntikas point out that, when in 
all these three types of laksanas the characteristic is nothing other than the 
characterised, it is plain idiosyncrasy to treat the four laksanas as if utterly 
different from all other cases.
One more example is given, which matches an ordinary perceptual act with its
Abhidharmic analysis. We notice the presence of smoke, even from afar, from
an upward movement: the movement, though, is no other than the smoke. What
is noticed (smoke) and that through which we notice it (the movement) are
identical: laksana is both an instrumental and objective term. Yasomitra
expands the rationale behind this identification:
For the Vaibhdsika, who upholds momentariness, the upward 
movement of smoke is not different from the latter. That itself, arising 
in sequence in discrete higher locations, gets to the state of upward 
movement. That upward movement is marked (laksyate) as if separate 
from it, but no ‘quality of upward movement’ is accepted as distinct 
from the smoke.156
Here the analogy is between the four laksanas and the movement of smoke. 
‘The quality of being compounded’ {samskrtatva) is only a name for certain 
regular behaviours of momentary dharmas, namely their arising, similarity, 
dissimilarity and disappearance, comprising the four laksanas. ‘The quality of 
upper movement’ (urdhvagamanatva) is no other than a specific behaviour of 
momentary dharmas of smoke, arising and passing away in increasingly higher 
locations. The specific spatial configuration of the sequence of similar smoke- 
instants gives the illusion of a continuous agent performing a certain action,
136 ksanikavadino vaibhasikasya dhumasyordhvagamanam ndnyad asti \ sa 
evordhvadesdntaresu nirantaram utpadyamanam drdhvagamandvasthdm labhate \ tad 
urdhvagamanaih tato bhinnam iva laksyate na ca dlulmasyordhvagamanatvam anyad isyate ||
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namely, moving upward. In fact, here we have an activity (kdritra), which does 
not involve any continuous agent beyond its evanescent manifestations: this 
‘refutation of motion’ is very much akin to the one in the commentary to 
Mahdydnasutrdlamkdra, as we shall see in Chapter 5.
Vasubandhu offers other arguments to show that the Vaibhdsikas’ 
understanding of laksanas is unconvincing and fraught with logical flaws. In 
particular, the possibility of linking supra-temporal laksanas to their momentary 
manifestations in the present is brought into question. Resorting to the medium 
of kdritra complicates the issue, and some of the criticism to this scheme will be 
taken into consideration in Chapter 5, since the link to kdritra is also proposed 
and rejected in Vasubandhu’s commentary to the Mahdydnasutrdlamkdra. This 
second similarity between the two commentaries (possibly by the same author) 
suggests a certain relation between them: perhaps the latter should be read as 
encased in the ongoing debate delineated in the Bhdsya.
This discussion suggests at least three important points concerning the four 
laksanas:
i. they were understood differently in Vaibhdsika and Sautrdntika\
ii. they were closely linked to their doctrine of momentariness, which 
was also different in the two systems;
iii. their interpretation of the four laksanas had repercussions on their 
overall understanding of what a laksana is, with the Sautrdntikas 
favouring a sequential understanding of dependent arising where 
laksanas are only analytical terms for its behaviour.
All three points are relevant for a proper analysis of later debates on 
conventions, and bear upon the sections of Candraklrti’s Prasannapadd that will
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be treated in the next Chapter. Point (iii) will provide an especially useful 
background, since the status of laksanas is the main focus of Candraklrti’s 
argument.
2.2 The seer and the knower: identifying the synchronic agent
The Vaibhdsikas analyse causation in terms of supra-temporal dharmas, 
instantiated into the present as activities by the projecting force of their laksanas. 
Sautrdntikas accept momentary and causally related dharmas, with no existence 
in the future or past. A noticeable trait of both accounts is that, not only they are 
utterly impersonal, but they also eschew any usage of the idea of ‘agent’, 
however loosely understood.
Such method may appear to be in tune with the very purpose of Abhidharma. 
The latter proposes itself as a ‘transparent’ language to speak the workings of 
complex impersonal processes. Conventional linguistic usages burden reality 
with fictitious identities, ‘agent’ being one such imperfect habit of speech. 
Indeed, as we shall see, this seems to be the Sautrdntika (and perhaps Yogcicdra) 
stand.
But is an agent necessarily a person? We have seen that when grammarians 
speak of a kartr, there is no restriction implying that it should be sentient. 
Moreover, the primary sense of ‘agent’ might be understood as a capacity 
(,sakti), either a syntactical capacity or, as a counterpart ‘in the world’, the power 
to contribute towards the accomplishment of the main action. In either case, we 
are certainly not concerned with a person, or a ‘self’ for that matter. This 
suggests that the impersonal language of momentary dharmas need not do away 
with the analytical category of ‘agent’.
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The Abhidharmakosa testifies for that: the commentary and sub-commentary to 
1.42 record a lengthy discussion, trying to find a proper place for the kartr, 
when a cognitive act (like ‘seeing’ or ‘knowing’) is analysed. The focus here is 
on synchronic agency, leaving out the problem of continued agency through 
time (as in the case of statements regarding rebirth, or acting after an intention, 
etc.). In some sense, this type of identification is more basic, while any 
diachronic scheme must be derived from this initial assessment of the nature of 
each act, irrespective of their succession through time.
The passage I have chosen is interesting for a number of reasons. First of all, 
Vasubandhu offers a gamut of rebuttals to the position that ’the eye sees’, some 
of which resemble the Yogdcdra position as criticised by Candraklrti, and which 
are in fact identified as such by Yasomitra. This short discussion, thus, throws 
light upon Candraklrti’s relation to Abhidharma - since the Yogdcdra position 
he criticises is here articulated stressing the precise features he is going to 
criticise, such as the identification of the action with the agent.
Instead of offering a translation of the verse, commentary and sub-commentary, 
I will give a summary taking from the three, and highlighting whatever relevant.
2.2.1 Caksuh pasyati rupdni
The eye sees forms: this is the basic statement of verse 42. By mere force of 
syntax, the eye (meaning, the faculty of vision, the visual organ) is the agent 
(kartr) or, more specifically, the seer. Should this syntactical suggestion be 
taken literally?
Advaita thinkers would answer in the negative, and their preferred solution 
offers a useful contrast. If we take Sankara’s ‘Discrimination between the Seer
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and the Seen’, the question posed is in effect identical: who is it that sees, where 
is the agent of a cognitive act? Through a graded process of elimination, 
Sankara concludes that ‘the Seer is Brahman’, while the seen, the object, is false. 
Thus, the proper referent of our syntax of agency is always Brahman, cognition 
itself, while we superimpose illusory limitations in terms of objects and persons. 
Advaita is an exercise in clarifying the proper referents of personal and non­
personal pronouns: when properly understood, some terms refer to the 
ultimately existent.157
This manner of disclosing the ‘proper referent’ employs the categories of 
grammar to assert that, in fact, speaking of an agent points to an ultimate 
Brahman, or Self, which is the very possibility of any agency -  it is agency 
itself (at least as tatasthalaksana). 158 In one sense, this account is not 
particularly in tune with a ‘softer’ understanding of Panini’s categories; their 
structure mirrors Advaita ontology well, and there is no need to dilute the 
semantic power of terms like kartr.159 (Bhavya pointed out this much: Advaitins 
take the upacdra of kartr as a literal expression).
The more technically nuanced depiction of an agent found in grammatical 
commentaries and sub-commentaries, on the other hand, gives room for
157 The very beginning of Sankara’s Bhdsya opens with two personal pronouns ( ‘you’ and T )  
and explains ignorance in terms o f a confusion in understanding their referents. Sankara is also 
explicit in asserting that the atman is not altogether beyond speech referent (na tdvad ayam 
ekdntendvisayah), because it is the ‘object of the understanding of T”
(asmatpratyayavisyatvdt), ‘not removed’ {aparoksatvdt) and also ‘establish for each person’ 
ipratyagdtmaprasiddheh). The contrast with the Buddhist position is quite significant: for 
Sankara ‘everyone accepts the existence of the Self, as ‘it is not that I do not exist” (sarvo hy 
dtmdstivaih pratyeti na ndhamasmlti).
158 For the difference between svarupalaksana and tatasthalaksana see, for example, 
Veddntaparibhdsd, 8.4 and following sections.
159 If I understand it correctly, Gerow’s argument agrees with these considerations. See E.
Gerow, ‘What is karma (kirn karmeti)? An exercise in Philosophical Semantics’, in Indologica 
Taurinensia, Volume X, 1982, pages 87-116.
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alternative ontology. Grammarians gifted the ‘agent’ with a shifting and elastic 
identity, which could well find a place in the Buddhist world of evanescent 
existents. Thus, it may really be a momentary dharma, the atom-instant of the 
faculty of vision, to be the one who sees: the agent.160
Other dharmas may be candidates for the same role. Vision happens only when 
the eye is in conjunction with the consciousness of the same type (the visual 
consciousness). Without the consciousness, the eye does not see. One could 
therefore assume that, in fact, consciousness is the primary basis of perceptual 
acts (a move not too dissimilar from Sankara’s own).
Nevertheless, consciousness does not have a physical presence (it is amurta) 
that would make it liable to obstruction. If consciousness is the one who sees, 
we should be able to perceive anything anytime, even when something, like a 
wall, is in between. This disproves a position that Yasomitra identifies as 
Vijncinavada, and brings the discussion back to the initial thesis: ’The eye, and 
not the consciousness, sees’.161 We can take this as the first identification of the 
agent, the kartr of the act of seeing.
The conclusion could occasion a further qualm. The Vaibhdsikas adopted a line 
of argument resting on the assumption that walls or other physical objects may 
not obstruct consciousness. In that case, even if the eye is the one who sees, 
why would consciousness not arise in respect to objects behind walls, and so 
on?
160 On the issue of the compatibility of grammarians’ depictions of agency with the Buddhist, 
see Chapter 1, and also Gerow, ibidem.
161 caksuh pasyctti na vijndnam |( For further references to this discussion, and for a similar 
account o f perception taken from the Vibhdsd, see Leo M. Pruden (tr.), 
Abhidharmakosabhdsyam by Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 
1988, page 147, note 173.
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Vasubandhu’s answer is that an instance of visual consciousness and a moment 
of the eye-organ operate in reference to the same object. The visual 
consciousness will only arise if its substratum -  the faculty of vision -  will be in 
contact with a visible object, not otherwise. The Vijnancivada position, on the 
other hand, fails to explain why we do not see objects behind a wall.
Yasomitra identifies what follows as a further objection from the Vijhanavada 
side: how is it that the faculty of vision (caksuh) behaves just like the tactile 
faculty (kaya-indriya), being unable to sense what is enclosed? The 
Vaibhdsikas' reply is that it is because the enclosing matter creates obstruction. 
Yet, this is not satisfactory, since a transparent enclosure creates no obstacle to 
vision, which suggests a difference between the sense of tact and sight.
Vasubandhu’s solution to this problem rests on a specific theory of perception, 
that Yasomitra explains with some detail.
For the occurrence of a visual perception, three conditions are necessary (as
specified in the tikd'y.
the visual organ should be intact;162
the object should be reached by light;163
a mental act should pose its attention to that.164
The problem with cases like the intervening presence of walls and so on, is not 
their being obstructive to the eye-sense (the Vaibhdsikas’ solution), but 
obstructive-ness to light, i.e. opacity.
162 caksunndriyam anupahatarii bhavati ||
163 vimya abhasagcito bhavati\\
164 tajjas ca manasikdrah pm tyiipasthito bliavati\\
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This section goes back to the position that, in fact, it is consciousness that sees: 
when the appropriate conditions come together, visual consciousness will arise. 
If we follow Yasomitra’s identification, this should be the Vijhanavada position. 
Vasubandhu’s critiques of Vaibhdsika stances are usually from the Sautrdntika 
perspective, but the last portion of the discussion depicts the Sautrantikas as 
discarding the very rationale that prompted it. This might explain why 
Yasomitra does not identify these objections as Sautrdntika. The term 
Vijhdnavddin, though, may have been here employed in a restricted sense of 
someone who advocates (vddin) consciousness (vijhdna) as the proper agent of 
perceptual act, which may not necessarily coincide with a Yogdcdra philosopher.
In the Siitras we find the statement ’having seen forms with the eye’ (caksusd 
rupdni drstvd). This seems to contradict the conclusion so far reached - that it is 
in fact visual consciousness that sees, since, as Yasomitra specifies, such 
sentence would have to be amplified as ’a person sees with the eye’, (pudgalas 
caksusd pasyati). The latter statement makes sense only if we take it that it is 
the eye that sees (yasmdc caksuh pasyati), and not the consciousness.
Here the reply is twofold. The first possible explanation is that ’with the eye’ 
means here ’with the support of the eye’ (tends rayena). The sentence should 
then be explained to mean ’having seen by consciousness with the support of 
the eye’ (caksusd dsrayena vijhdnena drstvd). There are other usages to justify 
this interpretation: ’having cognised dharmas with the mind’ (manasd dharman 
vijhdya) cannot be taken literally, since, as Yasomitra puts it, in the present it is 
the consciousness, and not the mind, to perform an activity (kdritram karoti). 
Since mind is already past in the moment of cognition of dharmas, the latter 
must be a function of mental-consciousness (manovijhdna) and not of mind 
itself (manas). If we can ascribe agency to consciousness even in the latter 
usage, even in the first the agent cannot really be the visual organ.
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The second reply is that the work (karman) of that which is supported is 
ascribed to the support, by approximation (iupacaryate). Here, what is supported 
means the visual consciousness, which is the real agent. The support is the eye. 
In reference to the fact that consciousness is seeing (vijndne pasyati sati) there 
is the approximated statement that ’the eye sees’ (caksuh pasyatity upacdrah). 
In sentences like ’the seats cry’, we cannot accept the literal meaning, since 
seats are not sentient. What the sentence actually means is that the men, staying 
in the seats, cry. There are analogous sentences in the Canon. For example, the 
Sutras say ’the forms to be cognised with the eye are beautiful’ (caksurvijneydni 
rupdni kdntdni), while we (Vaibhdsikas) know that it is consciousness, and not 
the eye, that cognises (vijiidnam vijdndti). In this case too, it is consciousness 
(not the eye) that sees: a literal reading of some passages might mislead.
There are statements in the Sutras that describe the eye-organ as a ’door’ 
(dvdram) for seeing (darsanam). This entails that it is not the eye itself that sees, 
but that the eye is a cause or support (hetuh or dsrayah) for the act of seeing, 
whose proper agent is in fact consciousness. If it should be that the eye itself 
sees, Vasubandhu explains, the meaning of such Sutras would be something like 
’seeing is (a door) for seeing forms’ (darsanam rupdndrii darsandya), which 
makes no sense. Notice that the last point entails that Vasubandhu is inclined to 
identify the agent (the eye) and the action of seeing.
The most important section, from the point of view of the discussion about 
agency, is the next. The question is now posed: if consciousness sees, who is it 
that cognises?165
165 yadi vijiianam pasyati ko vijanati?\\ Bhasyam .
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The answer is that there is no difference between the consciousness of a form, 
and the seeing of a form. Since the initial question was about the consciousness, 
which sees, this amounts to identifying the agent and the action (what 
Candraklrti most abhors). The example adduced can be taken to corroborate this. 
Discriminative knowledge can be said either to see, or to know in detail.166 If 
we remember that discriminative knowledge, or wisdom, is at times equated 
with vipasyand, it is not out of place to gloss this as suggesting that the seeing is 
in fact the knowledge or wisdom. And this is precisely how Yasomitra takes this 
whole passage; firstly, he openly equates consciousness and seeing.167 Secondly, 
he expounds upon the example of wisdom iprajnd), telling us that both the Kosa 
itself, as well as the sutras, identify it as seeing. Not all consciousness, though, 
sees. Thus, the agent of a visual cognition is a visual consciousness, and not the 
eye. This concludes the first extended criticism of the Kasmlra Vaibhdsika 
thesis, as stated in kdrikd 1.42.
2.2.2 Kartr and kriyd as analytical categories
The next possible objection to the position that ’the eye sees form’, is that it
appears to entail an identification of agent and action:
If it is the case that ‘the eye sees’; then what is the separate action of 
seeing, belonging to the eye as the agent?168
Vasubandhu replies that this is not a fit objection, since, in the case of 
consciousness, it can be accepted that consciousness cognises, and there is no 
difference here between agent and action. The same is to be applied to the
166 tadyatiid kadacit p  raj fid- pasyaty apy ucvate prajCindtity api |j
157 anenopanydsena darsanavijfianayor andrthdntambhdva id darsayad  || Tlkci.
158 yadi caksuh pasyati kartrblmtasya caksusah kd'nyd drsikriya ||
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statement that ’the eye sees’. Some of Yasomitra’s remarks are worth
reproducing in full:
’If consciousness cognises’, one should tell what is the other action of 
consciousness separate from consciousness as an agent - in this way, 
one incurs an equal fault. ’And there, there is no difference of agent 
and action’ (means): Between the agent consciousness and the action, 
having the characteristic of consciousness, there is no difference, no 
otherness. Yet there is the naming of a link between agent and action, 
as in ’consciousness cognises’. Similarly here also it could be: ’the eye 
sees’. Thus, this is not to be faulted.169
This position is particularly relevant, since it offers the possibility to identify 
agent and action even from a non-Vijncinavada perspective. This possibility was 
already adumbrated in the preceding section, when Yasomitra had quoted from 
the Kosa, and from a sutra, to show how prajnd (wisdom) is seeing (clarsana), 
but in that case the identification of agent and action is not explicit. Here, 
though, we find a rather unambiguous statement of the same.
An analogous identification is to be found in the next opinion reported:
Others say: the eye-consciousness is the seeing, and 
because it is its support one says that ’the eye sees’. Like 
when, because it is the support of sound, one says ’the 
bell sounds’. 170
These and the immediately preceding ‘others’ cannot be Sautrdntikas, since, as I 
anticipated, the latter’s position will be explicated almost at the end. Neither can 
they be Vijndnavddin, if the term is taken in its usual connotation of a specific 
philosophical stream -  otherwise, the term ‘others’ would make little sense.
169 yadi vijnanam vijdndd \ kartrbhutasya vijiidnasya kdnyd vijiidnakriyeti vaktavyam id tulyam 
codyam dipadyate \ na ca tatra kartrkriydbhedah \ na kartrvijiidnasya kriydyds ca 
vijfidnalaksandyd bh edo’nyatvam id  | bhavad ca kartrkriydsambandhavyapadesah vijnanam 
vijdndttd tadvad i/idpi bhavet caksuh pasyatlty acodyam etat \
I
apare punar bntvate ’ caksurvijndnam darsanam, tasyasraybhdvdt 'caksuh p a sv a d ’ ityucyate  
| yathdi nddasydsvayabhdvdt 'ghantd nddab' ity ucyate id  ||
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Two facts suggest that latter two (and possibly even the first) opponents are 
Vaibhdsika philosophers other than the Kasmlra. First, the disputants appeal to 
the authority of the Vibhdsd, which would have force only for those who accept 
it: this suggests that the debate is internal to Vaibhdsika itself. Moreover, 
Vasubandhu concludes the debate by restating what he identifies as Kdsmira 
Vaibhdsika, not just Vaibhdsika. He does not always employ this specification, 
when the objectors are all outside the Vaibhdsika fold. Here though, the explicit 
mention of Kdsmira may be necessitated by the fact that the objectors are 
themselves Vaibhdsika subgroups.
The Sautrdntikas enter the discussion by declaring it senseless: ‘What is this, 
can the sky be eaten?’ (kim idam dkdsam khadyate). Perception should be 
understood in terms of dependent arising, which precludes the idea of a ‘real’ 
agent:
Visual consciousness arises in dependence upon the eye and forms. In 
this case, who sees, or who is seen? Since this is non-operative 
(.nirvydpdra), mere dharmas, and mere cause-and-effect. On these, 
approximations (upacdrdh) are forcefully made: the eye sees, 
consciousness cognises. But one should not become attached to the 
latter. Since, the Blessed One said: ‘One should not be attached to 
popular explanation, one should not run after the notions of common 
people’.171
Yasomitra’s remarks on this section bear upon the issue of how philosophical
language should relate to common usages -  at least from a Sautrdntika stance.
First, Yasomitra places the problem within the grammatical analysis and
understanding of agency:
Non-operative means inactive (nirTha): by this he negates an action 
existing apart from the agent. ‘Mere dharmas’ is the negation of an
171 atra sautrdntika diuih | kim idam dkdsam khadyate 1 caksur hi pratitya tupdnl cotpadyate 
caksurvijndnam \ tatra kah pasyati ko vd drsyate \ nirvydpdram hidam dharmamdtram  
hetuphalamdtram ca \ tatra cchandata upacdrdh kriyante caksuh pasyati vijnanam vijdndtTti 
ndtrdbhivestavyam \ uktam hi bhagavatd janapadaniruktim ndbhiniviseta samjhdm ca lokasya 
ndbhidhdved iti II
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independent agent {svatantrasya kartuh). ‘And mere cause-and-effect’ 
shows that efficacy (karyakdranci) of cause and effect is meaningful, 
even if an agent is not there.172
The negation of an independent agent is the negation of Panini’s definition of 
agency. By context, it follows that grammatical analysis is here identified with 
popular explanation. What follows explicates the same:
‘On this, approximations are forcefully made’: if the thing is a part of 
conventions (vyavahdra), then, in this world {iha) for the purpose of 
establishing a referent for conventions, having construed even the non­
existent as existent, the determination (■vyavasthana) of agent, action 
and so on is made, such as ‘the eye sees’, ‘consciousness cognises’ 
and so on. ‘But one should not become attached to the latter’: an 
existent thing is other than something, which is about to exist, etc. 
‘One should not be attached to popular explanation’: that saying which 
is fixed and ascertained among the people is ‘popular explanation’ and 
one should not be attached to that. Why? Thinking ‘here there is this 
explanation’ one should not think that all explanations are meaningful. 
‘One should not run after (abhidhdvet) the notions of common 
people’. One should not superimpose such notions of common people 
as ‘self’, ‘living being’ and so on. The sense is that one should not 
accept that ‘there is a self, distinct from the body and the rest’, since it 
is the superimposition of something non-existent. Or: ‘One should not 
abhiclhdvet the notions of common people’ means that one should not 
trespass them. The sense is that, one should not imagine that, since the 
referent is not there, even the notion does not exist. ‘Running beyond’ 
or ‘trespass’ have the same meaning.173
172 nirvydpdram iti nirlham 1 cmena hi kartur arthdntarabhutdm kriyduh pratisedhati j 
dharmamdtram iti svatantrasya kartuh pratisedham karoti \ hetuphalamdtram ceti | asaty api 
kartari hetuphalayoh kdryakdranam arthatvam darsayati ||
173 tatra cchandata upacdrdh kriyante \ yadi vastu vyavahdrdhgam \ teneha 
vyavahdrthasatiisiddhyartham asad api sadrupena parikalpya kartrkriyddivyavasthdnam kriyate 
caksuh pasyati vijnanam vijdmatTty evam ddi \ ndtrdbhinivestavyam \ bhdvo bhavitrapekso 'nya 
ity ddi | janapadaniruktim ndbhiniviseteti \ janapadas tatra niyatdi niscitd coktir 
janapadaniruktih tdiii ndbhiniviseta j  kasmdt j atreyani niruktir iti na vd sarvdm evdrthavatim  
niruktim kalpayet \ samjndm ca lokasya ndbhidhuved iti \ dtined jivalj ity evam adikdni sanijiid(ni) 
lokasya nddhydropayet \ abhiitasamdropena asty dtmd sarlrddivyatirikta iti ndtiva gacchet \ 
atha vd samjndm ca lokasya ndbhidhdven ndtisaret \ arthdbhdvdt samjhdpi ndstTti na kalpayed 
ity arthah \ atisaranam atikramanam ity eko ’rthah || See also Leo M. Pruden (tr.), 
Abhidharmakosabhdsyam by Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press,
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The examples given suggest that Yasomitra understands the conventionally 
designated ‘agent’ as being none other than the ‘self’ or ‘living being’ spoken 
of in common usages. Seen in this light, the Sautrdntika position on this 
grammatical category seems to take it in a rather rigid way, precluding the 
possibility of identifying the agent with a momentary dharma, in contrast to the 
Vaibhdsikas’ understanding of the same. The status of notions like ‘self’ or 
‘living being’ is understood as (i) ultimately a misconception but (ii) 
conventionally to be accepted: by extension, we must understand that (i) and 
(ii) must refer to ‘agent’ as well. Since Abhidharma proposes itself as a 
language for ultimate truths, by this very logic it should exclude such 
categories as ‘agent’ -  valid only within conventions.
Apart from the more technical implications of the passage, Yasomitra provides 
a striking example of the ambiguous relationship between ordinary language 
and its Buddhist re-descriptions: in effect, he interprets the same passage (and 
the same verb, abhidhdvet) in two opposite manners. In one reading, the 
Sutra's warning is against running after the linguistic conventions of the world: 
in the other, one is warned against transgressing them (literally, running over 
or going beyond). This double warning, points to a difficult middle way 
between the mere repetition of ordinary usages at one end, and idiosyncrasy at 
the other.
Vasubandhu concludes by restating the Kasrmravaibhdsika position, namely, 
that ‘the eye sees’. This mere statement, though, is by now deprived of any
1988, page 118 and page 147, note 178. The note gives further references to corroborate that 
abhidhdvet may be read in two different ways, but strangely enough does not mention 
Yasomitra.
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force, as no rebuttal is offered against the Sautrantika objections: this strongly 
suggests that, in fact, Vasubandhu’s own preference is not with the Vaibhdsika.
2.2.3 A counter-position, on agency
The Abhihdarmadipavrtti confirms that Vasubandhu was perceived as a critic 
of Vaibhasika orthodoxy. Both in the specific instance and in its general thrust, 
the short work is bent to rectify the Kosa’s position by presenting a 
compendium of Vaibhdsika orthodoxy (not unlike Sanghabhadra’s 
Nyay anus dm ) .174
Regarding the qualm of ‘the eye sees’, the section of the vrtti discloses the 
grammatical horizon that rendered the whole discussion possible. It presents a 
brief discussion of agency, which could well fit in a vydkarana treatise.
The author of the vrtti does not actually employ the term kartr or kdraka, but
the example adduced is common to all grammatical discussions of this subject:
‘Devadatta cooks the rice’. His remarks echo Patanjali and Jinendrabuddhi,
when he decides to explain what constitutes svatantra or pradhdna.115 Not
only the section explicates the grammatical underpinnings of this Abhidharmic
qualm, but also offers further elaboration on the idea of prddhdnya (the
defining trait of an agent) even merely from a grammarian’s stance. It is thus
worth giving a translation of the entire portion:
Therefore, even when other conditions are there, since the eye has 
prominence in respect to the action of seeing, it is said just in this way 
that ‘one sees through the eye’. Just like, Devadatta, even when the 
vessel, water, flame, raw rice and so on are there, as cooking is taking
174 Collett Cox, Disputed Dharmas. Early Buddhist Theories on Existence, Tokyo: The 
International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995.
175 As discussed Chapter 1.5.4.
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place, has obtained competency in respect to one’s own action of 
placing the kettle, pouring the water, inserting the rice, stirring with 
the ladle and removing the foam and has got lordship in respect to 
union with the instruments, because of prominence it is said: 
‘Devadatta cooks’. When on the other hand there is a wish to express 
the moistening of the raw rice grains or the cooking, since there is 
prominence of water or fire there is the designation ‘water moistens’ 
or ‘fire cooks’. Therefore, an assemblage being there, when seeing is 
taking place, due to prominence it is said that ‘the eye sees’. If one 
asks ‘how is there prominence’? When that is improved, seeing is 
improved. Since, as the visual consciousness of the first clhycina is 
equal in the second and the others, an improvement of the seeing is 
observed due to the improvement of the eye. Therefore it is properly 
said that ‘the eye sees, the nayana sees’, while in reference to the mind 
the operation of prajnd is metaphorically approximated as ‘he sees 
through the mind’.176
Most of this argument is analogous to those found in Patanjali’s Mahabhdsya, 
where ‘wish to express’ (vivaksd) is used to explain how each element is in one 
sense a kartr, in line with his interpretation of kdraka as karoti iti (therefore, an 
agent). It also follows Patanjali (like Vasubandhu and Jinendrabuddhi do) in
i nnexplaining svdtantrya as prominence instead of literal independence.
Moreover, the vrtti offers a precise parameter to identify prominence 
(prddhdnya, equal to svdtantrya), the mark of agency. The eye can be seen to 
be prominent in the act of vision as the quality of the latter depends from its 
own quality (not, on the other hand, on the quality of the visual consciousness).
176 tasmdt satsv apy anyesu pratyayesu darsana(na)kriydyds caksusah prddhdnydt tad evdiijasd 
pasyatlty ucyate j yathd vd devadattah sthdlijalajvalanatanduiddisu satsv api pdke 
pravartamdne svasydm
adhisrayano(yeno)dakdsecanatanduldvapanadarvlparighattandcdmanisravanakriydydm  
labdhasdmarthyah sddhanasanniyoge ca paraprdptaisvaryo devadattah prddhdnydt pacatlty 
ucyate \ yadd puna(na)s tanduldndih vikledo vivaksitah pdko vd tadd jaldinalayoh prddhdnydd 
vyapadeso bhavaty ambu kledayaty agnili pacatlti \ tasmdt sdmagrydm satydm darsane(ne) 
pravartamdne prddhdnydc caksuh pasyatlty ucyate \ kathaiii prddhdnyam iti cet \ tatprakarse 
darsana(na)prakarsdt \ tulye hi prathamadhydnacaksurvijndne dvittyddisu caksusprakarsdd 
darsanaprakarso drsyata iti | tasmad yuktam uktam caksuh pasyati nayanah(natn) pasyati 
manasi tu bhaktyd prajiidvrttir upacatyate tnanasd pasyati iti ||
177 Dhannakuti also refers to the importance o f the speaker’s intention. See Vadanydya, 1.16.
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The Sautrdntika criticism was based on interpreting svatantra literally as 
‘independent’, while the vrttVs reply is in line with the grammatical 
commentaries, which specify that here svatantra means ‘the main one’, the 
prominent element in an action. In other words, the Sautrdntikas’ mistake is in 
regards to the proper meaning of agency, which, as grammarians had already 
amply specified, need not imply an actual complete independence, but only a 
relative one in the sense of prominence among many causal elements. If this is 
a reply to Vasubandhu, it is in part surprising: since, as we shall see, 
Vasubandhu’s own views on prddhdnya accord with this possible criticism, 
which perhaps misses the issue at stake. Which could be: when does 
Abhidharmic analysis need to dispense with the category of ‘agent’?
Although this discussion is here between Vaibhdsika and Sautrdntika (at least, 
Vasubandhu’s version of the latter’s view), it will in turn help understand 
Candraklrti’s stance on agency and its place in conventional descriptions. This 
qualm, perhaps more than any other, shows the deep interconnectedness of 
Abhidharma and vydkarana: the latter is openly employed to decide upon a 
central matter of correct usage -  the identification of an agent acceptable to a 
specifically Buddhist ontology.
2.2.4 Agents and conventional persons: a passage from the 
pudgalaviniscaya section
Another debate on agency is found in the Kosa’s last section: it regards 
conventional speech about agents, and is in this sense a ‘step removed’ from the 
technical discussions reported so far.
The pudgalaviniscaya is a portion of the Kos'a especially dedicated to the 
refutation of the VdtsiputrTyas’ doctrine of an indefinable person (pud gala) and
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of the Nyciya doctrine of a permanent self (dtman). An entire study has been 
devoted to this section by Duerlinger, and many of his insights are a useful basis 
for my discussion (especially as he contrasts Vasubandhu’s own views to 
Candraklrti’s ).178 The grammatical nuances and the stratification of analysis 
present in the Kosci’s treatment of agency, though, are worth greater attention.
In brief, as Duerlinger convincingly argues, Vasubandhu considers that persons 
(pudgalas) exist ‘by way of a conception’ in the sense of being conventional 
designation based on a really existent group of dharmas: the five skandhas. No 
other person or ‘self’ is to be found beyond the aggregates.
The series of objections and rebuttals to this position is relatively long and 
complex, but among them one stands out as an explicit discussion on agency:
If there is no self, who is the agent of these karmans, and who is the 
enjoyer of the results?
‘Agent’: what is its non-technical sense? The one who acts is the 
‘agent’. The one who enjoys is the ‘enjoyer’.
This is called a synonym, not its sense. ‘The agent is the independent 
one’ -  thus the specialists in laksanas give a definition of the agent. 
And only in respect to some work there is somebody’s independence.
The latter is seen in the world, in cases like Devadatta’s bathing, 
sitting, going and so on.
And whom do you exemplify as Devadatta? If it is the self, the latter is 
what is to be proved. Or is it the five aggregates? That indeed is the 
agent. There is, moreover, a threefold karman, of the body, speech and 
mind. Among them, in respect to bodily karman, the body engages in 
it in dependence upon the mind. The mind engages in the body in 
dependence upon its own cause, and the same is true of the latter:
178 See J. Duerlinger, Indian Buddhist Theories o f Persons,  London: Routledge Courzon, 2003, 
especially pages 106-107, containing an alternative translation of the section considered. 
Duerlinger remarks how pudgalaviniscaya  is the title given by Yasomitra, while Vasubandhu’s 
own title would be dtmavddapratisedha  (refutation of a doctrine of Self). I have retained the 
former title, since my interest is in the ‘ascertainment of an agent’, with which it resounds 
better.
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therefore there is not anyone’s whatsoever independence. Since, all 
existent things occur in dependence upon conditions. Since it is 
accepted that even the self is not a cause without relying on something 
else, its independence is not established.179 Therefore, no ‘agent’ 
having such lakscina can be got.
On the other hand, what is the main cause of something is said to be 
its ‘agent’. And the self is not seen to be a cause for anything 
whatsoever. Therefore, it would not even be an ‘agent’ of this kind.180 
Since, from recollection comes agitation, from agitation pondering, 
from pondering effort, from effort wind, from there karman, then what 
does the self do here?181
179 Duerlinger: ‘Nor is [the existence of the causal] independence of a self that is [defined as a 
causally] independent [cause] established, since its causality cannot be assumed.’ In this case I 
understand the argument differently. I understand Vasubandhu (and Yasomitra) as pointing out 
that even in the opponents’ system a self does not have efficacy without coming into play with 
other causes and conditions. Yasomitra gives the example of the production of intellection 
(buddhi), which probably refers to the Nydya-vaisesika doctrine that, for a cognition to occur, 
manas must come in conjunction with the at man. This is to explain why, the diman being 
eternal, we do not know all things at all times. To have a cognition, dtman itself needs to be in 
conjunction with something else. Taking the argument as Duerlinger does deprives it of its 
force, since here Vasubandhu is employing a premise accepted by the opponent -  not simply 
saying that ‘causality cannot be assumed’. The difference in our translations depends mainly 
from our rendering as abhyupagamdt. Duerlinger understanding of the compound makes it to 
my eyes extremely awkward. His reading could have been justified if we found *kdranatva- 
anabhyupagamdt, but what we have is akdranatva-abhyiipagamdt and I see no reason to take 
the nan in reference to abhyupagamdt instead of in reference to kdranatva.
180 Duerlinger: ‘But should the cause [of an action of body, for instance,] be called an agent, 
then since we do not at all perceive a self that is [such] a cause, a self is not even an agent in this 
sense.’
In this translation, the main word is missing. That word is no other than ‘main’, and its absence 
renders the grammatical reference in Vasubandhu’s argument undetectable. In effect, I do not 
even think that there is any reason to take this definition of agency as an opponent’s objection -  
I believe this is a definition of agency given by Vasubandhu. Moreover, Duerlinger’s translation 
does away with the relative clause, which stylistically marks a definition.
1 8 1  asaty dtmani ka esduii karmandiii kartd has ca phaldnduh bhoktdi bhavati \ karteti \ ka esa 
bdhydrthah \ karotlti kartd \ bhuhkta iti bhoktd \parydya ucyate ndrthah \ svatantrah kartd iti 
kartrlaksanam dcaksate Idksanikdh \ asti punah kvacid eva kdrye kasyacit svdtantryam  j  lake 
drstam devadattasya sndndsanagamanddau  |  kali punar bhavbn devadattam uddharati  [  yady 
dtmdnam \ sa eva sddhyah \ atha pahcaskandhakam \ sa eva kartd  j  trividhaih cedath karma 
kdyavcihmanaskarma \ tatra kdyakarmani tdvat kdyasya cittaparatantrd vrttih \ cittasydpi kdiye 
svakdiranaparatantrd vrttih tasydpy evam iti ndsti kasyacid api svdtantryam  |  
pratyayaparatantrd hi sarve bhdvdh pravartante \ dtmano ’p i ca
nirapeksasydkaranatvdbhyupagamdn na svdtantryam sidhyati \ tasmdn naivamlaksana 
upalabhyate kascit kartd | yat tu yasya pradhanakdranam tat tasya kartety ucyate | na ca 
dtmanah kvacid api kdranatvam drsyate \ tasmdt sa evam api na kartd yujyate | smrtito hi
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The passage echoes the discussions of agency found in grammatical 
commentaries from Patanjali onwards. The important move, in fact, is to 
criticise a literal interpretation of svdtantrya as independence, replacing it with 
the notion of predominance {prddhdnya, which is the same gloss given by the 
Mahdbhdsyakdra). In other words, the agent is not really independent, but is the 
main element in the accomplishment of the action: this position being identical 
to the Vibhdsdprabhdvrtti portion analysed earlier. What is more, Vasubandhu 
argues for the lack of independence with an explicit mention of the necessity of 
causes and conditions to bring about the action: this argument is also found in 
the section of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary discussed in Chapter 1. If we 
exclude Jinendrabuddhi’s reference vivaksd (analogous to the 
Vibhdsaprabhdvrtti), his reasoning towards equating svdtantrya and prddhdnya 
is identical. This equation, it is worth repeating, goes back to at least Patanjali, 
and does not really rest upon the acceptance of a self. Since, as Vasubandhu 
points out, for a self to accomplish an act, an assemblage of conditions is 
required even in some of the opponents’ views.
The passage makes some important points. A proper understanding of agency 
cannot take the definition of an agent as independent too literally, but should 
interpret independence as causal prominence. In either definition, though, a 
permanent self would not qualify as an agent, either because its agency is 
absent independently from other causes, or because other causes can be shown 
to have efficacy without a self being posited. Most relevantly, in conventional
cchandah cchatidad vitarkah vitarkat prayatnah pm yatnad vayuh tcitah karmeti kim atrcitmd 
kurute  || My translation is quite different from Duerlinger, both in general as well as in specific 
instances. I have marked some of the latter in the previous notes, but an overarching difference 
is in the manner I divide objections and rebuttals: this is no small difference, as it results in a 
rather contrasting reading of Vasubandhu’s main arguments.
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speech about persons performing actions, the ultimate referent of the 
designation ‘agent’ is no other than the five aggregates.
2.3 ‘Self as indirect reference
In the Abhidharmakosa, Vasubandhu needs to explain why the internal 
entrances are called ddhydtmika, which means literally, 'close to the self: while, 
in fact, there is no self. This is a fitting example of the overlapping of two types 
of language, as highlighted by Waldron.182 The first is the synchronic analysis 
in terms of ultimate, momentary dharmas', the second involves continuation 
through time, thus, samsdra -  and ordinary conventions.
Vasubandhu explains that, through metaphor, or by approximation, 
consciousness can be called dtman. These are some possible ways to render the 
term upacdra, etymologically akin to 'going near1 (thus, 'approximation'). 
Upacdra is also employed to refer to secondary usages, where the literal 
meaning of the term does not fit the context. An example is the sentence ’this 
student is fire’ (agnir mdnavakah). The intention is to identify certain qualities 
of fire with the student's own: the student is not, literally, fire.183
Just like fire actually refers to the student, dtman is considered to be an upacdra 
for consciousness. The latter absolves many of the functions otherwise ascribed
182 William S. Waldron, The Buddhist unconscious. The dlaya-vijhana in the context o f  Indian 
Buddhist Thought. London: Routledgecourzon, 2003.
183 On laksand  and upacdra  as secondary usage, see K.K. Raja, Indian Theories o f  Meaning, 
Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963, chapter 6. The section treating o f  the 
Buddhist usage o f laksand, though, seems to conflate the views about language o f several 
different schools (Madhyamaka ,  Yogdcdra  and Pramdnavdda  are treated as a seamless 
theoretical whole).
See also David S. Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem o f  Gradualism is a 
Comparative Perspective, Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1992, pages 26-35. Ruegg is more 
sensitive to the specificities o f a Buddhist context, and in his treatment recognises a significant 
thread through vyakarana, alamkdrasastra  and Buddhist philosophy o f  interpretation. We may 
say that at least three ideas o f alamkdrasastra  apply quite well to Buddhist texts: upamd  or 
simile (see for example the Saddharmapundankasutra ) ;  upacdra  or secondaiy usage; and 
dhvani  or suggestion, if  we follow Ruegg’s analysis.
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to the eternal dtman, like being the innermost, or being that, which continues 
from one life to the next despite the destruction of the bodily elements. On the 
other hand, consciousness is not, literally, a self: since such a thing as a self, i.e. 
a permanent and independently existent essence, simply does not exist (in a 
Buddhist context). Thus, the structure of this upacdra fits the sense of 
'secondary usage', as in the example of'this student is fire'.
One meaning of upacdra is that of a courtesy, for example the acts of politeness 
prescribed for a guest in one's house. In this last sense, the employment of 
dtman is a 'courtesy' towards worldly conventions.184
2.4 Conclusion
The main purpose of this Chapter was not merely to reconstruct specific 
Abhidharmic debates, but rather to show how they bear on two issues: the 
nature of laksanas, and the role of vyakarana. The arguments have accordingly 
been discussed in a somewhat selective light, trying to focus on the aspects of 
the debates that either explicitly or implicitly involved some theoretical position 
on laksanas and on the role of vyakarana.
184 As Sthiramati remarks, all linguistic usages are a type o f secondary indication: ‘There is no 
direct referent o f a word, since it (the referent) is beyond the scope all naming through 
know ledge... on the other hand, all o f  this is secondary usage, there is no primary usage.’ As 
also quoted by Raja, note 3 page 247; mukhyapadartho ndsti ,  tasya
saiyajfidndbhidhdnavisayatikrdntatvdt . . .  api ca san>a evdyath gauna eva, na mukhyo ’sti  || Raja 
interprets Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavydvartam  as having the same purport, but his reference to 
arthakriydkdritd  suggests a conflation o f  early Madhyamaka  with later Pramdnavdda  views on 
language and its functionality. See Chapter 5 for more on this.
I differ from Waldron’s interpretation o f  this section. Waldron states that1 [...] in the 
Abhidharmakosa it is citta...  that the unenlightened beings (mis)take for the self.’ This suggests 
a rather negative sense o f  the term upacdra, while upacara is described as a conscious 
concession, even employed by the Buddha. Moreover, it is a standard Abhidharmic position that 
any o f the five skandhas,  can be taken as a se lf (not just citta).  This position is explicitly 
endorsed by Vasubandhu, in verse 1.20 and its commentary. But see William S. Waldron, The 
Buddhist unconscious ,  The dlaya-vijfidna in the context o f  Indian Buddhist Thought.  London: 
Routledgecourzon, 2003, page 120. Note 68 makes it clear that we are dealing with the same 
passage.
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One of my contentions, which I hope this Chapter corroborates, is that it is 
fruitful to look closely even when a text does not present itself as being directly 
discussing a certain issue. It is often the case that important presuppositions 
happen to be treated as incidental topics. There is in fact some rationale in this: 
the most fundamental presuppositions of a debate are the most difficult to draw 
out, and may become visible only when the debaters push their arguments 
further and further from their initial concerns. Sometimes commentators round 
up a long debate by saying ‘enough with this side issue’ {alam prasangena). 
This may in fact signal the opposite: if the debate’s length was worth noticing, 
the ‘side issue’ may contain very crucial points.
On the topics treated in this Chapter, more could be said by drawing from other 
sections of Vasubandhu and Yasomitra’s texts alone; and obviously, from the 
Abhidhanna texts preserved in Tibetan and Chinese. I could have employed 
more sources, but I trust I have drawn from an adequate number of primary 
sources to substantiate my arguments and contentions. It will be seen that the 
sections I analysed have significant similarities with both Madhyamaka and 
Yogdcdra works addressing analogous questions; and also, that the similarities 
may help understand the positions of those Mahaydna philosophers.
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Chapter 3 
Laksanas, and the emptiness of laksanas
Free from laksya and laksana, not exemplified through words,
1 o c
You saw this world as pacified, with your eye of jncina.
Nagarjuna
Maclhyamaka philosophy may be interpreted as a critique of the metaphysical 
underpinnings of Abhidharmic language: Nagarjuna discarded the ontological 
weight of the world of dharmas, to understand them as mere surface and 
convention.186
I have so far described a milieu that posed great emphasis on 
definitions/characteristics (laksanas). This is true both of sdstra literature as a
1 8 5  laksyalaksananirmuktani vagudaharavarjitam \ scintam jagad idam drstam bhavata 
jndnacaksusd  | |  Lokdtitastava,  1 2 .
186 Generally, Nagarjuna has referred to positions akin to the Vaibhdsika',  and his successors (as 
far as I know) did not discuss explicitly the Theravada  stance. One could therefore wonder as to 
whether the main lines of argument would apply to the latter school as well.
One consideration, though, makes me think that it is so. Pieris has reconstructed the Theravada 
employment of the term sabhava  (Skt. svabhdva),  and some of his remarks are here significant. 
First of all, Theravada  commentators openly reject a position similar to the Madhyamaka  as 
‘rubbish’, discarding the idea that ‘[...] what is arisen is void of the reality of being arisen (jdti- 
sabhdvena), or that birth-death-decay is void in terms of their reality (taih-sabhd vena)  ’ (page 
1 8 9 ) .  To this, Pieris remarks that ‘[...] interpreting “void in terms o f sabhava” as “void in terms 
o f existence” is negated by insisting that the constituents o f existence or dhamma  such as visible 
form, etc., t r u l y  exist and that voidness is not to be equated with their non-existence.’(page 1 9 0 ,  
emphasis is the author’s own). If Pieris’ interpretation is sound, Madhyamaka  critique would 
then equally apply to their notion o f  svabhdva , however different it may be from the 
Vaibhdsika's.
See A. Pieris, iSabhdvadhamma: a Pali AbhidharmmikaNeologism and Its Probable Meaning, 
in Journal o f  Buddhist Studies,  Volume 1 ,  Sri Lanka: Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2 0 0 3 ,  pages 
1 8 6 - 2 0 6 .
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whole, regulated by vyakarana, and of the more specialised concern of Buddhist 
Abhidharma. Both produced, and employed, shared laksanas, which shaped 
their analysis and technical usages.
Within a Buddhist context, the shift from dharmas to their emptiness brings the 
focus upon the status of laksanas, as opposed to their sound formation. A 
Vaibhdsika text is mostly concerned with giving viable laksanas, while any 
discussion on their ontological status (like the one reproduced in Chapter 2) 
appears as a detour within a broader discussion. Dharmas are selfless, not 
because the laksanas themselves are empty, but because no dharma with the 
laksanas of a ‘se lf may be ultimately found. Madhyamaka, on the other hand, 
examines whether these laksanas may be in any sense ultimate. By shifting the 
attention to definability itself, Madhyamaka provides an analysis that could 
always resolve its referents as empty. Falling necessarily within the 
interdependent pah’ of laksya and laksana, nothing is immune to analysis.
Such dialectic is the analytical tool with widest possible applicability: many 
refutations can be read as specific instances of this argument.187 Two short texts 
exemplify well the shift of emphasis towards emptiness, as the emptiness of 
laksanas.
187 Tachikawa noticed as much, although he did not mention that laksya and laksana are the 
basic ‘variables’ at play:
In this system it is propositions describing two entities standing in a relationship o f  
dependent co-arising to one another that represent the focus o f discussion and serve 
as the pivot for all subsequent logical developments.
See M. Tachikawa, An Introduction to the Philosophy o f  Nagarjuna, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
1997, page 35.
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3.1 The Lokatitastava and the Heart Sutra: emptiness as lack of 
characteristics
Besides the Mulamadhyamakakdrika, a number of ‘minor’ works are attributed 
to Nagarjuna. Many of such works resemble the Kdrikd in style and subject 
matter, occasionally expanding upon certain topics. This can be said of the 
Lokatitastava.
Expositions of Maclhyamaka will necessarily rely on the 
Midamadhyamakakarika as their fundamental source. Here, though, I will start 
from the Lokatitastava for the following two reasons: i.) the Lokatitastava is 
structurally akin to the Hrdayasutra, to the extent that it could be read as a 
commentary to the latter; ii.) it influenced Candraklrti’s interpretation of 
Nagarjuna, especially in terms of equating emptiness with lack of characteristics 
(ilaksanas).
The relationship between the Hrdayasutra and the Stava regards primarily the 
gradual sequence presented in both texts. This sequence corroborates an 
interpretation of Madhyamaka as allowing graded conventions, so that 
emptiness is approached from a specific framework of conventional truths.
The second point provides a useful key to some distinctive features of 
Candraklrti’s thought: namely, its relation to vydkarana, Abhidharma, Yogdcdra 
and non-Buddhist Indian philosophies.188
188 Ruegg has commented upon the difficulty in reading Candraklrti’s philosophical language, 
especially with reference to the wide background o f erudition that informs it: while listing the 
sources o f Candraklrti’s thought, he in effect starts by saying that ‘[...]h is exposition and 
argument presuppose on the part o f  the reader a high degree o f familiarity with grammar 
(vydkarana)[.. . ] \  while the other sources include Abhidharma and non-Buddhist philosophies. 
As the very structure o f  my thesis suggests, I agree with this gradation, which is in some sense a 
gradation o f  laksanas. See David S. Ruegg, Two prolegomena to Madhyamaka philosophy, 
Wien: Universitat Wien, 2002, page 8.
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Candraklrti’s exposition of the two truths can be read as an analysis of laksya 
and laksana, and of their status. Nagarjuna had provided a precedent for this, in 
the Lokatitastava. Their treatment of the pair of laksya/laksana may open some 
insight into Nagarjuna’s own understanding of his other analyses. The 
Prasannapadd quotes from the Stava while engaging its longest discussion of 
the topic.
3.1.2 From the aggregates to their emptiness
The first verse of the Lokdtita suggests its relation to Prajndpdramitd texts, as 
the Buddha is praised as viviktajnanavedine. Even on the strength of the Tibetan 
translation as dberi p a ’i ye ses rig gyur pa , we may take the compound 
viviktajnana as as either sasthitatpurusa or as a kannadhdraya: thus, vivikta is a 
noun, or an adjective. The Tibetan choice of dben pa ’i ye ses rig gyur pa makes 
it plausibly related to its usages in the Prajhdpdramitbsutras, as in 
prajndpdramitd vivikta, in this case in a sense akin to ‘empty’.189
The second half of the same verse can be also read as referring to Sakyamuni’s 
previous training as a Bodhisattva. It seems unlikely that ciram would be used 
for a few years of training within one life (the six years of Gautama’s intense 
austerity). An anonymous commentary upon the Lokdtita glosses ciram with 
dsariisdrdt, which would also better fit a Mahdydna context, perhaps in 
reference to adibuddha. l9°
189 Lindtner translates it as ‘versed in the cognition o f the void’. Christian Lindtner, 
Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy o f  Nagarjuna,  Delhi: Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1987. Nagarjuna’s work has been traditionally (and plausibly) linked to the 
Prajndpdramitdsutras, to the extent that the first verse of the Mulamadhyamakakarika is found 
embedded in the short Kausikaprajndpdramitdsutra.
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As the very word Mahaycina occurs in verse 27 of the stava, there is little doubt 
about its belonging to this stream.191 Through an outline of their basic structures, 
its similarity to the Hrdayasutra in particular, may become apparent.
The core of the Sutra is a dialogue between Sariputra and Avalokitesvara. The 
bodhisattva, while training in the Perfection of Wisdom, had seen the five 
skandhas and (ca) had seen their empty nature. Inspired by Sakyamuni, 
Sariputra asks Avalokitesvara how a Bodhisattva should train in the Perfection 
of Wisdom. The answer is that he or she should first see the five skandhas, then, 
see their empty nature. (Sariputra only mentions a male Bodhisattva, but
Avalokitesvara specifies that it is ‘he or she’). ‘Form is emptiness’ (ruparii
sunyatd) and ‘emptiness is no other than form’ (rupdn na prthak sunyatd), and 
this is also true of the other four skandhas. We could plausibly say that this is 
the centre of Avalokitesvara’s reply.
Avalokitesvara’s realisation as well as the proposed training for an aspiring 
Bodhisattva begins by seeing the five skandhas, the Abhidharmic 
deconstruction of a living being into mental and non-mental constituents. 
Neither starts on the basis of the rough conventionalities of the untrained and 
proposes to directly see their emptiness: the skandhas have to be seen first. This 
is an important feature of the manner I understand Madhyamaka, and is a 
recurrent structure of many other Mahay ana scriptures.192
190 See Appendix 2 . 1 have not yet been able to establish whether this commentary is the same as 
the Akdratikd, reproduced by Lindtner in Ndgdrjaniana,  since I find the photos difficult to read.
I will occasionally refer to this work in this Chapter.
1 9 1  at as tvayd mahdydne tat sdkalyena darsitam  || 27c.
192 Other texts by Nagarjuna, like the PratTtyasamutpddahrdayakdrikd,  present the same 
gradation. For another clear example in a Mahdydna  scripture, see the 
Siivarnaprabhdsottamasutra ,  Sunyatdparivarta.
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Verses 2 and 3 of the Lokatitastava present an analogous gradation. Nagarjuna 
first declares that there is no living being (na sattvo ’sti) apart from the skandhas 
(skandhamatravinirmuktah). And to the intelligent ones, the Buddha showed 
even the skandhas to be like a dream or an illusion: empty. Here too, there is no 
indication that the conventional validity of the five skandhas should be 
discarded. On the other hand, the ascertainment of ultimate emptiness passes 
through a prior observation of the five aggregates.
The Sutra asserts the emptiness of the five skandhas, and Nagarjuna offers their 
dialectical refutation. This is a common difference between sutras and sdstras: 
the latter offer reasoned demonstrations and expositions of what the former state 
or imply.
The Heart Sutra expands upon its initial assertions, by declaring that all 
dharmas are emptiness (sunyatd), devoid of characteristics (alaksandh), non­
ceased (aniruddhah), not stained or stainless (amala-avimaldh)m  not lacking 
(anundh) and not full (asampurndh). Of all these qualifications, the first two are 
particularly significant for Madhyamaka thought, where ultimate truth can be 
explained through the equation of emptiness (sunyatd) with lack of 
characteristics.
The six verses of the Lokatitastava devoted to the refutation of the skandhas, 
appeal to both types of definitions treated in the first two Chapters: those of 
vydkarana and those of Abhidharma.
193 These compounds could be analysed differently. For mnyatidaksanah  could be taken as one 
tatparm a , while amaldvimalah could be taken as two different words. I owe this to the 
comparison with the Tibetan translation, which excludes certain possibilities, and in particular to 
the guidance o f Ven.T.Gyaltsen.
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Verse 3 refutes form (rupa, the aggregate of materiality). According to 
Abhidharmic analysis, rupa is composed of the ’four great elements’ 
(,mahdbhutdni) . 194 The latter are not as such perceptible, while rupa, their 
derivative, can be perceived. 195 Here Nagarjuna retorts that it is self­
contradictory to describe rupa as perceptible, while denying the same of its 
constituent elements: brown wood, for example, will not make for a green table. 
Thus, rupa is refuted.196
Vecland (feeling or sensation) cannot be ultimately existent, due to the 
reciprocal dependence of sensation and something to be sensed (vedaruya). This 
type of argument is structurally akin to the arguments about laksya and laksana.
The refutation of samjnd is based upon a pun. The Tibetan translation as mifi 
fails to reproduce the two possible senses of the original, and obscures the fact 
that what appears in the six verses is none other than the names of the five 
skandhas. Samjnd does not only signify a word or appellation (mm), but also the 
aggregate of notion. Lindtner is aware of the problem, and he translates here as: 
‘concept [= a name, mi/i]’,197
194 The Abhidharmakosa's  stance is that rupa  comprises the five indriyas  and the five types o f  
avijnaptis  (1,9a). When this is fit within a theory o f great elements, the latter are counted as four 
(1,12a).
195 Nagarjuna uses the expression a-caksur-grdhyani  to refer to the great elements. It literally 
means ‘not to be apprehended by the eye’, but it can be sensibly interpreted as referring to all 
the sense faculties. The word pratyaksa , meaning direct sense-perception, gets its meaning 
through the same type o f extension.
195 A slightly different argument to refute the aggregate o f form is found in Sunyatdsaptati,  45.
197 Christian Lindtner, Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy o f  Nagarjuna, 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987, page 131.1 am indebted to Prof. David S. Ruegg for bringing 
my attention to the fact that the Tibetan translation did not choose to render samjnd  with the 
word normally employed to refer to the aggregate.
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The literal meaning of the refutation depends upon the sense of samjnd as 
’word’, which explains the Tibetan rendering. Word and referent (,samjnd and 
artha) cannot be established as either same or different. If they were identical 
then ’the mouth would be burnt by fire’.198 If different, they could not be related, 
thus no meaning could be understood from any word. This dialectic can actually 
apply, through some modification, to samjnd as a skandha (which, as 
Stcherbatsky also noticed, is related to word-meaning). 199 The precise 
relationship between word and notion, though, is a complex point of discussion 
and would require much more extensive treatment than the present context may 
allow.
3.1.3 The meaning of autonomy and the absence of God
The treatment of samskdraskandha is significant for one more reason yet: 
Nagarjuna begins with a paraphrase of Panini, the only one I am aware of in his 
texts. The verse starts by stating that the Buddha, conventionally, spoke of 
kartd svatantrah and also of karman. Kartd svatantrah can be split in two ways: 
as kartd + svatantrah or as kartd + asvatantrah. The commentary follows the 
second option:
198 On the frequency and significance o f  this example in different, independent traditions, see 
Jan E.M. Houben, ‘Semantics in the history o f  South Asian thought’, in Madhav M. Deshpande 
and Peter E. Hook (eds.), Indian Linguistic Studies. Festschrift in Honor o f  George Cardona ,  
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2002, especially page 205. Note 5 in the same page quotes the 
Nydyasiitra,  which Nagarjuna must have known very well, if  we accept the Vaidalyaprakarana 
to be his work. Houben points out that in all the traditions analysed, this or similar examples are 
used to refute certain 'pre-theoretic ideas' such as 'an unreflective common sense approach to 
language and reality' which 'may tend to identify the word with the referent'. It is to be marked 
that according to Madhyamaka  analysis, it is impossible to establish a relation when two things 
are not identical - and also when they are  identical. This presupposition is at the basis o f  many 
refutations, not only the one at hand, but also the more well-known analysis o f  satkdiyavdda  
and its opposite (the identity or difference o f  cause and effect).
For this specific argument and its expansion, see also Vaidalyaprakarana, verse 52 and 
commentary.
199 Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic,  New York: Dover Publications, 1962.
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There is, what? An agent like a ‘Lord’ and so on. How is he? Not 
autonomous, depending on an assemblage like (?) and so on. There is, 
what? An object of the action. How is it? Not autonomous, dependent 
on something else, depending on the agent. It is said, uttered, what?
This pair. How? In transactional usage, conventionally. There is, 
what? The establishment. How is it? Opined, accepted. By whom? By 
you. Of what? Of these two, agent and object of the action. How is it? 
Mutually dependent. How? On the other hand...200
The possibility to read the verse as kartd + asvatantrah did not occur to 
Lindtner, but it is both grammatically sound and stylistically justified. It is a 
feature of Buddhist authors in general and of Nagarjuna in particular, to exploit 
simple inversions by the addition of a single word or particle.201
The word Isvara, translated here as ‘Lord’, is used in Sanskrit literature in at 
least two different senses. It can refer to a powerful god, with a remarkable level 
of agency within the world, but still not omnipotent nor eternal: in particular, it 
is often a synonym of Siva. This type of ‘Lord’ is acceptable within Buddhist 
cosmology, and would correspond to a ‘conventional’ one, dependent upon 
causes and conditions.
The second sense is that of an ultimate ‘Lord’, omnipotent and eternal creator of 
the universe: God. This is what does not find a place in Buddhist cosmology,
2G°asti kali kartd Tsvarddih kimvisistah asvatantrah ebhivyddi(?)sdmagryadlunah asti kiiii tat 
karma kimvisistam asvatantram pardyattam kartradlunam uktam bhdnitam kim etaddvayam  
kuto vyavahdratah saihvrtyd asti kd siddhih kimbhutd abhimatd svlkrtd kasya te tava kayor 
anayoh kartrkarmanoh kimbhutd paraspardpeksikTkatham tu  | | S | |
Please see the Appendix 2, image 3, for the many differences from the actual manuscript. For 
example, instead o f asvatantra , the manuscript consistently has asvatantra, but I frankly doubt 
Nagarjuna wished to say that agents and objects o f the actions are conventionally propelled by 
horses.
201 This was first brought to my attention by Dr.K.Srinivasan, in reference to Ncigdnanda,  where 
a similar verse occurs in two very different contexts, acquiring a dramatically divergent meaning 
the second time (1.18 and 5.33). Nagarjuna himself offers examples o f  this (as in 
Mulamadhyamakakdrikd  24.1 versus 24.20) and the same stylistic device is used by Santideva 
for different purposes (Bodhicaiydvatdra , 6.10).
130
and what Buddhist authors take great pains to refute. In this instance, the 
refutation rests on what grammatical commentaries themselves point out. Any 
agent depends upon a causal assemblage: hence there is no ultimate svatantra if 
we understand the word to mean ‘independent’.
The difference between convention and ultimate analysis is not here in the fact 
that, conventionally the agent is autonomous while it is not so ultimately. Both 
conventionally and ultimately the agent is analysed as non-autonomous, and the 
same is true of the karman. Except that: conventionally, the agent is taken to be 
dependent from a causal assemblage, while ultimately it is dependent on the 
karman too. In other words, conventionally one may agree with the 
grammarians, who speak of a predominant agent while being aware of the 
agent’s dependence on a causal assemblage. Ultimately, though, the kdrakas 
themselves are mutually established.
The alternative reading of the verse is to split kartd svatantrah so that it means 
‘autonomous agent’. In this case, the verse means that the Buddha spoke of an 
autonomous agent only conventionally. This is not dissimilar to what the 
grammatical commentaries tell us: ‘autonomy’ is only contextual, hence 
conventional, and is to be understood as causal prominence, rather than causal 
independence. Following this reading, the wording is identical to Panini’s sutra 
that defines agency {svatantrah kartd).
Nagarjuna shifts with ease from the laksanas of Abhidharma to those of Panini,
/suggesting he regards both Has having force. As we have seen, this is a
/
characteristic of Abhidharma literature as well: even more so, it will be seen, 
this feature is prominent in Nagarjuna’s great commentator, Candraklrti.
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Vijncina, the fifth aggregate, is refuted by appealing to the mutual dependence of 
cognition (jncina) and something to be cognised ijheya). The argument is not 
dissimilar to the one employed for vedana202
We can therefore see that the modes of refutation for each of the aggregates are 
not identical in each case, although there are occasional recurrences. Nagarjuna 
himself, though, offers a red thread that runs through the five refutations and 
constitutes their blueprint or fundamental principle, in the following verse.
3.1.4 Beyond the world, beyond characteristics
Concluding his examination of the five aggregates, Nagarjuna points out that 
laksya and laksana are mutually dependent. Verse 11 does not constitute the 
refutation of a specific aggregate; it follows the section on the aggregates and 
precedes a verse of a different tenor. This suggests that the statement on the 
emptiness of laksya and laksana is given as the primary rationale underlying all 
the preceding refutations: as the fundamental dialectical structure, of which each 
previous argument is but a specified application. The skandhas can be 
deconstructed, by questioning their definability: the latter always stems from the 
interdependent pair of laksya and laksana. As in the Heart Sutra, the first 
synonym of the emptiness of the skandhas is the absence of laksanas.
I have quoted the subsequent verse at the beginning of this Chapter. Here we 
find no refutation, but a hint at the fruit and purpose of the previous analysis. 
Absence of laksana and laksya entails inexpressibility; thus, the world is ’bereft 
of exemplification through speech’ (vcigiidahdravarjitam). It is also ’pacified’
202 In effect, verse 39 o f  the Bodhicittavivarana (the one edited and translated by Lindtner) 
refers to both vijncina and vedana:
ses pas ses bya rtogs p a  te \ \ ses bya m edpar ses pa  m ed \ \ de Itar na ni rig  bya dan \ \ rig byed  
m ed ces cis mi 'dod ||
See also Acintyastava 50a: jnane satiyathd jneyam  jn eye jncinam tathci sati ||
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(,sdntam). Laksya can also mean a goal, like, literally, the target of an arrow. As 
Santideva will tell us, without referents, ’due to the absence of any other way, 
the mind is pacified’.203 Thus, the recognition of the empty nature of laksana 
and laksya has an obvious soteriological significance.
The symmetry between the sutra and the stava continues in the following verses. 
The next two synonyms of emptiness listed by Avalokitesvara are ‘non-arisen’ 
(<anutpanna) and ‘non-ceased’ (anirudclha), and verses 13-19 deal in fact with 
the ultimate impossibility of production or cessation.204
Other similarities may be found, but this much is enough to highlight the 
recurring feature I commented upon at the outset: in both cases, the starting 
point is the laksanas of the Abhidharma. The analysis in terms of aggregates 
and so forth, suffices to deconstruct a person into its constituent dharmas: 
subsequently, the dharmas themselves are understood as empty. This gradation 
is to be found both in the prajndpdramitd literature (the Heart Sutra being only 
one example205) and in the Lokatitastava: and these are important sources for 
Candraklrti’s own exegesis of Madhyamaka.
In that respect, it is sensible to examine whether and how the conventions of 
Abhidharma constitute the starting point of Candraklrti’s analysis: I will
2 0 3  tadanyagatyabhavena niralam bapraSam yate  | |  Bodhicaryavatara  9.34.
204 In particular, verse 13 deals with the impossibility o f arising {utpcida)\ verse 14 refutes 
cessation (vinam -nirodha)\ verse 15 and 16 discuss the identity or difference between an 
existent thing (bhdva) and disappearance (vincisa); verse 17 analyses whether the effect (kcirya) 
can arise from a cause which has already ceased, or one who has not; verse 18 applies this to the 
example of the seed and sprout (blja  and ankum)\ verse 19 draws the conclusion that the world
(jagat) is therefore bom from a misconstruction (parikcilpasamudbhavam) and hence, being 
unarisen, does not cease (<anutpannam na nasyciti).
205 In Chapter 2 I have extensively quoted from the Vajracchedikd as another text talking about 
laksanas and their absence.
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dedicate several sections of the following to that end. In the present Chapter the 
issue will be analysed from the perspective of a discussion about defining traits 
(laksana) and their proper status.
That laksanas and their emptiness may be the central theme of the Lokdtita is 
also corroborated by the anonymous commentary to the stava, in its concluding 
gloss:
‘Praise o f the one gone beyond the world’ means: the three worlds, 
called desire, form and formless; gone beyond, removed from those, 
because of having gone beyond all laksanas and dharmas, the stava, 
the praise, of that Tathdgata20b
3.2 Candraklrti and laksanas
Candraklrti offers a sustained analysis of the status of laksya and laksana in 
several sections of the Prasannapadd. His position is partly derived from the 
Lokdtita, and plausibly from the vast array of Mahdydna Sutras he quotes 
throughout the commentary. It may be summarised in three main points:
i. in the highest sense {paramdrthatah) all phenomena {dharmas) are empty. 
The pair of characteristic and characterised {laksana and laksya), which would 
individuate them, is mutually dependent, thus un-established;
ii. being mutually dependent, on the other hand, allows for conventional 
validity. The same parameter, which established ultimate emptiness, makes 
conventions possible;
lokdtitastavah lokds trayah kdmarupdrupydkhydh tebhyo 'tlto ‘pagatah  
sarvalaksanadhanndtltatvdtyas tathdgatah tasya stavas stutir iti j |
Once again please see Appendix 2, image 10, for the original text, which I have edited to obtain 
sensible readings.
134
iii. some types of descriptions are to be preferred to others. Some philosophers 
offer models that do not fit in either of the two truths as just described, and 
others still, are prey of poor reasoning.
The first two points are asserted in the Prasannapada both as general statements, 
as well as in reference to specific instances.
3.2.1 The basic status of laksana and laksya
An overarching discussion of laksana and laksya appears in the commentary to 
Millamadhyamakakarikd 1.1. Here Candraklrti attacks the Yogdcdra ideas of 
svalaksana and sdmdnyalaksana (in the sense in which they are used in 
Dignaga’s system). He quotes two verses of Nagaijuna, both showing the 
ultimate non-existence of laksana and laksya. The first verse is from the 
Millamadhyamakakarika itself, while the second is the passage of the Lokdtita I 
have analysed above. To the latter, Candraklrti provides a relatively elaborate 
commentaiy:
Moreover, that laksana might be either different or non-different from 
the laksya. Among the two possibilities, if it is different, then due to 
its being different from the laksya even the laksana would not be a 
laksana. And due to its being like the non-laksya, different from the 
laksana, even the laksya, would not be laksya. In the same way, the 
laksana being different from the laksya, the laksya would be 
independent of the laksana. And therefore that would not be laksya, 
due to its independence from the laksana: like a flower in the sky. Or, 
if laksya and laksana are not different, then, since it is non-distinct 
from the laksana, like the laksana’s very self, the laksya lacks the 
state of being laksya. And since it is not distinct from the laksya, like 
the laksya’s very self, even the laksana would not have the nature of 
laksana. As it has also been said:
Tf the laksana is other from the laksya, that laksya would 
be without laksana;
and you very clearly told of their non-existence in case of 
its being not other.’
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And there is no other way to establish laksya and laksana apart from 
as same or different.207
The argument of sameness and difference is retraced to Lokatitastava 12. That 
no third is given between identity and difference is an axiom of Madhyamaka 
dialectics. The implication of the passage amounts to what I described in point 
i.): the reciprocal dependence of laksya and laksana makes them ultimately 
empty.
On the other hand, two other passages in the same section clarify how the
reciprocally dependent laksya and laksana have to be conventionally accepted:
In this way, even though in the case of earth and the rest when 
scrutinised there is no laksya apart from hardness and so on, and 
apart from the laksya the laksana is without basis, still, just 
conventionally, the Acaryas have been positing their
establishment through a reciprocally dependent establishment of 
both. And this should necessarily be accepted. Since otherwise, 
conventions would not cease to be fit when reasoned about: and 
that would itself be reality (tattva), not conventions.208
207
kinca bhedena vci tal laksanam laksyat sydt abhedena va \ tatra yad i tavad bhedena tada 
laksyad bhinnatvdd alaksanam api na laksanam \ laksanac ca bhinnatvdd alaksyaval laksyam 
api na laksyam \ tathcl laksyad bhinnatvdl laksanasya laksananirapeksam laksyam sydt \ tatas 
ca na tal laksyam laksananirapeksatvdt khapuspavat \ athdbhinne laksvalaksane, tada laksanad 
avyatiriktatvdl laksanasvdtmavad vihiyate laksyasya laksyatd | laksydc ccivyatiriktatvdl 
laksyasvdtmaval laksanam api na laksanasvhabhdvam \ yathd coktam: laksya I laksanam anyac 
cet syd t tal laksyam alaksanam \
toy or abhdvo’nanyatve vispastam kathitam tvayd  || iti || na ca vind tattvdnyatvena 
laksvalaksanasiddhau anyd gatir asti \
I
My translation is in substantial agreement with Ruegg, but for stylistic uniformity I have 
decided to retranslate all the passages I quote. Although Ruegg occasionally translates laksana 
as ‘defining characteristic’ -  which captures both o f the senses discussed below -  in this 
instance, interestingly, he also retains the original Sanskrit. I believe this is justified when 
laksana and laksya, and their meaning, are in fact the topic under discussion. See David S. 
Ruegg, Two prolegomena to Madhyamaka philosophy, Wien: Universitat Wien, 2002, 
especially pages 111-112. For a different translation, see M. Sprung (tr.), Lucid Exposition o f  
the Middle Way, Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979, page 56.
208 evam prthivyadindm yadyapi kathinyddivyatiriktaih vicdryamdnam laksyam ndsti 
laksyavyatirekena ca laksanam nirdsrayam tathdpi samvrter eveti paraspardpeksaym tay'oh 
siddhyd siddhim vyavasthdpaydm babhuvur dcdtydh \ avasyam caitad evam abhyupeyam \ 
anyathd hi samvrtir upapattyd na viyujyate tad eva tattvam eva sydin na sanivrti/i 11
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This passage is (like the preceding one) an answer to the Sautrdntika claim that 
laksana is no other than the laksya. As we have seen in Chapter 2, this position 
is attested even in the Kosa and might well predate Dignaga’s and 
DharmakTrti’s more technical usages of the term svalaksana. Candraklrti 
discards the option of identity just as much as he discards the ultimate 
difference between laksya and laksana. In this perspective, both the Sautrdntika 
position and the Vaibhdsika become unacceptable (since the latter would accept 
at least some laksanas as ultimately existent and distinguishable from their 
laksyas). The position that both laksya and laksana are existent is 
conventionally, but only conventionally, sound: as the following passage makes 
clear:
If it is worldly usage, then necessarily, just like the laksana, the laksya 
should be there. Therefore, this only is the defect. Or (should the 
twofold characteristic be accepted) as ultimate truth? Then, as the 
laksya is not there, the twofold laksana is also not there.209
On the other hand, this passage does not engage in any analysis in terms of 
ultimate identity or difference. This is what Candraklrti means when stating that 
Mdclhyamikas resemble common persons: at least, this reading does not clash 
with other statements, where a Madhyamaka does not resemble a common 
person, in other respects.
The reasons for Candraklrti’s critique involve his specific perspective on 
Sanskrit grammar, with particular reference to the kdraka system, through
I will quote the same passage once again in a later discussion, where it will be linked 
specifically to the question o f  the status o f  Abhidharma. In this case, I have translated tattva  as 
‘reality’ for stylistic ease, to avoid the slightly awkward ‘thatness’. Nevertheless, 1 am in 
agreement with those who may find this translation disputable.
2 0 9  [ • • ■ ]  yad i laukiko vyavahdrali tada avasyam laksanaval laksyendpi bhavitavyam \ tatas ca sa  
eva dosah \ atha paramdrthah \ tada laksydbhdvdl laksanadvayam api ndsti  [ . . . ]
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which the two terms laksana and laksya can be analysed. About that aspect of 
the argument, I am devoting a section below.
In brief, Candraklrti criticises that anything (in this case, laksana) could \ 
established independently from other conditions. To be independently 
established would mean that the thing is not empty. What is not empty would 
not fit within conventions (since it would be an ultimate) and would not fit as an 
ultimate truth either (since ultimate truth is not an established entity in 
Madhyamaka).
3.2.2 Applying the dialectic to a specific instance: the four 
conditions (pratyayas)
We have seen that laksana and laksya being mutually dependent entails that i) 
they are ultimately un-established and ii) they constitute sensible conventions. 
The application of these two ideas to a specific Abhidharmic instance is found 
in the commentary on the verses refuting the four pratyayas. The four pratyayas 
are categories through which Abhidharma describes causality through time (in 
particular, mental causality, as the dlambanapratyaya can only refer to mental 
instances). Candraklrti also tells us that hetus (causes) are subsumed within the 
four pratyayas, thus they are not taken up separately.210
The application of the dialectic of laksya and laksana to the four pratyayas 
(besides fulfilling the role of explaining the adjective amitpannam in the
2 1 0  ye  cdnye purojatasahajatapascajjatadayah te etesv evdntarbhutdh  | J
This statement does not support Garfield’s exegesis. Garfield proposes that Nagarjuna would 
accept pratyayas  and not hetus.  The basic problem with this interpretation is that the two sets 
are overlapping: all the six hetus  are contained in the four pratyayas.  The four pratyayas 
constitute a more comprehensive whole, wherein the six hetus  can be subsumed, while the 
opposite is not true. In other words, the mention o f the pratyayas  alone is sufficient to cover all 
of the pratyayas  and the hetus.
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opening verse -  according to Candraklrti211) is complementary to the one found 
in the Lokdtita: the latter takes up dependent origination in the a-temporal sense 
of dependent imputation, in reference to the five skandhas. The analysis of the 
skandhas as presented in the Lokdtita, in other words, does not entail the 
analysis of causal relations through time, and hence does not rest on 
consideration of temporal priority or succession. The analysis of the pratyayas, 
on the other hand, takes up the issue of the relation between chronologically 
successive causes and effects.
Pratyayas and hetus are conventionally acceptable Abhidharmic categories: 
they do not rest on the type of ‘self’ or ‘what belongs to a self’ (dtman or 
dtmlya), which is not even conventionally accepted. Yet, under ultimate analysis, 
they cannot be individuated through their proposed laksanas (which Nagarjuna 
renders in his verses).
Candraklrti introduces the refutation of the four pratyayas through a 
hypothetical objection: conditions (refuted in the previous verses only in a 
generic manner) must exist, since their definitions have been taught. To answer 
this, Nagarjuna is going to refute the definitions of the pratyayas.
That this is the purpose of the refutations can also be evinced by some of
Candraklrti’s other comments. For instance, he sums up the arguments against
nirvartako hetuh as:
Therefore, what had been said - ’due to the occurrence of its 
definition there is a hetu-pratyaya’ - things being in this way, 
this is not fit.212
211 kicimm anirodhadivisistapratltyasamittpadapratipadayisayci atpadapradsedhena 
nirodhadipradsedhasaukdtyam manyamdna dcdiyah prathamam evotpbdapradsedham  
drabhate || More specifically, Candraklrti takes the refutation o f the four pratyayas as refuting 
arising from something else.
212 tatas c a y  ad uktam - laksanasambhavdd vidyate hetupratyaya id  tad  evaih sad  nayujyate  ||
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Candraklrti emphasises how the commonly accepted definitions of the four
pratyayas remain conventionally acceptable. Let us take the case of
dlambanapratyaya:
How then is it that ’mind and mentations have supports’? That 
laksana is conventional, not ultimate, thus there is no flaw.213
For the samanantara and the adhipati too, Candraklrti clarifies that Nagarjuna
is referring to their Abhidharmic definitions:
In this context, the succeeding cessation of the cause, which is 
the condition for the arising of the effect, is the laksana of the 
immediately contiguous (samanantaram).214
In this context ’x being there y occurs, x is y’s dominant’ is the 
laksana of the dominant condition (adhipatipratyaya).215
Candraklrti points out that these are laksanas in three out of four instances of 
the very first set of refutations offered by Nagarjuna. He also specifies how 
these refutations do not invalidate the laksanas of Abhidharma from a 
conventional standpoint: an important qualification that should be borne in mind 
when evaluating the relationship between Madhyamaka and Abhidharma. The 
latter should be distinguished from the relationship between Madhyamaka and 
other Indian philosophical schools: Candraklrti states that non-Buddhist 
definitions, though, are to be discarded even conventionally as devoid of good 
reasoning.216 All this implies that Abhidharmic definitions are refuted in a way 
that differs from the refutation of the non-Buddhist schools.
213 katham tarhi sdlambands cittacaittdh j samvrtam eva tal laksanam na paramarthikam ity 
ados ah ||
214 ta d a  kdranasydnantaro nirodhah kdiyasyotpbidapratyayah samanantaralaksanam  |j
215 ihayasm in sa tiy a d  bhavati tat tasya adhipateyam ity adhipatipratyayalaksanam  ||
216 na hi tirthikaparikalpitdyuktividhurbh padarthdh svasamaye 'bhyupagantum nybiyah [ . . . ]
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I do not think that this is a case of mere partisanship on the part of Candraklrti. 
A permanent ‘Self’ is, from a Madhyamaka point of view, inexistent even 
conventionally. Non-Buddhist schools frame systems of definitions revolving 
around a permanent and non-contingent Self, and hence those definitions are 
flawed even conventionally. For example, in the Nydya-vaisesika, intellect 
(.buddhi) is understood as a quality of the Self (idtman). If such a Self is 
considered a case of mistaken conventions (mithydsamvrti), it follows that the 
Nydya-vaisesika definition of buddhi is not workable even conventionally. 
Abhidharmic definitions, on the other hand, do not revolve around a permanent 
Self, hence they are conventionally viable even for a Mddhyamika.
3.2.3 The example of space
The section that is found in the Mulamadhyamakakarika under the title 
dhdtupariksd (examination of the elements) could well be called ‘examination 
of the la k s a n a s and constitutes another important and explicit discussion of the 
status of laksanas?11
Nagarjuna takes up one of the unconditioned (asaihskrta) dharmas accepted as 
real by the Vaibhdsikas, namely space, only to generalise his conclusion to the 
other elements (and in part to all things). The first reason to take up dkdsa is 
probably that its refutation was not automatically included in the previous 
chapter on the skandhas, since the aggregates do not include the two 
asamskrtadharmas, namely dkdsa and nirodha. In this way, Nagarjuna ensures 
a remarkable thoroughness in treating of the various Vaibhdsika dharmas.
217 Sprung entitled his translation o f this chapter ‘The Primal Elements or Character and 
Characteristic’. See M. Sprung (tr.), Lucid Exposition o f  the Middle Way, Boulder: Prajna Press, 
1979, page 103.
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The choice of dkdsa is significant, though, not only since it offers scope for an 
obvious image of emptiness which Nagarjuna hints at, but also because it is 
permanent.218 The analysis of dharmas in terms of laksya and laksana can show 
their emptiness irrespective of chronological causality, this being a central 
feature of the wider sense of pratityasamutpdda in Madhyamaka (where it is 
also a term for the co-dependence of constructs/concepts).
In case of the Vaibhdsikas, dependent arising meant the instantiation of a- 
temporal dharmas into a present activity, due to the joint operation of a causal 
assemblage and the laksanas with their anulaksanas: which means that 
dependent arising is a term for an operation through time. For the Sautrantikas, 
instantiation in time is perfect synonym with existence, and dependent arising 
constitutes the ‘history’ of dharmas, their origin through time. Nagarjuna shifts 
the emphasis towards conceptual dependence, which includes temporal 
occurrences without being limited by the latter.
Any translation that decides to render laksana as either definition or 
characteristic will fail to capture an essential ambiguity (or rather, richness) of 
the argument, which could be read as implying a close link between conceptual 
and linguistic determination (definition) and ontological identification 
(characteristic).219 Nagarjuna and Candraklrti, speak in terms of succession 
(does the laksana come before the thing it refers to, or vice-versal), which may 
be taken as chronological or logical. Succession through time occurs only in the 
present attempt to determine laksyas and laksanas, to which the reader might 
assent; while priority, in this argument, is fundamentally of a logical kind. The
218 A whole study has been dedicated to this issue. See Nancy McCagney, Ndgcirjima and the 
philosophy o f  openness, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997.
19 For example, Sprung opts for ‘characteristic’: but see note 7. Sprung also noted that ‘The 
problem is both logical and ontological.’ See M. Sprung (tr.), Lucid Exposition o f  the Middle 
Way, Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979, page 103 note 1.
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reference to chronological succession is therefore, at once, literal and 
metaphorical.
The other important features of Nagarjuna’s and Candraklrti’s discussions in 
this section are no different from what we found either in the Lokdtita or in the 
first Chapter of the Mfilamadhyamakakdrika. Again, the short chapter exploits 
the dialectic of laksya and laksana, taking dkdsa as an example, which is no 
more than a variable to be generalised.220 The tenor of the concluding verse of 
the chapter suggest its relevance, as here Nagarjuna explicitly mentions the 
epistemic/soteriological goals of his endeavour and implies therefore that the 
route of deconstructing laksya and laksana is a privileged path towards 
comprehending emptiness.221 Compared to other types of analysis, it applies to 
ail instances, whether analysis through time is at stake or not. All other analyses 
can also be traced back to an analysis in terms of laksanas, because the starting 
point to be examined will unavoidable be a specific manner to understand a 
certain term; in other words, the laksana of some laksya.
Thus: laksana and laksya are (ii) necessarily valid as conventions, but (i) 
ultimately un-established. Point (iii), namely, that only certain types of laksanas 
retain conventional validity, while others are unacceptable at any level, is what I 
intend to elaborate upon in the remaining portions of this chapter.
220 Minimally, it should be generalised to the other five dhcitus: akasasctma dhatavah p an caye  
pare  || 7 ||
221 astitvam ye  tu pasyanti ncistitvam calpabuddhayah \ bhdvdndm te na pasyanti 
drastav)>opasamaih sivam  | j 8 \ \
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3.3 Candraklrti and the Vaibhasika-Sautrantika divide: instants and 
the emptiness of laksanas
I have hinted at the continuity between Nagarjuna and Candraklrti’s stance on 
laksanas and the debate between Vaibhcisika and Sautrdntika discussed in 
Chapter 2. One could yet ask: where does Candraklrti fit in this Abhidharmic 
divide?
Sautrdntikas were still close to the Vaibhdsikas, as they derived their basic 
framework from the latter. Many of the disputes between the two schools 
revolved around Sautrdntika proposals to reduce certain dharmas from the 
status of dravyasat (existing as ultimates) to that of prajnaptisat (existing by 
way of an imputation). As pointed out by Duerlinger,222 this distinction does not 
mean that the prajnaptisat dharmas are utterly non-existent: it means, though, 
that they are further reducible under analysis. In other words, some of the 
dharmas accepted by the Vaibhdsikas should be understood to be names for 
wholes or for functions, which are real, although not in the sense that ultimate, 
part-less atoms are.
In this sense, Mddhyamikas are in principle outside of such Abhidharmic 
debates: since none of the dharmas are, from their point of view, ultimate. The 
different models might be accepted as analytical devices or explanatory 
frameworks within conventional truth, but the debate cannot be about which
222 J. Duerlinger, Indian Buddhist Theories o f  Persons, London: Routiedge Courzon, 2003. See 
page 30, and especially note 8 8 .1 think, though, that Duerlinger excessively downplays the 
ontological disparity between being prajnaptisat versus dravyasat, a distinction, which carries 
significant weight even in Abhidharma. In one sense, I do not think that he is accurate to assert 
that the sense o f  prajnaptisat is utterly different in Madhyamaka. In fact, it means the same as in 
earlier Abhidharma1. existence by way o f a conception, depending upon something else. The 
difference, it seems to me, is about what this something else might be. From Vaibhcisika or 
Sautrdntika point o f  views, it will have to be a collection o f dravyasat dharmas', for the 
Madhyamaka, it will be some other prajnapti. Beingprajiiapti works therefore in the same 
manner, but the basis for a prajiiapti to occur is understood differently.
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ones are dravyasat, since none are. Within certain broad parameters, it is 
therefore expectable that Madhyamikas may be flexible in matters of 
Abhidharmic conventions.
This is true of Madhyamaka as a whole, where different thinkers have 
approached conventions in different ways. I read Candraklrti as a rather flexible 
Mddhyamika exponent. And for reasons, which follow from such flexibility, I 
believe that Candraklrti was in some ways closer to the Vaibhcisika: he rejects 
both specific Sautrdntika doctrines, as well as their proposed understanding of 
laksanas.
Candraklrti’s analysis of momentariness corroborates this interpretation. 
Impermanence, and its extreme doctrinal formulation in terms of dharmas being 
momentary, can play a role in reasoning towards lack of svabhdva: what is 
radically impermanent has no fixed nature, and things being radically 
impermanent, they are empty of svabhdva?27. Moreover, ksanikatva is essential 
in understanding the continuity of consciousness in the sense of the doctrine of 
karman - therefore valid conventions. The other longer discussion of graded 
conventions I will refer to (that of Prajnakaramati’s commentary on the 
Boclhicarydvatara) is sparked by trying to find a proper place for ksanikatva. At 
any rate, all Madhyamikas, and Candraklrti among them, appear to accept this 
doctrine as a valid conventional truth. Momentariness, though, can be 
understood in at least two rather different manners, which I have discussed in 
Chapter 2, whether we follow a Vaibhdsika or a Sautrdntika approach. Some of 
Candraklrti’s references to momentariness as an analytical tool towards 
emptiness do not rest on a specifically Vaibhdsika or Sautrdntika view. On the
223 Millamadhyamakakarika 15.8: adyastitvarii prakrtya syan na bhaved asya nastita | prakrter 
anyathabhavo na hi jatupapadyate ||
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other hand, he does seem to reject the Sautmntika scheme, in one or possibly 
two occasions.
3.3.1 Madhyamaka versus the laksanas of all compounded factors
The 7th Chapter of the Mfdamadhyamakakdrikd is dedicated to the analysis of 
those laksanas that occasioned the first debate I discussed in Chapter 2, i.e. the 
laksanas of all compounded factors (samskrta). This is one of the sections of 
Nagarjuna’s work where it is clear that he started from an Abhidharmic 
framework close to the Vaibhdsika. These categories are refuted, though, and so 
are the upalaksanas, which the Vaibhdsikas considered necessary to ensure that 
the laksanas themselves are samskrta, compounded. Candraklrti offers a 
different rationale to establish the dependent arising of laksana -  one, which is 
available only to the Madhyamikas, in their unique understanding of 
pratTtyasamutpdda as dependent imputation. He then passes on to distance 
himself from the other alternative -  the Sautrdntika view. This section testifies 
once more for the interconnectedness of dependent arising, the laksanas, and a 
view of momentariness.
The main objection that Candraklrti has to face is that, if one does not accept the 
anulaksana called cessation of cessation (nirodhanirodha, the same as 
vindsavindsa), then nirodha itself would not exist, since it would lose the 
quality of being samskrta (and of course it would be difficult to take a 
functional dharma as asamskrta). Candraklrti replies that this is the case only 
for the opponent, but that this consequence does not follow for the Madhyamika. 
In ultimate analysis, the latter would accept that there is neither nirodha nor 
utpada (in fact, that is how the Mulamadhyamakdrika begins). On the other 
hand, the Madhyamika can stay within the conventions of those ‘whose mind’s
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eyes are blinded by ignorance’ (.avidyatimiropahatamatinayanah) and accept 
that
[...] ‘when there is arising, there is something to arise, when there 
is something to arise, there is arising. When there is cessation, 
there is something to cease, when there is something to cease, 
there is cessation’: since we accept such worldly usages, how 
could the same consequences follow for our side?224
Since ‘arising’ is in this chapter the name for a laksana, and since the same is 
true for ‘cessation’, it follows that ‘something to arise’ and ‘something to cease’ 
(iutpaclya and nirodhya) are laksyas: and Candraklrti’s argument is once more 
based on the dialectic between laksana and laksya. Both of them can be 
considered dependently originated, since they are mutually imputed. The 
argument could hence be rephrased as ‘when there is a laksana, there is laksya, 
when there is laksya, there is laksana’, and so on.
I think that the echoes of the discussion in the Abhidharmakosabhdsya are clear 
enough for Candraklrti’s contemporary readers to understand this as a reference: 
perhaps even as a clarification of where he stands in regards to the status of 
laksanas as a whole, considering that the section of the Abhidharmakosabhdsya 
was especially devoted to this issue (as I highlighted in Chapter 2).
3.3.2 Does disappearance exist?
Although the samskrtalaksanas are refuted, at least in the sense of not being 
ultimate, the alternative Sautrdntika position of universal momentariness (where 
only one ksana is accepted) is heavily criticised by Candraklrti. To be more 
precise, his criticism takes up Vasubandhu’s own doctrine that disappearance
224 sad  atpade utpadyam sa d  utpddye ntpddah \ sad  nirodhe nirodhyam sad  nirodhye nirodhah 
ity evam lauki/casya vyavahdrasydbhyapagamdt kuto ’smatpakse samaprasangitd bhavitum 
arhad  || Prasannapadd, 7.32.
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(■vindsa) is uncaused, since it is an absence (one of Vasubandhu’s main 
arguments in favour of momentariness, often reproduced by later Pramanavada 
type treatises).225
Candraklrti’s argument is made of two parts: first, he attacks the idea that 
disappearance may be uncaused, since otherwise it would be even 
conventionally non-existent, like a sky-flower (khapuspavat). It would then 
follow that things are not momentary, and also that they would lose the quality 
of being compounded (samskrtatvam), since they would be devoid of 
disappearance. The argument centres on the premise that, whatever is not 
caused is utterly non-existent and cannot be functional. Candraklrti also 
specifies that ksanabhanga (instantaneous destruction) can be accepted in 
reference to mere jdti (birth, same as utpdda), and therefore the claim that 
momentariness needs to be proven by declaring cessation uncaused is 
counteracted. The expression he uses (jdtimdtrdpeksatvdt), though, is 
ambiguous, and could either mean that ksanabhanga refers only to the ksana of 
jd ti, or that things only need jdti and then cease -  thus bringing Candraklrti’s 
position, in fact, closer to the Sautrdntika. The fact that in the passage quoted on 
the previous page, Candraklrti refers only to utpdda and nirodha, raises the 
question of how many instants he would conventionally accept, to which I will 
return shortly.
In the second part of the argument against Vasubandhu, Candraklrti’s 
conclusion might appear rather startling, as he declares that cessation (vindsa) 
has a nature of its own (svarupa) and that this nature is to be understood as 
existence (bhdva). This conclusion was in effect flung from the opponent, as an
225 See Abhidharmakosabhasyam  on Abhidhannakosa 4.2 and 4.3ab. The similarity between the 
position expressed therein and what Candraklrti criticises is striking, although they could come 
from a common source. For a similar argument in a Pramanavada text, see for example 
Tattvasamgraha 355, with Kamalaslla’s comments.
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unwanted consequence following the acceptance that cessation is caused.
Candraklrti had answered that the cause does not produce an effect
(,kriydmanam kimcit), it just causes cessation to take place. If this implies that
cessation is an ‘existence’ (bhdva), that does not seem to bother Candraklrti at
all (‘we indeed accept this’ isyate evaitat):
Since, disappearance is existence in reference to its own nature 
(.svcirupa), but from the point of view of its having the essence
(,svabhdva) of the removal of dharmas like form, etc., it is not
• *  226 existence.
Is Candraklrti saying that disappearance exists, but as something else’s non­
existence? Conventionally, perhaps he is. The terminology employed by 
Candraklrti is puzzling, as he seems to distinguish svarupa from svabhdva, and 
he also appears to accept both -  at least as conventions (something, which many 
in the Tibetan tradition have long taken as the distinctive trait of other 
Mddhyamikas, but which would distinguish Candraklrti for its absence).227 
Nonetheless, this argument is more comprehensible if we take Candraklrti as 
saying that, conventionally, cessation exists, but that its effect is the non­
existence of the dharmas to which it applies. If this is indeed a plausible reason, 
the distinction drawn is analogous to the Vaibhdsika's differentiation between 
svabhdva and kdritra (see Chapter 2.1.1). The fact that Candraklrti may employ 
this distinction, even though conventionally, suggests that at least some 
Madhyamikas must have been quite aware of what Williams points out -  that 
they used svabhdva in a different sense than the Vaibhdsikas (since sometimes
00 Rthey seem to use it in the same sense). Even if we allow for significant
226 v im  so hi svarftpdpeksayd bhdvah rupadidharmanivrttisvabhcivatvdt tu na bhdvah \ 
Prasannapadd, 7.32.
227 See Georges B.J.Dreyfus and Sara L, McClintock (eds.), The Svatantrika-Prasangika 
Distinction , Boston: Wisdom, 2003. See also: Robert Thurman (tr.), The Speech o f  Gold, Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass, 1989: this is a translation oftTsongkhapa’s main work on the 
distinguishing traits o f  Prdsahgika versus other systems.
228 Paul Williams, ‘On The Abhidharma Ontology’, in Journal o f  Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981), 
pages 227-257.
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differences in Candraklrti’s usage, it is still the case that the types of distinctions 
he draws are closer to Vaibhdsika, and are aimed specifically at refuting a 
Sautrdntika inspired reform regarding the ksana.
3.3.3 Candraklrti and momentariness
In another section, Candraklrti refutes, rather vehemently, the Sautrdntika's idea 
that the four laksanas may be referring to one ksana, and hence to something 
which ceases right after arising:
Just like you do not accept the momentariness of a shape and its 
reflection, a seal and its imprint and so on, in the same way for 
other things too, destroyed immediately after arising, 
momentariness is not fit. Since the reading in the Abhidharma 
says: the four laksanas, of the compounded, namely birth, decay, 
abiding and impermanence, exist in just one instant of something 
which is arising, whether external or internal. In that context, 
because of the reciprocal incompatibility of birth and decay, as 
also of abiding and impermanence, their simultaneous 
occurrence in one thing is not accepted by the wise.229
The difficulty in interpreting the passage is that it is not immediately clear 
whether Candraklrti is refuting the Sautrdntika theory as ultimately untenable, 
or whether he intends to show how, even conventionally, it is not sensible. I 
would favour the second reading, since a different argument is given by
229yathd bimbapratibimbamudrapratimiidrddinydyena ksanikatvam nesyate bhavadbhih tathd 
anyasydpi bhdvasya utpdidasamanantaradhvamsinah ksanikatvam naynktam \ yatah  
jdtijardsthytyanityatdkhydni catvdri samskrtalaksandni utpadyamdnasya bdhyasya 
adhybtmikasya vd ekasminn eva ksane bhavantity abhidharmapdthah \ tati'a jdtijarayoh  
paraspavavirodhdt sthityanityatayos ca ekasminn eva bhdve nayngapat sambhava isyate 
sadbhih |[ Prasannapadd on 26.2.
I think that abhidharmapdthdt must here refer to either Vasubandhu’s Bhdsya, or to some 
specifically Sautrantika-inspired Abhidharma: since the position described would not 
necessarily fit the standard Vaibhasika view
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Candraklrti when demonstrating the Madhyamikas’ non-acceptance of 
momentariness as ultimate:
[...] thus, according to what we read in the Madhyamaka system, 
one should accept (its) non-establishment, because of the non­
establishment of a momentary word-referent.230
According to the Madhyamaka system, no dharmas (here, word-referents) can 
be ultimately said to exist. Without dharmas, it becomes impossible to speak of 
their momentariness.
If this is to be taken as Candraklrti’s rationale to discard momentariness as 
ultimate, and if the other argument is to disprove the Sautrdntika position even 
conventionally, it follows that the Vaibhdsika's view has not been 
conventionally refuted.
3.3.4 Candraklrti ’ s conventions: Vaibhdsika or Sautrdntikal
Vaibhdsika was, in one sense, a synonym of mainstream Abhidharma. The very 
fact that Sautrdntika can be understood as a critique of the former views suggest 
that Sautrdntikas are, after all, no more than reformed Vaibhdsikas. If this is 
true, then Candraklrti is hinting that, in conventional matters, he is merely 
following mainstream Abhidharmic classifications, without subscribing to the 
Sautrdntika project of a revised list of ultimate dharmas: as I have already 
pointed out, a Madhyamika could not participate in such project, a priori.
Bhavaviveka, though, is known as having widely favoured Sautrdntika doctrinal 
schemes, and it is perhaps to distance oneself from this attitude that Candraklrti
230 [■■■] i d !!iudhycmiakasiddhantapathat kscutikapadarthasiddhei- asiddhir avaseya \ Ibidem .
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makes it rather clear that he is not endorsing specific Sautrantikci Abhidharma, 
even conventionally.
I would also argue for the relative closeness of Madhyamaka and Vaibhdsika, 
which can be evinced from several sets of considerations. First, Nagarjuna 
consistently analyses Abhidhannic positions, which appear closer to Vaibhdsika 
than Sautrdntika: this suggests that the latter view was not his starting point. But 
more compelling doctrinal reasons make Sautrdntika analysis less viable as a 
template for Madhyamaka conventions (especially in Candraklrti’s 
Madhyamaka). These have to do with the status of laksanas, the topic of the 
long discussions between Vaibhdsika and Sautrdntika, reconstructed in Chapter 
2. They also have to do with a different understanding of the role of diachronic 
analysis within dependent origination; and once again, with grammar.
Sautrdntikas, as we have seen, argued for the identification of laksana and 
laksya, a move which runs against the grain of Candraklrti’s (and Nagarjuna’s) 
insistence on their mutual dependence. In the instance that occasioned the 
debate reported in Chapter 2, Vaibhdsikas are rebuked for upholding the factual 
difference between laksana and laksya, in reference to the samskrtalaksanas. 
This position, too, is one that both Nagarjuna and Candraklrti would discard. So 
far, thus, we have an equal distance from both Sautrdntikas and Vaibhdsikas: 
but I believe that in other cases, the Vaibhdsikas’ avoidance of analysis would 
be more in line with Madhyamaka.
This is borne out by certain lines of argument used in the Sautrdntika objections. 
The Vaibhdsikas are reminded of a series of instances where they themselves do 
not posit a laksana apart from the laksya. I have discussed these examples and 
their relative weight in Chapter 2: the example of the laksana of cow, the 
laksana of earth, and so on. In all this cases, Sautrdntikas would argue that
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laksana and laksya are patently the same, since they cannot be established as 
different. They would also argue that the Vaibhdsikas must accept as much, and 
that therefore their stance on the samskrtalaksanas contradicts a more general 
perspective on laksanas.
The last point is here important. What Sautrdntikas remark is that the 
Vaibhdsikas accept the identity of laksya and laksanas despite themselves, 
meaning, not out of self-conscious theorisation, but because of the actual 
impossibility of establishing the pair as different. This implies, though, that 
Vaibhdsikas had not analysed general cases of laksya and laksana as either 
identical or different: and this is precisely what Candraklrti upholds to be a 
correct attitude towards their conventional occurrence. In this sense, the 
Sautrdntika system presents an over-analysis of conventions, which the 
Vaibhdsikas have generally not committed to -  except in the specific instance of 
the samskrtalaksanas (which is in fact taken up for discussion in the 
Mftlamadhyamakakdrikd).
The discussion on the samskrtalaksanas is also linked to a different 
understanding of dependent origination and its workings through time. As 
pointed out in Chapter 2, Sautrdntikas were strict in understanding 
pratTtyasamutpdda as the diachronic causal link between dharmas that last no 
more than one moment. For the Vaibhdsikas, dharmas exist in the three times 
and pratTtyasamutpdda is the instantiation in the present of their activity 
(kdritra): causality can even function simultaneously -  as in the case of sahabhu 
hetuh.
Even in the case of explicit discussions of causality, Candraklrti, as we have 
seen, appears to accept the possibility of simultaneity -  as he accepts sahabhu 
hetuh. There is also a more fundamental sense, in which pratTtyasamutpdda as
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the strictly diachronic casual succession of momentary dharmas, does not 
square well with Madhyamaka interpretations of the same.
Mddhyamikas, starting from Nagarjuna, speak of being dependently originated 
also in the sense of being dependently imputed. This is in the same logical sense 
in which laksya and laksana are analysed, or in the same sense in which long 
depends from short and viceversa (an example used even by Nagarjuna).231 This 
sense of pratTtyasamutpdda is obviously not referable to succession through 
time in the Sautrdntika sense: and at least in terms of its structure, the 
Vaibhdsika tenet of a-temporal dharmas is closer to a-temporal analysis in terms 
of reciprocally dependent prajnaptis. It is not impossible to go from a strictly 
diachronic understanding of momentary dependent origination to an analysis of 
dharmas as empty: Santaraksita’s and Kamalasila’s tradition of Madhyamaka is 
a good example. Yet, this does not seem to be the route taken by Candraklrti 
(nor, arguably, by Nagarjuna).
The discussion on laksya and laksana in the Prasannapada is intertwined with 
Candraklrti’s clearest assertions about the regulating role of the kdraka system, 
as shown above. This is also a point where the Sautrdntika proposal of doing 
away with one of the kdrakas (kartr) is in direct opposition to Candraklrti’s 
stance -  who, I believe, would sympathise with the Vaibhdsikas’ retention of 
this category at all levels of analysis. In Chapter 5, I will show that in fact, the 
opposite is true for Yogdcdra, which reproduce the Sautrdntika attitude towards 
kartr.23,2
As I argued in Chapters 1 and 2, vydkarana and Abhidharma are well 
understood as two sets of laksanas, whose operation within the complex fold of
231 astitve sati ndstitvaih dirghe hrasvam tathd sa d  j| Acintyastava, 13a.
232 Asanga’s Paramdrthagdthd is probably one o f the oldest examples o f  the Yogdcdra attitude 
towards kartr, which, as I have mentioned, resembles the Sautrdntikas\
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Buddhist philosophy varies but constantly recurs. I have provided in this section 
several instances where Candraklrti discusses the very status of these laksanas, 
or where the results of his discussion constitute the necessary background for a 
specific refutation. All this occurs in very important sections of the 
Prasannapadd, giving credibility to my contention that the analysis of laksana 
and laksya is central to Madhyamaka thought.
The next Chapter will turn to the related question of where Madhyamikas may 
place these complex analyses of conventions. If Madhyamikas accept ‘as much 
as common people do’, where to fit the refined laksanas of Abhidharma and 
vyakaranal
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Chapter 4 
Conventions, the world, 
and Madhyamaka
It is in this way, Avalokitesvara: this dependent arising is the 
dharmakaya of the Tathagatas.233
It has been common to subdivide Madhyamikas into Prdsahgika and 
Svdtantrika. This nomenclature is derived from a discussion found in the first 
chapter of Candraklrti’s Prasannapadd. It owes its currency primarily to the 
Tibetan doxographical tradition, and is therefore only retrospectively applicable 
to the Indian sources. A recent publication has been devoted to a better 
understanding of the categories of Prdsahgika and Svdtantrika: the net result 
being a cautionary note about their employment.234
In the context of this debate, the following analysis will provide a perspective 
that, to my knowledge, runs contrary to a widespread view about Prdsahgikas. I 
read certain philosophers (namely Candraklrti, Santideva and Prajnakaramati) as 
allowing for a system of graded conventions: a feature, not usually associated 
with them, as much as with the philosophers grouped as Svdtantrikas.
In particular, this bears upon their relationship to two complex systems of 
conventional analysis: vydkarana and Abhidharma, the focus of Chapters 1 and 
2. Looking at Madhyamaka discussions against the wider background
233 yadidam avalokitesvara ayaiii pratifyasamutpddas tathdgatdndm dharmakayah || 
AryapratTtyasamutpddo ndma mdhayanasutra
234 Georges J.B Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (eds.), The Svdtantrika-Prdsahgika distinction, 
Boston: Wisdom, 2003. The introduction places the problem within the historiography o f  Indian 
Buddhism.
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delineated in the previous sections of this thesis may give a more nuanced, and 
hopefully precise reading of their implications. It will also be understood that 
the philosophers’ stand on laksanas (as discussed in Chapter 3) is the basis for 
their specific perspective on conventional descriptions.
Bhavaviveka and his successors have been defined as Sautrdntika-madhyamikas 
for their ample use of Sautrdntika categories. Santaraksita, Kamalaslla and so 
on would be Yogdcdra-madhyamikas, since they merge Madhyamaka with a 
conventional acceptance of Yogdcdra, as an intermediate step towards the 
comprehension of ultimate emptiness. In the case of Svdtantrikas, scholars seem 
to agree as to their employment of a complex, and plausibly graded, system of 
conventional truths.235
Prdsahgikas have been described as accepting only ‘as much as common people 
would’ -  thus eschewing any possibility of graded conventions.236 The system 
of conventions employed by Candraklrti (or, by extension, Santideva), might 
thus be understood as non-gradual, contrasting emptiness, a truth in the ultimate
235 See for example J. Hirabashi and S. lida, ‘Another Look at the Madhyamika vs. Yogacara 
Controversy Concerning Existence and Non-Existence’, in L. Lancaster (ed.) Prajhdparamitd 
and Related Systems, Berkeley: University o f California, 1977, pages 341-360. Here the position 
just described is maintained in a rather extreme form.
236 An alternative classification is available in the Tibetan tradition, where one class o f  
Madhyamikas are described as ‘’Jig rten grags sde pa (the school [that relies on] what is known 
in the world)’: Georges J.B Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (eds.), The Svdtantrika-Prdsaiigika 
distinction, Boston: Wisdom, 2003, page 21.
This may only partly overlap with the Prdsahgikas, but it is indeed the most important feature 
for my discussion, and it is interesting that it could give rise to a separate doxographical 
categoiy. Candraklrti explicitly endorses this position (accepting as much as the loka), but the 
meaning o f  his statements is complex and will be discussed in some detail below.
Also, among Indian authors Advayavajra’s main distinction is not between Svdtantrika and 
Prdsahgika, but between Mayopamadvayavada and Sarvadharmdpratisthdnavada. Some 
Tibetan commentators identify the two types of distinctions, but this may be again retrospective. 
See Klaus-Dieter Mathes, ‘Can sutra mahamudra be justified on the basis o f Maitrlpa’s 
Apratisthanavada?’ in Brigit Kellner et.al. (eds.), PramdnakTrtih. Papers Dedicated to Ernst 
Steinkellner on the Occasion o f his 70,h Birthday, Part 2, Wien: Universitat Wien, 2007. See 
also the Advayavajrasamgraha, TattvaratndvalT, 19-20.
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sense (pciramarthasatya) against a conventional acceptance of what even 
‘cowherds’ would accept.
I wish to argue for a variant reading of Candraklrti and Santideva (through 
Prajnakaramati): hence, my analysis only regards those philosophers so far 
classified as Prdsangikas, who seem to accept as much as the ‘world’ does. 
Although, as pointed out by Eckel, this feature is not necessarily absent in some 
philosophers classified as Svdtantrika (like Jnanagarbha237), it is prominent in 
Candraklrti and Santideva, who may provide the possible strongest case against 
my reading.
4.1 Samvrti and Paramdrtha: Candraklrti and Prajnakaramati
The words ‘convention’ and ‘conventional’, have been employed to render the 
Sanskrit samvrti, and also frequently for its partial synonym vyavdhara. Such 
terms normally occur (not only in Buddhist texts) in conjunction with satya, 
referring to a conventional truth (,samvrtisatya), to be contrasted to what is true 
in the ultimate sense (paramdrthasatya). Thus we have the well-known 
Buddhist system of two truths, conventional and ultimate. Differences between 
Buddhist schools can be understood in terms of how they explain the two truths 
and their reciprocal relation.
The Sanskrit terms represented by ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’ have a range of 
meanings not to be captured by any single English word, as each meaning plays 
upon a different etymological possibility. The choice of ‘conventional’, while 
sensible and justified, neglects some of the primary concerns of the original
237 See M.D. Eckel, ‘The Satisfaction o f  No Analysis’, in Georges J.B Dreyfus and Sara L. 
McClintock (eds.), The Svcitantrika-Prcisahgika distinction, Boston: Wisdom, 2003, pages 173- 
203.
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sources. The recurrent element in the different etymologies of samvrti is the 
idea of concealing, not so much the concept of relativity.238
Even I-Tsing (in the 7th century C.E.) noticed how older Chinese translations of 
samvrti failed to reproduce the sense of ‘concealment’, and argued for the 
importance of the latter meaning. I am in substantial agreement with his remarks, 
which show a remarkable sensitivity to Sanskrit language and to the problems 
of translating certain key terms.239
Candraklrti offers a rather detailed exegesis of the sense of samvrti while 
commenting upon Mulamadhyamakakdrikci 24.8. In that verse, Nagarjuna
238 Conspicuously absent is any discussion o f  historical or cultural determination in a modern 
sense, which resonates through most contemporary depictions o f  relativity. This point is more 
important than what it might initially appear. There is a tendency, occasionally between the lines, 
to equate historical change with impermanence in the Buddhist sense, thus ending up charging 
Buddhist traditional scholars with some form o f essentialist prejudice about history, running 
counter to the very doctrines they wish to purport. This can be seen, for example, in Gombrich’s 
project to apply the Buddhist's own idea o f ‘conditioned genesis’ to the very history o f  
Buddhism, or, more recently, in Huntington’s attacks on the essentialising doxographical trends 
o f practically every Buddhist thinker except Candraklrti (and maybe two others?). I believe this 
type o f criticism to be simplistic: it takes into no account that Buddhists can and do speak o f  
histories, although their perspective about historical reconstruction is significantly different 
from what Gombrich or Huntington favour. I have unfortunately no space to elaborate this 
rather important issue any further, but I hope that its relevance on the interpretation o f  samvrti 
may be comprehensible.
See R.F. Gombrich, How Buddhism Began.The conditioned genesis o f  the early teachings. Delhi: 
Munshiram Manoharlal, 1997 and C.W.Jr. Huntington, ‘Was Candraklrti a Prasahgika?’ in: 
Georges J.B Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (eds.), The Svdtanti'ika-Prdsahgika distinction , 
Boston: Wisdom, 2003.
239‘Paramartha-satya, the ‘highest truth’, and Samvrti-satya, the ‘secondary or concealed truth’. 
The latter is interpreted by the old translators as the ‘worldly truth’, but this does not fully 
express the meaning o f  the original. The meaning is that the ordinary matters conceal the real 
state, e.g. as to anything, such as a pitcher, there is earth only in reality, but people think that it
is a pitcher from erroneous predication.’ [...] J, Takakusu, (tr.), A Record o f  the Buddhist 
Religion, by FTsing, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1982, page 168. The passage continues 
with other perceptive remarks and I-Tsing’s own renderings for the two truths, which he 
analyses in terms o f  Sanskrit samdsa terminology -  despite their being Chinese phrases.
Nagao too has treated in some detail o f the etymologies o f samvrti and its Chinese renderings. 
See: G.Nagao, The Foundational Standpoint o f  Madhyamika Philosophy, Delhi: Sri Satguru 
Publications, 1990, especially Chapters 3 and 4.
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distinguishes between two truths, upon which rests the Buddha’s teaching: 
lokasamvrtisatya and paramdrthasatya.
Candraklrti gives some alternative meanings for lokasamvrti. The word loka can 
itself have more than one sense. As given by the Prasannapadd, its first sense is 
the one of a person imputed in dependence upon the five aggregates (this seems 
to be its primary sense even according to Santideva). Samvrti is then glossed as 
‘complete covering’ (samantdd varanam), a synonym of ignorance (ajndnam). 
What is true from the point of view of a person’s ignorance of reality (tattva), is 
thus lokasamvrtisatya.
It is worth pointing out that here loka must necessarily refer to the ‘common 
person’ {prthagjana), in the technical sense of someone who has not entered the 
Path of Seeing: in other words, someone who is not yet a Noble One (arya). 
Alternatively, it must be a Noble One engaging with samvrti, not in meditative 
absorption on emptiness (see below for Prajnakaramati’s position about a Noble 
One’s engagement with samvrti). What this means is that, the loka of the 
lokasamvrti need not be an entirely unrefined person: in fact, even an 
Abhidharma author could fit this category, as long as he would not have entered 
the Path of Seeing, or even after that, when engaging in post-meditation. The 
same applies to a grammarian.
In Candraklrti’s second alternative, samvrti is taken as ‘arising in dependence 
upon each other’. This etymology justifies the English rendering as ‘relative 
truth’, and is closely connected to the idea (discussed earlier) that reciprocal 
dependence ensures conventional validity, although it entails ultimate 
emptiness. The last interpretation takes samvrti in the sense of ‘token’, linguistic 
symbol: in other words, a convention. In this instance, loka should be taken to 
mean ‘the world’. Although Candraklrti does not explicate this, it appears
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implicit in his gloss as ‘conventions in the world’ (loke samvrtih), which does 
not fit well with taking loka jnst as ‘person’.
Prajnakaramati, a late Madhyamika commentator, broadly follows Candraklrti 
in his explanation of samvrti. He too, identifies it as a ‘covering’, pointing out 
how both samvrti and avarana (obscuration) stem from the same verbal root. 
Commenting upon verse 9.2, which identifies samvrti with intellection (buddhi), 
he brings the discussion on a rather complex epistemological point: is all 
intellection to be called samvrti, or are there types of buddhi that could be 
understood as different from this obscuration to tattval
Prajnakaramati’s is rather emphatic about buddhi being necessarily sariivrti. He 
draws a distinction between buddhi and jhdna, which I believe reproduces the 
common distinction between vijhdna and jhdna to be found, for example, in the 
list of four reliances (as in, one should rely on jncina and not on vijhdna). Some 
technical aspects of Prajnakaramati’s argument support the conclusion that 
buddhi and vijhdna are here taken to be synonyms.240
The definition of vijhdna as ‘seeing an object’ (arthadrsti) is quoted by
Candraklrti as acceptable. Although this definition is part of a Yogdcdra treatise
(it is in the first chapter of the Maclhydntavibhdhga), its thrust is in line with
mainstream Abhidharma. The Abhidharmakosa defines vijhdna as
prativijhaptih, which the bhdsya glosses as:
cognition, or perception, towards such and such object is called the 
aggregate of consciousness.241
240 See Appendix I, commentary to 9.2.
241 visciyam visayam prati vijnaptir upalabdhir vijndnaskandhci ity ucyate || 
Abhidharmakosablmsya on 1.16a.
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Yasomitra further clarifies that perception (upalabdhih) here means the 
apprehension of a mere object (vastumdtragrahanam), which differentiates 
vijhdna from the other formless aggregates, since the latter apprehend 
specificities (vedandclayas tu caitasd visesagrahanarupdh).
The common trait of these definitions of vijnana is that consciousness is 
understood as intentionality towards an object. In technical descriptions of the 
dependent arising of consciousness, this object is classified as the necessary 
support condition (<dlambanapratyaya), without which consciousness will not 
come about.
Madhyamaka often depicts its practice as ‘the yoga of no perception’
(ianupalambhayoga), and Santideva emphasises that a support is in fact a cause
of bondage (sdlambanena cittena sthdtavyam yatra tatra vd, Bodhicarydvatdra,
9.47). It would then follow that no vijhdna or buddhi (taken as synonyms) may
qualify as a proper cognition of emptiness, since buddhi arises only in
dependence on a support. In Prajnakaramati’s terms:
In this way, samvrti is the means to teach paramdrtha, and the 
realisation of paramdrtha is what is to be got through such 
means: since it cannot be taught otherwise. (Question:) Is it not 
then that such a thing also, the object of such an intellection 
{buddhi) is to be considered paramdrtha? To this he says ''buddhi 
is called sam vrti. All buddhi indeed is samvrti, since due to 
having a non-support as a support it has the nature of a 
misconstruction, and all misconstruction has indeed the nature of 
wrong knowledge, since it apprehends a non-thing. As it is said 
‘misconstruction does itself take the form of wrong knowledge’.
Wrong knowledge is samvrti. Therefore, indeed no buddhi 
apprehending the form of paramdrtha makes sense as 
paramdrtha. Otherwise, being apprehensible by an obscured 
buddhi, its quality of being paramdrtha would be lacking, since
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paramcirtha is in fact not the object of an obscured (or, 
conventional) jhdna .242
Prajnakaramati supports his argument by quoting the Satyadvaydvatcirasutra at
some length: but the most important section of his commentary is perhaps
where he describes paramdrtha:
Thus, the Blessed One, whose inner self is illumined by the 
shining of jhdna pervading the expanse of infinite things, said the 
truth of paramdrtha to be without the specificities of all 
conventional things, and devoid of any adjunct.243
The usage of words like ‘inner self or ‘devoid of adjuncts’ are to be understood 
within the context of Buddhist usages, and should not be confused with their 
homonyms in, for example, Advaita Vedanta: Prajnakaramati gives ample 
indications of having no sympathy for a view of ‘Self’. What is relevant, though, 
is the emphasis on samvrti as a synonym of cognitive impediment and 
misconstruction, and the contrasting usage of jnana as against buddhi to refer to 
a realisation of paramdrtha.244 That this is similar to the distinction between 
jhdna and vijhdna can be also evinced by comparing the section of the
242 evaiii paramdrthadesanopdyabhutd samvrtih paramdrthddhigamas ca upeyabhuta iti 
cinyathd tasya desayitum asakyatvdt \ nanu ca tathdvidham apt tathdvidhabuddhivisay!ah 
paramdrthatah kith na bhavati | itydtrdha buddhih samvrtir ucyate iti | sarvd hi buddhih 
dlambananirdlambanatayd vikalpasvabhdvd vikalpas ca sarva eva avidydsvabhdvah 
avastugrdhitvdt \ y a d  aha \ vikalpah svayam evdyam avidydrupatbm gatah \ iti \ avidyd ca 
samvrtih iti naiva kdcid buddhih pdramdrthikarupagrdhim paramdrthato yujyate  | anyathd 
samvrtabuddhigrdhyataya paramdrthanipatayaiva tasya hiyeta paramdrthasya vastutah 
sdmvrtajhdndvisayatvdt || Commentary on Bodhicaryavatdra 9.2.
243 iti pratyastamitasamastasdmvrtavastuvisesam asesopadhiviviktam uktam 
anai'itavastuvistarav)>dpijhdndlokdvabhdsitdntardtmand bhagavatd paramdrthasatyam iti || 
Ibidem.
244 One more section o f Prajnakaramati’s commentary emphasises the mistaken nature o f  
samvrti: this is the explanation o f 9.107 and 9.108, where the opponent asks how is there indeed 
any living being in nirvana, as he should not have samvrti. The answer is that, although it is true 
that all intellection is samvrti, as it is o f the nature o f  a mental construct, therefore liberation too 
is samvrti, the latter is perceived only by others, not by the liberated being himself:
[ ...]  tasydpibnddhyd visavlkarandt \ buddhis casatvaivasam vrtih  kalpandsvabhdvatvdt \ 
buddhih samvrtir ucyate iti vacandt nirvrtir api samvrtih sydt 11 [ . . .]  parasya nirvrtasattvdd  
anyasya sattvasva cittam tasvdsau vikalpah yo'yaiii nirvrtasydpi buddhyd visavlkaranam  j  na hi 
paracittavikalpena anyasya samvrtir yuktd \ tato'nvabuddhy>d visaytkriyamdno'pi nirvrta evdsau
I
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Lankavatarasutra (quoted in other contexts by Prajnakaramati) that elucidates 
their defining trait. One passage mentions that
(...) jhdna has the characteristic of non-attachment, while vijnana has 
the characteristic of attachment to the manifoldness of objects.245
The rest of the discussion resembles Prajnakaramati’s own, by drawing similar 
distinctions.
If samvrti is concealment and obscuration, though, the question arises as to 
whether any type of samvrti is acceptable. The next sections will discuss this 
point.
4.2 Identity and difference between Madhyamikas and cowherds:246 
Abhidharma and Vydkarana
I noticed how the Svdtantrika Madhyamikas have been read as including a 
system of graded conventions. The same cannot be said of Prdsahgikas 
(especially Candraklrti), often understood as accepting, conventionally, only as 
much as ‘common people’ would.
Prdsahgikass ‘qua Prdsahgikas’ 247 would have no reason or parameter to 
choose between alternative sets of equally functional conventions. Or, even
245 [...] asahgalaksanam jhdnam visayavaicitiyasahgalaksanahi vijhanam || Lankavatarasutra, 
3.37. Compare also the Suvikrdntavikrdmipariprcchdsutra: avisayo hi jhdnam  |j
246 'Cowherds’ is a common example o f  an ‘untrained’ person in Indian philosophical texts.
247 See Paul Williams, The Reflexive Nature o f  Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence, 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000, page 41-43. Williams’ position is in some respects antithetical 
to mine. His argument would be that Sanskrit grammar is a specialised set o f  mere 
conventions, and as such has no more value than what ‘cowherds’ may talk about.
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more drastically, they should desist from framing alternative analyses of
conventionality, since, as Arnold put it
What is conventionally true, in other words, is just our 
conventions, and any technical redescription thereof is, ipso facto, 
not conventionally valid.248
These types of reading are not without foundation. Madhyamikas -  as opposed
to Yogdcdras -  did not create an Abhidharma of their own, and have been even
read as a critique of the Abhidharmic project to Tedescribe’ the world.
Moreover, Candraklrti openly states that
The worldly person indeed, without starting to analyse whether it is 
from itself of from other and so forth, understands only this much: 
from a cause, arises an effect. The dcdrya also explained things in
i 249the same way.
What his argument fails to acknowledge is that: i.) the karakci system is an expressive structure 
found in the speech o f ‘cowherds’ as well, not just the ‘idea’ o f ‘a very elite group’; ii.) 
Madhyamikas need not accept just as much as cowherds do, in all contexts, even conventionally, 
Point i.) has been dealt with in the preceding sections o f this thesis, while I am going to argue 
for point ii.) in what follows. He also does not reproduce Prajnakaramati’s argument in its 
entirety, for which, see Appendix and also the later section o f this thesis, about svasamvedand.
Williams also remarks that
Since whatever are the latest scientific discoveries of psychologists, psychiatrists 
and neurosurgeons for example concerning the mind are not matters o f ultimate 
truth, for the Madhyamika they must come within the conventional.
There is more to this issue. Psychologists, psychiatrists and neurosurgeons may well 
(unwittingly) introduce ultimate reified entities (like a self, or an object o f  knowledge existing 
independently from cognition) as part o f  their methodological premises. This will stultify the 
plausibility o f their conventional analysis, from a Madhyamaka point o f view: just as it is the
case for the non-Buddhist laksanas, which Candraklrti dismisses. Hence, even if someone may
claim  to be doing merely conventional analysis, the Madhyamika can be very much ‘concerned’ 
with bringing such claim under scrutiny. Indeed, to even think that a neurosurgeon may 
‘discover’ something about the mind might carry certain ontological presuppositions. Note 3 on 
page 43 offers an important opening for a category like svasamvedand'. I would nonetheless 
argue that what Williams says o f svasam vedand could be extended to (at least some section) o f  
vydkarana. I do not think Williams has adequate consideration for the importance and special 
value o f  the kdraka system.
248 Dan Arnold, ‘Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction Following 
Santaraksita’, in Asian Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2005, pages 98-99.
249 loko hi svatah parata ityevamddikam vicdram anavatdrya kdrandt kdryam utpadyate ity 
etdvanmdtram pratipannah \ evam dcdryo ’pi vyavasthdpaydmdsa H Prasannapada  1.3.
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We could therefore interpret Madhyamikas as accepting conventionally only as 
much as common people do, while on the other hand understanding the 
emptiness of shared conventions. In this case, Williams would be justified in 
questioning Prajnakaramati’s fondness for Panini’s grammar, which is 
apparently difficult to understand as conventions shared by all.250
The last instance, though, exemplifies the inadequacy of the simple scheme so 
far adduced: important sections of Madhyamaka literature (verses, passages, or 
even whole chapters of important works) do not content themselves with 
understanding conventions in the very same manner as untrained ‘cowherds’ 
would. I thus believe, on the strength of textual evidence and interpretive 
cogency, that the identity between Madhyamikas and ‘common people’ should 
be further qualified.
A plausible starting point for a more nuanced reading is the passage quoted 
earlier. What Candraklrti is stating should be seen within a specific, restricted 
context -  the context of avoiding essentialist dead ends in interpreting causation. 
A common person {loka) accepts causal regularities, without trying to establish 
cause and effect in terms of identity or difference. This statement should 
probably not be taken to imply much more. We cannot expect Madhyamikas to 
turn to the least erudite and to the philosophically untrained, ask them what they 
believe and accept, and use that as a basis to talk of conventions. What here is 
more plausibly meant is that, all we need for the employment and recognition of 
causal regularities is the regularity itself, not a discussion about the identity or 
difference of the elements at play (this point is also made by Garfield). This 
does not entail that Madhyamikas cannot accept and prefer certain more refined
250 1 have amply argued in Chapter 1 that the types o f  Panini’s rules used by Madhyamikas, 
including Prajnakaramati, have to do with the expressive structure o f the language, rather than 
with morphological details. Hence, the question o f  their wide applicability cannot be so easily 
dismissed.
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redescriptions of conventional truths. Nagarjuna and Candraklrti (as I have 
noticed) regularly employ two sets of refined analysis, not available to the 
untrained: these being Abhidharma and Vydkarana. Where the non- 
Mddhyamika sees a person, Madhyamikas may decide to speak of the interplay 
of skandhas, dhatus and dyatanas through the causal connections of hetus 
(causes) and pratyayas (conditions), or would analyse the same process in terms 
of the syntactical categories, which form the interpretive structure of any 
conception of action. There is good textual evidence to corroborate this, as I 
hope to have shown already.
Regarding Arnold’s argument about redescription, I am unable to ascertain what 
he means by the term. Grammar, medicine, Abhidharma and many other 
branches of knowledge could be all termed ‘redescriptions’, but it would be 
implausible to argue that, being technical, they do not count any more as 
conventions. At any rate, Madhyamikas employ all three.
Moreover, what counts as a description and what as a re-description is hard to 
establish. Arnold may mean that any description, which introduces ontological 
ultimates in the scheme of conventions, is by that token going beyond its proper 
boundaries: I would then have no qualm. This flaw would for example accrue to 
Dignaga’s svalaksana, at least in Candraklrti’s reading. Since Arnold’s 
statement is very concise, I cannot ascertain whether my understanding really 
differs from his.
The reasons for Madhyamikas’ usage of Abhidharma and Vydkarana are in part 
related. Both systems offer sets of very refined definitions (laksanas) and, as we 
have seen, conventions rest on identifying phenomena through such laksanas. 
Conventional understanding works through definition and determination of its 
intended referents. Without the possibility of conceptually circumscribing
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phenomena, there could be no conventions. Thus, the framing of an intentional 
referent (a ‘target’, laksya) is closely connected to the determination of its 
characteristics: it follows that the more refined and intelligent are the definitions, 
the better one’s comprehension of conventional truth.
4.2.1 Candraklrti on the svalaksana and Prajnakaramati on
svasamvedand
The acceptability of specific conventions, even from Candraklrti’s viewpoint, 
depends from certain means to acquire valid knowledge (Prasannapada lists 
four as acceptable). Candraklrti specifies on occasions that the systems of non- 
Buddhist philosophy are unacceptable, as they make mistakes even from the 
point of view of conventional truth. They are yuktividhurah (illogical) and 
accept a permanent Self of one type or the other. On the other hand, 
Abhidharmic analysis does not rest on the acceptance of a permanent dtman, 
therefore it has the double advantage of not contradicting reason (from 
Candraklrti’s point of view) and of establishing selflessness of persons (which 
means, it is functional, as it goes towards a comprehension of emptiness).
This point is more important than it may seem, and it is worth elaborating upon. 
Why would the laksanas given by Nydya- Vais'esika philosophers not work even 
conventionally? The processes that they purport to describe make sense only in 
reference to a series of permanent, non-contingent categories, which ensure 
coherence even to any of the other categories they list. For example, the 
explanation of kannan and rebirth rests upon the acceptance of a permanent self, 
without which the workings of the other Nyaya-Vaisesika categories make no 
sense. It is crucial to consider this, else Candraklrti’s statement that they are 
yuktividhurah (unsound) could be nothing but gratuitous.
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Candraklrti’s employment of Abhidharma testifies to his acceptance of the latter 
as a set of conventionally valid definitions: I hope to have demonstrated this. 
Nevertheless, there are some unique traits in Candraklrti’s attitude towards 
Abhidharma.
In fact, a plausible manner to describe Candraklrti’s attitude is that, in matters of 
Abhidharma, he is quite flexible. If we take, for example, the rather important 
doctrine of momentariness (ksanikatva), it can be easily seen to appear through 
the pages of the Midamadhyamakakdrikd (this is important, as its place in 
conventions is explicitly discussed in Santideva and Prajnakaramati). 
Nevertheless, whether we accept a Vaibhdsika or a Sautrdntika view of 
momentariness is quite immaterial to the arguments.251
Yogdcdra Abhidharma is on the other hand problematic, insofar as it accepts 
categories, which in Candraklrti’s view do not fit in either of the two truths. 
This is also how I understand the critique of Digriaga’s svalaksana. Ultimately, 
there are no laksanas: thus, svalaksanas could not be taken as true in the 
ultimate sense (they could not be within the perception of the Noble Ones, as 
Candraklrti puts it). On the other hand, if a laksana is self-established, it ceases 
ipso facto to be conventional: since the mark of conventional truths is to be 
independently un-established (see the section on the Lokdtita). Thus, the reason 
for the unacceptability of Dignaga’s svalaksana is not that it constitutes a 
technical redescription, but the impossibility of establishing it as either
251 We can notice, though, that the starting point o f  the Mulamadhyamakdrikd resembles much 
more Vaibhdsika rather than Sautrdntika positions, and that Candraklrti’s commentary follows 
suit. This may also be due to the popularity of Vaibhdsika and the fact that Sautrdntika is after 
all a type of reformed Vaibhdsika scheme, hence not representative of a ‘mainstream’ 
Abhidharma. Incidentally, the Dhannasamgraha, also bearing the name of Nagarjuna as its 
author, does employ categories that are quite close to Vaibhdsika Abhidharma. Although the 
work may not really be by Nagarjuna, the fact that (perhaps even much later) his name would 
be associated to a Vaibhdsika type of Abhidharmic scheme should not pass unnoticed.
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conventionally or ultimately true. This is borne out by a passage of the 
Prasannapadd, already quoted in a different context:
If it is worldly usage, then necessarily, just like the laksana, the 
laksya should be there. Therefore, this only is the defect. Or 
(should the twofold laksana be accepted) as ultimate truth? Then, 
as the laksya is not there, the twofold laksana is also not there.252
Candraklrti warns that, conventionally, there must be both (laksana and laksya). 
Since the theory of svalaksanas does away with the laksya, it does not fit within 
conventional truth. Ultimately, neither can be established, and thus not only the 
laksya, but the svalaksana too cannot be ultimate.
Significantly, right after this passage, Candraklrti appeals to the other set of 
regulatory tools, with which he measures conventional validity, and charges the 
Yogdcdra?, with an incongruent handling of Sanskrit grammar, in particular of 
the kdrakas:
That in this way an explanation of words following the link 
between the action and the kdrakas is not accepted, make things 
very difficult. You communicate just through these words 
employing the link between the action and the kdrakas, while 
you do not wish the meaning of the words to be action, 
instrument and so on: alas, your usage is bound to mere fancy!253
In other words, a philosopher cannot be completely idiosyncratic, inventing a 
new grammar that may defy all the commonly accepted syntactical structures: 
especially since he is using them. And this is, at least according to Candraklrti, 
what the Yogdcdras are attempting. It would resemble someone saying: ‘The
252 [*••] y adi lankiko yyavaharah tada avasyam laksanaval laksyendpi bhcivitavyam \ tatas ca sa  
eva dosa/t \ athaparamdrthali \ tada laksydbhdvdl laksanadvayam api ndsti [...]
25j atha sabddndm evaih kriydkdrakasambandhapurvikd vyutpattir ndngikri)>ate tad  idam 
atikastam | tair eva kriydkdrakasambandhapravrttaih sabdair bhavdn vyavaharati sabddrtham  
kriydkaranadikaih ca necchatlti aho bata icchamatrapratibaddhapravrttir bhavatah ]| 
Prasannapadd, 1.3.
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sentence I am uttering is not in English’. What should we understand it to mean? 
Incidentally, the tenor of Candraklrti’s objection and its implications answers 
some of the doubts raised by Williams about the actual importance of Sanskrit 
vydkarana. It is not a matter of being elitist, but to avoid self-contradicting or 
self-referential expressions.254
If my reading is plausible, then Santaraksita’s and Moksakaragupta’s systems 
do not differ so drastically from Candraklrti’s, as the latter’s own logic is 
flexible enough to accommodate alternative Abhidharmic conventions: as long 
as these do not create a confusion between reciprocally dependent definitions 
(conventional truths) and their emptiness (ultimate lack of laksanas). I say this 
on the premise that Mipham Rinpoche, Williams, and Arnold are right in their 
account of the reformed svalaksana.~
To this, one might retort that Prajnakaramati’s criticism of svasamvedand in his 
commentary to Bodhicarydvatdra verse 9.21 quotes precisely Santaraksita and 
refutes his (and Moksakaragupta’s) defence of this category. Moreover, the 
refutation resembles very strictly what Candraklrti employed to refute the 
svalaksana, which suggests that, in fact, it cannot but work both ultimately and 
conventionally. If this is so, how could one possibly uphold that Mipham 
Rinpoche, Williams and Arnold are not, in effect, remarkably mistaken?
In this case, my argument is mainly based on an attempt to give the strongest 
and most convincing interpretation of Prajnakaramati’s stance. Certain 
weaknesses would in fact follow from taking his grammatical argument as 
referring to a conventional refutation of svasamvedand, and they could be
254 See above, Note 13.
255 Again see Dan Arnold, ‘Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? A Tentative Reconstruction 
Following Santaraksita’, in Asian Philosophy, Vol.15, N o .l, March 2005
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avoided by restricting it to the sphere of ultimate analysis. Besides, there are a 
few indications on the part of Prajnakaramati’s himself that the refutation is not 
on the ultimate level.
The debate about svasamvedand or self-awareness is long and complex, but here 
I am merely concerned with four steps in the alternation of objections and 
replies:
i. knowledge is said to know itself;
ii. this is criticised as entailing that the same thing is at once agent
(kartr) and object of the action (karmari), which is unacceptable, as 
nothing can act upon itself;
iii. it is then proposed that the relationship between knowledge and itself
is not agent-object-action, and that the word svasamvedand is not 
being used in that sense;
iv. the Madhyamika objector retorts that the word svasamvedand is
understood by all listeners as entailing an agent and object of the 
action: is it not that the opponent is speaking through kdrakasl
The last step is akin to what we found in Candraklrti’s refutation of the
svalaksana. Prajnakaramati’s phrasing of his argument is remarkably similar
Candraklrti’s own:
We expressed a refutation, relying on the word-meaning well 
established through conventional usage through the distinction 
into action and kdrakas, since the word ’self-awareness’ 
expresses such a meaning. If on the other hand, out of fear of 
flaws, even the word meaning well established in the world is 
abandoned, then your refutation is going to be just from the 
world. Even in this way, there is no establishment of self- 
awareness in the ultimate sense.256
256 kriyakarakabhedena vyavahiiraprasiddhaiii sabdcirtham adhigamya dusanam uktam 
svasamvedanasabdasya tadarthabhidhdyakatvat \ yad i punar dosabhaycil lokaprasiddho'pi 
sabdarthah parityajyate tada lokata eva badha bhavato bhavisyati | ittham api na 
paramdrthatah svasamvedanasiddhih |j Commentary on Bodlucaryavatara 9.20.
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The last sentence, it seems to me, emphasises how Prajnakaramati’s main 
interest is in refuting self-awareness as an ultimate. There are contextual reasons 
to believe so, since the refutation of self-awareness is part of a wider refutation 
that mind may be ultimately existent (i.e. the Cittamatra position).
There is at least one case where grammatical analysis would show the necessity 
of a conventional acceptance of a reflexive relation.257 When a relation of 
identity is described, even in Sanskrit, one and the same agent acts as one’s own 
qualifier (visesana) and what is qualified (visesyd). Does it therefore follow that 
Madhyamikas cannot speak of identities, even conventionally? And if they 
cannot speak of identity, can they speak of difference? If they give up both 
identity and difference, can they speak at all?
For these reasons, I believe that the grammatical part of Prajnakaramati’s
argument is stronger when restricted to a refutation of svasamvedand as an
ultimate. The following sections of his commentary to 9.26 suggest that this is
indeed how it was intended:
When it is said that the conventional usages such as ’seen’ and so 
on would not be there, is it that it would not be there in the 
ultimate sense, or conventionally? If it is said that ’it would not 
be there in the ultimate sense’, then this is indeed acceptable for 
us. Since, for something conventional, there is no descending 
into considerations about the ultimate.258
757 I owe to Tom Tillemanns the simple but important parallel between svasamvedana  and 
identity.
258 y a d  ucyate drstadivyavahdro na syad  iti sa  kith paraindrthato na sydt samvrtyd vd \ tatra 
yad i paraindrthato na syad  ity ucyate tada priyam idant asmdkam | na hi sdmvrtasya  
paramdrthacintdydm avataro'sti ||
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On the other hand, the existence of mind only sometimes spoken 
of by the Blessed One, will be explained as an interpretable 
meaning, like the aggregates, entrances etc...259
The last point opens some unexpected interpretive avenues. Prajnakaramati says 
that cittamdtra can be taken as neydrtha, interpretable meaning, just as the 
aggregates and the entrances. One may say that any Mddliyamika would have to 
necessarily agree to this, as the only alternative left would be to discard some of 
the Buddha’s own words as completely invalid.260 Interpretable categories, on 
the other hand, are acceptable as conventions. Following Santideva’s and 
Prajnakaramati’s own arguments, cittamdtra could not be maintained in any 
way without upholding some variant of the doctrine of svasariivedand. This 
necessarily implies that, in some forms of conventional descriptions, 
svasariivedand must be acceptable.
If this is the case, the force of Prajnakaramati’s recourse to the kdrakas is not 
identical to CandrakTrti’s own. This might be either because the svalaksana 
works differently from the idea of svasariivedand, or because Prajnakaramati’s 
attitude towards the issue may be at variance with CandrakTrti’s own. Either 
way, it would entail that giving descriptions that do not follow the normal 
understanding of kdrakas can be a pardonable shortcoming, at least in the case 
of svasariivedand, and as long as they are explained to be so.
259 ya t tu kvacid bhagavata cittamdtrdstitvam uktam tat skandhayatanadivan neyarthayayeti 
kathayisyate j |
260 Lopez notices how in effect several Mddliyamika authors, including for example Candraklrti 
and Jnanagarbha, accept the idea of Yogdcara being a stepping-stone. See: D.S. Jr. Lopez, ‘On 
the Interpretation of the Mahayana Sutras’, in Donald S Jr. Lopez (ed.), Buddhist Hermeneutics, 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993.
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4.2.2 Are Madhyamikas ‘satisfied with no analysis’ ?
I have argued in favour of the importance of conventional refinement in 
Madhyamaka, despite Williams’ remarks and despite Arnold’s statement about 
redescription. Besides these, it is necessary to discuss Eckel’s idea of ‘the 
satisfaction of no analysis’.261
In a reconstruction of Tsongkhapa’s thought, Eckel has identified abstention 
from analysis (and satisfaction about such abstention) as an important trait of 
Madhyamaka thought, referring in particular to certain passages in the 
Prasannapadd.262 While I find the general thrust of the argument very 
convincing, I believe that, as in the example of ‘accepting as much as common 
people do’ some crucial qualifications are necessary. The section of the 
Prasannapadd taken up by Eckel is directly connected to the question of laksya 
and laksana, and at this point it should not be difficult to place this discussion 
within the broader context so far reconstructed.
The Prasannapadd quotes the example of ‘Rahu’s head’ as a case where, under 
analysis, Rahu is found to be no more than the head, and yet the expression is 
acceptable: is this not the same as when (in the Abhidharma) one speaks of ‘the 
hardness of the earth’? Eckel correctly remarks that here Candraklrti is 
concerned with answering an opponent who argues that, in the case of the 
hardness of the earth, the definition and what is defined are ultimately the same. 
This is in the context of the possible identification of laksya and laksana, 
defending the idea of svalaksana as propounded by Dignaga. It is practically the
261 See M.D. Eckel, ‘The Satisfaction o f No Analysis’, in G.B.J.Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock 
(eds.), The Svdtantrika-Prdsahgika distinction , Boston: Wisdom, 2003, pages 173-203.
262 1 believe this idea could be linked to the Sanskrit avicdraramanTyatd, which on the other 
hand means, ‘being satisfactory as long as there is no analysis’: hence a slightly different 
concept.
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same question we found in the Abhiharmakosa, where the position of the 
identity of laksya and laksana was argued for by the Sautrdntika (as discussed 
in Chapter 2).
One section of Eckel’s reconstruction is, to my understanding, quite off the 
mark:
Candraklrti argues that the words “body of a pestle” and “head of 
Rahu” can be used to answer legitimate questions in ordinary 
usage (laukikavyavahdra). If someone mentions the word “body” 
or “head”, he says, it is perfectly understandable for someone to 
ask, “Whose body?” or “Whose head?” These questions can 
express legitimate curiosity. But there is no reason for anyone to 
be curious about hardness and earth: everyone knows that earth 
is hard.263
The first inaccuracy in this passage regards the level of technicality involved. 
Eckel says that ‘everyone knows that earth is hard’ and in the accompanying 
note (38) he specifies that ‘everyone’ means anyone ‘knowledgeable about the 
Indian theory of gross elements’. In effect, there is no shared ‘Indian theory of 
gross elements’ (at least to my knowledge), and what constitutes the laksana of 
earth is a matter of dispute. For example, in the Vaisesika system, earth is 
defined as the substratum for the quality (guna) of odour (ganclha), which is not 
necessarily an acceptable definition for a Buddhist. What Candraklrti and his 
opponents are discussing about is the laksana of earth as accepted in the 
Abhiclharma: thus, in effect, a technical redescription involving a good degree 
of analysis -  or, if one wishes, curiosity.
The second inaccuracy regards precisely ‘curiosity’, which, I suspect, Eckel 
uses to translate the Sanskrit dkdnksd. The latter is a technical term, often 
translated with ‘verbal expectancy’, and I would argue that here it is used in the 
same sense. Candraklrti is saying that when the word ‘head’ is uttered, it creates
263 Ibidem , page 190.
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a verbal expectancy for its possible owner (consisting of a whole body plus a 
mind), since it is usually the case that a head is accompanied by other limbs to 
form the body of a person -  and since usually a person is formed by more than 
just a head. It is therefore acceptable to speak of ‘Rahu’s head’ to satisfy this 
expectancy, even though there is no ‘Rahu’ apart from the head. Otherwise, we 
could have been speaking of someone else’s head, and such possibility should 
be excluded in order to refer to the specific head we wish to indicate. In other 
words, even though there is only a head, the mere word ‘head’ retains the 
ambiguity of being possibly accompanied by other limbs, because this is usually 
the case. It is not a question of ‘curiosity’, but verbal expectancy.
On the other hand, Candraklrti specifies that the case of ‘hardness’ is different. 
There is never any earth apart and beyond hardness, and therefore no 
expectancy is created in regards to earth as a necessary specification. Although 
non-Buddhists propose different laksancis for earth, there is no need to even 
consider them, as they are devoid of good reasoning (yuktividhurdh). 
Candraklrti is not denouncing a case of illegitimate curiosity, as Eckel would 
have it. He is saying that here there is no verbal expectancy for something else, 
and therefore we cannot understand the expression ‘hardness of earth’ as 
satisfying the same communicative function as when we speak of ‘Rahu’s head’.
In the passage quoted above, Eckel implies that the ‘satisfaction of no analysis’ 
is in reference to ‘hardness of earth’, where curiosity is not appropriate (since 
‘everyone knows that earth is hard’); on the other hand, curiosity (and thus, 
analysis) is appropriate in the case of ‘Rahu’s head’. I read Candraklrti as saying 
precisely the opposite:
[...] because in the case of worldly usages one does not engage in 
such type of analysis, and because worldly referents are existent 
when not analysed. Just like, indeed, no self is possible when
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analysed as different from form and so on, still from the point of 
view of worldly conventions it exists in reference to the 
aggregates, and in the same way Rahu and a pestle exist: 
therefore, there is no success in the example.264
‘Rahu’ and a ‘pestle’ exist as unanalysed verbalisations that satisfy the 
expectancy created by the words ‘head’ and ‘body’ respectively, just like ‘self’ 
is a conventional expression to identify certain aggregates, although under 
analysis it is not to be found beyond them. It is Rahu and the pestle, in effect, 
that we should not be curious about: while we may well be curious about the 
hardness of earth (is it a sound definition, not resting on some ultimate, reified 
elements?)
The status of Abhidharmic definitions is different. They do not work as one-way 
specifications, where one of the referents (like ‘Rahu’ or ‘pestle’) is, even 
conventionally, existent only as a functional delimiter to curb a certain verbal 
expectancy. Candraklrti very clearly states that Abhidharmic definitions are 
acceptable, as far as they are taken to be conventions, indicating that he 
understands Nagarjuna to accept as much. This was already exemplified earlier, 
in reference to the four pratyayas (in Chapter 3). Here, though, Candraklrti 
gives a very general statement about the status of Abhidharmic laksanas, and 
their difference from expressions like ‘Rahu’ or ‘self’:
In this way for earth and the rest, although there is no laksya 
under analysis as different from hardness and the rest, and the 
laksana would be devoid of a support without the laksya, even 
so, considering that it is only conventions, the Acdryas posited 
their establishment through a reciprocally dependent 
establishment. And this should necessarily be accepted. Since 
otherwise, conventions would not be disjoined from reasoning, 
and that itself would be reality (tattva) and not conventions. And
264 lankike vyavahare itthamvicampravrtter avicaratas ca laukikapadarthcmam astitvat || 
Ibidem.
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it is not that only a pestle and such other things are impossible 
when analysed through reasoning. What then? By a reasoning 
that will be explained, even form, feeling, and so on are not 
possible: it would then follow that just like in the case of a 
‘pestle’ one should accept even conventionally their non­
existence. But this is not the case, so that is false.263
In the expression ‘hardness of earth’ both hardness and earth are conventionally 
existent as the reciprocally dependent pair of laksya and laksana. The 
significant mistake of the Santrantikas (and in this case, Dignaga’s) has been to 
attempt an explanation of their status that replaces reciprocal dependence with 
ontological identity. The examples adduced, though, failed to convince 
Candraklrti since, in the case of ‘Rahu’s head’, there is an ontological disparity 
between ‘Rahu’ and ‘head’, as the first merely functions to delimit which head 
we are speaking about, and has no existence whatsoever beyond that function. 
The same function cannot be ascribed to ‘the hardness of earth’, since a verbal 
expectancy of something beyond hardness does not arise. Thus, the relationship 
between the two terms of the expression does not rest on ontological disparity, 
as both have the same level of existence: conventional and reciprocally 
dependent. As such, they are a valid pair of laksya and laksana.
I am aware of having repeated similar arguments throughout this discussion: but 
CandrakTrti’s stance on the issue is subtle and my understanding turns Eckel’s 
position upside-down. Candraklrti was not in favour of inheriting ‘unanalysed’ 
conventionalities, except in a very specific sense, and the ‘hardness of earth’ is 
no such thing. It is a case of Abhidharmic analysis, and as such an acceptable
265 evam prthivyddmdm yadyapi kdthinyddivyatiriktam vicduyamdnaiii laksyam ndsti 
laksyavyatirekena ca laksanam nirdsrayam tathdpi samvrter eveti paraspardpeksay>d tay>oh 
siddhycl siddhim vyavasthdpaydm babhuvur dcduydh \ avasyam caitad evam abhyupeyam \ 
anyathd hi samvrtir upapattya na viyujyate tad  eva tattvam eva sycin na samvrtih \ na ca 
apapattyd viciuyamancincim sildputrakddmdm evdsambhavah \ kim tarhi \ vaksyamdnayd 
yaktyd rupavedanadindm api ndsti sambhava iti tesdun api samvrtyd sildpatrakadivan ndstitvam 
as they am syd t \ na caitad evam ity asad etat [| Prasannapadd 1.3.
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refinement of one’s conventional understanding. If this is the case, is there 
anything that Abhidharmic analysis should not analyse or be curious about?
By now, my answer should be expectable: the problem with Abhidharma is not 
in the analysis of conventions, per se, but in the tendency to essentialise the 
elements at play in the analysis: in overdoing the analysis to the extent of 
turning it into an ontological statement. In particular, an attempt to identify 
laksya and laksana as ultimately different (as the Vaibhdsikas would do) or as 
ultimately the same (the Sautrdntika position) is the analytical excess (or 
perhaps, the lack of sufficient analysis) that Candraklrti, and Nagarjuna before 
him, would resist.
The point of departure from the Abhidharmic description is in this assessment 
of laksana and laksya as neither ultimately identical nor different, but as 
reciprocally dependent. The contours of Abhidharmic analysis, though, remain 
acceptable for Madhyamaka, since they still give a picture of conventions that 
does not rest on the acceptance of some ultimate ‘self’, and on the other hand 
they do not derive consciousness from material events (they do not essentialise 
the object of cognition). I hope that this will be considered a sufficient 
corroboration of my argument about the importance of Abhidharmic analysis 
for Madhyamaka conventions: this conclusion goes against the grain of any 
argument against redescription; nor do I find Eckel’s interpretation of the 
‘satisfaction of no analysis’ entirely convincing.
180
4.2.3 More on Candraklrti and kcirakas
Moreover, Mahamati, all dharmas are devoid of kriyd and kdraka: 
they do not arise, due to the absence of a kdraka. Therefore it is said: 
all dharmas are unarisen.266
I have discussed the importance of grammar in Chapter 1, and I have 
exemplified its usages in the discussions of svalaksana and svasariivedand. 
There are a few more reasons, though, for which I think that it is especially the 
kdraka system to have found such a prominent place in Madhyamaka.
Discussions about the proper identification of grammatical agents are attested 
even in the Abhidharma as already indicated in Chapter 2. In this sense, 
Nagarjuna and Candraklrti are in line with an Abhidharmic trend.
A characteristic feature of Candrakirti’s commentary, and of Nagarjuna’s own 
text, is to take single verses of the Mulamadhyamakakdrikd as blueprints for 
multiple refutations. This means, a verse represents a certain syntactical 
structure, where the commutability of the specific elements affords for a much 
wider applicability. Significantly, this is especially true of the second chapter 
(gatdgataparfksa), where it is rather clear that the action of going is simply an 
example extendible to any other action. That the whole argument rests on 
vydkarana, has been convincingly shown by Bhattacharya.267 More specifically,
2 6 6  punar aparam mahdmate kriydkarakarahitah sarvadharma notpadyante’karakatvat  j  
tenocyate 'nutpanndh sarvadharma id \ Lahkavatarasiitra, 2, 170
267 See Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, ‘Nagarjuna’s arguments against motion: their grammatical 
basis’, in A.L Basham et al., (eds.), A corpus o f  Indian studies. Essays in honour o f  Professor 
Gaurinath Sastri, Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980, pages 85-95. See also: Kamaleshwar 
Bhattacarya, ‘Notes Bouddhiques’, in Indologica Taurinensia, Vol.VII: Torino, 1979, 
Kamaleshvar Bhattacharya, ‘The grammatical Basis of Nagarjuna’s arguments. Some further 
considerations’, in Indologica Taurinensia, 8-9, 1980-81, pages 35 — 43, Bhattacharya, K.,
‘Back to Nagarjuna and grammar’, in Adyar Library Bulletin, 58-9, 1994-95, pages 178 -  1 8 9 .1 
thank Ian Westerhoff for making all these articles readily available.
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it rests on the analysis of an action in terms of kdrakas. Since kdrakas are the 
common manner in which any reader of Sanskrit will understand (and express 
or analyse) actions, the force and broad applicability of the choice becomes 
evident.
Certain facets of CandrakTrti’s employment of syntactical relations (kdrakas) 
deserve special attention: a discussion of the implications of his views might 
clarify Madhyamaka'1 s relation to both Yogdcdra and Cdrvdka.
Candraklrti reiterates time and again that we can (and do) speak of actions only 
within the conventional framework of the kdraka system -  therefore, with 
agents and possibly objects of the actions. The triad of kartr, karman and kriyd 
is there whether we refer to conscious or insentient processes, but in the case of 
consciousness this structure precludes certain possibilities.
Candraklrti has been read as criticising the Yogdcdra on the basis of their 
acceptance of an objectless subject. This might be more precisely rephrased as 
an objectless agent, considering that Candraklrti was not referring to a subject- 
syntax. The last point is to be noted: subject and agent are to be carefully 
distinguished to understand the weight of Candrakirti’s claims. For example, in 
bhdve prayoga type of sentences like arind na jiyate, we have a subject-less, but 
not agent-less, construction. Consciousness being the agent, his position 
amounts to saying that a thesis of mere consciousness is precluded: and 
cittamdtra (mere consciousness) would be the same as Yogdcdra.
This reconstruction of Candrakirti’s argument is probably correct, but also 
incomplete: an important prior consideration should be retained as the 
background of his objections, before assessing their strength. Candraklrti had in 
fact specified that we speak of actions not without speaking of agents (as I noted,
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this is the case in Sanskrit even when we do away with subjects). With this 
premise, the possible Yogdcdra rebuttal that vijndna exists and is devoid of the 
agent/object dichotomy has no force. Candraklrti has not only said that 
cittamdtra does not make sense, being an objectless subject: he also said that 
vijndna cannot be spoken doing away with agents.268[/in fact, this is well "jy  
understood by Madhyamika authors, who reconstruct (I would say, correctly) ' ‘ <
the Yogdcdra position as accepting consciousness as real, as an agent-less and 
objectless action: not as an object-less agent, or subject.269
We may then apply the same structure to analyse the Cdrvdka position.270 If 
consciousness were derivable from matter, the latter would pre-exist as a 
possible but not actualised jheya (object of knowledge) without jndtr (agent of 
knowledge) and, in fact, without jndna (knowledge as an action): which, I 
believe, Candraklrti would not accept.
One could retort that objects may be spoken of without being described as 
objects of knowledge, or alternatively that past objects are objects of present 
knowledge (they are objects of present intentionality). One wonders whether 
these rebuttals could resist Madhyamaka analysis, as the issue becomes quite 
specified and would be worth much greater space. Although Candraklrti does 
not discuss the problem in these terms, there are reasons to believe that in his
269 See for example the section o f Bodiiicaryavatdra  concerned with Yogdcara,  especially verse 
9.16 and commentary, translated in Appendix.
270 Tom TiHemanns presented a very similar argument during the Buddhist Symposium of the 
Centre for Buddhist Studies, Kathmandu University, Kathmandu, October 2006. As I had 
developed my arguments independently from his, there is a certain difference in the focus, since 
I look at the issue mainly through the kdraka  system. Neither o f us, though, is the first to bring 
forth such an argument: Khenpo Tsultrim Gyatso does that in his exposition o f  the Yogdcdra 
view and its shortcomings. See Khenpo Tsultrim Gyatso, Progressive Stages o f  Meditation on 
Emptiness,  Oxford: Lonchen Foundation, 1986, page 40.
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system, sentiency cannot be pre-existed by the insentient. In the
Madhyamakavatcira, he remarks:
It is only mind that arranges the variegated world of living beings 
and the receptacle world.
Since, the whole world is said to be born of karman, and without 
mind there is no karman,271
The world is born from intentionality, and is expressed through kdrakas, which 
resemble its structure and, in the case of karman, bear the same name. 
CandrakTrti’s (and plausibly Nagarjuna’s) employment of the term karman, 
oscillates between the idea of action and its grammatical sense of object of the 
action. May had perceived and commented upon this oscillation.272
To sum up the difference between Madhyamikas and common persons: 
Madhyamikas do not so much refrain from analysis of conventions, but from 
any attempt to reify the elements at play in the analysis. The vicdra which one 
should not engage is whether these elements are ultimately identical or different 
and so on: since if they could be identified in this way, they would exist as 
ultimate, and not as conventions.
On the other hand, this does not prevent Madhyamikas to regard certain ways of 
understanding conventions as more sound; nor does it follow that their 
preference is mere cultural inheritance. Candraklrti discards non-Buddhist 
definitions (laksanas) since they are yuktividhurdh (devoid of good reasoning)
2 7 1  sattvalokam atha bhdjanalokam cittam eva racayaty aticitram \ karmajam hi jctgad utktam 
asesaih karma cittam avadhuya na cdsti  || Quoted in the Sanskrit by Prajnakaramati, while 
commenting on Bodhicaiydvatdra  9.73.
272 See Jacques May (tr.), Candraklrti: Prasannapadd Madhyamakavrtti (Commentaire limpide 
an Trade du Milieu),  Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959, note 413 page 144. The most perceptive 
of May’s remarks are perhaps those regarding the fact that ‘En fait, les divers sens du terme 
karman  ne se separent pas dans l’esprit de nos autors[...]’ and despite its brevity in comparison 
to Gerow’s discussion, the argument he makes for their identification is similar and highlights 
certain crucial points. Especially, may marked that the ‘object-directs’ are nothing but 
‘specifications (visesana) de son acte’, which is not veiy different from Gerow’s reproduction o f  
the late grammarians’ argument for the ultimate identity between phala  and vydpdra.
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and not because of some invocation of authority. The Abhiclharma's mistake 
was not in the analysis, but in its reification. This reification is often detected as 
the usage of a self-referential language, which betrays the very expressive 
structures it uses: and Candraklrti identifies the latter as the kdraka system.
4.3 Identity and difference between Madhyamikas and Cdrvdkds. 
Paraloka, karman, and the origin of vijndna. The meaning of 
pratipattrbheda
The first distinction I made - between Madhyamikas and ’cowherds’ - is to some 
extent logically neutral: I intend to say that, even if one were to start applying 
Madhyamaka analysis to unrefined conventions, it would not ipso facto stultify 
an ascertainment of their emptiness. This is predicated upon the axiom that, 
anything being empty, emptiness can be accessed by applying ultimate analysis 
to any type of conventionally perceived phenomena, whether they have passed 
through the refining lenses of Abhidharma and Vydkarana, or otherwise.
On the other hand, the further distinction I wish to highlight verges upon an 
important point of interpretation. The possibility of a materialistic reading of 
Madhyamaka would have far-reaching implications, which traditional scholars 
(including Nagarjuna) would consider undesirable. In classical Indian thought, 
the materialistic position is normally represented by the Cdrvdka school. As the 
Cdrvdkas deny a ’self’ surviving the body’s disintegration, their position was at 
times felt akin to the Buddhist - in fact, in the graded exposition of ’all views’ 
{sarvadarsana) by Madhava, Buddhists come right after Cdrvdkas: meaning 
that they are second worst. This might be one of the reasons why the Buddhists 
took so much pain to distinguish their own position from the Cdrvdkas, and
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denounced the latter’s doctrines as lower than even the positing of a permanent 
self.
There are three related issues where the Buddhist and Cdrvdkas openly diverge. 
Firstly, Cdrvdkas denied paraloka, the other world. There is ample evidence to 
show that the latter refers to nothing else than the next life, the world 
(whichever it might be) that one shall inhabit after one’s death. Not only this is 
the common usage of the term in Sanskrit, and even in modern Indian 
vernaculars, but this is the manner in which Buddhist texts of all hues, and 
Madhyamaka o
'""authors like Candraklrti, consistently employ the term. Thus, to state it briefly, 
Cdrvdkas deny, while Madhyamikas accept, repeated birth and death.
Without rebirth, extended causality over more than one life, i.e. the law of 
karman, is of course untenable. Here is the second obvious difference: 
Madhyamikas accept karmic causality.
Both of these differences stem from a basic divergence in the understanding of 
consciousness and its origin. Cdrvdkas explain sentiency as an epiphenomenon 
of materiality. The physical elements would gain sentiency under specific 
conditions; much in the way fermented barley might acquire alcoholic gradation. 
Consciousness is therefore no more than a conditioned quality of the material 
elements, bound to disappear with the dissolution of the body at death.
Madhyamikas, on the other hand, emphasise that consciousness and materiality 
are distinguishable, and that the former could not originate from the latter. Both 
Nagarjuna and Candraklrti speak of consciousness in non-reductionist terms. 
Nagarjuna writes that consciousness enters a realm of existence {vijhdnam
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sannivesate samskarapratyayam gatau). Candraklrti is even more specific, as he 
writes that
Thus, in analogy to such things as an image and its reflection, 
when consciousness conglomerates in the mother’s womb, name 
and form, conditioned by consciousness, comes about (...) if in 
this realm of existence consciousness does not conglomerate, 
then there would be no manifestation of name and form: ’if, 
Ananda, consciousness were not to enter the mother’s womb, 
then the foetus would not become a foetus’- thus from the 
utterance (of the Buddha).273
In short, Madhyamaka does not diverge from the wider Abhidharmic outlook 
about the relationship between consciousness and materiality. This was 
certainly not a uniform or unproblematic position, but I am not aware of any 
Indian Buddhist school that would have ascribed second-degree existence to 
mind and relegated it to a mere temporary quality to be lost with the body’s 
death. Indian Buddhism seems to make little sense without the overall 
background of continued birth - the continued suffering of samsdra.
In two different passages of the Prasannapadd, Candraklrti expounds the 
Cdrvdkas’ position, highlighting how they do in fact deny the other world and 
karman, and how they reduce consciousness to materiality. Candraklrti also 
explicitly tells us that these denials cannot be shared by Madhyamikas. In one 
passage, the hypothetical opponent charges Madhyamikas with being a variety 
of nihilists (ndstikavisistdh), on the ground that, like the materialists, they deny 
this and the other world, the self, etc. Candraklrti replies that the significant 
difference is that Madhyamikas apply these denials only from the point of view 
of ultimate analysis, while accepting karman and rebirth as valid conventions.
273 tadevam bimbapratibimbadinyayena matiih kitksau vijnane sammurcchite vijnanapratyayam  
ndmarupam nisicyate, ksarati pradurbhavatltyarthah \ yad i iha gatau vijncmam na 
sammurchitam sycit, tadci namarupaprcidurbhavo na sydt; ' sa ced ananda vijncmam mcituh
kttksim ncivakramet, na tat kalalam kalalatvdya samvarteta' iti vacancit || Prasannapadd 26 .2.
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This is what I would like to stress: what constitutes Nagarjuna and Candrakirti’s 
philosophy is not merely the techniques they employ to refute inherent existence, 
but also certain specific takes on conventional truth. Moreover, the two issues 
are closely linked.
To present Madhyamaka only in terms of its insistence on emptiness, without 
couching this in a wider discourse about samsdra, suffering, and its ending, is to 
misrepresent the very direction, and possibly outcome, of its dialectical methods. 
This is what, I believe, Candraklrti addressed in the continuation of the debate 
just introduced.
The hypothetical opponent is not satisfied with the reply that, between nihilists 
and Madhyamikas, the difference is a matter of conventionalities: he retorts that, 
even so, factually (vdstutah) there is no difference between the two, meaning 
that their position as to how things really are (or, in this case, are not) is not 
distinguishable. Interestingly, Candraklrti assents. Yet, he qualifies his assent by 
introducing a specification, and an analogy, which should tell us something 
about the relation between the two truths.
Candraklrti responds to his opponent’s charges by saying that, although 
ultimately the denial of this or the other world, a ‘self’ and so on, may be 
identical in he case of Madhyamaka and nihilism, still, there occurs a difference 
in the one who comprehends {pratipattr-bheda). He elaborates through an 
analogy. Suppose that a theft had taken place. Two witnesses may be called to 
testify in front of a jury: the first witness has seen the crime, the second has not. 
Nevertheless, both of them declare the suspected person to be the thief, but for 
different reasons. The first saw the theft happening, the second personally 
dislikes the thief. Now, the real witness is like the Mddliyamika, who denies
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ultimate rebirth, while accepting it conventionally. The second is like the 
materialist, who denies rebirth both ultimately as well as conventionally.
Please notice that, regarding the second witness, Candraklrti is telling that he is 
still lying, although what he says corresponds to truth in one sense. The contents 
of an assertion are not the only parameter to decide its truth: another is the 
relation of the speaker to that content. If we transpose the analogy, it would 
suggest that anyone who would not accept rebirth conventionally while at the 
same time denying it ultimately would be - from his or her own side - lying, 
even in respects to the ultimate denial. This suggests that a proper 
comprehension of ultimate analysis rests on a specific understanding of 
conventional truth, and that without such understanding, ultimately disowning 
the existence of karman and rebirth is flawed. This is not surprising, when we 
recall how Nagarjuna himself had warned that the teaching of the Buddhas rests 
on two truths (dve satye), and that, without comprehending conventional truth, 
one will not be able to access ultimate truth. If anything, it would be more in 
keeping with the Madhyamaka emphasis on prajnapti to give higher level 
existence to mind (as some like Santaraksita do). To decide between knowledge 
and the object of knowledge in favour of the latter’s ontological primacy would 
hardly square with Madhyamaka dialectics, as Nagarjuna himself warned that 
the two are mutually dependent.
4.4 A system of graded samvrtisatya
It is usually accepted that in Madhyamaka, samvrti may have at least two 
degrees: the categories of false samvrti versus authentic saiiivrti (mithydsarhvrti 
and tathyasamvrti) are employed and explained by both Candraklrti and 
Prajnakaramati. False samvrti, though, is not really a truth, even for the ordinary 
person: hence it cannot be said to be a degree of conventional truth.
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The distinction between conventional truth and falsity helps explain 
Madhyamikas recourse to vydkarana and their criticisms of others’ self- 
contradiction in employing the kdraka system, while at the same time denying it 
(Candrakirti’s refutation of the svalaksana). All of this regards the internal 
coherence of conventional truth, where laksanas should not be ‘devoid of good 
reasoning’ (yuktividhurdh), as Candraklrti puts it.
What the analysis so far presented suggests, though, is that even within 
conventional truths, a gradation may be accepted: otherwise, it would be 
difficult to understand the recurrent employment of Abhidharma categories by 
the Madhyamaka. One could argue that this is due to an inherited framework of 
conventional analysis, and that Madhyamikas could have well started from a 
different one. This interpretation, though, is arguably speculative, and fails to 
make good sense of the relationship between Madhyamaka and what it purports 
to be: an interpretation of the central concerns of the Buddhist teachings. I hope 
to have convincingly shown the close connection between Madhyamaka and 
their wider background, namely the conventions of both vydkarana and 
Abhidharma..
It is therefore desirable to look for some better rationale for the inclusion of 
Abhidharmic categories as the fundamental refinement of our conventional 
language and understanding. Both in the case of Candraklrti and Prajnakaramati, 
their remarks about levels of teachings and conventions offer a sensible starting 
point.
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4.4.1 Candraklrti and graded conventions
Candrakirti’s gradation from falsity to truth may be reconstructed as follows:
mistaken conventions: these are perceptual or inferential errors, including cases 
of sense impairments or the non-Buddhist doctrines of self;
acceptable worldly conventions as ordinary speech: at this level, one can speak 
of a person, a self (not in the sense of a permanent core, though), and so on;
acceptable worldly conventions as Abhidharmic analytical categories: here one 
explicitly recognises the conventionality of the previous level by employing the 
analysis in terms of skandhas, dhatus, ay a tanas, etc.; it counts as a partial 
understanding of emptiness, at least as selflessness of persons;
ultimate truth; emptiness and the emptiness of emptiness.
Most secondary literature on Candraklrti does not systematically distinguish 
between the second and the third levels of this gradation of conventions, and 
this results in a series of interpretive positions, which I cannot endorse (for 
example, Williams’ statement that a Prasangika ‘qua Prasangika’ cannot 
distinguish between different sets of valid conventions). In two passages of the 
Prasannapadd the issue is either explicitly addressed or the different levels are 
implicitly employed.
4.4.2 Three levels of teachings
In MiUamadhyamakakdrikd 18.6, Nagarjuna tells us that
The Buddhas spoke of a self, and they also taught no-self.
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They also taught that there is neither self, nor no-self whatsoever.274
The translation fails to capture a difference in Nagarjuna’s terminological 
choice: in the case of ‘self’, the Sanskrit has prajnapitam, while for the other 
two (no-self and neither self nor no self) the use is desitam. This stresses that 
citmcin is necessarily a prcijnapti. This position, as discussed earlier, is endorsed 
by Candrakirti elsewhere.275
Candraklrti offers a very elaborate commentary to the verse, introducing it as 
part of a series of objections and rebuttals. The question posed by the 
hypothetical objector is in effect very similar to what we found in the 
Abhidhannakosa’s portion analysed in Chapter 2.3, where ‘self’ is depicted as a 
metaphorical usage referring to consciousness.
Here too, the same canonical source (a verse of the Dhammcipada/Uddnavarga) 
is quoted. The objector is asking: how are we to accept the non-existence of a 
‘self’, when even the Buddha used the term ‘self’ while addressing his 
students.276 On the other hand, in other instances the Buddha has explicitly 
denied that a self may exist, identical or different from the skandhas, and also 
declared that all dharmas are without self (andtmdnah sarvadharmdh). Is it not 
the case that the Teachings contradict themselves?
2 7 4  dtmetyapi prajnapitam andtmetyapi desitam \ bnddhair nditmd na cdndtmd kascid ityapi 
desitam \ \
275 See the section on the status o f Rahu’s head and my comments on Eckel’s interpretation o f  
the same, earlier in this Chapter.
276 ‘One self is one s e lf  s protector: who else could be a protector? With a well tamed self, the 
wise reaches heaven. One self is one s e lf  s protector: who else could be a protector? One self is 
one se lf  s witness, o f  thing and bad things done.’
dtmd hi dtmano ndthah ko nu ndthah paro bhavet  |  dtmand hi snddntena svargaiii prdpnoti 
panditah  J  |  dtmd hi dtmano ndthah ko mi ndthah paro bhavet \ dtmd hi dtmanah sdksl 
krtasydpakrtasya ca  | |
This is the same verse quoted by Vasubandhu in the Abhidhannakosa.  Candraklrti also adds one 
more quote, from the Samddhirbjasutra.
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Vasubandhu’s solution, as we have seen in Chapter 2, was to say that the 
Buddha spoke of consciousness as a ‘self only metaphorically, or more aptly 
put, as a courteous approximation (iipaccira). Candraklrti, on the other hand, 
distinguishes between teachings, whose intended meaning has to be drawn out 
(neydrtha) and those where it has already been drawn out (mtartha). The two 
ideas are in effect very similar. Upacdra is after all an expression, whose actual 
intended referent must be understood through interpretation: in this sense, it is 
no different from neydrtha?11
Candraklrti proposes three levels of increasing explicitness in the teachings, 
suited for three types of audiences, interpreting Nagarjuna’s verse as implying 
the following gradation:
dtman was taught for those who reduce consciousness to a modification of the 
physical elements;
andtman was taught for the middling ones, who have a solidified view of a real 
dtman and thus cannot go beyond rebirth, but who have accumulated great merit 
and eschewed non-virtuous actions;
neither dtman nor andtman was for the disciples with highest capacities, capable 
to understand the most profound teachings due to their extraordinary conviction 
(iadhimuktivisesa).
To the first type Candraklrti devotes the greatest part of his comments, as he 
seemed to regard their mistake to be particularly catastrophic. He gives a
277 This becomes veiy clear in the Trimsika: see verse 1, with Sthiramati’s commentary.
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relatively detailed characterisation of the materialists’ position. They consider 
intellect (bucldhi) to come about due to a modification (paripdka, lit. a 
‘maturation’ or ‘fermentation’ , as in the case of wine) of the elements, occurring 
during the growth of the embryo. In this way, even while speaking of 
conventional truth (vyavahdrasatydvasthitd eva) these end up denying the next 
life and the self (paralokam dtmdnam capavadante)?1% Because of this denial, 
they are not interested in a good rebirth or in liberation 
(svargdpavargaparanmukdh) and, having heaped up negative karman, they 
reach naraka (hell, or perhaps more precisely, purgatory).
After a series of adjectives that praise the Buddhas for their great compassion in 
using the term dtman to help the least capable of their audiences (the 
materialists), Candraklrti specifies that their position is to be understood as 
ahetuvddah, upholding origination without causes, and tells his readers to refer 
back to his remarks in the karmakdrakapariksd as well as in the 
Madhyamakdvatdra. This clarifies a very important point: ahetuvada (and 
ucchedavdda) does not necessarily imply the negation of all types of causality. 
More specifically it has to do with the negation of the causal continuity of 
karman between lives, and therefore with the non-acceptance of the 
continuation of consciousness at death. Candrakirti’s treatment of the materialist 
position in this section does not leave much space for ambiguity, since at the 
same type he describes their views as accepting causality (from the physical 
elements to buddJii) and yet classes them as ahetuvddim ,279
278 Incidentally, this is one o f  the instances where paraloka  cannot mean anything but the next 
life (see my remarks on Garfield’s translation, above).
279 What this implies is that Garfield’s proposed interpretation o f  Madhyamaka would have been 
understood as a possibility by Candraklrti, and rejected. Like Garfield, Cdrvdkas too can accept 
social interaction as a causal process, but not accepting karman in the sense o f the continuation 
o f consciousness between lives, they fall into a mistaken view o f  conventions (by reifying the 
insentient causal elements at play).
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The middling disciples are those fit to receive the teachings on no-self. This will 
serve to counteract their attachment to ‘the view of a self as a real collection’ 
(satkayatmadrsti), which Candraklrti compares to a string (sutra) binding birds 
who have already gone far -  due to their positive actions.
A significant feature of both the valid conventions of ordinary speech (level two) 
and the valid conventions of Abhidharma2*0 (level three) is that both assert the 
continuity of karman, albeit with a different level of refinement. In the first case, 
they do so in terms of persons and the agency of persons; while Abhidharmikas 
have already dispensed with these rougher identifications -  which are open to be 
taken as ultimate, as the theories of non-Buddhist eternalist (the sasvatavdda of 
the <‘Tirthikasy).
The fact that the teaching on neither self nor no-self is higher still is explained 
through a recurrent rationale (in Madhyamaka texts):
Just like the view of self is not reality, even the view of no-self, 
being its counter position, is not reality. In this way it has been 
taught that there is no self whatsoever, neither there is any no-self 
whatsoever.281
This is a typical Madhyamaka distinction between not positing something and 
positing the opposite of something: it is often applied to existence and non­
existence, and has to do with the way Madhyamikas understand and employ
280 In this gradation, I assume that Abhidharmic conventions would necessarily fit the middling 
disciples. Although Candraklrti does not say this explicitly, the declared purpose o f  
Abhidharmic analysis it to undo dtm adrsd , and this is coincides with Candrakirti’s depiction of 
this intermediate teachings.
2 8 1  yathaiva hi dtmadarsanam atattvam evam tatpratipaksabhdtam api andtamadarsanam naiva 
tattvam id \ evaih nasty dtmd kascit na copy andtmd kascid astTti desitam \ \
For a similar reasoning, see Bodhicajydvatdra  9.34: ‘When no existence is got, o f which one 
might imagine ‘it is not there’, then, how could a groundless non-existence stand in front o f the 
mind?’ yada na labhyate bhcivoyo ndstid prakalpyate \ tadci nirdsrayo ’bhava/i katham dsthen 
mateh pur ah ||
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prasajya type of negations. What is important here is to stress that, by the same 
logic, negating no-self does not result in the acceptance of self or in some 
indecisive stance in respect to self or no-self. It is simply that no-self is 
understood as a dependent imputation only possible due to positing self in the 
first place.
The relationship, though, is not perfectly equal -  since, as we have seen 
elsewhere, the prajnapti of dtman does not depend on the prajhapti of its mere 
absence, but is in reference to the skandhas. If this relationship was mutual and 
on the same plane, there would be no convincing ground to establish a threefold 
gradation in the teachings, as Candraklrti does.
The non-acceptance of karman can be either part of misconceived 
conventionality (as ucchedavada) or part of the ultimate view. In the first case, 
it is a case of positing the absence of karman; in the case of ultimate analysis, it 
would be better described as not positing karman. The difference is subtle and 
touches the core distinction between nihilism (in the specified sense of the 
Carvaka’s over-denial of conventions) and analysis in terms of emptiness. It is 
probably part of what Candraklrti means that, although both Cdrvdkas and 
Madhyamikas may say that there is no karman, they understand ndsti (‘it is not’) 
in a drastically different way. For Cdrvdkas, in no sense continuity of 
consciousness after death occurs, but the great elements always exist. For 
Madhyamikas, in ultimate analysis, there is no question of existence or non­
existence, either in the present life or in the next, of either consciousness, or the 
great elements, or the next life; or the present life for that matter. Their 
apparently identical expression (ndsti) belongs to a very different plane of 
analysis.
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Both the first and the second types of teachings -  both self and no-self -  are, in 
CandrakTrti’s estimate, conventions. As I have argued, though, they are not 
prajilaptis in the same exact sense: one serves the purpose of rectifying the 
gross mistakes of materialists, by employing worldly conventions. The teaching 
on no-self, thus the Abhidharma, on the other hand, begins the deconstruction of 
conventions and is a prajnapti functional to the disclosure of paramartha. The 
difficulty is that the non-positing of a self may easily be taken for the positing of 
no-self, and since some may not understand it otherwise, the Buddha taught as if 
assenting to no-self as a position.
The two types of acceptable conventionalities, serve the double purpose of 
avoiding the two extremes of misinterpreting ultimate analysis as resulting in a 
Cfl/wdkfl-like annihilationism (ncchedavcida) or of reifying the continuity of 
karman into an eternalist stance (sasvatavcida). In this sense, conventional truths 
are essential in the project of a middle way, madhyama pratipat. Although it is 
true that the latter is only perfectly reached with the realisation of the ultimate 
emptiness of conventions (as well as of emptiness), the extremes find equally 
expression when the mistake is in terms of conventional truth. The anta of 
ucchedavdda is especially insidious, since the reciprocal establishment of 
intentionality and intentional referents (mental and non-mental events), of 
object (artha) and purpose (artha), might be more easily overlooked.282
282 The gradation presented in the verse and in Candrakirti’s commentary, should be compared 
to Ratnavalf,  4.94-98: Just like a grammarian would even teach the syllables, the Buddha spoke 
the Dharma according to the capacity of the trainees (94). To some he spoke a Dharma for 
turning away from sins; to some, for the sake of accomplishing merit; to some still, one which is 
based on duality (95), to some, one which is not based on duality, profound, and frightening the 
timid; to some, one which is the essence of emptiness and compassion, the means to accomplish 
Buddhahood (96).
yathaiva vaiydkarano mdtrkdm api pdthayet  |  budclho ’vadat tathd dharmam vineydndm 
yathdksamam  | |  94 J| kesdmcid avadad dharmam pdpebhyo vinivrttaye  | kesdmcit 
punyasiddhyartham kesdmcid ii dvayanisritam  | |  95 | |  dvayanisritam ekesdm gambluram  
bhfritbhisanam \ sunyatdkarundgarbham ekesdm bodhisadhanam  1 1  96  | |
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4.4.3 Analysing space into emptiness: atoms
While depicting the general gradation just discussed, Candraklrti does not 
explicitly employ Abhidharmic analytical categories. He does, though, in the 
gcitagatapanksci, the examination of movement. There, commenting on the first 
verse the Prasannapadd shows a gradual analysis in terms of smaller and 
smaller particles:
(Objection) Or someone may say: for a goer who is going, the area 
which is traversed by the foot should be ‘that which is presently 
being gone to’.
(Reply:) It is not so: because the two feet also are conglomerations of 
atoms. The prior area of the atom placed on the tip of the finger falls 
within what has been already gone to by him (the goer). The final 
area of the last atom placed on the heel is included in what has yet to 
be gone to. And, apart from the atoms, there is no foot: therefore, 
apart from what has already been gone to and what has yet to be 
gone to, there is nothing to be gone to in the present time. Moreover, 
the type of analysis applied to the foot should also be made for the 
atoms as well, in conjunction to their subdivision into prior and
• 2STposterior parts. '
In this passage, we start from conventions of ordinary speech, like feet or 
fingers, and end up with their emptiness under analysis. The atoms of 
Abhidharma appear in between the analytical process, and thus do absolve a 
role fairly in tune with Candrakirti’s more general discussion on their meaning.
Verse 94 contains a possible pun: the word mdtrka, here translated as ‘syllable’ can also refer, in 
a Buddhist context, to mnemonic lists o f Abhidharmic items. After learning syllables, though, 
one does not exactly discard them: they remain basic premises for more complex levels o f  
enunciation and analysis.
283 at ha sydd gantur gacchato yas carandkrdnto desah sa gamyamdnah sydd ili \ naivam  
caranayor api paramdnusdihghdtatvdt \ ahgulyagrdvasthitasya paramdnor yah piirvo desa sa 
tasya g a te’ntargatah  | pdrsnyavasthitasya caramaparamdnor ya uttaro desah sa  
tasydgate ’ntargatah \ na ca paramdnuvyadrekena caranam asti tasmdn ndsti 
gatdgatavyadrekena gamyamdnam  j yatha caivam carane vicdra evam paramdnunam api 
pnrvdparadigbhdgasathbandhena vicdrah kdrya id  || Prasannapadd 2.1.
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As I argued for the categories of clhatu, skandhm  and so on, the atoms here are 
analytical tools towards ultimate emptiness (skandhcis are sometimes explained 
as the atoms themselves, in fact). In one sense, they are as unreal as the category 
of self or person: yet they appear more refined, since they can be employed to 
show that a self or person is not dravyasat.
4.4.4 Santideva and Prajnakaramati: conventions and momentariness
Centuries separate Candraklrti from Santideva, and the latter from his 
commentator Prajnakaramati. Nonetheless, the Tibetan tradition grouped all 
three as Prdsangikas, and indeed the similarities between these authors are 
many.
In the specific instance of graded conventions, Prajnakaramati offers a relatively 
detailed discussion that could be understood as an expansion of Candraklrti’s 
scheme, following the same rationale. Santideva and Prajnakaramati, though, 
tell us something more about the role of Abhidharmic conventions (the third 
level of Candrakfrti’s scheme). What they offer is a rather explicit theorisation 
dealing with the difficult point of Candraklrti’s thought: the proper relationship 
between the conventions of ordinary speech (the second level) and the valid 
conventions of Abhidharma (the third level).
The Bodhicarydvatdra and its commentary offer reasons to consider the latter 
superior to ordinary concepts, and I will argue that these reasons are very much 
in line with the position of the Prascinnapada. Moreover, they open up the 
possibility of refined conventions to comprise of virtually infinite degrees -  a
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position which would justify a flexible attitude towards different types of 
Abhidharma and accordingly make sense of Candraklrti’s own use of the same.
In the 9th Chapter of Bodhicarydvatdra, Santideva is faced with an explicit
question about the place of ksanikatva:
(Things) are not really momentary. If (you say that) 
conventionally (they are so, we retort that) this is 
contradictory.284
To which he replies that
the fault is not with the yogins’ conventions. Compared to the 
worldly, they see reality.285
The logic of this reply rests on a subdivision of persons into common persons 
(prdkrtaka) and yogins, a subdivision which is set out at the very beginning of 
Chapter 9, and which rests on whether one realises or not paramdrthasatya 
(truth in the highest sense). Yogic perceptions, though, are such precisely 
because they do not work within the obscuration of conventions, samvrti, 
which is understood etymologically as a covering to paramartha. Strictly 
speaking, a different understanding of conventions cannot per se be the ground 
to distinguish common persons from yogins: and accordingly, Santideva gives
2 8 4  tattvatah ksanika naite samvrtya ced virudhyate\\ Bodhicaiyavatara,  9.7a.
2 8 5  net doso yogisam vrtya lokdt te tattvadarsinah  11 Bodhiccuyavatara,  9.7b. See also Alexander 
Von Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine o f  Momentariness,  Stuttgart: Franz Veiner Verleg, 1995, 
page 200, note 4 2 7 .1 do not here follow his rendering o f the third case (samvrtya), although it 
better fits Prajnakaramati's commentary: ’[...]  because [it is in fact perceived] by the 
conventionfal expeience] o f  yogins’. Crosby and Skilton's translation is to my eyes equally 
sensible, and possibly more immediately representative o f  Santideva's verse when read without 
its commentary. The reason to prefer the latter option is that I believe that reframing cases into 
new syntactical contexts is no more than a usefiil commentarial stratagem. It allows the 
commentator to elucidate some o f the implications o f  the verses, but 1 do not think it purports to 
recast the simpler syntactical structures o f the root texts themselves.
Von Rospatt briefly discusses this verse in two sections o f his work (note 427 and note 451). He 
points out that the text has not much to say about the actual experience o f momentariness, yet I 
do think that it tells us something o f  the framework. His remark, moreover, does not apply to the 
entire commentary, since we do have a section where Prajnakaramati discusses in greater detail 
the experience o f  momentariness, while commenting upon 9.78.
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their insight into tattva -  and not the different quality of the conventions 
themselves -  as the reason to establish the superiority of yogisamvrti. This 
gradation, and the fundamental epistemological issues that underlie the debate, 
are better understood from Prajnakaramati’s commentary:
Opponent | If they were not taught ultimately, how could they then 
be momentary? Thus he says: ‘They are not momentary’.
In reality (tattvatah), from the point of view of paramdrtha, since 
they have no essence these dharmas are not even momentary. The 
teaching of momentariness and so forth is to show that nature to 
people to be trained (or, because such nature does not appear to 
people to be trained).
If ultimately they are not momentary, how is it that even in the 
teaching they have been said to be so? Placing this in mind he says 
‘If you say ‘conventionally’. If it said that they are called momentary 
from the point of view of samvrti, expecting such an answer he faults 
it: then ‘it is contradictory’. That they are momentary according to 
samvrti and not according to paramdrtha is contradictory: it does not 
hold together. Because they are perceived as non-momentary, it 
contradicts perception. And, since those engaged in conventional 
usages perceive its opposite, momentariness is not the form 
corresponding to samvrti,286
Common persons do not perceive the world in terms of momentary dharmas 
(nor in terms of the conventions of Abhidharma in general, for that matter). 
Aryas, in their realisation of ultimate truths and emptiness, do not perceive 
conventions: in one sense, their realisation is the non-perception (anupalambha) 
of conventions. Who, then, perceives the world of Abhidharma!
286 yad i na paramdrthato desitdh, katham tarhi te ksanikdh ? ity aha — tattvatah ksanikd m ite  iti 
I tattvatah paramdrthatah nihsvabhdvatvdt ksanikd api na bhavanti ete ime bhdvdh 
ksanikadidesanci vaineydndm tatsvabhdvatdprakdsandt I yad i na tattvatah ksanikdh katham 
tarhi desandydm api kathitdh ? iti manasi nidhdya aha -  samvrtya cet iti I ya d i samvrtya 
ksanikd abhidhlyanta ity ucyate ity attar am dsankya dusayati -  tadd virudhyate I samvrtya 
ksanikdh na paramdrthata iti virudhyate na sahgacchate I aksanikatayd pratTteh pratltivirodhah  
sdmvyavahdribhir aksanikatvapratlter na ksanikatvam sdnivrtan'i rupaiii itiydvat\\\ Pahkikd on 
9.7.
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Both this question, and the answer which follows, suggest that Candraklrti and 
Prajnakaramati tackled the same issues from two distinct (although by no means 
contradictory) perspectives. Candraklrti’s emphasis was in placing different 
levels of conventions in a pedagogical gradation, which avoids the pitfalls of 
two avowed extremes. Although this aspect is present in Prajnakaramati’s 
discussion, the emphasis is elsewhere, as his discussion is predominantly 
framed from an epistemological angle.
The commentator emphasises Santideva’s category of yogisamvrti. This is an 
important idea, not elaborated upon (as far as I know) by Candraklrti. Although 
Prajnakaramati does not use the term, his mention of meditative absorption 
{samadhi) suggests that we are here dealing with prsthalabdhajhana, the 
cognition of the world one obtains after coming out of meditative absorption, 
and which differs from the cognition that one would have without having ever 
entered samadhi. It is this type of post-meditative cognition, which corresponds 
to the category of yogisamvrti:
The fault is not with the yogins’ samvrti.
Here there is no such flaw as a contradiction to perception. Why? 
Because, according to the samvrti or conventional usage of yogins 
who have obtained samadhi in the selflessness of persons, there is 
perception in terms of momentariness.
This is what is intended: although momentariness is not perceived by 
the short-sighted, it is nonetheless within the scope of the yogins’ 
conventional usage. Even the conventional usage of yogis does not 
escape having the nature of samvrti, since it has been said that ‘the 
intellect is called samvrti’ (9.2). And it is not that what is stultified
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by perception is surely stultified, since a certain type of perception 
does not constitute a valid means.287
The type of cognition alluded to in this passage is what Candraklrti never 
seems to discuss: he either speaks in terms of the Aryas’ realisation of ultimate 
truth, or in terms of the common persons’ conventions. In one instance 
(criticising the svalaksana) he goes on to say that something that does not fit in 
either perception fits nowhere. However, Candraklrti is there more specifically 
stating that svalaksana contradicts the very logic which allows for conventions 
to exist -  he is not merely saying that it does not exist, because it is not 
perceived by commoners. His silence does not necessarily militate against his 
acceptance of a difference between meditative and post-meditative cognitions: 
denying such difference seems hardly plausible in a Buddhist context. However, 
even traditional Tibetan scholars have characterised Candraklrti as mainly 
concerned with meditative absorption into emptiness.288 Prajnakaramati, on the 
other hand, following Santideva, points out that even those who realise 
emptiness still need to engage with conventions, although their engagement has 
been transformed:
Even the conventional usage of yogis does not escape having the 
nature of samvrti, since it has been said that ‘the intellect is calledo 7
samvrti’ (9.2). And it is not that what is stultified by perception is 
surely stultified, since a certain type of perception does not constitute 
a valid means.
2 8  V Na doso yogisamvrtyd  || nay at h pratltivirodhalaksano dosah j kuta/i ? yogindm  
pudgalanairdtmyasamadhildbhindim yd saihvrtir vyavahdrah, tayd ksanikatayd pratlteh \ 
ayam abhiprdyah — yadi ndma arvdgdarsanaih kmnikatvam na pratTyate, tathdpi 
yogivyavahdragocarah\\
288 ‘Ju Mipham Rinpoche, for example, identified the different emphasis on thejnana obtained 
in samadhi as the main difference between Candraklrti’s and Santaraksita’s systems. See 
Georges B.J. Dreyfus, ‘Would the True Prasangika Please Stand? The Case and View o f ‘Ju 
Mipham’, in Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (eds.), The Svatantrika-Prasangika 
Distinction , Boston: Wisdom, 2003, pages 317-347.
Opponent \ Then, how is it that, although it corresponds to samvrti, 
only yogins see this, while the short-sighted don’t?
Reply | Thus he says: ‘compared to the other person, they see tattva’.
In comparison to the other person, who is short-sighted, those yogins 
see tattva, see beyond the sense faculties. Such expression gives the 
reason. Because, they see tattva, therefore they understand 
momentariness, selflessness and so forth, even though those are not 
perceived by other people. Hence, the perception of the other persons 
does not stultify them.289
This last argument has to be carefully analysed, least it may be taken to involve 
circularity. Momentariness, selflessness and so forth are analytical tools, which 
go towards the complete analysis in terms of ultimate emptiness. If these tools 
are the manner through which one comes to understand emptiness, how can the 
understanding of emptiness be an a priori condition of their conventional 
validity? If the argument were to be taken in this way, I doubt it would carry 
much force.
To solve this circularity, we may appeal to the distinction between the two types 
of selflessness: selflessness of persons (puclgalanairdtmya) and selflessness of 
phenomena (<dharmanairdtmya). Abhidharmic conventions are valid analysis in 
terms of the emptiness of persons, and therefore are not mistaken in reference of 
the absence of an ultimate puclgala: to this level belongs momentariness, 
selflessness and so on. They do not extend the analysis to all the referents in 
play, though, and as such they present an incomplete view of emptiness. Yet,
289yogivyavahdro ’p i  samvrtirdpatdm na jah d ti ‘buddhih saihvrtir u cyate' (9.2) iti vacandt \ na 
ca pratdibddhitam bcidhitam eva, tathdvidhdydh praider apramcmatvdt | Lokdt te tattvadarsinah 
| katah panar etat sdihvrtam api ksanikatvddi yogina eva pasyanti ndrvdgdarsinah ? ity dha — 
lokdt te tatt\>adarsina iti \ lokdd arvdcTnadarsandt sakasdt teyoginas tattvadarsinah  
atlndiyadarsinah \ hetupadam etat \ yasm dt tattvadarsinas te tasmdt ksanikatvanairatmybdi 
lokdpvatdam api pratipadyante \ ata eva na tesdih lokapratdibadhd \ \
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emptiness is present in the yogin’s conventions (even when the yogin perceives 
momentary dhannas) at least in the sense of the emptiness of persons.
Even among yogins, there can be levels of insight and accordingly manifold 
conventionalities. Santideva points this out by saying that yogins with sharper 
intelligence refute other yogins.290 ‘Sharper intelligence’, as the commentator 
explains it, refers to the degree of realisation, such as being on the various 
Bodhisattva levels (bhumi) or having attained any of the levels of meditation 
(idhycina).291 The difference, though, is only one of degree, in so far as any 
intellectual imputation is mere convention. It could nevertheless be said that 
certain conventions go towards their own dissolution, and this is hinted at by 
Prajnakaramati, when he defines the yogins as having attained the samadhi of 
selflessness of persons {pudgalanairdtmya). The specification pudgala 
necessarily implies that they have on the other hand not reached the samadhi of 
selflessness of phenomena (dharmanairdtmya). The first degree of attainment 
comes through such teachings as the ones on momentariness, which is also their 
resultant view .292 The view of momentariness is therefore closer to the 
dissolution of all views than a view of permanence would be, since the latter is 
no dissolution at all. As I mentioned Prajnakaramati also defines samvrti as 
‘covering’, in the sense of a veil which precludes direct ‘seeing’ of ultimate
290 badhvante dhlvisesenayogino 'pyut tar attar aih || 9.4.
291 In brief, 1 suggest that Santideva and Prajnakaramati have indeed taken into serious 
consideration the question o f  many levels o f conventionalities. Williams (1998) points out that 
the category o f  intermediate conventionalities is one ‘which the Prasangika has rather tended to 
ignore’. See Paul Williams,77?e Reflexive Nature o f  Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka 
Defence, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000 page 43, note 3). Although this might be generally 
true (in the sense o f having less interest for Abhidharmic phenomenology, I feel that Santideva 
and Prajnakaramati have in fact addressed the issue rather directly.
292 This is not contradictory, if  we consider the continuity from srtitimayT prajiid, to cintdmayi, 
to bhdvandmayi: wisdom from hearing, pondering and cultivation. The content o f  the three may 
be the same, but it has to become increasingly clear and stabilised. The link between the 
understanding o f selflessness o f  persons and momentariness is also brought out in 
Prajnakaramati’s commentary to 9.78.
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truth: we could say that the veil is thicker in the commoner’s case than in the 
yogin9 s.
Santideva points out an unwanted consequence (prasanga) that would follow 
the rejection of his arguments.293 The opponent should accept that yogins have a 
greater insight into tattva than commoners, or accept that a woman’s body 
cannot be depicted as impure. Since, if common people’s insight were as good 
as the yogin's, their desire for women would stultify any deconstruction of 
beauty into a heap of bodily impurities. Santideva’s argument suggests that he is 
here referring implicitly to the four erroneous views (or perversions, viparycisa): 
imputing permanence to the impermanent (;nitydnityaviparydsa) purity to the 
impure (subhdsubhaviparydsa) pleasure to the painful (sukhaduhkhaviparydsa) 
and self to the selfless (dtmandtmaviparydsa).294 This implies that the opponent 
is none other than a Buddhist -  since the force of the argument rests on the 
acceptance of the four viparydsas as erroneous.
The reference to the viparydsas may help to clarify the relationship between 
teachings which use definitions and those employing emptiness. Both are aimed 
at eradicating bondage, which, it is agreed, comes from attachment, hatred and 
delusion (rdga, dvesa and moha). They operate, though, in a different way. If 
we take the instance of attachment, the teaching on impurity shows the 
hollowness of desirability. The object of attachment is not, as such, being 
refuted, but the reasons for our attachment are.
293 Incidentally, it is worth noticing that here the device o f prasanga is not used simply to refute 
the opponents view, but to establish one’s own.
294 In fact in verse six, the expression ‘towards the impure, etc.' (asucy-dclisu) is glossed by 
Prajnakaramati as referring to the other erroneous views as well: ‘By the word ‘etc.’ the 
intellection o f  permanence, etc., in reference o f  what is impermanent etc., is included.’
adisab clad anityadciu nityadibnddhir grhyate ||
206
The teaching of emptiness, on the other hand, directly refutes the existence of 
the desired object. This should undermine the possibility of finding reasons for 
attachment at the very outset. 295 We may think that the first level of teaching 
should be sufficient to eradicate attachment, since we may believe in the 
existence of something and yet have no attachment towards it. Santideva 
responds that the teaching on emptiness is necessary, since only when any 
possible object of imputation is removed, we will have forever uprooted the 
possibility of delusions. Although there is a difference of degree between 
imputing desirability and imputing mere existence, any imputation is, as such, 
erroneous and structurally similar.
The aim is to take away any mental support, or point of reference (dlambana), 
since, ‘A mind with supports will get stuck here or there’. 296 The first level of 
teaching only removes intentionality towards the idea of beauty, but the 
imputation of existence remains, which is the necessary ground for any other 
imputation (and possibly, it is also a tendency towards it). While at first the 
conceptions about an object are removed, then the very conception o fm  object 
ought to be dissolved.
We may fit momentariness into a similar scheme. While the meditation on 
impurity {asucibhdvana) removes the mental flaw of attachment, 
momentariness helps removing the erroneous imputation of permanence and 
personal self. It shows that objects are impermanent, but it does not refute the 
existence of an ever-changing continuum of momentary events (ksanasantati).
295 The effect o f  the understanding o f emptiness upon desire is taken up in verse 32 and 
commentary, responding to the objection that even a magician is enthralled by his empty 
creations.
296 sdlambanena cittern sthdtavyam yatra  tatra vd , 9.48.
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An analysis of its constituent elements will deconstruct even this, so that no 
basis of imputation for permanence or its opposite may remain.
In other words, momentariness comes as a stepping-stone from a solidified view 
of reality, to the complete dissolution of intellectual imputations. It corresponds 
to a limited (but correct) perception of selflessness. It is limited, since it does 
not apply to the elements into which the person is analysed. It is correct, since it
f \ J  5  ascertairl the absence of a self among those elements.297 What is here discussed 
in reference to momentariness, could be generalised to Abhidharmic 
conventions as a whole.
A more precise rationale to establish a relationship between the realisation of 
selflessness of persons and the conventional perception of momentariness is 
given in Prajnakaramati’s commentary to 9.78. This verse introduces the actual 
meditation on selflessness, and the commentator encases the verse in an 
explanation of its specific role towards liberation. Prajnakaramati understands 
Santideva as implying that, although meditation on the selflessness of persons 
still rests on some view of grasping and it should be ultimately abandoned 
(pasccit punar iyam api prahdsyate upalambhaclrstitvdt) it may be accepted for 
some time (tdvat kdlam astu) for the sake of removing attachment to a sense of 
egotism (ahamkdra). Apart from this broader statement about its specific role as 
a stepping stone, which is in line with Candraklrti’s own view and adds 
something unspecified in the previous sections of Prajnakaramati’s commentary,
297 Compare Von Rospatt’s remarks on the role o f momentariness in the Paramdrthagdthds: 
‘[...]the doctrine o f  momentariness serves in the Paramarthagathas as an instrument that 
decomposes the seeming unit constituted by a sentient being in a succession o f  discrete entities 
or events, and thereby stresses the non-existence o f a Self. Insofar as this approach is also 
adopted with respect to conditioned entities in general [ ...] , the doctrine o f momentariness is 
used to dissolve the existence o f all things as they are ordinarily perceived by reducing them to a 
succession o f  momentary entities which can ultimately be reduced to acts o f  origination. In this 
sense, the doctrine o f momentariness undermines the substantial existence o f  phenomena, 
though without effacing them completely’. See Alexander Von Rospatt, The Buddhist D octiine 
ofMomentariness, Stuttgart: Franz Veiner Verleg, 1995, page 81, 82.
208
the most interesting remarks are those which clarify the link between 
momentariness and selflessness of persons:
It is as follows: due to having reached the excellent limit of its 
cultivation, as there is a direct vision of selflessness, its contrary, the 
vision of a true collection, ceases. When the latter has ceased, 
moreover, because one does not any more see something identical, 
that may continue, there is the vision of a mere instant devoid of 
prior or subsequent forms. Then, due to the absence of a 
superimposition of what is prior or subsequent, one does see any 
possible means to achieve future happiness for oneself. Hence, no 
attachment is born towards any object of such a means, nor is there 
aversion towards something contrary to that, simply due to the 
absence of attachment.298
Although the expression bhavcinaprakarsaparyanta may remind one of 
Dharmaklrti’s own system, the sequence of cultivation is here perhaps different. 
One does not start by inferring momentariness through correct reasoning, to 
then meditate on that ascertainment: the actual meditation to be done is directly 
on selflessness, and is to be described in the immediately subsequent sections. 
According to Prajnakaramati, though, seeing momentariness is the direct result 
of cultivating selflessness of persons (again, not viceversa), and he offers a
298 tathahi tadbhdvanaprakarsaparyantagamanat saksan nairatmyadarsandt virodhi 
satkdyadarsana/h nivartate | tannivrttau ca ekasydnugamino darsandbhavat 
purvdpararupavikalasya ksanamdtrasya darsanam \ tatah purvdparasamdropabhdvdt na 
andgatasukhasadhanam kiiiicid dtmanah pasyati | tato na tasya kvacid visaye rdgo jdyate ndpi 
tatprativirodhini dvesah dsahgdbhavdd eva || Panjikd on 9.78.
The text continues: napy a(pa*)kdrinam prati apakdrasthanam pasyati | yen a yasmin 
krto ’pakdrah tayor dvayor api dvitTyaksane ’bhdvdt \ na ca anyena krte ’pakdre preksdvatah 
anyatm  vairanirydtam ucita ndpi yasya krtas tendpi | evaih ragddinivrttau anye ’p i tatprabhavdh 
klesopaklesd noptpadyante \ ndpi vdstutah kascit kasyacid upakdrT idam pratltya idam utpadyate 
iti pm tityasamutpddadarsandd vd | evaih hi pudgalasunyataydm satkayadarsananivrttau 
chinnamulatvdt klesd na samuddcaranti | tadyathdpi ndma sdntamate vrksasya midacchinnasya 
sarvasdkhdpatrapaldsam susyati evam eva sdntamate satkdyadrstiprasamdt sarvakesa 
upasdmyantiti \ tasmdd varath nairdtmyabhdvana || Panjikd on 9.78. Compare this also with 
Nagarjuna’s PratTtyasamutpddahrdayakdrikdvydkhydna on verse 5.
* Although Vaidya gives akdrinam, the BauddhabharatT edition gives apakarinam, which makes 
better sense.
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rationale in that respect: the untrained do not see the mere instants, because they 
are used to impute upon them what is actually prior or subsequent: due to the 
habit of imputing an enduring element. Once it is ascertained that there is no 
self (or rather, when that is directly ‘seen’), the mere instants are free to be 
perceived without any additional imputations. This reasoning is quite coherent 
with Prajnakaramati’s commentary on 9.7, discussed above.
4.5 Conclusions
This Chapter proposed to look at Madhyamaka's stance on conventions and 
analysis within a more refined scheme, and against a wider background. This 
may open up certain possibilities, in terms of Madhyamaka's relation to and 
employment of other aspects of Buddhist thought. It may also preclude other 
avenues, as it does not facilitate the assimilation of Madhyamaka to a method 
easily divorced from a specific context of application (and hence, easily 
exportable).299
In other words, the ‘method’ of Madhyamaka is not merely a series of typical 
argumentative structures, easily distinguished from the specific concerns, 
referents, and context of application of the system as a whole. There is also a 
definite relation between argumentative structures and content: between analysis 
in terms of emptiness, and the use of Abhidharmic categories, or between the 
acceptance of continued birth and the dialectic of cognition and objects of 
knowledge; and so forth.
299 Even an early scholar o f  Madhyamaka like Murti, through that ease o f  ‘exportability’ was a 
great asset o f Madhyamaka, that, for instance, distinguished it from Advaita. See TRV Murti,
The Central Philosophy o f  Buddhism: A Study o f  the Madhyamika System , London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1955. In some ways, I believe that Garfield continues in the same vein. In 
Garfield’s case, if  I understand his stance, this tendency may stem from his broader thesis about 
Buddhism being somewhat at odds with Indian culture as a whole. I would rather argue that 
Buddhism is one o f the forming elements o f  South Asian culture: and one o f  the most important 
for that matter.
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Chapter 5 
Comparisons with the Yogacdra
Some of the differences between Madhyamaka and Yogacdra have been pointed 
out in the context of debates found within Madhyamaka texts. I now intend to 
look back at some of the main themes of the previous two Chapters, and 
reconstruct their relevance within the Yogacdra system. The relationship of 
Yogacdra to Abhidharma, and thus to laksanas, will be treated first: the 
subsequent section will discuss kdrakas. The order is not identical to the manner 
in which the topics were presented in the case of Madhyamaka, as I understand 
Yogacdra taking a different starting point.
The main arguments of the Yogacdra may be understood in Abhidharmic terms. 
They regard a thesis about the origin and cause of the universe, and propose to 
give a more refined set of laksanas that would analyse it: Yogacdra Abhidharma 
has the longest list of dharmas (one hundred). Secondly, Yogacdra understands 
what constitutes consciousness differently from other Abhidharmas: and this is 
linked to their usage of the kdraka system.
The first point is exemplified by Vasubandhu’s Twenty Verses, which are often 
taken as the quintessential delineation of the Yogacdra view. I will therefore 
first offer a reading of that treatise.
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5.1 Twenty Verses: vijnaptimatrata as an Abhidharmic argument
The relation between Yogacdra and the Abhidharma can be easily distinguished 
from the Madhyamaka position: while Madhyamaka discusses Abhidharma and 
its proper place, Yogacdra, in one sense, is Abhidharma.
We have at least two texts in that tradition, which are, unmistakably, 
Abhidharmic treatises: the Abhidharmasamuccaya (and its bhasya) and 
Vasubanclhu’s Pancaskandhaprakarana. Besides these, the Madhydntavibhdhga 
can itself be read as an Abhidharmic text (Sthiramati brings out some structural 
similarity between the first chapter and the first section of the 
Abhidharmakosa). In the case of the Twenty Verses, I will try to argue that they 
present a specifically Abhidharmic argument.
5.1.1 The main thesis of Verse 1
The common manner to render Vasubandhu’s first verse of the Twenty suggests 
a syllogistic structure. In the language of Indian logicians, it would comprise of 
a pratijnd or thesis, a hetu or logical ground, and a drstdnta or example:
all of this is perception-only (vijnapti-mdtram eva idam) - pratijnd; 
because of the appearance of a false object (asad-artha-avabhdsandt) - hetu; 
like when someone with an optical disorder sees nets of hair, etc. (yadvat 
taimirikasya asat-kesa-unduka-adi-darsanam) - drstdnta.
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Pande explicates the assumption300, and most translators’ choices imply it301. 
This reading is also suggested by the title of the work (vijhapti-matrata-siddhih), 
since it gives an apt beginning for a work bent on establishing perception-only. 
This argument could be further simplified as: there is only cognition; because, 
there is no object; as in an optical illusion.
It may be argued that, if Vasubandhu would have intended the verse to be read 
as such, the stress should have been on the falsity {asattvdt) and not on the 
appearance (avabhdsandt). This is logically more cogent. It would make more 
sense to say that the world is mere perception because what appears is false , 
rather than say that it is mere perception because a false object appears. This 
table is empty, because there is no banana; rather than, this table is empty, 
because a false banana appears. The second phrasing is perhaps hardly an 
argument.
Yet, we can understand the argument as implying that: all of this is mere 
cognition, because there is the appearance of a false object, as opposed to the 
appearance of a real object. Since the appearance is a qualified appearance, in 
other words, it does work as a logical ground.
300 G.C. Pande, Studies in Maltayana,Sarnath: CIHTS, 1993, pag, 115: ’The first Karika is, in 
fact, a syllogism ’.
301K.N. Chatterje,(tr.), Vijhaptimdtratasiddhih, Varanasi: Kishor Vidya Niketan, 1980:'It is all 
mere ideation because the non-existing things appear as seemingly external objects as persons 
having bad eyes see non-real hair, texture and the like'. T.A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist 
Doctrine o f  Experience, Delhi; Motilal Banarsidass, 1982: ’It is all mere representation of 
consciousness, because there is the appearance of non-existent objects’. S. Anacker, Seven 
Works o f  Vasubandhu, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998, page 161: ’All this is perception only, 
because o f the appearance of non-existent objects’. T.R.Sharma, VijTiaptimatratasiddhi 
(vimsatikd) (With Introduction, Translation and Commentary), Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 
1993, page 61:’On account of the appearances of non-existent objects, it is all mere 
consciousness only, just like hairs, moons, etc. (which do not exist in reality) to a man with a 
cataract (in his eye)’. Jay L. Garfield Empty words: Buddhist philosophy and cross-cultural 
interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002
, page 157: ’All this is appearance only, because of the appearance of the non-existent. Just 
someone with cataracts sees hairs, the moon and other non-existents.’
213
Vasubandhu’s introductory comments refer to a Sutra passage where it is stated 
that: ‘It is mind-only, Sons of the Victors: the three world-spheres’. 302 
Vasubandhu then explains that mind and cognition (citta and vijnapti) are 
synonyms. The purpose of such a remark is plausibly to indicate that his initial 
statement of mere cognition (vijnaptimdtra) is identical to the Sutra's statement 
of mind-only (cittamdtra).
Kochumuttom argued that the word traiclhdtukam does not mean ’the three 
worlds’ but its derivatives: only mind and mentations (citta and caitdsikas) 
would then fall within the scope of vijnapti-mdtratd, while the elements 
themselves (bhutas) are left untouched. In Kochumuttom’s own words:
’traidhatuka, is an adjective meaning ’belonging to the three worlds’
[...] it is not a substantive meaning ’the three worlds.’303
This distinction is indeed crucial in formulating his interpretation of Yogacdra, 
in the lines of a realistic pluralism. The specification is not at all convincing. In 
favour of Kochumuttom’s argument, one could indeed quote several instances 
where traiclhdtuka is used as an adjective: but in these instances the qualified 
noun is also present, at least once. As an example, the AbhidharmapradTpa has 
’traidhatukam dynh,304 as well as 'traidhdtukah dharmdh305 ’. The same text, 
though, uses the term as a noun, referring to the Buddhist ’worlds’.306 If we
302 cittamdtram bho jinaputrd yaduta traidhatukam  || He introduces this quote with the comment 
that ‘In the Mahdyana the three World-Spheres are established to be cognition only’ (mahdyane 
traidhatukam vijhaptimdtram vyavasthdpyate).
303 T.A. Kochumuttom, A Buddhist Doctrine o f  Experience, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982, 
page 166.
304 AbhidharmapradTpa, page 17.
305 traidlmtukdh diihkhasamudayadarsana(na)heyd bhdvandheyds ca dhanna uktdii || 
AbhidharmapradTpa, page 285.
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look at Yasomitra’s usage in his vyakhya, traidhatukam is used to gloss
*307samsara , in the sense of the place where living beings are reborn - the 
bhajanaloka as opposed to the sattvaloka. It is clear that this must include the 
objective elements of existence - in fact, that they are precisely being referred to. 
When Mahdydna Sutras use the term traidhatuka, it seems likely that they refer 
to the three worlds, not to citta and caitdsikas3m: and Vasubandhu’s usage is 
probably a quote from a Mahdydna Sutra. In all these instances, traidhatukam 
seems to be in the neuter gender and in isolation: no qualified noun is found.309 
Or, if traidhatuka is the first member of a compound, the relationship is not 
karmadharaya . In Vasubandhu’s text too the term appears in isolation, and it is 
thus more plausible to read it as a substantive, not as a qualifier.310
Some attempts to differentiate Vasubandhu’s system from Asanga’s vijndna- 
vdda have focused on the use of vijnapti versus vijndna in the Twenty Verses. 
To support this distinction, Wayman suggests that the introductory 
commentarial portion might be an interpolation, though the philological grounds 
of his decision are far from conclusive. The disputed section (preserved in
306 trayo 'ncibhidhya ’vyapadasamyagdrstayah sarvatra traidhatuke pancasv api gatisu 
dvdbhydmprakdrdbhydm santlti || Abhdharmapradlpa , page 173.
307 samsaranty asmin sattvd iti samsdrah = traidhatukam || Yasomitra’s commentary to 
Abludharmakosa i . l .  This can only refer to the bhajanaloka, the ’receptacle world’, since 
sattvaloka is explicitly used to gloss jaga t of the same verse: jaga t sattvalokah.
308 See for example, the SaddhannapundarTkasutra, page 59: ahyavasitd hy atm sattvdh pahcasu 
kdmagunesu traidhdtukaratydm aparimuktd [...]; page 60: la ucyante srdvakaydnam  
dkdnksamdnds traidhdtukdn ninlhdvanti [...]; page 67, verse 85: putrds ca te prdnina sarvi 
mahyam traidhatuke kdmavilagna bdldh\\
309 See also the term traidhdyukavTtardga, as employed in Divydvaddna , page 18: arhan 
samvrttas traidhdtukavltardgo [...], and page 97: muncldh saiiivrttds traidhdtukavltardgdh 
samalostakahcand dkdsapdnitalasamacittd vdsicandanakalpd [...]. In both instances, the sense 
of traidhdtukam  proposed by Kochumuttom seems hardly applicable.
310 Paul Griffiths already pointed out that Kochumuttom’s understanding of the term is ‘wrong’. 
See Paul J. Griffiths, On being mindless. Buddhist meditation and the mind-body problem , Open 
Court Publishing Company, 1986.
215
Tibetan) contains a Sutra passage, and the Sanskrit equivalent identifies citta, 
vijndna and vijnapti. I may agree in taking these as merely partial synonyms: 
but the set of identifications underminefthe force of Wayman’s argument.311
The common usage of vijnapti is close to 'intimation’, something which ‘makes 
known’. This is its dictionary meaning referring to a non-technical usage 
outside of specifically Buddhist contexts. It is therefore more sensible to look at 
its usages within the tradition that the Twenty Verses show closest affinity and 
continuity with. As pointed out by King, vijnapti is an Abhidharmic term.312
In the Abliidharmakosa, vijnapti is used in two different contexts, either 
meaning ‘informative action’ or, as a synonym of consciousness (vijndna). The 
first sense refers to instances of bodily or vocal actions, which have a quality of 
‘making known’ akin to the common usage of the term outside of Buddhist 
contexts. Vijnapti of this type falls within form or materiality (rupa): it is not 
something mental.313
Vijnapti as used in Yogacdra, though, has often been translated as ’perception’. 
This is justified by its other usage within the Abhidharmakosa, which defines 
vijndna as prativijnapti. When, moreover, the compound prati-vijnapti is split 
into its component parts, the Bhdsya glosses vijnapti itself as apprehension or 
perception (upalabdhi).314 This does not support the reading of any significant
311 See the essay on Vasubandhu in: Alex Wayman, Untying the Knots in Buddhism: Selected  
Essays, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997. For a criticism of Wayman’s general stance on 
Yogacdra in relation to the Sandhinirmocanasiitra see also John Powers (tr.), Jhdnagarbha's 
Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter from  the Sandhinirmocana-Sutra, Delhi: Indian 
Council o f Philosophical Research, 1998, pages 7-8.
312 Richard King, ‘Vijnaptimdtratd and the Abhidharma context o f early Yogacdra’, in Asian 
Philosophy, Vol. 8 No. 1 Mar. 1998 pp. 5-18.
313 For a discussion o f vijnapti in the Abhidharmakosabhasya see 4.2-6 and commentary.
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difference between vijnapti and vijnana: as the Bhasya (most likely by the same 
author as the Twenty Verses, in fact) openly identifies them.
Between these two meanings, the second better fits the context of the Twenty 
Verses: as we have seen, the initial section of the text openly identifies vijndna 
and vijnapti, just as the Kosa did. This identification would not work if we took 
vijnapti in its other technical sense of ‘informative action’, since informative 
action is materiality and not consciousness. If on the other hand Vasubandhu 
intended to employ the term vijnapti in a completely idiosyncratic way, it is 
hard to understand why he never decided to specify its sense: hence interpreting 
vijnapti as distinguishable from vijndna remains highly speculative.
I do agree, as I believe to have made clear, that the characterisation of Asanga’s 
and Vasubandhu’s view as idealist is plausible, and would endorse most of 
Garfield’s arguments on this point.315 This is also on terminological grounds.
The main thrust of the argument, thus, implies that perceptions (vijnaptis) 
certify no more than themselves. They are not true representations: they may be 
called so only in the sense that an actor might represent a character that never 
was or will be a presence beyond the stage.
5.1.2 An alternative translation
The first two quarters of verse 1, have been usually read as separate sentences. It 
is grammatically justifiable, though, to join them, so that the overall sense
314 visayaiii visayaiii prati vijhaptir upalabdhir vijiianaskandha ity ucyate \ 
Abhidharmakosabhasya on 1.16a.
315 See Jay L. Garfield, Empty words: Buddhist philosophy and cross-cultural interpretation , 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pages 155-159, ’Cittamatra is idealism’.
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would be that: ’All of this mere-perception comes from the appearance of a 
false object, like’, etc.
I am suggesting that, if one had to supply a verb to the sentence, utpaclyate 
(arises) could be used instead of bhavati (is), and this would give an alternative 
translation:
All this mere-perception arises from the appearance of a false object, 
just like the seeing of false nets of hair, etc., on the part of someone 
affected by an eye-disease, arises from the appearance of a false 
object.316
In this rendering, to the statement of perception-only is added a depiction of its 
origin; and the second quarter is no more, strictly speaking, the logical ground 
of a three-member syllogistic figure.
316 Corresponding to the hypothetical Sanskrit expansion as: *\>ijnaptimatram eveclam 
asadarthdvabhdsandt utpaclyate, yaclvat taimirikasydpy asatkesondukdclklarsanam  
asadarthdvabhdsandt utpaclyate \ Even retaining bhavati would make little difference, as the 
root blul is not necessarily to be taken as a copula, and can carry the sense of ‘to come into 
existence’. Yet, utpadyate clarifies the sense in which I understand the verse.
When we look at the origin of vijhaptis, we see that the second quarter of the verse consists o f a 
compound with some interpretive options. We may either understand it as ’ from the false 
appearance of an object’ or as ’from the appearance of a false object’, depending on whether we 
refer as at to artha or avabhdsandt. The second reading is preferable, as we can thus retain the 
sense of non-existent, and not merely deceiving, for the word asat (which we rendered with 
false). This is also the standard translation.
The example may also be understood differently. Since the position that the seeing o f false nets 
of hair arises from a false appearance is not immediately acceptable to the hypothetical realist 
opponent (who might prefer to ascribe its origin to defects in objectively existent phenomena), 
the example is fit to explain the characteristics of perception-only, rather than its arising. If we 
want to shift the referents o f the simile, we may rephrase the translation, as
This, which is mere perception-only, originates from the appearance of a non­
existent object, and is like the seeing of non-existent nets o f hair, etc., on the part 
of one with an ophthalmic disease.
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We can also read the objection in verse 2 as directed to the origin of perception, 
not to the first half as a statement of perception-only:
[...] if perception does not come from an object.317
A passage from Sthiramati's MaclhydntavibhdgabhdsyatTkd suggests that this is
how the commentator understood this verse. This passage comes close, in
structure and content, to being its paraphrase. The use of ‘it is said’ (ucyate)
suggests that it was perhaps intended as a quote:
[...] therefore, in order to make one relinquish attachment to that, it is 
said: this consciousness-only arises as the appearance of an object, 
etc., just like for those with an optical disease the appearance of nets 
of hair, etc., even without an object, a being, etc.. In this way the 
dependent imagination of what does not exist, consisting of eight 
consciousnesses, has been mentioned.318
The symmetry with Vasubandhu’s verse is hard to miss: similar or identical 
expressions occur even in the same order (evedam, arthddydbhdsam, 
taimirikdndm, kesonclukddi). Sthiramati supplies utpadyate, and not bhavati, as 
the verb fit to complete Vasubandhu’s sentence, and reads it as a reference to 
the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhdva). In this reading, the verse has an 
indirect reference to how the dependent nature operates.319
317 vijnaptir yadi ndrthatah | The second half o f the verse now fits with the rest quite well: 
seeing nets o f hair also comes from the appearance of such false objects. The similarity between 
the example and the exemplified is explicitly attacked in the commentary to verse two, by the 
hypothetical objector: this suggests that it was expressed in the initial thesis.
318 /... /  tasmdt tadabhinivesatydjandrtham ucyate - vijhdnam evedam arthddydbhdsam  
utpadyate, taimirikdndm iva kesondukddydbhdsam vindpy arthasattvddineti \ evaih 
cdstavijildnavastukah paratantro 'bhutaparikalpa ity uktaih bhavati ||
Madhydtntavibhdgabhdsyatlkd, page 15 in Pandeya’s edition. I read artha and sattva  as a dvanda 
and not as a tatpurusa, partly because of the occurrence of ddi, but mainly because this type of 
interpretation is in line with the way Vasubandhu reads the fourth Kdrikd (artha-sattva , etc.). I 
think that this is also the sense in which artha-sattva-pratibhdsam  is used in the tikdi, page 12.
319 One could object that saying that the seeing o f false nets o f hair arises from a false 
appearance of objects is neither clear nor, perhaps, cogent -  since, in one sense, the 
misapprehension is fitter to exemplify what a false appearance is. Yet, the cognition of false nets
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I find both readings plausible, for different reasons. The first seems more in tune 
with taking the verse as a gloss to the Sutra's statement, which it could not be if 
the first quarter (vijnaptimatram evedam) where not understood as a complete 
sentence. The second reading, though, is corroborated by Sthiramati, and links 
Verse 1 quite well to the arguments found in verses 6-8.
The language and tenor of the objections, as well as the common ground 
assumed by the rebuttals, set the treatise within the cosmology of the 
Abhidharma. This can be seen throughout the text, and hence it would be hard 
to deny that the context of the establishment of cognition-only 
(vijhaptimdtratasiddhHi) is indeed Abhidharma. One section more than others, 
though, shows how the main argument (as delineated in my reading of Verse 1) 
is primarily an Abhidharmic thesis. What was stated in the first verse is 
developed in the section comprising verses 6, 7 and 8.
5.1.3 The proper locus of dependent arising
To anticipate the outcome of the following analysis: Vasubandhu is arguing that 
the proper place of occurrence of dependent arising is no other than 
consciousness. This is an important axiom that differentiates Yogacdra from 
other Buddhist systems, and is implied in the statement of verse 1. Vasubandhu 
supports his main idea by appealing to certain further Abhidharmic 
considerations.
of hair, etc., does arise from appearance of what is false, if  we consider the process of the arising 
of vijnaptis from a Yogacdra perspective.
220
The sixth verse of the Twenty may appear as a digression into a subtle, but 
possibly idle, cosmological dispute. The animals in the heavens are ’real’, in the 
sense of possessing a mind-stream, while the hell-guards are not so, they are 
mere inanimate dolls. The difference has to be accounted for: in both cases we 
have a mixture of two gads, realms of existence.
Vasubandhu upholds that the ground of the distinction is the ability to enjoy the 
characteristics of the respective realm. While the animals may be perfectly 
capable to enjoy heavenly pleasures, hell-guards would be impaired in their 
functions if they were to undergo the same torment as the hell-beings. Thus, 
there is no karmic justification for their presence there, and we must remember 
that the realms are places of karmic retribution (in fact, they are formed by the 
force of the collective karman of the beings there). Yet, how is this going to 
help the argument for vijhapti-mdtratd ?
Anacker suggests that Vasubandhu is here venting his dislike for the idea of 
'real’ hells, but this seems a weak justification for the lengthy discussion.320 We 
can make better sense of the digression by placing it within Abhidharmic 
cosmogony, skilfully bent towards Vasubandhu’s thesis.
The question of the genesis and nature of the hell-guards allows the author to 
introduce one of the most important arguments in the work. The distinction
320 Despite what Anacker says about Vasubandhu’s position, I find no indication that he treats 
the hells as ontologically different from the human realms. His speculation about Vasubandhu’s 
motives and inner attitude towards the hells has no textual corroboration whatsoever, at least 
that I know of. Besides, the depiction of hells as “an approved place for the infliction of 
suffering” in no way represents the views of ‘traditional Buddhist exegetes’, which Vasubandhu 
would then see as ‘abhorrent’. It is a basic Abhidharmic idea that there is nobody to approve or 
disapprove, or decide for, the constitution of a certain realm: the latter is taken as a result of 
causes and conditions, including of course living beings’ karman. I therefore see no basis for 
Anacker’s reconstruction of the issue at stake. See S. Anacker (tr.), Seven Works o f Vasubandhu, 
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998, page 160.
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between the plausibility of animal birth in the heavens (svarga) and the non­
plausibility of the hungry ghosts’ birth in the hells (hell-guards seem to be 
classified as pretas) stresses the retributive character of the realms, an obvious 
reminder of the formative role that karman plays in framing the ’receptacle 
world’ (bhajana-loka) as a whole. In this view, the world is but a delayed mirror 
of collective intention, as the force of previous actions (whose quality depends 
on intention) structures a shared environment for beings with similar pasts. Thus, 
like trees for humans, the terrifying shapes of the guardians of hells are 
projections of past deeds - the past deeds of those living there. I disagree with 
Anacker that Vasubandhu is here in any way doing away with a classical feature 
of Buddhist cosmology. In fact, the hells exist as collective projections as much 
as the heavens, or the human realms, do. The hell-guards, though, could not 
perform any function if they were to get the karmic retribution, which 
constitutes hells and consists in un-remitting pain, while the same cannot be said 
of animals in the heavens.
Once the formative role of consciousness is stressed and accepted, it is quite 
plausible to ask why the cause should be conscious and not the effect. 
Vasubandhu points out that it is more sensible to accept that: the cause, the 
vdsand or influence of previous deeds, as well as the effect, the perceptions of a 
specific realm (including the hell-guards) are in the same locus - one’s 
continuum of consciousness.
Vasubandhu’s digression, far from being mere idiosyncratic fancy, allows him 
to shift from the rebuttal of main objections to a central theme in Abhidharma: 
the history of past karma becomes the explanation of the ’appearance of a false
222
object’ (asad-arthci-avabhasana), unfolding the implications of the very first
321verse.
If this reading of the main Yogacdra thesis as presented in the Twenty Verses 
may be found plausible, it may offer a good case in contrast with what has been 
said of Madhyamaka. Madiiyamikas focussed on discussing the very terms of 
the Abhidharma: we may say that their analysis is not just within, but also 
predominantly about the Abhidharma. Vasubandhu’s argument, on the other 
hand, is entirely internal to the system it debates with: it speaks the same 
language, without looking at it from a distance.
5.1.4 Real referents of a metaphor: a comparison with the Thirty 
Verses
The Thirty Verses can be read as a companion text to the Twenty. Their 
closeness to Abhidharma is more pronounced, as they in effect describe the 
workings of various layers of consciousness, which comprise all possible 
dharmas. That this is the case is especially borne out by the first verse and its
32'The whole discussion seems closely related to a debate in Abhidharmakosabhdsya to 3.58, 
where we find two options: either the hell-guards are living beings, or the hell guards are 
modifications of the elements, brought about by the collective karma of the hell-denizens, just 
like the wind at the end of a world-cycle. We can see that these two options correspond to the 
first and second objections to Vaubandhu’s position in the Vimsatikd. Among Tibetan scholars, 
sGam.po.pa makes this link explicit, identifying the first view as Vaibhdsika and the second as 
Sautrdntika, then passing on to describe the Yogacara position in terms which accord with the 
Vimsatikd.
See H.V. Guenther (ti\), SGam.po.pa, The Jewel Ornament o f  Liberation, Boston: Shambala, 
1971: ’Are these hellish demons who preserve the appearance of human beings and the 
guardians such as the ravens with iron beaks (khva.lcags.kyi inchu.can) sentient beings ? The 
Vaibhasikas say, and the Sautrantika deny, that they are, while the Yogacaras as well as Mar.pa 
and Mi.la.ras.pa in their Father-Son-Instruction declare that because of evil deeds committed by 
the victims, there arises in their minds the appearance of such hellish beings.’ Guenther (see his 
note to this passage) notices the reference to the Abhidharmakosabhdsya, but misses the link 
with the Vimsatikd.
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use of the word upaccira. Available renderings of this verse, I shall argue, miss 
its central purport.
In Chapter 2 ,1 discussed the occurrence and meaning of the term upaccira in the 
Abhidharmakosa. There, it referred to the usage of the word dtman, and how 
this has to be understood as a secondary usage, referring to something else: 
namely, mind (citta).
Verse 1 of the Thirty makes a similar statement, and I believe it should be
translated as follows:
The metaphor of self and dharmas, which occurs as manifold,
refers to the transformation of consciousness: and the transformation is
threefold.322
This reading is in line with the usage of upacdra in the Kosa, which in itself 
supports it. I in fact believe that Vaibhdsika texts should be used as a more 
plausible background for Vasubandhu’s Yogdcdra; rather than, for example, 
Themvdcla sources.323
322 dtmadharmopacdro hi vividho yah pravartate j vijnanapariname'sau parinamah sa ca tridha 
| Trimsikd, verse 1.
323 I consider that here Kalupahana’s exegesis rests on a dubious methodology. He reads 
Vasubandhu (and in fact, Nagarjuna) against the backdrop of Pali Buddhism. There is no 
evidence, to my knowledge, that Pali Buddhist was at all popular in Northern India during the 
Gupta era. Hence it is not sensible to take that as a presupposition of Vasubandhu’s arguments. 
To say that Pali Buddhism is better representative of ‘early Buddhism’, and hence should be 
used as a plausible starting point, two answers can be given. The first is that the presupposition 
is open to debate. More importantly, even if we were to accept it, Vasubandhu had most likely 
formed himself on the Vaibhdsika Agamas, as opposed to the Pali Nikdyas. Hence there is no 
justification to take Pali Buddhism as the horizon, within which Vasubandhu’s arguments 
operate.
See David J. Kalupahana, A History o f  Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities, 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992.
In the case o f Asahga, it has been argued that he stemmed from a MahTsdsaka milieu. See Andre 
Bareau, ‘The List o f the Asamskrta-dharma According to Asahga’, in R.K.Sharma (ed.) 
Researches in Indian & Buddhist Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993, pages 1- 6.
224
Secondly, this is precisely the manner in which Sthiramati reads the verse. Raja 
had noticed that this section of Sthiramati’s commentary may in fact be one of 
the oldest discussions of the term upacdra,324
Lastly, a specific usage of the 7th vibhakti supports this reading. I shall contrast
it with Anacker’s rendering and show why the latter is weaker:
The metaphors of “se lf’ and “events” which develop in so 
many different ways
take place in the transformation of consciousness: and this 
transformation is of three kinds: [...]325
The major difference is here in the third quarter. Anacker translates it as ‘take 
place in the transformation of consciousness’, while I understand it as ‘it refers 
to’. This is a common usage of the 7th vibhakti, meaning that one term refers to 
another, and is all the more common in case of nominal constructions (please 
notice how both Anacker and myself, in fact, need to provide a verb for 
vijndnaparindme ’sau). The fact that the term upacdra is used further justifies 
my translation as opposed to Anacker’s. Upacdra is a secondary usage, which 
refers to something else. I will not press the point much further, as any Sanskrit 
reader acquainted with the long discussions of bhakti and laksand in 
Alamkdrasdstra (and elsewhere) may immediately and easily recognise what I 
am referring to.326
324K,K. Raja, Indian Theories o f  Meaning, Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 
1963. See also K.K. Raja, ‘Buddhist and Mlmamsa views on Laksana’, in R.K.Sharma (ed.). 
Researches in Indian c£ Buddhist Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993, pages 195 -  
201 .
325S. Anacker (tv.),Seven Works o f  Vasubandhu, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998, page 186.
326 On this, again, see Raja’s well-presented discussion.
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Anacker rightly notices that
The “se lf’ has been regarded as a metaphor throughout Buddhism. But 
here the concept of “event”, accepted in Abhidharma circles, is also 
called metaphor.327
This is in tune with my argument about the relationship between the upacdra of 
the Kosa and what we find here: a mere extension. Indeed, if we took away the 
term dharma from Verse 1, the first sentence could well be a Vaibhdsika 
statement.
The full implications of this shift, and of the usage of the term of upacdra, 
though, are not addressed by Anacker. The statement discloses the proper 
referent of both metaphorical expressions: ‘self1 and dharmas. If the 
transformation of consciousness is their actual referent, it follows that a 
discussion of its subdivisions and working includes by default all possible 
dharmas we may talk about. Just like in any other Abhidharma endeavour, 
Vasubandhu is concerned with explaining the real referents of more 
approximate expressions.
It is also worth stressing that the term upacdra contains a significant 
ambivalence. In one sense, as Sthiramati points out, it is bhrama or error: as it 
consists in taking one thing for another.328 But even the examples he takes up 
(like, the ‘student is fire’) are cases of a conscious error, a wilful going astray of 
speech. When Yogdcdra philosophers speak of dharmas it is not a mistake, but 
an approximation: just as when the Buddha spoke of a ‘self’, as explained in the 
Kosa.
327 S. An acker (tr.), Seven Works o f  Vasubandhu, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998, page 18 3 .1 
would here disagree with Anacker’s choice to translate dharma as event, both on etymological 
as well as philosophical grounds.
328 See the Trimsikdbhdsya to verse 1.
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5.2 The importance of laksanas
I have indicated how, although the Twenty Verses relate very directly to 
Abhidharma, they cannot be called an Abhidharmic treatise, while the case is 
different for the Thirty. A proper Abhidharmasdtra should give a list of 
dharmas and their laksanas: this is what several other Yogdcdra works do, to a 
greater or lesser extent. They are lists of all that which exists, and of how it 
works, just as the Abhidharmakosa is.
I have mentioned how this is true of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its Bhasya, 
the Pancaskandhaprakarana. Asanga’s *Satadharmasdstra, important work for 
Chinese Yogdcdra, falls within a similar category. The Thirty Verses also start 
by stating all that which exists (a transformation of consciousness) and then 
define its subdivisions, as well as which dharmas accompany which. As I will 
try to show, the Madhyantavibliaga has a similar structure.
The difference with Madhyamaka texts is quite sharp: the latter do not form new 
definitions for enlarged lists of dharmas. Their lists are nonetheless in one 
respect broader, since the two truths do not just comprise dharmas (samvrti), 
but emptiness (or, paramdrtha) as well: the latter is not treated as an existent 
dharma in a list of compounded and un-compounded factors, as Yogdcdra 
authors would. Some may understand the Yogdcdra interest in dharmas and 
laksanas as stemming from their greater emphasis on introspective practice: I 
would argue that it stems from a difference in then- ontological perspective as 
well.
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5.2.1 The first Chapter of the M adhyantavibliaga
In the Paramarthagatha, Asahga states that
The name ‘person’ should refer to a stream, and the term ‘dharma ’, to
329a laksana:
If we take the statement strictly, it differs from the Vaibhdsika understanding of
dharmas, according to which certain dharmas are laksanas, while others are
laksyas. It resembles, on the other hand, the Sautrdntika perspective on the
actual identity of the two (there is no laksya beyond the laksana itself).330 In
effect, this appears to be Sthiramati’s explicit position:
Their own-being itself is indeed the laksana of things. It is in this way: 
the earth-element is solid in laksana, and there is no earth-element 
apart from solidity.331
This is in rather stark contrast to Candraklrti’s (and Nagarjuna’s) position on 
laksanas as one empty element in an interdependent pair.332 I have here 
translated svabhdva as own-being, rather than ‘nature’, to stress this point.
Vasubandhu takes care to specify which karikds of the first Chapter of the 
Madhyantavibhaga (called ‘the Chapter on laksanas) refers to which type of 
laksana. He also concludes the discussion by giving out another list of laksanas, 
which corresponds to the structure of the Chapter. The first section of this list is 
significant: the laksana of existence and the laksana of non-existence; in respect
329 pravahe pudgaldkhya sydd dhannasamjha ca laksane || Pammarthagdthd  44ab.
330 For this debate see Chapter 2.1,
331 svabhdva eva hi bhdvdndm laksanam  | tadyathd prtlimdhdtuli kharalaksano na ca kharatvdt 
prthivTdhdtuhprthagastlti [| Sthiramati’s tikd on Madhydntavibhdgabhdsya L I.
332 See Chapter 3.2.1.
228
to the first, the laksana of being free from existence and from non-existence, 
and free from identity and difference.333
Maclhyamaka texts emphasise how laksanas are not, in fact, ultimately tenable. 
They also proceed to refute the true existence of clharmas, by refuting their 
laksanas: this is how the Midamadhyamakakarika begins, in reference to the 
four conditions.334
On the other hand, the Madhyantavibhaga starts by devoting its first chapter to 
the formation of sensible laksanas, and Vasubandhu explains how these 
laksanas distinguish between what truly exists and what does not. The chapter 
also resembles the Abhidharmakosa, inasmuch as it constitutes a grouping of all 
existent dharmas (within the three svabhdvas or laksanas, which it describes).
The emphasis on laksanas suggests a remarkable distance from the 
Madhyamaka approach, a distance which Sthiramati (plausibly) reads as a 
polemic between the lines. Sthiramati highlights the difference between the two 
systems by adding words like ‘ultimately’ {paramdrthatah) or ‘essentially’ 
(,svabhdvatah) where the kdrikd simply says ‘it exists’.335 Although these are 
indeed additions by Sthiramati, his comments seem more cogent than reading 
Vasubandhu as asserting that the dependent nature exists, but only 
conventionally: nowhere (that I know of) does he state as much.
333 tatra laksanatah abhdvalaksanato bhavalaksanatas ca \ bhavalaksanam punar 
bhavdbhdvavinirmuktalaksanatas ca tattvanyatvavininnuktalaksanatas ca j| Bhasya on 1.23.
334 See Chapter 3.2.2.
335 See the tfkd to 1.2: [...] abhdtaparikalpo ’stfti svabhavata iti vdkyasesah | [...] j 
abhutaparikalpas ca paramdrthatah svabhdvato ’ sti [...] ||
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It may be argued that the difference stems from the Yogdcdra interest in 
processes, especially meditative and cognitive processes, as opposed to 
ontological considerations. In other words, they emphasised laksanas as the 
latter help understand how dharmas function and can be known, as opposed to 
whether they truly exist.
Nonetheless, the inception and a great bulk of the discussion in the first chapter 
of the Madhyantavibhaga (as well as in the commentary and sub-commentary) 
is about, specifically, the laksana of what does and does not exist. It also gives 
reasons for which something has to be necessarily accepted as existing, and as 
non-empty.
The last point brings the discussion to a related argument in Yogdcdra, that the 
next section will briefly analyse.
5.2.2 What has laksanas, and what has the laksana of no-laksana
To once again summarise Candraklrti’s position, dharmas have laksanas only as 
contingent imputations that work within samvrti, while ultimately there is no 
question of either laksanas or dharmas.
This is not quite the case for Yogdcdra. All dharmas fall within the three natures 
(trisvabhdva), which can also be called, three laksanas. The three natures, in 
turn, are ‘nature-less’: but in three different senses.
In this scheme, only the misconstrued nature can be said to have ‘essence-less- 
ness in terms of laksanas\ and this marks it as un-arisen, and utterly non­
existence. The other two are explained as not having ‘own-being’ (svabhdva), 
but in such a way that it safeguards their existence: with no indication
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whatsoever that such existence should be further analysed and thus taken as 
mere convention.
The manner in which Yogdcdra employs laksanas ensures that consciousness 
retains a real aspect, irreducible under analysis, and thus ultimately existent. I 
shall further analyse this theme, by turning back to kdrakas.
5.3 Kdrakas and the irri^ucibility of consciousness y
In the scheme just presented, consciousness falls within that which, being 
dependently arisen, truly exists. We may therefore now ask which special 
features make it immune from deconstructing analysis. I will propose that this 
can be looked at from the perspective of kdrakas.
The characterisation of consciousness as luminous by nature, as the support of 
purification, and so forth, are all traceable to the absence of the misconstrued 
nature {parikalpitasvabhdva) in the dependent {paratantra): the emptiness, 
which constitutes the perfectly accomplished nature (parinispanna). This is 
more specifically the absence of two things (advaya): an agent of apprehension 
(,grdhaka) and an object of the same action (grdhya). This is where analysis in 
terms kdraka categories becomes possible.
The relation to kdrakas also bears on a more fundamental issue that the previous 
sections of the thesis have touched between the lines: how close is the link 
between consciousness and language structures? Several prior considerations 
suggest that, for both Vaibhdsika and Madhyamaka, the relationship was 
significant. Perhaps, though, Yogdcdra authors were proposing a different 
model altogether.
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5.3.1 Consciousness as an action without agent or object
The main argument of the following section is that: the Yogdcdra system 
revolves around a reformulation of what constitutes consciousness, and this can 
be explained from the perspective of kdrakas. It is an Abhidharmic method, as 
opposed to a critique of Abhidharma (which would be the case of Madhyamaka). 
It is in this way very much akin to their employment and formation of laksanas.
It would be appropriate, from a Vaibhdsika point of view, to call mind or 
consciousness (citta or vijhdna) an agent: grdhaka, something which 
apprehends. Even if one were to consider it as action itself (kriyd), hence 
apprehension (grdha), it would always occur with an object (karman): the 
support (alambana), which constitutes its necessary condition.
In any case, this is the manner in which Yogdcdra authors explain the terms. 
Vasubandhu specifies what constitutes grdhya and what constitutes grdhaka in 
his commentary to Madhyantavibhaga 1.4:
Because of its non-existence, that too is non-existent:
That which is can be apprehended by it is fourfold: visible form and so 
on, the five sense-faculties, mind, and what is called ‘six 
consciousnesses’. Because of the non-existence of that apprehendable 
referent, that consciousness too, the apprehender, is non-existent.336
This is where Yogdcdra introduces a qualification. Vijndna has one further 
aspect, which is neither grdhaka nor grdhya: the pair is illusory and does not 
constitute its true nature. Instead, a further aspect of vijndna exists, without 
agent and without object.
3 3 6  tadabhavdt tad apy asad iti ya t tad grdhyam rupddi pancendriyam manah 
sadvijndnasamjhakam caturvidham tasya grdhyasya ’bhavat tad api gmhakam vijhdnam asat  | |  
V a s u b a n d h u ’ s  Bhdsya to Madhyantavibliaga  1 . 4 .
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This distinction is found both in the Yogacara texts themselves, as well as in the 
refutations of Yogacara by Madhyamika authors.
Without this distinction, the passage of the Madhyantavibhagabhasya may 
suggest that Yogdcdra also completely does away with the existence of any 
dharmas, including consciousness itself. Thus, it would indeed bring Yogdcdra 
close to Maclhyamaka.
Here Sthiramati’s commentary is particularly useful, as he introduces the
distinction that I have been discussing:
Because of the non-existence of the referent, that consciousness is 
non-existent. It cognizes, thus it is called consciousness: in the 
absence of something to be apprehended, the action of cognition is 
also not fit. Therefore, due to the non-existence of its referent, 
consciousness too, in the sense of a cognizer, is non-existent: but not 
in the sense of the appearance of objects, beings, self, and cognitions. 
Since, if that did not exist, there would follow complete non-
1T7existence."
It is only consciousness in the sense of the agent of apprehending an object (the 
usual definition of vijndna) that is false: and not, consciousness in general. To 
say that consciousness is called so because ‘it cognizes’ makes a grammatical 
point: although the possibility is there, it should not be understood as an 
instrument of cognition, or as cognition itself. ‘It cognizes, thus it is called 
consciousness’ (vijdndtTti vijhdnam) excludes the interpretation as ‘one cognizes 
through that, therefore it is called consciousness (vijhdyate aneneti vijhanam).
3 3 7  arthdbhdvdt tadvijndnam asat \ vijdndtTti. vijndnath grdhydbhdve vijdnandpy ayuktam \ 
tasmdd arthdbhavdd vijndtrtvena vijhdnam asad na tv arthasattvdtmavijhaptipratibhdsatayd \ 
tadasattve hi sarvatha 'bhdvaprasahgah  {{ Sthiramati’s tikd  on Madhyantavibhagabhdsya ,  
verse 1.4. An alternative translation (modified from Friedmann) is in: Paul Williams, Mahayana 
Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, New York: Routledge. 2005, page 8 9 .1 believe that 
Williams reconstructs the argument correctly, although its grammatical underpinnings are not 
brought to relief. I am in overall agreement with Williams comments about interpretations of 
Yogdcdra  that try to establish how the system does not posit mind as ultimately existent.
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The non-existent consciousness should be understood as an agent. On the other 
hand, the term pratibhdsa, translated as ‘'appearance’, is necessarily an action. It 
thus follows that consciousness exists as an action, not as agent or object of the 
action.
If we do not accept Sthiramati’s qualification as plausible, subsequent portions 
of the text lool^ inconsistent. Vasubandu, following the content of 1.5, explains 
that the argument of the preceding verse (that consciousness as grdhaka is false) 
establishes its quality of being a misconstruction: utter non-existence is not, on 
the other hand, the way to establish that.338 This is because a mere error does 
come into existence. In other words, the error may be an error, but at least its 
actual existence is not denied.340
If we observe how Santideva and Prajnakaramati present and criticise the 
Yogdcdra position, it is clear that they understood the opponent system as 
accepting such a model of consciousness. In particular, verse 16 states that ‘a 
different’ aspect ‘truly exists’, and Prajnakaramati explains that it is ‘different’ 
from the aspect of being the agent of apprehension.341 This does quite faithfully 
correspond to the scheme so far described.
338 na tathd sarvathdbhdvdt  [ J
339 na ca sarvathdbhdvo bhmntimdtrotpdcldt  | |
340 This is indirect proof of the authoritativeness o f Sthiramati’s commentary: modem scholars, 
who suggest that his position is in fact at odds with Vasubandhu’s own, would fail to make 
sense of different (and contiguous) sections of the same text. See Anacker’s stated position and 
remarks: pages 2-3, also the (rather gratuitously speculative) note 16. Also see Note 8, page 275, 
which makes rather general statements, eschewing the technicality of the arguments at stake.
341 See Appendix 1.
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5.3.2 A passage from Asahga, on action and agents
The position that actions may exist without agents is explicitly taken up in the
initial section of a work by Asahga, the Paramarthagdthd. The short text,
though, presents two possible positions: the first is that there is no agent, but
there are actions:
There is no master whomsoever, no agent and no experiencer; 
all dharmas too are inactive: yet, action occurs.342
In the ultimate sense, there is selflessness of persons: because they 
regard that, the stanzas are in the ultimate sense, by counteracting the 
two extremes of superimpositions and over-negation.
In this context, the master is the agent of possession, the experiencer 
of actions. With the half verse he discards that its effects have a self, 
misconstrued as something different. All dharmas too are inactive: 
thus he discards that the dharmas themselves may be a self. Through 
this he avoids the extreme of superimposition.
Yet, action occurs: thus, by the fact that the dharmas do exist, he also 
avoids the extreme of over-negation. In respect to this, there are three 
types of action: the action of a master, the action of an agent, and the 
action of an experiencer.343 [...]
The commentary to Verse 2 also specifies how exactly the ‘master’ and 
‘experiencer’ are not to be found within the dependently arisen aggregates, 
bases and entrances: incidentally, it refers to three means of valid cognition
342 svdm l na vidyate kascin na kartd ndpi vedakah \ dharmdh sarve 'pi niscesta atha ced vartate 
kriyd || Paramdrthagdthd  1. This verse resembles Vimalaklrtinirdesasutra 1.4: naivatra atmana 
na karaku vedako vd \ na ca karmu nasyati subham asubham ca kimcit ||
343 pudgalanairdtmyam paramdrt/iatas tadadhikdrat paramdrtham gdthd \ 
samdropapavadantadvayapratipaksena [ tatra svdm lparigrahasya kartd kriydndm vedakah | tat 
phaldndm gdthdrdhendrthdntaraparikalpitam dtmdnam pratiksipati j (Here I read dtmdnam  for 
Wayman’s dtmdnam)
dharmdh sarve ’p i niscesta iti dharmdnam evdtmatvam pratiksipati \ etena samaropantam  
parivarjayati \ atha ced vartate kriyety anena dharmdstitvena cdpavadantam parivarjayati j 
tatra kriyd trividhd svdmikriyd kdrakakriyd vedakakriya ca || Commentary to the same verse.
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(pramdna). This section seems to identify the person (pudgala) with the agent 
or experiencer, as the denial of the two appears to be linked. In this respect, it 
resembles the Sautrdntika position on the same issue, discussed in Chapter 2. If 
I understand the implications of the commentary correctly, the action here is 
dependent arising, where there is no ‘master’ to bring it about, or separate 
person to experience it, and so forth, but only a flow of momentary dharmas.
Here Asahga delineates the Middle Way in syntactical terms: agents do not exist,
but actions do, although the dharmas have no activity. This may appear as a
contradiction, that the author discusses Verse 5 and its commentary:
All factors are momentary, how can things that don’t stay have actions? 
Their existence is itself the action, and that is itself called an agent.344
It has been said: all dharmas too are inactive. Yet, it has not been said 
how they are inactive. Thus he says: all factors are momentary how 
can things that don’t stay have actions?
It has been said: yet, action occurs. Then, when action does not exist, 
how can action occur? Thus he says: their existence is itself the action 
and that is itself called an agent. Action is due to being effects: agent 
is due to being causes.345
According to this section, thus, the coming into existence of the momentary 
dharmas can be called action or agent when referred to either their being effects 
or causes. It may appear that this places actions and agents on the same plane, 
but it is not precisely so. Strictly speaking, the existence of actions is at no point 
denied in the treatise. What is denied is that the dharmas may possess activity: 
niscestdh, the term translated as ‘inactive’, should be understood as a bahuvrlhi
344 ksanikah sarvasamskdrd astlutanam kutah kriyd \ bhutir yesdtit kriydsau ca kdrakah saiva  
cocyate || Verse 5.
345 dharmdh sarve 'pi niscesta ity uktam \ na tuktaih kathaih niscesta iti \ ata dha j ksanikah 
sarvasamskdrd asthitanam kutah kriyeti \ atha ced vartate kriyety uktam \ tat katham asatydm  
kriyayam kriyd vartata iti dha | bhutir yesam kriydsau ca kdrakah saiva cocyata iti j phalatvdt 
kriyd hetutvdt kdrakah || Commentary to the same Verse.
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compound. The dharmas, on the other hand, are the action itself. ‘Agents’ too 
are directly denied existence, and then explained once again as a way of 
speaking of the same dharmas, when understood as causes.
In this way too, agent and action cannot be used to reduce a single moment of 
consciousness into two components, since the imputation of agent or action is 
already in relation to other moments. The plane of analysis has shifted from the 
initial statement about the absence of agents and the existence of actions: that 
was from an ultimate perspective (paramartha). And in that scheme, which 
corresponds to Vasubandhu’s and Sthiramati’s as depicted above, a moment of 
consciousness remains irreducible precisely because it is an action, with no 
agent and no object. By eschewing the usual characterisation (laksana) of 
consciousness as a specific kdraka, it can be asserted as truly existent.
5.3.3 A note on Santaraksita’s position
Santaraksita’s position about consciousness having a nature that cannot be split 
into the triad of action, agent and object, is expressed in Tattvasariigraha 
2001.346 This has been discussed in Chapter 4, and is treated in one section of 
Prajnakaramati’ s commentary.347
There is one point where Santaraksita’s depiction, in terms of kdrakas, could 
possibly be distinguishable from Asahga. In fact, we can interpret his statement 
as meaning either that i.) consciousness is not divided into three, because it 
exists as mere action without the other two; or ii.) none of the three applies as a 
characterisation of consciousness.
346 kriydkdrakabhedena na svasamvittir asya tu \ ekasydnantsarupasya tmirupydnupapattitah  ||
347 See Appendix, commentary to verse 9.20.
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A proper assessment of this issue bears, among other things, upon the 
reconstruction of Santaraksita’s arguments in favour of self-awareness 
(svasamvedand). I am unable to determine, though, whether his position entails 
the first or second structure in terms of kdrakas. On one hand, he seems to speak 
of consciousness as apprehension devoid of apprehender and something to 
apprehend: which would be akin to Asahga’s, Vasubandhu’s, and Sthiramati’s 
position. Yet, the specific explanation of what this apprehension is, suggests 
that he may not understand it as an action in the first place.348
The second reading would indeed offer some interesting interpretive 
possibilities, and raise questions about Santaraksita’s understanding of the role 
of vijnaptimdtratd. The differences in his handling of kdrakas, from both 
Asahga and Vasubandhu on one hand and Prajnakaramati’s on the other, may 
well stem from his employment of cittamdtra, but only as an intermediate
. 349step.
We also find that this second interpretation is envisaged in at least one passage
^  of Sthiramati’s work. He is commenting upon the Madhyantavibhagabhasya
^  3.17, wherefand explanation of the eighteen clhdtus identifies the faculties as the
agents (grdhaka, hence kartr), their objects as objects of the action (grdhya,
hence karman) and the corresponding consciousness as the action (tadgraha,
kriyd). Sthiramati specifies that the triad of agent, object and action is a delusion:
The dhatu is laid out in the sense of the three types of seeds, for the 
purpose of removing the delusion of an agent, action and object.350
343 See Tattvasamgraha  2000-2012 with commentary.
349 A proper understanding of Santaraksita’s position would require a through analysis of his 
entire section on svasamvedand:  which I hope to take up on another occasion.
3 5 0  kartrkriydkarmasammohavydvartandrtham trividhe bijdrthe dhdtur vyavasthdpitah  | |  Sub­
commentary on M adhydntavibhagabhdsya  3.17.
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It is nonetheless hard to establish whether this really means that in all instances 
the three categories are to be considered delusory, or whether there are proper 
contexts for their usage. In fact, an immediately subsequent section (3.18) 
explains the sense in which we can have a superimposition or over-negation in 
respect to cause (Jietii) result {phala) and action (kriyd). Hence, just like there 
may be a proper usage of the idea of kriyd, it may be the same for the kdrakas.
5.4 The role of momentariness in Yogacara
The analysis presented so far clarifies how the Yogdcdra was close to the 
interests of previous Abhidharma, in terms of its main arguments and the 
employment of laksanas and kdrakas. I have also argued that this relates to a 
difference in ontological approach, rather than a mere disinterest in ontology, 
when in comparison to the Madhyamaka.
When treating of Madhyamaka, the proper place of Abhidharmic analysis was 
discussed in relation to momentariness, and in relation to atoms.351 In their 
system, both fit a similar position: as intermediate conventions, and not ultimate.
In Yogdcdra, though, the situation is quite dissimilar. Atoms are refuted with a 
type of analysis, which is both acceptable and occasionally borrowed by 
Mddhyamika authors.352 On the other hand, momentariness appears as an 
acceptable determination of the ultimately real dharmas.
351 See Chapter 4.4.3. 4.4.4.
352 Santideva’s refutation o f atoms in the Prajndparicchecla o f the Bodhicaryavdtara is akin to 
Vasubandhu’s own, in the Vimsatikd, which Prajnakaramati even quotes.
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It has been even argued that momentariness owes its origin to the Yogacara.353
In particular, the Mahaydnasutrdlamkdra and its commentary present a section
that directly deals with asserting that dharmas are momentary. One line of
argument relates to the refutation of movement:
(Momentariness of consciousness should be accepted) because, when 
something originates as moving to another place, there is no 
movement.
No action whatsoever, by the name ‘movement’, defined as the 
transference to another place, is indeed plausible for the factors.
Either an already arisen (movement), or one yet to arise, would cause 
the impression to move elsewhere. If already arisen, at the time of 
movement (the impression) would have yet moved nowhere: in this 
case, the movement of something static is not plausible. Or, if yet to 
arise, when there is no movement it makes no sense to say ‘gone to’.
And, it makes no sense to say that such action generates activity in an 
impression which stays in the very same place. Since that which is 
static does not get to another place. On the other hand, it makes no 
sense in an impression which is placed elsewhere. Since, without 
action, there is no getting to another place. And, apart from the 
impression, no other action is perceived, in the same place or 
elsewhere.
Therefore, there is no other ‘movement’, apart from the birth of the 
continuum in another place. Because that does not exist,
i 354momentariness is proved.'
353 Alexander Von Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine o f  Momentariness, Stuttgart: Franz Veiner 
Verleg, 1995. For some disagreements with this position, see: Y. Karunadasa, ’The Theravada 
Version of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness’, in Journal o f Buddhist Studies, Volume 1, 
Sri Lanka: Centre for Buddhist Studies, 2003, pages 120-185.
3 5 4  _  .
desantaragamanena utpattau gatyabhavat \ na hi saihskdrandm desantarasaihkrantilaksana
gatir ndma kdcit kriyd yujyate \ sd hi utpannd vd samskdram desdntaram gamayed anutpannd 
vd | yady utpannd tena gatikdle na kamcid gata iti sthitasyaiva gamanam nopapadyate \ atha 
anutpannd tena asatydm gatau gata iti na yujyate \ sd ca kriyd yadi taddesastha eva samskdre 
kdritram karoti na yujyate j sthitasya anyadesdprdpteh  | atha anyadesasthe na yujyate | vind 
kriyayd anyadesdprdpteh \ na ca kriyd tatra vd anyatra vd dese sthitd saihskdrdd 
anyopalabhyate \ tasmdn ndsti samskdrdndm desdntarasantatyutpdddd anyd gatih \ tadabhdvdc 
ca siddhaih ksanikatvam  || Mahdydnasutrdlamkdra 18. 85, commentary.
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The passage offers a proof of momentariness, in no way suggesting that it is a 
mere conventional characterisation: even Asahga’s text, dedicated to
paramdrtha, described the dharmas as momentary. The section of 
Vasubandhu’s commentary under consideration comes in the context of proving 
the momentariness of the subjective (internal) side of experience.
hi the immediately preceding section of the commentary, change, not movement, 
is used to prove momentariness.35^  The first arising of the impressions {cidya- 
utpada) in a new rebirth has to come from specific causes 0hetut\>a-visesat). If it 
did not come from specific causes, but was due to the same one cause, we 
would not perceive a succession of changing conditions -  since the cause for the 
succeeding impressions would have remained the same. If we accept that the 
cause of the first arising is different from the causes of the succeeding 
impressions, this entails their momentariness (following from their 
impermanence)356. An analogous argument, taking change as the logical ground 
to prove momentariness, is employed in the examples of growth, accumulation, 
change of locus (dsraya), maturation leading to good or bad rebirth, even in the 
bhdsvara realm. So far, the step is from impermanence to momentariness.
The portion which we are analysing implies a more complex scheme. Von 
Rospatt, taking the Mahdydnasutrdlamkdra as one of his main sources, has 
detected three main deductions of momentariness: a generalisation of the 
accepted momentariness of mind, an argument from change and one from
355 See commentary on Mahayanasutralaihkara 18, 84-88. Significantly, the section commenting 
upon desantaragamanena (18, 85) is the longest and most elaborate. It is also the only one to 
comprise a sub-list o f examples, o f the different types of gati.
356 yadi hi tasya hetutvena viseso na sydt, taduttardydh samskdrapravrtter uttarottaraviseso  
nopalabhyeta, hetvavisesdt \ visese ca sad, taduttarebhyas tasya anyatvdt ksanikatvasiddhih || 
Ibidem ,
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destruction. The analysis in this section Vasubandhu’s commentary has a further 
starting point: an argument from the impossibility of motion.
If we compare it with Nagarjuna’s refutation of motion, we find several 
differences. The second Chapter of the Mulamadhyamakakarika refutes motion 
through a syntactical dialectic, according to which agent and action (like going 
and the one who goes) make for an interdependent pair, where one implies the 
other.357 On the other hand, Vasubandhu’s argument only focuses on the 
impossibility of an action beyond the samskdras themselves. In other words, we 
can speak of an action (movement, going), as long as we understand that the 
samskctras do not ‘possess’ that action: they are the action. This is akin to 
Asartga’s position in the Paramdrthagdtha (see above).
Moreover, Nagarjuna’s argument does not end with the assertion of some 
Abhidharmic category, like a momentary dharma: while Vasubandhu’s line of 
argument presupposes that the dharmas are in fact there, and goes on to prove 
their momentariness.
5.5 Conclusion
In this way, the relatively short passage well exemplifies the differences 
between Madhyamaka and Yogdcdra, both in their relation to kdrakas and in 
their usage of Abhidharma. As by now should be clear, I believe that there is a 
significant connection between the two aspects: when Abhidharmic categories 
are considered fit depictions of ultimate realities, it is possible to discard the 
ordinary interdependence of kdrakas, and attempt to offer a language
357 See on this Kamaleshvar Bhattacharya, ’Nagarjuna’s arguments against motion: their 
grammatical basis’, (in Kamaleshvar Bhattacharya et al., A corpus o f  Indian studies. Essay’s in 
honour o f  Professor Gaurinath Sastri, Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980.
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unrestricted by those, to speak of paramdrtha. In one sense, this should help 
safeguard paramdrtha as a possible object of further analysis, as it is described 
with sui generis categories (like, an action without an agent), which are not any 
more relatable to the other elements found in ordinary usage.
Madhyamaka authors were aware of this step: hence, the debate between the 
two systems should also be understood at this level of analysis, where a 
plausible use of language is being discussed. Taking this aspect of the debate 
into serious consideration means a different emphasis in the interpretation of 
Madhyamaka and Yogdcdra; I believe that this shift of emphasis does better 
justice to the sophistication of the arguments involved, by placing them in a 
suitable context and hence drawing out more precisely the sense of the elements 
at play in the objections and rebuttals -  rather than merely focusing on the 
argumentative structure.
Even with this shift of emphasis, though, I am inclined to agree with the 
traditional interpretation that sees the difference between Yogdcdra and 
Madhyamaka to be substantial, not merely one of approach. In fact, an analysis 
of their respective usage of the kdraka system shows that Madhyamakas 
emphasise the interdependence of the kdrakas and the kriyd, while Yogdcdra 
philosophers look for an element, which may remain immune to analysis. It is 
difficult to construe this as a mere difference in epistemology, as it implies a 
different ontological commitment.
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Conclusion
Throughout the thesis, I have taken up for analysis concerns and debates that I 
consider central to medieval Indian Buddhism, to show how vydkarana (the 
kdraka system) and the analysis of laksanas (central to Abhidharma) play a role 
in philosophical thought: especially in regards to whether something can be 
considered ultimate (not analysable further) and if so, what can|accepted to be 
an ultimate. This could be categorised as the fundamental ontological stance in 
any of the philosophical schools taken up in this thesis. It is important to stress 
that here ultimate does not necessarily mean a thing as opposed to a process, nor 
does it imply any notion of a core or substance: I use the word in the technical 
sense of anything, which cannot be analysed into further components (hence, 
which can be taken as the most fundamental unit of existence). I understand the 
Vaibhdsika, Sautrdntika, Yogdcdra and Madhyamaka as having distinct 
positions in regards to ultimates; I also think that their debates are genuine, in 
the sense of the philosophers working under similar presupposition and 
understanding each other’s stance. In other words, they are not playing different 
‘linguistic games’, but each is attempting to win the very same game.
I have more specifically tried to show the profitability of reading the two main 
philosophical systematisations of the Mahdydna (i.e. Madhyamaka and 
Yogdcdra) against a broader backdrop of analytical conventions: some common 
to Indian sdstras as a whole (i.e. vydkarana) and other specific to the Buddhist 
(i.e. the Abhidharma). In this way, the texts have consistently been read as 
referring to shared ideas in a context broader than the specific issues at hand: 
this can plausibly clarify the latter as well. I have not attempted to give out a 
precise historical reconstruction, either in terms of being exhaustive, or as an 
account of plausible genetic relations between ideas: my concern was more
basic, as I tried to make better sense of the original sources, through a more 
refined understanding of their language.
To analyse the language of philosophical argumentation may appear as no more 
than a necessary first step, and indeed it is a first step: but when the debates 
themselves end up focusing on language, it also becomes the fundamental 
methodological concern. When the arguments start discussing a proper use of 
language it usually means that they have come to the last (arguably the most 
difficult) possible point of discussion: they are discussing about what can and 
what cannot be spoken, and how. I may therefore say that this thesis is both 
about the presuppositions as well as about the final stages of Buddhist 
philosophical discourse.
The entirety of the thesis can be read in this light. The first and second Chapters 
focus on the presuppositions, the common ground: and their point of contact is 
in the fact that both vydkarana and the Abhidharma are, in different senses, 
systems of laksanas (defining traits or definitions). The second Chapter offers 
some intermediate ground, as it reconstructs debates that are envisaging the 
topics of the next three Chapters: there is an initial discussion about laksanas, 
but the central concern in Abhidharma is to form laksanas rather than evaluate 
their ontological status. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 enter into the debates about 
defining traits and the proper use of language, as found in the philosophies of 
Madhyamaka and Yogdcdra.
The word laksana in itself offers a significant ambivalence: it can be understood 
to refer to either the data (defining traits) or their interpretation (definitions), 
and by now it should be comprehensible that one of the issues at stake in all the 
debates encountered so far is the relationship between these two possible senses. 
Looking at the same issue from the perspective of the kdraka system, it
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reappears as the proper relation between syntax and semantics, between 
sentence-analysis and relations ‘in the world5. I started by noticing, in the first 
Chapter, how there occur certain structural symmetries between kdraka relations 
and fundamental Buddhist ideas. The symmetry only works, though, as long as 
the very technical senses of the primary kdrakas, are kept in mind, hence only 
through a remarkable amount of semantic indirection (an ‘agent’ is not 
‘someone’ who does something). But because the more direct senses of ‘agent’ 
and so forth do not square well with certain features of Buddhist thought, it 
became a debatable issue as to whether those categories can be retained at all 
levels of analysis: Vaibhdsikas did retain them; Sautrdntikas rejected them; 
certain Madhyamikas considered them conventionally indispensable; Yogdcdra 
philosophers attempted to redefine them. True, this is a schematic account: yet, 
it is a profitable starting point for some further considerations.
It can be seen that there is a certain similarity between the Vaibhdsikas, and 
Madhyamaka on one side, and the Saatrdntika and Yogdcdra on the other. This 
similarity has been already noticed in regards to other aspects of their thought, 
but here I highlighted it from the perspective of their fundamental understanding 
of language as ‘syntax of the real’ (or, of the unreal).
The question could then be: do the other similarities and differences stem from 
these divergent attitudes towards language, or viceversa? It would be easier to 
presume the first alternative, and it may perhaps fit the overall trend of my 
thesis so far, but I am disinclined to offer any conclusion in this regards. Using 
either the tenets or the use o f language in each of the schools as a starting point, 
one could probably bring forth strong arguments to derive any of the two from 
the other. Hence I believe that it would be very difficult to come to a convincing 
conclusion (because, both alternatives could sound convincing).
246
What is more feasible, and perhaps sensible, is to at least be aware of the 
structural similarities and the role that a certain understanding of language may 
have in shaping the outcome of philosophical arguments between the schools: 
and this much, I think I have done. To give specific examples: I have not so 
much tried to give historical reasons for Candrakuti’s invocation of the kdrakas 
in his refutation of the svalaksana. But I have tried to highlight that such 
invocation is philosophically relevant, and also I have attempted to analyse what 
its intended force could be, and why is it called for at a crucial juncture in the 
debate. The same applies to my reconstruction of Prajnakaramati’s criticism of 
svasamvedand, where I argued that the usage of kdraka categories might have a 
!  '\v  somewhat different purpose that in the case of Candrakirti’s refutations (without 
being contradictory to the latter’s approach). What these two examples show is 
that, even in the case of two authors who have a relative theoretical proximity, 
we must be extremely sensitive to the context and the technicalities involved in 
the argumentation when trying to reconstruct a debate: all the more so, when the 
debate starts discussing a proper use of philosophical language.
I am aware that some of the specific conclusions about the established tenets of 
the four schools I analysed, may not be agreed upon by all scholars: I do not 
think, though, that this will greatly damage the strength of my overall argument. 
I am in fact, more broadly, arguing about the profitability of a certain method. 
This method (which I tried to follow) is to take certain technicalities in Indian 
Buddhist thought quite seriously: not to gloss over them, but rather to provide 
glosses, which will bridge the gap between a medieval Indian scholar and a 
contemporary reader.
This gap is perhaps best understood as follows: there are certain presuppositions, 
which classical authors took too much for granted to spell out, and that many 
modern interpreters consider too technical or uninteresting to take into serious
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consideration. The two issues go hand in hand: since the texts themselves do not 
always signal out-loud what is in fact important, it is assumed by modern 
authors that, let us say, kdraka analysis or Abhidharma is not crucial in 
understanding Madhyamaka (think of Williams’ remarks about vydkarana being 
an elitist set of conventions).
On the other hand, I should have amply demonstrated that Buddhist classical 
authors assumed that their readers would have been familiar with both 
vydkarana and Abhidharma, much in the same way that an English literature 
professor may assume that one’s students know the English alphabet. In fact, 
the few accounts of ancient learning in India that we possess (like those of 
Chinese travelers) suggest that vydkarana was a starting point; and Abhidharmic 
categories form a remarkable part of the basic curriculum even in contemporary 
traditional Tibetan monastic education, which must have inherited many 
features of Buddhist higher education in medieval India.
It would be unfair to state that no previous scholar noticed the importance of 
vydkarana and basic Abhidharma for the understanding of Mahdydna thought: 
and I have acknowledged in several occasions my indebtedness to available 
scholarship. Nonetheless, I do think that this thesis provides a broad and 
sustained analysis of a variety of sources; hence it is neither too generic nor too 
specialised. In this respect I think it differs both from the more generic 
statements about the importance of vydkarana and so forth, as well as from the 
available specialised essays on very specific instances. The generic statements 
remain somewhat vague and uncorroborated by sufficient sources (rather, they 
implicitly appeal to the erudition of the reader); the specific case-studies do not 
formulate any synthetic interpretation.
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One last consideration: I am surely not arguing that a debate on language is 
something of a scholastic and uninteresting preoccupation. On the other hand, I 
do think it is philosophically crucial. Nevertheless, I would also like to avoid a 
quick assimilation of Buddhist thought to the philosophies of language and 
interpretation of contemporary Europe and North America (like, let us say, 
Heidegger). In part, I do not feel equipped to propose such complex parallels.
But I would like to remark that there are some important issues within Buddhist 
thought that need to be properly understood before assimilating it to a 
philosophy of language of any kind.
First, the proper role of philosophical debate within Indian Buddhism needs to
be assessed: and this can be done only]trying to reconstruct the context of /
*■ /  
medieval Indian Buddhist textual practices by reading between the lines, and by
taking hints from the available practices in contemporary traditional Buddhist
cultures. Reading between the lines means, taking into account such things as
style and humour, which can help to understand the intended weight of a certain
statement in a text. For example: how does the overall tone of an Abhidharmic
treatise differ from that of a modem analytical philosopher? I am not suggesting
that one should make a systematic study of such an issue, but I do think one
must be sensible to style and diction in order to grasp the intention of a given
text.
Secondly, there are certain technical aspects of Buddhist thought that need to be 
properly interpreted before making such assimilations. What is the precise 
relationship between mental constructs (vikalpa), imputations (prajnapti) and 
names (;ndma)l What is relationship between names (ncima) and the aggregate 
of notions (samnaskandha)? How do all these categories relate to the world as 
an environment (bhdjanaloka) and the world as the collection of sentient beings 
(,sattvaloka)?
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All of these issues are occasionally taken up in a variety of different texts: in 
Sutras, in Abhidharmic commentaries, or in Madhyamaka treatises, for example. 
I have not attempted to exhaust all of the interpretive concerns that could allow 
for a well-informed and sound reconstruction of the Mahdydna understanding of 
language. I have attempted, though, to offer an initial basis, and to bring the 
analysis to a better level of refinement. The thesis should have demonstrated 
that vydkarana and the analysis of laksanas run through central debates 
throughout medieval Indian Buddhism, being formative parts of the arguments 
at stake, rather than authorial idiosyncrasies: and that the issue of whether 
something can be analysed or can remain as an un-analysable ultimate (like the 
svalaksana, svasamvedand or vijnaptimdtratd) is closely linked to handling of 
kdrakas and certain specific view on the formation of laksanas through them.
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Appendix 1
Santideva’s Bodhicaryavatara, 9.1-34 
with Prajnakaramati’s Panjika: 
English Translation
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Note on the Translation
I have taken some freedom in changing the constructions from passive to active, 
and in providing whichever words would make the English text intelligible. 
Also, I have not followed the convention of bracketing such additions, except 
for a few cases. I believe that anyone acquainted with Sanskrit will be able to 
recognise the additions, while for others brackets are cumbersome and tell very 
little. Let me exemplify this through one instance, where I add and change quite 
a few words.
The commentator offers two alternative explanations of Verse 32. For the 
second interpretation, he avoids repeating what was already said, by stating that 
The rest can be entirely explained as in the first explanation.
This is how I translated the Sanskrit expression 
Anyat sarvam purvavat 
Very literally, this could be rendered as 
All else, like the earlier one.
But this, in English, is not even a complete sentence. Moreover, the fact that 
Sanskrit can tell more about the referents of pronouns, thanks to three noun­
genders and of course inflection, cannot be reproduced by English pronouns. Or, 
in certain cases, idiomatic recurrence makes the referents unambiguous in 
Sanskrit: and this cannot be rendered in English through a literal translation. 
That is why I decided to explicate the referents of certain pronouns, as in this 
case, where I translated purvavat with ‘as in the first explanation’.
One may object that such additions could have been marked by bracketing. 
Hence:
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The rest (can be entirely explained) as in the first (explanation).
That makes the text inelegant, and hard to read: at least, to my eyes. Moreover, 
the same logic would suggest that even articles like ‘the’ and prepositions like 
‘in’ should be put between brackets, since their usage is interpretive and does 
not literally reproduce the Sanskrit syntax of article-less vibhaktis. And so on.
The second difficult choice regards terminology. Certain key words, like 
svabhdva, have different meanings in different contexts. One could say that all 
the different meanings rest on a common layer, provided by the etymology. 
Nonetheless, this commonality of etymology is lost in English: essence, own- 
being, own-existence, nature, all can be used to translate what is, in fact, the 
same Sanskrit term. I have not attempted to force a consistency, which would 
have made the text incomprehensible. On the other hand, an important game of 
mutual hints is lost without remainder.
Thirdly, there are certain terms, which I decided to retain in the Sanskrit. This is 
the case for samvrti and paramdrtha (in most instances). The main reason is that 
the possible meanings of such terms are the topic of the commentary, and 
therefore no single choice would do justice to the latter.
A good example is the term samvrti. This is usually translated as convention, 
and such translation is indeed a plausible way of looking at its etymology, from 
the point of view of the commentarial tradition itself. In the case of 
Prajnakaramati’s interpretation, though, the primary sense of samvrti is that of 
concealment or, more literally covering. Yet, the sense of convention is often 
implied in many of the usages. Had I chosen ‘concealment’, it would have been 
awkward and, in some cases, unintelligible. On the other hand, ‘conventions’ is
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sharply at odds with Prajnakaramati’s (and perhaps, Santideva’s) interpretive 
emphasis. Hence, samvrti has been left in Sanskrit.
In the case of paramdrtha, there are even more compelling reasons to retain the 
Sanskrit. The compound can be split either as tatpurusa or as karmadhdraya 
(actually, even as a bahuvnhi, although it is not mentioned as such by 
Prajnakaramati). The commentator offers both possibilities as plausible. 
Moreover, artha has several possible meanings, whose mutual relation is not 
always perceptible in English. All of this could not be rendered, with any single 
translation.
There are other instances, where I followed commonly employed usages, 
despite their being not entirely satisfactory. ‘Perfection’ is in no way faithful to 
the etymology of pdramitd, and in many contexts such etymology is important 
(for example, in the Heart Sutra). Nevertheless, Prajnakaramati’s commentary 
does not quite play upon the compound pdramitd, and therefore the hann done 
may be very little.
Using ‘wisdom’ for prajnci has been already criticised by, for example, 
Williams. Nonetheless, ‘discriminative knowledge’ is very cumbersome, and 
the phrase ‘perfection of discriminative knowledge’ is almost half a line in itself. 
As long as one remembers that ‘wisdom’ is used in a technical sense, specified 
within the commentary, the re-contextualisation should make it acceptable, I 
hope.
In the Introduction I have hinted at how the following portion of 
Prajnakaramati’s commentary includes most of the topics touched upon within 
the body of the thesis. It will be noticed that different sections relate differently 
to the discussions found in the various Chapters.
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The Sanskrit text used is Vaidya’s edition: although in one case I disagree with 
his proposed emendations and hence my numbering of the verses differs from 
his.
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The importance of Prajnakaramati5s commentary
Prajnakaramati was not by any account a direct student of Santideva, and 
belongs to a slightly later phase of Maclhyamaka thought in India. One could 
still make arguments in favour of his relative faithfulness to Santideva’s own 
thought, but it is not faithfulness that makes his commentary interesting to the 
present thesis.
Prajnakaramati’s is the only surviving Sanskrit commentary to the 
Bodhicciryavatara, and has not been translated into English. Although the 
commentator covered all the Chapters (excluding the tenth), a major bulk of his 
work is devoted to the 9th Chapter. He seems to treat this as an independent 
work, as the presence of new invocatory verse indicates. This much has been 
pointed out by previous scholars.
The invocatory stanzas do themselves tell us certain relevant features of 
Prajnakaramati’s interpretation. First, he stresses the ineffability of the 
Perfection of Wisdom: ‘Perfection of Wisdom’ as a word is a type of 
convention (samvrti) or concealment, and yet it can be employed as an 
indication. To put it, paramcirtha (the ultimate referent) cannot be directly 
referred to through language. The section of the commentary translated in this 
thesis elaborates on this point in some detail.
Almost in the same breath, Prajnakaramati tells us that he intends to make an 
exposition iyivrti) of the Perfection of Wisdom ‘in clear words’. If a paradox 
can be perceived, it may be just an apparent paradox. When one has to use 
words as indications, clear words (and cogent reasoning) may work better than 
unclear ones. This basic consideration is quite in line with Prajnakaramati’s
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handling of the issue of proper linguistic usage in the debate against self- 
awareness.
Besides, the expression ‘clear words’ may be a reference to Candrakhti’s 
Prasannapcida: Prajnakaramati is heavily indebted to Candraklrti, whom he 
quotes several times.
As a commentator, Prajnakaramati does write in a lucid and simple style, 
quoting from a vast array of Buddhist sources, both sutras and sastras. His 
reconstruction of the opponents’ position is in my opinion remarkably accurate: 
especially in the case of the refutation of Yogdcdra, which occasions the most 
interesting debate in terms of the concerns of this thesis.
Prajnakaramati also offers a good discussion about conventions and their levels, 
an important issue not so explicitly addressed in all Madhyamcika sources. In 
this respect as well, his commentary has great relevance to the issues discussed 
in Chapters 3 and 4.
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O f O
[167] Because it’s stainless, the unexcelled abode, free from elaborations or
outflows,
is named through conventional expressions like ‘perfection of wisdom’ and so
on.
Understanding it well, pure intellects reach supreme bliss.
I bow to her as due, and explain her, through clear words.
Where the Acdryci, the treasury of good qualities which is Santideva, 
can speak clearly, having reached the other shore of the great ocean of Sayings, 
how can I, with a flawed intellect, speak the meaning of that? Even then, 
because unequalled merit comes from practicing wisdom, I engage in this.
My mind has no impression whatsoever 
of any bit of a good quality; and, I have no quality of intuition.
Still, only as the fruit of serving a good friend, 
such a speech of mine comes about.
Thus:
Someone, due to his specific lineage, attends upon an auspicious friend, and is 
pained by the suffering of all those who have got to the three worlds. He wishes 
to remove the entire suffering of all living beings, and indifferent to his own 
happiness, he deems that the only means to pacify such suffering would be 
Buddhahood. Desiring to obtain it, the Mahdtman, has caused boclhicitta to arise; 
to complete the two accumulations which are the means to accomplish the state 
of the Sugata, in due order, he engages in giving and so forth. As he engages in 
this way, he may even perfectly master samatha: but without wisdom, giving 
and the rest will not bring about Buddhahood, the cause for the accomplishment
358 The numbers between square brackets refer to the page number in Vaidya’s edition.
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of the world’s good. Considering this, one who wants release from the suffering 
of samsdra, should certainly strive to make wisdom arise. As it is said 
Through samatha, one well endowed with vipasyand
And so on. In that respect, samatha has been explained. Now, explaining 
vipasyand, which is obtained immediately after that, and goes by the name of 
perfection o f wisdom, he says
The Sage spoke this entire set 
for the sake of wisdom: 
hence one should bring forth wisdom 
with a wish to turn suffering away. 1
Giving and the rest have been explained as per their defining traits, immediately 
earlier in this treatise. ‘This’ points to them, in terms of the pronoun idam: the 
latter indicates direct perception. ‘Set’ means retinue or section, or also an 
accumulation. ‘Entire’: in the way expressed, as well as any other. [168] ‘The 
Sage spoke for the sake of wisdom’ is the link.
The defining trait of wisdom is to discern the nature of dependently arisen 
things as it abides. ‘For the sake of’ that, means that it is the purpose, which has 
giving and so forth as its ‘set’: this means that they are the assistants, to the 
cause of perfect awakening. That is because, wisdom, having the nature of 
discerning the dharmas, is the most important among giving and the other 
perfections.
In this respect, giving is the first cause towards obtaining a perfect Buddha’s 
awakening, since it is included in the accumulation of merit. And only when
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adorned by discipline, bringing about a succession of good births endowed with 
the conditions for the enjoyment of pleasure, is it a cause for the obtainment of 
unexcelled jncmci.359 Forbearance too, protecting the accumulation of merit - 
giving and discipline - by counteracting aversion, which is its antagonist, occurs 
for the realisation of Buddhahood. This good, consisting in the three starting 
with giving and called ’the accumulation of merit’, does not come about without 
valour. Therefore the latter too, as it is a cause for both accumulations, is born 
to destroy all obscurations. And for one whose mind is in samdclhi, there arises 
the perfect understanding of things as they are: hence, the perfection of 
meditation is also fit to be a cause for unexcelled jhdna.
Thus, even when these giving and so forth are accumulated with care, without 
wisdom they are not causes for realising the state of a Sugata, and thus they are 
not even called ‘perfections’. On the other hand, when they obtain the 
purification made by wisdom, they occur unimpeded and high: coming about in 
a way conducive to that state, they become its causes, and they get the name of 
‘perfections’. Then, purified by wisdom through the yoga of not apprehending 
triads like a giver, a gift and a recipient, and so on; practiced carefully and 
continuously for a long time, reaching the apex; they bring about the 
Tathagata’s clharmakdya. That is devoid of all the net of constructs occurring 
due to ignorance, it is free from the obstructions of afflictions and something 
cognisable, it has the nature of the realisation of the two types of selflessness. It 
is the basis of the entire wealth of one’s own and others’ benefit, the very self of 
tattva in the ultimate sense. In this way, giving and the rest, having wisdom as 
their chief, are called secondary.
359 1 have either translated jndna  (as, cognition) or left it in the Sanskrit, whenever the context 
suggested that a special type o f  cognition was at stake. The Sanskrit term may be used with or 
without this underlying suggestion: something mirrored in its alternative Tibetan renderings as 
either shes p a  or y e  shes.
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Opponent | If wisdom is the main one among giving and so forth, let that alone 
be the instrument to accomplish perfect Buddhahood. Why bother with the 
others like giving and so on?
Reply | One should not say this, because the others are described as useful. Only 
when giving and the rest, as if devoid of eyes, get the eyes of wisdom, can they 
go towards the desired state of a Sugata. Thus, they are said to be of secondary 
importance to wisdom; but it is not that wisdom, on its own, is the instrument to 
accomplish perfect Buddhahood.
Therefore, it is established that the set of giving and so forth, is for the sake of 
wisdom.
The Sage (muni), the silent one, is the Buddha, the Blessed One. This is because: 
he has no mental construct;
he ‘silenced’ the two extremes of superimposition and over-negation;
he has the three silences, defined as: the kannan of body, speech and mind
needing no more to be trained. Wishing to protect the entire world, who is
suffering from the three types of suffering, he spoke: he has spoken, meaning
that he explained. In the Sutras like the Perfection o f Wisdom and so on, he
explained in due order, for the sake of wisdom, the set of giving and so forth. As
it is said in the Noble Perfection o f Wisdom in One Hundred Thousand Lines:
Just like, indeed, o Subhuti, the orb of the sun and the orb of the 
moon perform their function upon the four continents and follow 
and go about the four continents, in the very same way the 
perfection of wisdom performs its function upon the five 
perfections, follows and goes about the five perfections; the five 
perfections, without the perfection of wisdom, do not get the name 
of ‘perfections’. Just like, indeed, o Subhuti, a king, a universal 
monarch, does not get the name of ’universal monarch’ without the 
seven precious things, in the very same way, Subhuti, the five 
perfections, without the perfection of wisdom, do not get the name
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of ‘perfections’. Just like, o Subhuti, some small rivers go towards 
the great river Ganges, and together with the great river Ganges 
they go towards the great ocean, in the very same way, Subhuti, the 
five perfections, taken up by the perfection of wisdom, go towards 
the knowledge of all aspects.
And so on. [169] Moreover, it has been said:
Kausika, this perfection of wisdom excels the perfection of giving 
of the Bodhisattvas great beings, it excels the perfection of 
discipline, it excels the perfection of forbearance, [it excels the 
perfection of valour,] it excels the perfection of meditation. Just 
like indeed, o Kausika, a hundred or a thousand people blind from 
birth, without a guide cannot set into the path, not to speak of 
entering the town; in the same way Kausika, the five perfections 
are without eyes and blind from birth, if without the perfection of 
wisdom: they have no guide. Without the perfection of wisdom 
they cannot set into the path to Buddhahood, what to say of 
entering the town of the knowledge of all aspects. When on the 
other hand, Kausika, the five perfections are taken up by the 
perfection of wisdom, then, these five perfections have eyes. Taken 
up by the perfection of wisdom, these five perfections obtain the 
name of ‘perfections’.
And so on.
In the same way elsewhere too, one should understand according to the Sutras.
It has also been said:
You are not censured by any of the stainless perfections: 
like the moon-streak by the stars, you are always followed.
Alternatively:
’this’ refers to the composition just concluded, having samatha as its topic. ‘Set’ 
means: the assemblage of its causes, and that section of the text, as they bring 
up wisdom. For the sake of wisdom means that wisdom, as explained earlier, is 
its purpose or goal. This is because, wisdom manifests in a mental continuum
262
purified by samatha, like crops sprout in a purified field. As it is said in the
Siksdsamuccaya:
Moreover, what is the greatness of this samathal It is the power to 
give birth to the knowledge things as they are. Since
’Someone with samadhi knows things as they are’ - thus said the 
Sage.
This also, has been said in the DhannasangTti:
For a mind in samadhi there is seeing of things as they are. For a 
Bodhisattva who sees things as they are there occurs great 
compassion towards living beings. T should cause this door of 
samadhi to arise in all living beings.’ He, prompted by that great 
compassion, fulfilling the trainings of higher discipline, higher 
mind, and higher wisdom, awakens to unexcelled perfect 
Buddhahood.
And so on.
The Sanskrit particle hi, means: because the Sage spoke of the set of giving and 
so on, or of the set made of samatha, for the sake of wisdom; hence one should 
bring forth wisdom. We should join the sentences in this way. Bring forth 
means to cause to manifest, to realise directly; to cultivate, to practice; or to 
cause to increase.
That wisdom is again twofold: as cause and as result. The causal one is also 
twofold, either of a Bodhisattva practicing from conviction or of one, who has 
entered the grounds. The one as result, on the other hand, is endowed with all 
the best aspects, and has the nature of realising the emptiness of all dharmas 
through the yoga of no sign. [170]
In this regards, at first the causal one, made of listening, contemplation and 
cultivation, through gradual practice, brings about the wisdom of one who has
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entered the grounds. The latter then, obtains higher and higher grounds and thus 
increases in excellence until the removal of both obscurations: it brings forth the 
wisdom, which has the nature of Buddhahood, wherein the entire net of 
constructs is removed.
Then he says: with a wish to remove suffering. Suffering, either in the living 
beings included in the five realms or in oneself, is samsaric. It has the nature of 
birth, illness, old age and death, and is characterised as disjunction with what is 
dear and conjunction with its opposite and also, loss of the gain one looked for. 
In brief, it is the five aggregates of appropriation in themselves. Its removal: 
nirvana, pacification. This means the complete cutting away, having the nature 
of not arising again. With a wish, a longing, for that: meaning, a strong desire.
Thus, someone who has distorted notions, by the force of attachment to 
superimposing existence upon the unreal, grasps at a self and what belongs to a 
self. Due to such grasping, the group of afflictions generated by misplaced 
mental activity is bom; and from that, karman; from that, birth; and from that, 
illness, old age, death, grief, lamentation, pain, depression and the secondary 
afflictions are bom. In this way, there is the arising of this mere heap of 
suffering.
One then observes such dependent arising in this way, in its normal direction, 
through perfect wisdom. Moreover, he sees it as devoid of a self or an owner; 
as having the same aspect of a magical display, a mirage, a city of Gandhatyas, 
a dream or a reflected image, and so on; and hence, as being ultimately without 
essence. Then, due the perfect cognition of things as they are, since this is by its 
nature a counteragent, the limbs of ignorance and becoming, which have the 
nature of delusion, cease; and from the cessation of ignorance, the 
compositional factors, which have that as their condition, cease. In this way, due
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to the cessation of whatever precedes and exists as a cause, one should 
understand the cessation of whatever follows as an effect, up to birth: and from 
that, illness, old age, death, grief, lamentation, pain, depression and the 
secondary afflictions cease. Thus the cessation of this mere heap of suffering 
occurs.
In this context, ignorance, craving and appropriation are included in the section 
of afflictions. Compositional factors and becoming are included in the section of 
karman. The remaining limbs are included in the section of suffering. The 
cessation of the prior limit and the ulterior limit is included in the section of 
cessation. Thus, the three sections, selfless, devoid of a self or what belong to a 
self, come about when joined to coming about or vanish when joined to 
vanishing, similar in nature to a bundle of reeds. And this will be explained 
extensively elsewhere, following reasoning and scripture.
Hence, one who observes through wisdom that what is compounded has the 
nature of a dream, a magical display and so forth, understands that all dharmas 
have no essence, and thus realises paramartha: then, the entire heap of flaws, 
including their impressions, cease. Wisdom is therefore fit to be the cause for 
the pacification of all suffering.
When one analyses through reasoning and scripture, an undistorted discernment 
of the nature of things, is bom. To show this, he explains the two truths with the 
words ‘Samvrti and paramartha ’ and so forth:
Samvrti and paramartha, 
these two truths are accepted. 
Tattva is not the scope of the intellect, 
the intellect is called samvrti. 2
o
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The complete understanding of things as they are, is covered (scimvriyate), 
obscured (avriyate), by it, due to the obscuration of their essence360 and due to 
their illumination being obscured. Hence, it is called samvrti. Ignorance, 
delusion, distortion -  these are its synonyms. Ignorance superimposes the nature 
of a non existent thing, and has the nature of an obscuration to seeing the own 
nature of things: it is fit to be samvrti. As it was said in the Noble Sutra o f the 
Rice-Stalk:
[171] Moreover, the non comprehension of tatfta, the mistaken 
comprehension, not knowing, is ignorance.361
And it was also said:
It shows an unreal object and occurs having obscured the real,
Ignorance, just by birth, is like the occurrence of bile disease.362
Also, the dependently arisen form of a thing, shown by that, is called samvrti. 
This itself is called ‘the samvrti truth of the worldly person’ considering that it 
is truth only according to the samvrti of a worldly person. It was said that: 
Delusion, due to the obscuration of essence, is samvrti.7 7 o
The only truth that appears through that is fabricated.
The Sage spoke of that as samvrti truth,
And a fabricated thing is samvrti.363O  o
This samvrti is twofold, just from the point of view of a worldly person: correct 
samvrti and false samvrti. It is as follows: any aspect of a thing, like blue and so 
forth, dependently arisen, when apprehended by faultless organs is truth: from 
the point of view of a worldly person itself. What occurs within a magical
2 This can either mean that essence (svcibliava) constitutes the obscuration, or that the essence, 
the nature of things, is being obscured. Samvrti is formed by the addition of the prefix sain to the 
root vi\ and the explanation takes advantage of this etymology.
361 Salistambasutra.
j62 Vaidya mentions that this is also quoted by Vibhuticandra, but does not mention the original 
source o f  the verse.
363 Madhyamakavatara 6.25.
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display, a mirage, a reflected image and so on, even if dependently arisen, and
what is apprehended by faulty organs, as also what is misconstrued by the
philosophical conclusions of the various Tirthikas,364 is false: from the point of
view of a worldly person itself. That has been explained:
That which a worldly person comes to apprehend 
with any of the six organs without fault, 
is truth for the worldly person.
In this way, the rest of what is construed 
is false just for the worldly person.365
Both of these are false for the Noble Ones with correct view, since in the state 
of paramartha, the truth of samvrti, is false: we will explain it with reasoning 
immediately after this. Therefore, the nature of things does not appear to the 
ignorant.
Paramartha is the supreme (parama), best referent (artha), the non-fabricated 
form of things, realising which, there occurs a destruction of all afflictions 
attached to the subtle obscuring impressions. Its synonyms are essencelessness 
of all dharmas, emptiness, tathata, authentic limit, dharmadhdtu, and so on:366 
the essencelessness of every dependently arisen thing is its ultimate form, 
because the concealed, conforming to appearance, is not fit.
364 Tirthika is a non-Buddhist philosopher. Just like Candrakirti, Prajnakaramati does not treat 
the Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools in the same way. Buddhist definitions can have 
conventional validity, while those o f the non-Buddhists cannot: since they rely on some 
permanent se lf in order to work.
355 Madhyamakavatdra.
365 ‘Essencelessness’ translates nihsvabhdvatd. ‘Authentic limit’ translates bhutakoti, following 
Sthiramati’s subcommentary on Madhydntavibhdga 1.16: bhutarii satyam aviparitcun ity arthah \
kotih paryanto yatah parendnyaj jneyam  ndstTty ato bhutakotir bhutaparyanta ucyate || I did not 
translate tathata because ‘suchness' seems awkward and because it is a word found in English 
dictionaries; dharmadhdtu, on the other hand, is interpreted in some sources 
{Madhydntavibhdga 1.16 and commentary) as ‘the ore of dharm as, but the usual Tibetan 
translation as chos ying suggests that this interpretation is not uniformly applicable. Hence I left 
it un-translated.
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In this way: it is not that an existent thing as it is seen has a real essence. Since, 
at a subsequent time, it does not remain, while an essence, being always non- 
adventitious, has an unmoving form: how could the essence of something ever 
cease? Otherwise, it would follow that its quality of being an essence would be 
destroyed: and thus, it would be just essenceless.
Also, it is not that when it arises in the form of a real essence it comes from 
anywhere, nor that when it ceases, it goes to heap up somewhere. On the other 
hand, in dependence upon an assemblage of causes and conditions, it arises like 
an illusion, and in the absence of that, it ceases. When something is bom in 
dependence upon an assemblage of causes and conditions, and obtains itself 
depending on something else, like a reflected image, where is the question of its 
being a real essence? [172]
Moreover, the arising of something from an assemblage of causes and condition 
is not ultimately possible. This is because that assemblage too, obtains its 
existence depending on something else, being bom from another assemblage: 
hence, it has no essence. In this way one should understand that each and every 
preceding one has no essence, as it is born from the assemblage of one’s own 
causal factors. In this case, if one agrees that the effect follows the nature of the 
cause, how could he accept that something with an essence arises from 
something without essence? As he will say:
That which is produced through an illusion and that, which is 
produced through causes,
please explain: where does it come from and where does it go?
It is seen in proximity of something else and not in the latter’s 
absence.
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In that fabrication, same as a reflected image, how could there be 
any reality?367
It was also said:
What is born through conditions is sure unborn; its arising is not 
there with an essence.
What depends on conditions is called empty. One who knows 
emptiness is not heedless.368
In the same vein:
Just from empty dharmas empty dharmas come about.369
And also, not even the smallest bit of birth is fit, for a thing: whether through 
connection with a cause which is itself, or something else, or both; or from
170connection to a non-cause.'
It is a follows: if their own nature were the cause of the birth of things, it should 
be either already accomplished or not. Then, for something which is already 
accomplished and exists, there is no causality upon oneself: as it is completely 
accomplished, what more would it have to do? On the other hand, something 
which has yet to arise has no other essence but to be unaccomplished; and for 
that which is one, there are no parts. Also, its essence cannot be ascribed to 
something else, which is to arise later, since when the first thing is 
accomplished the other, not yet accomplished, cannot have its essence.
367 Bodhiccirydvatdra 9.144-145
368 Anavataptahradapasamkmmanasutm
369 PratTtyasamutpadahrdayakdrikd
370 What follows is a refutation o f  arising in terms o f the catnskoti (the four alternatives): the 
topic o f  the first Chapter o f the MiUamadhyamakakdrika. Nagarjuna focuses his refutation on 
the Abhidharmic way of understanding causality in terms o f pratv eyas', Prajnakaramati (being a 
late Mddhyamika) implies in his refutation a broader spectrum o f  Indian philosophies.
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Therefore there is no arising of anything from oneself as already accomplished. 
And also in reference to the position of arising from oneself, one’s own nature 
being previously arisen is impossible for anything whatsoever, since it would 
imply the fault of one thing resting on another, ad infinitum. Also, something 
whose essence is yet to be accomplished is like a plant in the sky and is devoid 
of any capability: it cannot become the cause of one’s own arising. Otherwise, 
this would imply that even a hare’s horn could give birth to one’s essence.
The position of ‘from something other’ is also not fit: it would follow that 
darkness may arise even from the sun, or anything from anything else, since 
both those things that give birth and those who do not, are equally other in 
respect to the intended effects. Even the restriction that what gives birth and its 
product should be one, in terms of one continuum, does not in reality hold 
together: it is a mental construct in reference to an effect yet to arise. And the 
conventional usage of ‘effect’ and so on, is not according to how things are 
when in reference to dharmas placed in the future. Since, only in future it may 
be observed whether their referents essentially do exist. Also, in the state of 
being seeds, the otherness of the seed in respect to the present sprout is only a 
construct: the existence of the effect in the cause will be refuted later. [173] 
Where even the presently seen form does not withstand analysis, why speculate 
about something possible in the future, and the like?
Even the position of ‘from both’ is not fit, because it would imply the combined 
faults explained in reference to each of the previous positions. Also, because as 
long as the effect is not yet arisen, a cause having the nature of both identity and 
difference is ultimately non-existent. While, once it has arisen, there is nothing 
to give birth to: therefore, how could there be any function, for a cause having 
the form of both?
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Nor is it the option of ‘from no cause’: since this is a prasajya type of negation, 
‘from no cause’ is not fit. If they had no causes, it would follow that existent 
things may not have restrictions of place and time; or, their constant existence 
or non-existence would follow. And, those who wish to obtain something would 
not attend to the proper means for its obtainment: the causality of pradhana, a 
Lord and so forth will be refuted later.371 Therefore, existent things do not 
obtain their own-existence from without causes.
Thus, neither from themselves, others, both, or from without causes, do existent
things with real essences arise. As it is said:
Neither from themselves nor from other, nor from both or from no 
cause,
are anywhere any existents whatsoever indeed found to be
372arisen.
Also, through the analysis of being in essence one or many, all existent things
lack an essence and therefore are not essentially real. Therefore, being like a
dream, a magical display, a reflected image, and so on, the mere relation of
having something as a condition may be there, attractive as long as it is not
analysed. In respect to this, what is the use of being attached to existence,
causing all suffering? Thus, this is the essence of what is intended:
These existent things bom from oneself or other have in fact no 
essence,
as they do not have the nature of being one nor many, like a 
reflected image.373
371 Pradhana or prakrti is a Samkhya term and is later taken up in the context o f  refuting that 
system. A Lord here means a creator God, mainly defended by the Nydya system and later 
refuted in that context.
372 Mulamadhyamakakdrikd 1.2
373 Madhyamakdlamkdmkdrikd 1
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In this way, only essencelessness remains as the very ultimate (paramarthika) 
nature of all existent things. That itself, being the main aim (artha) of a human 
being is called paramartha, the excellent purpose.
Even to this, one should not become attached. Otherwise, whether it is
attachment to existence or attachment to emptiness, it makes no difference
whatsoever: both of them are samvrti, as they are in nature constructs. Also,
non-existence, its essence being construed, has no nature of its own whatsoever.
And it is not that non-existence is in nature the cessation of existence: since,
cessation has no essence. Moreover, if existence had itself some essence, then
non-existence, being in nature the negation of the former, could be there. But
existence has no essence, as it has surely been made understood. Therefore,
there is nothing whatsoever going by the name of ‘non-existence’ and having
the form of the cessation of existence. And also, when it has been made
understood, in the way explained, that existence and non-existence are not there,
it is not possible to have the nature of a mixture of the two; nor, of the negation
of the two: since, all misconstructions are linked to the misconstruction of
existence itself. When the latter is removed, all of these are undone with a single
stroke. Therefore:
Not existent, not non-existent, not existent and non-existent, and 
not even as neither of the two
[174] should anything be regarded as an object of attachment. That was said in
the Noble Perfection o f Wisdom:
Subhuti said: here, Long Lived Saradvatlputra, a son or daughter of 
noble family who follows the bodhisattva’s vehicle, not skilled in 
means, distinctly cognises that ‘form is empty’ and has attachment.
He distinctly cognises that ‘feeling is empty’ and has attachment.
He distinctly cognises that ‘notion is empty’ and has attachment.
He distinctly cognises that ‘formations are empty’ and has 
attachment. He distinctly cognises that ‘consciousness is empty’ 
and has attachment. In the same way, he distinctly cognises that
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eye, ear, sense of smell, tongue, body, mind, up to ‘the emptiness 
of all dharmas is empty’ and has attachment.
And so forth.
It was also said:
The teaching of the ambrosia of emptiness is to vanquish all mental 
constructs.
If one has grasping even for that, you set him aside.374
Not existent, not non-existent, not existent and non-existent, and 
not even as neither of the two,
Madhyamikas know tattva as devoid of the four alternatives.375
In this way, we see the entire universe as devoid of the four alternatives, 
pacified from the beginning; due to its nature as non-arisen, un-ceased, no 
cutting off, nor permanence, it is devoid of elaboration and hence like the sky, 
with no place for attachments.
These two truths are accepted: what are those? ‘Samvrti and paramartha \  this 
should be linked to what follows it. Just like in the sentence bhutam iyam 
brdhmam, dvapanam iyam mustikd. Samvrti is one undistorted truth, and, 
paramartha is another truth. The word and puts them together as having the 
same force merely in terms of being truths. Among these, the samvrti truth has a 
non-false form for the worldly person, and, paramartha truth is truth, 
undeceiving tattva for the Noble Ones: this is the difference. In this way, the 
word and is also fit as having the sense of showing a difference.
This is being said: all of these existent things, inner or external, are bom bearing 
two natures: the one of samvrti and the one of paramartha. Among these, one 
has its self-existence manifested as the object of the false vision of ordinary
374 Lokdtitastava 21
j7S Subhdsitasamgraha, Saraha
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people: their eyes are covered by the darkness of ignorance, and they see non­
existence things. The other, has its nature present as the object of the perfect 
vision of Noble Ones: they know tattva, their eyes of perfect cognition had the 
cataract of ignorance removed by the collyrium of discrimination. Thus, all 
referents of words bear these two natures. And among these two natures, the one 
which is the object of immature people with false vision is samvrti truth. On the 
other hand, the one which is the object of those who have realised tattva and 
have perfect vision, is paramartha truth. This is the explanation given by those 
who know the sdstras. As someone said:
All things bear two forms, which obtain their being by perfect or 
false vision:
the object of those who see perfectly, is tattva, the one of those 
who see falsely, is called samvrti truth.376
[175] Hence it is fit to interpret two as the collection of two things. ‘Are
accepted’ means that they are regarded or opined to be there. By whom? By the
Blessed Buddhas whose intellects have their obscurations removed, and by the
srdvakas, pratyekabuddhas and boddhisattvas who follow their path. These only
are the two truths and there is no other truth: for the purpose of this type of
ascertainment too, the word and is fit. As it was said:
The Buddhas’ teaching of the Dharma rests on two truths: 
the samvrti truth of the worldly and the truth of paramartha?11
In the Pitdputrasamdgama also it is said:
These are the two truths that Those Who Understand the World
saw by themselves without hearing from others:
samvrti and also paramartha,
and no third truth whatsoever is established.
376 Madhyamak3\>atara 6.23
377 Mulamadhyamakakdrikd 24.8
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Opponent [ Indeed, the Four Noble Truths, defined as suffering, arising, 
cessation and the path, have been told by the Blessed One in the Abhidharma. 
Then how is it that ‘there are only two truths’?
Reply 1 That is true. But on the other hand, according to the tendencies and 
expectations of the people to be guided, those were told by dividing the two 
themselves into four: since, the four are included in these very two. It is in this 
way: the truths of suffering, arising and the path, having the nature of samvrti, 
are included in samvrti truth; the truth of cessation on the other hand is within 
paramartha truth. Therefore, there is no contradiction whatsoever.
This may occur to someone:
Opponent \ Samvrti \s is itself manifested by ignorance and hence has the nature 
of a superimposition of what is not there; also, it is torn a hundred times through 
analysis: how can it be a truth?
Reply | That also, is true. On the other hand, following the tendencies of worldly
people it is called ‘truth’: it is here understood that samvrti truth is only within
the worldly. Adjusting to them, even the Blessed Ones, not intending to
consider tattva, speak in that very way of ‘samvrti truth’. Just because of this
the respected Acdrya has in his sdstra specified ‘samvrti truth of the worldly
person’. But in fact, paramartha is the only one truth: thus, there is no harm. As
was said by the Blessed One:
One only, o Monks, is the highest truth: nirvana, who has an 
undeceiving quality, while all formations are false and have the 
quality of deception.
It has been said: ‘These two truths’. Among these, samvrti truth is for those 
whose minds are submerged by ignorance, because it has that same nature. This
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is now understood. On the other hand, it is not known what is the nature and 
defining trait of paramartha truth. Hence its nature should be explained.
Thus he says: tattva is not the scope of the intellect. It is not the scope, the 
object, of the intellect: of any knowledge, because it crossed beyond the nature 
of being an object of whichever knowledge. Because, it cannot be made the 
object of any intellect, by any means whatsoever. Therefore, how can one make 
its nature understood?
It is as follows: the tattva of paramartha truth is by nature completely free of 
any elaboration. As it is of any adjunct, how could one see it through any 
construct whatsoever? And, what has the nature of having crossed beyond 
constructs is not the object of words. Because words, bom from constructs, 
cannot engage in what is not the object of intellects with constructs. [176] 
Therefore, lacking all constructs or expressions, not superimposed, nor obscured, 
the ineffable tattva of paramartha: how can it be made understood? 
Nevertheless, as a favour to worthy listeners, appropriating some utter construct, 
something is said in terms of through samvrti by means of indication and 
example.
Just like:
A person with an eye-disease, by force of that disease, sees the entire space of 
the sky adorned by nets of hair; he even pushes them away from his face. Seeing 
him acting in this manner, another thinks: ‘What is he doing?5, and approaches 
him. Although his eye is intent upon the hair perceived by the other, he does not 
perceive the shape of hairs; nor does he misconstrue existence, non-existence, 
and further specifications in reference to such hairs. Moreover, when that person 
with an eye-disease makes one’s opinion known to the other as ‘I see hairs here’, 
then, for the sake of removing his mental construct he tells him things as they
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are: ‘There are no hairs here’. He has spoken a sentence, only bent upon a 
negation, in accord with the one with the eye-disease perceives. But it is not that 
he, even making things understood in this way, has performed any negation or 
affirmation. And as for the hairs’ tattva that the healthy person sees: the one 
with the eye-disease does not see it.
In the same way:
Immature ones, who do not see tattva due to their eye-disease of ignorance, 
perceive things having the nature of the aggregates, bases, entrances and so 
forth. Such is their form in terms of samvrti. While the nature, according to 
which the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, whose impressions from ignorance are 
entirely removed, see those very aggregates and so forth, as those without eye- 
disease would see hairs; that is their paramartha truth. As the expert in the 
sdstra said:
That which is construed due to the influence of an eye-disease 
in the form of hairs and the like, that is just false.
The nature according to which one with pure vision sees 
is tattva: know this to be the case even in this context.378
In this way, even though inexpressible as per paramartha, the tattva of 
paramartha, by means of an example and having taken up samvrti, has 
been somehow spoken of. But in fact, it cannot be explained: it is in 
nature bereft of any conventional usage in terms of samvrti. As it was 
said:
How can the syllable-less the dharma, 
be heard or be taught?
Yet, the syllable-less intent
is heard and taught through superimposition.
Therefore, remaining only within the truth of conventional usages, paramartha 
is taught. And, from understanding the teaching of paramartha, comes the
378 Madhyamakdvatara 6.29
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realisation of paramartha: since one is the means for the other. As it was said in 
the sdstra:
Without relying upon conventional usage, paramartha is not taught. 
Without relying upon paramartha, nirvana is not realised.379
[177] In this way, samvrti is the means to teach paramartha, and the realisation 
of paramartha is what is to be got through such means: since it cannot be taught 
otherwise.
Opponent | Well then, such a thing also, such an object of the intellection: is it 
not paramartha1.
Reply | To this he says: intellect is called samvrti. All intellect indeed is samvrti, 
since due to having a non-support as its support it is by nature a construct, and 
any construct has surely the nature of ignorance: since, it apprehends something 
unreal. As it was said:
A construction in itself comes to have the form of ignorance.
Ignorance is samvrti. Therefore, surely no intellect apprehending the form of
paramartha makes ultimately (paramarthatah) any sense. Otherwise, being
apprehensible by the intellect, which obscured by samvrti, its quality of being
paramartha would be lacking. Since, paramartha is in reality not the object of a
jhana obscured by samvrti. In this respect, it was said in the
Aryasatyadvayavatara:
If indeed, Devaputra, according to paramartha, paramartha truth 
could become object of body, speech or mind, it could not be 
counted as paramartha truth: that would only be samvrti truth. On 
the other hand, Devaputra, paramartha truth has gone beyond all 
conventional usages, has no specification, is not arisen, not ceased, 
devoid of expressed and expression, knowable and knowledge, up
j79 Miilamcidhyamakakarika 24.20
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to: paramartha has gone beyond being an object of the knowledge 
of the Omniscient Ones, endowed with all best aspects.
And so on.
Therefore, it is surely not the object of any mental construct, because
specifications like: existence or non-existence, being self or other, truth or
untruth, etemality or discontinuity, permanence or impermanence, happiness or
suffering, purity or impurity, self or no self, empty or non-empty, something to
be characterised and a characteristic, being one or another, arising or ceasing,
and so forth; are not possible for tattva. They have the quality of being obscured
by samvrti. This was said by the Blessed One in the Pitdputrasamdgama:
And just this much should be known: samvrti and paramartha.
This has been well seen, understood and directly realised by the 
Blessed one, in terms of being empty. Therefore he is called 
Omniscient. Among these, samvrti has been seen by the Tathdgata 
according to how the world goes. That which moreover is 
paramartha, is ineffable, not cognisable nor perfectly cognisable, 
not to be known, not taught, not shown, up to: no action, no cause; 
up to: no obtainment, no non-obtainment, no happiness, no 
suffering, no fame or lack of fame, no form, no lack of form, and 
so forth.
Thus, the Blessed One, whose inner self is illumined by the shining of jhdna 
pervading the expanse of infinite things, said the truth of paramartha to be 
without the specificities of all conventional things, and devoid of any adjunct. 
Hence this is only to be personally experienced by the Noble Ones in terms of 
one’s own experience: just that is here the valid means of knowledge. The 
samvrti truth, on the other hand, is shown having resorted to worldly, 
conventional usage. Therefore, in this way, having, through this type of 
distinction a perfect cognition of the two truths, undistorted discrimination of 
the dharmas is bom.
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Having thus settled truth as twofold, through the distinction of samvrti and 
paramartha, showing that persons too are only of two types with jurisdiction 
over either, he says: ‘In respect to that’, and so forth:
In respect to that, we see two types of persons: 
the yogin and the unrefined. 
Of the two, the unrefined person 
is refuted by the yogic person. 3
‘In respect to that’ means either among those two truths of samvrti or 
paramartha. Someone has jurisdiction, is placed within, either of those. This 
means: one perceives either of those truths. Loka here means a person. ‘Two 
types’ means twofold: the knower of either samvrti or paramartha as truth. 
‘Person’ here is a word for many entities and means two groups of that. [178] 
‘We see’ means we understand to be there, through reasoning and scripture. 
How are they of two types? To this he says: ‘the yogin and the unrefined’. Yoga 
means samadhi, defined as the non-apprehension of any dharma, and one who 
has yoga is called a yogin: this is one type of group. Thus, non-refinement is 
ignorance and craving, the cause for engaging in samsdra: one, who has that, is 
called ‘unrefined’. In the Sanskrit, the suffix ka is added to prdkrta with no 
further meaning, thus ‘the unrefined person’ (prdkrtako lokah) refers to the 
second group. Among these two, the yogin sees the main tattva without 
distortion, while the unrefined sees a distorted tattva of things, as he is in error.
This may occur to someone:
Opponent | Since each of them, in his own way, does see tattva, who among the 
two is in error, so that only he may be refuted by the other? And, which of the 
two is refuted by which?
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Reply | To this he says: ‘The unrefined’ and so forth. ‘Of the two’ is in the 
Sanskrit expressed by a 7th Vibhakti indicating a collection and in the sense of 
ascertainment. ‘Of the two’ means that among those two persons, the yogin and 
the unrefined, the unrefined person is ascertained from within the collection as 
having an unrefined nature. And, having being ascertained he ‘is refuted’: thus 
the refutation is affirmed.
By whom? To this he says: ‘by the yogin \  A person who is a yogin is himself a 
yogic person, and the other is refuted by him: thus it is settled which one is the 
distorted mind. How? ‘By superior intellect’ should be joined to this. On the 
other hand, the yogin is not refuted by the unrefined.
The following is here opined:
The cognition, wherein confusion places real existence, of someone whose eye 
are affected by a disease and who sees inexistent nets of hair and the like, is 
refuted by: the knowledge of someone without the disease, apprehending the 
tattva of things as they in fact are. On the other hand, it is not that the 
knowledge of the latter is likewise refuted by the former.
Similarly:
The cognition of the unrefined, whose eye of intellect is flawed by the disease 
of the stains of ignorance, and who apprehends a distorted nature of things, is 
refuted by: the knowledge of the yogic person. In his eyes of jndna without 
outflows, the water of wisdom has cleansed away all stains; he knows the tattva 
of things. On the other hand, the yogin's cognition is not refuted by the other’s 
cognition.
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This also has been said:
What is apprehended by those, whose eyes are diseased, 
does not refute the cognition of those without eye-diseases.
In the same way, by the intellect of those who are obscured by a 
stained knowledge,
there is no refuting of a stainless intellect.380
Therefore, it is the cognition of the unrefined that is in error: hence, it is refuted.
Then, is it that only the unrefined are refuted by the yogins, 01* some yogins also? 
To this he says ‘Due to sharper’ and so on:
Due to sharper intelligence, superior and superior yogins 
refute other yogins as well,
Yogins too are refuted, by some other yogins. Not only the unrefined are: this is 
intended by ‘as well’. How are those who refute? ‘Superior and superior’: those 
who are better and better, those who have obtained excellence by acquiring 
specific qualities placed in different levels of superiority. Excelling more and 
more, is the sense. Those who in comparison to them have lesser qualities and 
are lower and lower are refuted, are surpassed in terms of greatness of 
knowledge and so forth. How? ‘Due to sharper intelligence’: ‘due’ to 
‘intelligence’, jndna or wisdom, being sharper, excelling due to the removal of 
more and more obscurations. And, this is only an indication: it is also due two 
sharper meditation, samadhi, absorption, and so on. It is as follows:
380 Madliyamakcivatdra 6.27
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In comparison to the qualities of knowledge and so forth of a boclhisattva who 
has obtained the first ground called Joyful, the qualities of knowledge, might 
and so on, of a bodhisattva who has obtained the subsequent second ground, 
called Stainless, do excel. [179] The same should also be understood for others, 
who have obtained subsequently higher grounds. Similarly one should consider 
the refutation of those who have respectively obtained the first meditation and 
the others, up to: the refutation of those with outflows by those without 
outflows.
This may occur to someone:
Opponent | Even if there might be some superiority in the intelligence of the 
yogins, how can it be made understood that the cognition of the unrefined is in 
error?
Reply | To this he says: ‘through an example accepted by both’, and so on: 
through an example accepted by both.
o o  t
For the sake of a task, there is no analysis. 4
‘By both’ means: yogins and unrefined. ‘Accepted’, regarded; ‘through’ that 
‘example’, an indication. The example of an illusion, a mirage, a city of 
Gandharvas, a reflected image and the so forth, spoken of in the Sutras by the 
Blessed One, is established for both of them as referring to essencelessness. 
Because, the essencelessness of all dharmas, is made understood in terms of 
being similar to that example.
381 The verse could be read as a continuous sentence, but I split it in accordance with 
Prajnakaramati’s commentary.
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It is as follows: things like form and the rest, whose nature is understood by all 
people, are established as essenceless only for the yogins, since they realise the 
truth of paramartha. On the other hand, those which are apprehended in a 
dream, a magical display and the like, are so even for the unrefined. Therefore, 
in respect to these, for both groups there is no contention and hence the quality 
of being an example is unhindered. Mimamsakas and others consider that there 
are real things which themselves appear as they are: like place, time, and so 
forth. These have been refuted elsewhere: hence their opinion is not cast out 
here. Others, though, are of our own herd, and yet think that mind only is 
ultimately existent, as it appears in dreams and so on. They too later, when the 
occasion comes, will be refuted by refuting self-awareness.382
What is established through reasoning is surely established for both. Therefore, 
by such an example it is established that, due to grasping at a distorted nature of 
things, the knowledge of the unrefined is in error. Even in the case of yogins, 
one should explain as fit, in a similar manner.
Opponent \ Well, if the tattva of things is that all existent things are without 
essence; how is it that Bodhisattvas, even though they know this tattva, with a 
wish to rescue all beings and for the sake of completing the accumulations, 
engage in giving and so forth? Since, these too, are without essence.
Reply | To this he says: ‘For the sake of a task, there is no analysis.’ ‘A task’ is 
something to be accomplished or taken up. It is called a result. ‘For the sake’ of 
that means: because of that. ‘There is no analysis’, because one engages in the 
cause of that, just without analysis. Even for things that are in that way, since
382 This is an important comment, to understand the proper place o f the refutation o f  
svasamvedana. Prajnakaramati highlights how the refutation of reflexive awareness has the 
purpose of refuting an ultimate mind.
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we find the restriction of one thing depending upon another, there is no 
contradiction to the relationship of cause and result. This is what is being said:
Giving and so forth, being by nature like an illusion and so on, have no essence.
Nevertheless, when practiced through the purification of the three points by
applying care and so forth, even though they are such, they become causes for
the realisation of paramartha. Because they are means to that, and because,
dependent arising is inconceivable. Only by a cause like this, such result is
realised, since one is the means to the other. That was said:
The truth of conventional usage is the means,
while the truth of paramartha is what is to be obtained.383
And, it has to be necessarily this way. Otherwise, how, through the practice of 
the path, could a stainless state arise from one with stains, or one without mental 
constructs from one which has them? It is because, from the perspective of 
paramartha, one has the nature of the other.
This is the same for other instances as well: and since all dharmas are ultimately 
with no essence, a result similar two the cause is accepted in all cases. Therefore, 
even from a cause within samvrti and essence-less, the result is the very 
realisation of essencelessness. Otherwise, how could the uncompounded 
nirvana be obtained from a compounded path?
[180] Therefore, giving and the rest, even if in reality essenceless, are taken up 
by Bodhisattvas, with compassion towards all beings, for the sake of realising 
the paramdrtha-tattva: as there is no other way to realise paramartha. Hence, 
engaging in giving and so forth is not prevented. In the same way one should 
explain that those who wish to obtain desirable results and avoid the undesirable,
383 Madhyamakavatara 6.80
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engage in what is skilful and abstain from what is not. This is going to be 
clarified again, later.
This may occur to someone:
Opponent | If yogins understand the form of things as an illusion and so forth, 
and an unrefined person too understands the same, where is then the contention?
Reply | To this he says ‘Existents are seen’ and so forth:
Existents are seen by a person 
and construed too as tattva, 
not as an illusion: 
hence the debate between a yogin and that person. 5
‘By a person’ means by an unrefined person. Having obtained causes and 
conditions they come about (bhavanti), they get their own form, hence they are 
called ‘existents’ (bhavdh). On the other hand, they have no ultimate form of 
their own, hence by the word ‘existent’ (bhava) absence of own existence 
(nihsvcibhdvata) is understood as expressed.
Not only are they ‘seen’ as existent in nature, but they are ‘construed too as 
tattva’. They are clung to (adhyavasTyante) as ultimate according to the very 
nature they are perceived. They become objects of attachment. Because of 
thinking: ‘The form of things that is the scope of our perception is truly real’.
‘Not as an illusion’, not like, on the other hand, in the way they are seen by a 
yogin: like an illusion, resembling an illusion, empty of essence; they are not
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perceived to be ultimately as such. ‘Hence’ in this respect there is ‘the debate 
between a yogin and that person’, of a person versus a yogin. The tattva of 
things understood by the latter is not understood by the other person, hence it 
may be said it means instead: of a yogin versus that person. Because, what the 
latter understands is negated as being the case by the yogin.
This is the intended sense:
All existent things have two forms, one in terms of samvrti and one in terms of 
paramartha. Among these, only the one in terms of samvrti is perceived by the 
worldly person, while the one in terms of paramartha, by the yogin: this has 
been explained.
A person with eyes confused by the power of mantras, and so forth, sees only 
such forms as of elephants, as projected by a magician. The magician, on the 
other hand, sees their actual nature, being their essence and so forth. One should 
understand in a similar way, as fit, even in the case of the yogin and the other 
person.
Then also, this may occur to someone:
Opponent | The form of things common for all people, and capable of 
purposeful activity, is apprehended through direct perception as valid means: 
how could that be negated?
Reply | Considering that the other may be thinking in this way, he says ‘Even 
the perception’ and so on:
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Even the perception of form and so on 
is from consensus, and not from proofs.
Even that which is called ‘perception’: like ‘form and so on’. The word ‘and so 
on’ includes sound and so on, feeling and so on. That also, is from ‘consensus’: 
from customary usage, worldly talk, ‘not from proofs’. Form and so on, is not 
real perception realised through valid means: this is the syntactical connection. 
Since perception and so on, are valid means only in terms of conventional 
usage, what is realised through them is form and so on, only in terms of 
samvrti. The actual form (tdttvikam rupam) is not to be realised through 
worldly means of knowledge: otherwise, it would follow that all persons 
understand tattva. As someone has said:
If what is apprehended by the senses would be in accordance with 
tattva,
any fool would know tattva: then what would be the use of 
knowing tattva! 385
Therefore even perception is not realised by valid means.
[181] Opponent \ If tattva as form and so on, even in direct perception, is not 
realised through valid means, how is it that there is consensus upon that? And 
if there is consensus, how is that false?
384 1 have used the term ‘p roof meaning ‘valid or sound proof to translate pramana. The term 
has been recently often translated as ‘valid cognition’, but I think such a translation is not 
desirable even in a Buddhist context. Although some (o f the Dignaga/Dharmaklrti school) 
would indeed define pramana  as a cognition, this is not accepted by all (not, for example, by 
Candraklrti). Moreover, even those philosophers that define pramana as a type o f cognition, do 
that in a polemical context and are aware that this is only a specific interpretation and not a 
common usage.
385 Catuhstava 3.18
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Reply | To this he says ‘Like the consensus’ and so on:
Like the consensus on the impure being pure and so on, 
it is false.6
Just like: in reference to a woman’s body and so on, ultimately impure, an 
intellection of purity is born, for those whose minds are distorted by attachment 
to it. Due to the word ‘and so on’ the intellection of permanence and so on in 
reference to what is impermanent, and so forth, is included.386
And that, grasping something where it is not, ‘is false’. It means that is grasps 
falsely. The intellection in reference to form and so on is in the same way: there 
is no difference.
Opponent | If there is no establishment of that through perception as valid means,
then it will be there through textual tradition (dgama). Since, in the Sutra the
Blessed One taught existent things as having the nature of aggregates, bases,
entrances and so on, and as having the nature of momentariness, and so forth. In
that respect, this has been said by the Blessed One:
All: all means, oh Brahmin, the five aggregates, the twelve 
entrances, the eighteen bases.
In the same vein:
All factors are momentary, where is activity for what does not stay?
386 This refers to a specific set o f distortions described in Buddhist texts: taking what is 
impermanent as permanent, what is impure as pure, what is no-self as self, what is suffering as 
happiness. The opponent here must be a Buddhist.
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Their existence is itself activity, and is itself called the doer 
(kdiraka).
And making understood a quality of momentariness or non-momentariness is 
not proper for what has the nature (svabhdva) of an illusion: things without 
essence have no nature whatsoever. Thus, how could they not be ultimately 
existent?
Reply | To this he says ‘For the sake of introducing people’ and so on:
And for the sake of introducing people 
the Protector taught of ‘existents’. 
In reality, they are not momentary, 
and if you say ‘conventionally’, it is contradictory. 7
For the ‘people’: for beings who are attached to existence and are to be guided 
through the teachings on the aggregates and so forth. ‘For the sake of 
introducing’: into emptiness, those who are not fit for a direct teaching on 
emptiness, in order to engage through a gentle gradation. The word ‘and’ 
indicates a cause. Because, ‘existents’, defined as the aggregates, entrances and 
so forth, even though all dhcirmas have in reality no essence, were ‘taught’, 
demonstrated, by the ‘Protector’. This is the Blessed Buddha, who knows the 
living beings’ dispositions and so forth, protects them from the suffering of the 
hells and so forth and causes them to obtain the happiness of prosperity and 
ultimate excellence. Therefore, there is no contradiction with the Sutras. As it 
has been said:
Just like ‘Mine’ and ‘I’ was spoken of by the Victors to accomplish 
a task,
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in the same way, to accomplish a task, the aggregates, entrances 
and bases were spoken of.387
Opponent | If they were not taught ultimately, how could they then be
momentary? Thus he says: ‘They are not momentary’.
In reality (tattvatah), from the point of view of paramartha, since they have no 
essence these existents are not even momentary. The teaching of momentariness 
and so forth is to show that nature to people to be trained (or, because such 
nature does not appear to people to be trained).
If ultimately they are not momentary, how is it that even in the teaching they 
have been said to be so? [182] Placing this in mind he says ‘If you say
‘conventionally’. If it said that they are called momentary from the point of
view of samvrti, expecting such an answer he faults it: then ‘it is contradictory’. 
That they are momentary according to samvrti and not according to paramartha 
is contradictory: it does not hold together. Because they are perceived as non- 
momentary, it contradicts perception. And, since those engaged in conventional 
usages perceive its opposite, momentariness is not the form corresponding to 
samvrti.™
Reply | The proponent of the sicldhanta answers: ‘The fault is not with the 
yogins' samvrti ’:
The fault is not with the yogins' samvrti: 
compared to the other person, they see tattva. 
Otherwise, the depiction of women as impure
387 Yuktisastikd
388 The following section is quite important: it shows how Abhidharmic categories can be Fit in a 
system o f graded sam vrti, hence differentiating them, by implication, from the categories 
offered by the non-Buddhists (which are, primarily, mistakes in terms o f saiiivtti itself).
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could be refuted by worldly people. 8
Here there is no such flaw as a contradiction to perception. Why? Because, 
according to the samvrti or conventional usage of yogins who have obtained 
samadhi in the selflessness of persons, there is perception in terms of 
momentariness.
This is what is intended: although momentariness is not perceived by the short­
sighted, it is nonetheless within the scope of the yogins’ conventional usage. 
Even the conventional usage of yogins does not escape having the nature of 
samvrti, since it has been said that ‘the intellect is called samvrti' (9.2). And it is 
not that what is stultified by perception is ipso facto stultified, since a certain 
type of perception does not constitute a valid means.
Opponent | Then, how is it that, although it corresponds to samvrti, only yogins 
see this, while the short-sighted don’t?
Reply | Thus he says: ‘compared to the other person, they see tattva’. In 
comparison to the other person, who is short-sighted, those yogins see tattva, 
see beyond the sense faculties. Such expression gives the reason. Because, they 
see tattva, therefore they understand momentariness, selflessness and so forth, 
even though those are not perceived by other people. Hence, the perception of 
the other persons does not stultify them.
And this should necessarily be accepted. Thus he says: ‘Otherwise’ and so forth. 
Otherwise, if this is not accepted, then other persons should stultify even what 
you yourself accept. What? ‘The depiction of women as impure.’ At the time of 
meditation on impurity, other persons should stultify the depiction, the
292
ascertainment, of a woman, a lovely one, as impure. There would be a 
contradiction with what is perceived by other persons, since the other persons 
apprehend the body of a woman as having a pure nature. Therefore, what is seen 
by yogins is not stultified by what is perceived by other persons. Here ‘Things 
as perceived by those with an eye-disease’ and so forth, should be applied as a 
cumulative reason.
Thus, not even from textual tradition (dgama) can existent things be established 
as paramartha. It is hence certain that all dharmas have the nature of an illusion, 
a dream, and the like.
This may occur to someone:
Opponent | If the nature of being like an illusion is omni-pervasive, then even a 
Buddha is like an illusion and like a dream. This too has been said in the 
Bhagavatl:
When this was said, Subhuti spoke the following to those sons of 
gods: those living beings, oh sons of gods, are like an illusion.
Those living beings, oh sons of gods, are like a dream. Therefore, 
an illusion and living beings: this is not two, it is made into one.
All dharmas also, oh sons of gods, are like an illusion, like a dream.
Even a Stream-Enterer is like an illusion, like a dream. [183] Even 
the fruit of entering the stream is like an illusion, like a dream. 
Similarly, a Once-Returner too, and even the fruit of once- 
retuming; a Non-Returner too, and even the fruit of non-returning; 
an Arhat too, and even the fruit of Arhatship are like an illusion, 
like a dream. Even a Pratyekabuddha is like an illusion, like a 
dream. His awakening is also like an illusion, like a dream. Even a 
perfect, complete Buddha is like an illusion, like a dream. Perfect, 
complete awakening is also like an illusion, like a dream. Up to: 
nirvana too, is like an illusion, like a dream. If there was any 
dharma excelling even nirvana, that also, I say, would be like an 
illusion, like a dream.
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In this way, how is it that from respect and disrespect merit and sin may arise? 
Expecting this opinion from the opponent, he says ‘How does merit’ and so 
forth:
How does merit come from an illusion-like Jina? 
Just, as it comes in case of his real existence.
If even the Blessed One is in nature comparable to an illusion, then: ‘from an 
illusion-like’ essenceless ‘Jina’, from the Blessed One, how, in which way, do 
you think there could be merit, good-deeds? Like through worship, respect, 
saluting the feet and so forth?
This is just a part of what is implied. How is there sin in disrespecting him? 
This should be understood. It is not that by respecting or disrespecting a person 
produced by a magician it makes sense that merit and sin are born. Such is the 
other’s opinion.
Reply | That has already been answered. Hence, here he asks to the other: ‘Just, 
as it comes in case of his real existence?’ Even ‘in case of his real existence’ in 
case of the Blessed One being existent from the point of view of paramartha, 
how is there merit? The words katham yathd (how) should be applied to both 
parts. This is what is intended: Just like for someone, from an ultimately 
existent Jina ultimately existent merit is born, in the same way for another, 
from one comparable to an illusion comes illusion-like merit. Therefore there is 
no difference between us two, since the mere fact that one thing has another as 
its condition, is common to both: that very answer that you have, is also ours, 
nothing differs. And, it has been made understood that there is no ultimately 
existent nature of things established through reasoning.
294
Opponent | Let there be merit even from a Jina that is like an illusion. But how 
is this going to be solved? Thus he says ‘If a being is like an illusion’ and so 
forth:
If a being is like an illusion, 
is he reborn after death? 9
Or, it can be begun in a different manner: if even a Jina is like an illusion, what 
to say then of living beings within samsdra? We say: They are also like that. 
Since, it has been said:
Those living beings, oh sons of gods, are like an illusion.
In this case, a great flaw follows: thus he says ‘I f ,  and so forth. ‘If a being’, 
someone having life, ‘is like an illusion’, has the same quality of what is by 
nature an illusion, ‘is he reborn after death?’ The question mark (kirn) is either 
in reference to a question, or indicating impatience. Is it reborn, arisen, again? 
Dead means dropped from the continuity of a similar realm 
(nikdyasabhdgcitdyds cyutah). The cause here should be stated, or this is not fit: 
since, when an illusory person disappears he does not arise again. Therefore 
existent things are real as paramartha: it has to be accepted.
Reply | It need not be accepted. Thus he says ‘As long’, etc.:
As long as there is an assemblage of conditions, 
an illusion also continues.
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‘As long’, for as much time as, ‘there is an assemblage’, a collection, ‘of 
conditions’, of causal factors like mantras, herbs and so forth, of assembled 
causal factors; for that length of time ‘an illusion too continues’, it does not 
stop before that, nor does it continue after.
In this way, as long as there is the assemblage having the nature of ignorance, 
karman and craving, for that long the illusion of a living being’s continuum 
goes on: since, it occurs depending upon the fact that one thing has another as 
its condition (iclampratyayatd).
Opponent | If from the point of view of paramartha there is no living being, 
how is it that the continuum of a living being occurs for as long as samsara, 
while it does not cease after a short while, like an illusion does? [184]
Reply | In response, this has been said: ‘As long as there is an assemblage of 
conditions, it continues’, while something that does have such a thing, does not 
continue. Moreover: remaining for a long time is not a reason to establish 
something as authentic. Thus he says: ‘Why say’ and so forth:
How can a being truly exists, 
solely because of a long continuum? 10
‘Long’ means persisting for a long time; a ‘continuum’ is a flow. That only, 
exclusively, is the meaning of ‘solely because of’ that. He asks: ‘how’? In what 
way does ‘a being exist’, is he to be found? ‘Truly’ means in terms of 
paramartha.
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This much, on the other hand, is the difference:
Whatever has specific causes and conditions to remain for a long time, 
continues for a long time. On the other hand, whatever does not have them does 
not continue. But it is not that according to this there is authenticity or falsity. 
Therefore, even when something has the nature of an illusion, rebirth is not 
impossible.
Opponent | If this is so, just like there is no taking of life in cases like the killing 
of an illusory person; similarly, it should not be there even in case of killing a 
person other than that: since, they don’t differ in nature.
Reply | Thus he says ‘There can be no sin’ and so forth:
There can be no sin in harming and so forth 
an illusory man, because he has no mind.
‘In harming and so forth’: killing and so forth an illusory man. The word ‘and 
so forth’ implies taking what is not given by him, etc.389 Even when lack of 
essence is the same, because in the continuum of an illusory man there is ‘no 
mind’, no consciousness, no sin, no non-virtue arises as taking life and so forth. 
Pdpaka (sin) here is just pdpa\ because the particle ka is added in reference to 
the very meaning of the word. Even in respect to that man, for one who 
bestows strikes with a wish to kill there is definitely some non-virtue, but no 
taking of life.
j89 Pranatipatavircimanasiksa is the first vow o f sila, and not taking what is given is the second. 
It hence follows that the following discussion regards the entirety o f slla.
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Opponent | How is there taking of life in case of someone other than the 
illusory man?
Reply | If one asks this, he says ‘But towards’ and so forth:
But if this is towards one endowed with the illusion of mind, 
merit and sin can come about. 11
The ‘mind’ itself being an ‘illusion’ is called ‘the illusion of mind’; ‘towards 
one endowed’, joined to ‘that’. This means, towards one linked to a mind, which 
has the nature of an illusion. The word ‘but’ is in the sense of a distinction from 
what was before. Punyapape (merit-sin) means ‘merit and sin’, those two, good 
deeds and bad deeds, ‘come about’, arise. Either help or harm (arises): from a 
specific assemblage there is a specific effect. Just like, even when the shape of 
the gomciya quail is the same as that of another type of quail, their nature is 
different due to having different causes. Similarly, here too there is no 
implication of the ascribed fault.
Opponent | Hitting at what has been said ‘endowed with the illusion of mind5 
etc, the opponent says ‘Since mantras’ and so forth:
Since mantras and so on have no such capacity, 
an illusory mind cannot come about?
‘Mantras and so on’: the word ‘and so on’ refers to herbs and so on. ‘Since5 
these ‘have no such capacity’ no such function to make mind arise, ‘an illusory 
mind cannot come about’ a mind having the nature of an illusion is impossible.
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Just like by the influence of mantras and so forth, employed by a magician and 
causing others’ delusion, shapes of elephants and the like come about, it is not 
so for the mind: this is what the opponent means.
Reply | Refuting it he says cAn illusion too can be of various types’, and so 
forth:
An illusion too can be of various types, 
coming about from various conditions. 12
[185] The word ‘too’ is in the sense of emphasis and also indicates a distinct 
step. ‘That illusion’ is indeed ‘of various types’, it is indeed of various sorts. 
Therefore ‘coming about from various conditions’: that which comes about, 
arises, from various conditions, from causal factors of many sorts, is said to be 
so.
This is what is meant:
Although the word ‘illusion, illusion’ is the same, nevertheless, it is not that 
there is no difference in what causes it: since, even when things have the nature 
of an illusion, an effect can have various natures. Having observed a certain 
cause in respect to one effect, it is not fit, just because of the sameness of the 
word ‘effect’, to misconstrue that that causal factor will apply to all effects. On 
the other hand, something has capacity only in respect to some things, since 
even when there is sameness of words there can be difference in nature. 
Showing just this, he says ‘Nowhere a single condition’:
Nowhere a single condition 
Has capacity in respect to all things.
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No ‘single condition’, causal factor or cause, having obtained capacity in some 
respect, ‘has capacity in respect to all things’: it is not possible that it may have 
capacity, power, in respect to all effects. ‘Nowhere’ can mean that it is not seen 
anywhere: it is not seen nor accepted at any occasion, place or time. And 
therefore, a certain illusion obtains its existence from the capacity of mantras 
and the like; while another occurs in its greatness from beginningless samsdra, 
and is brought about by the influence of ignorance and so forth. Therefore, the 
capacity of mantras and the like is not in respect to all things.
All of this has been brought up after taking up the reality of things 
corresponding to samvrti, which follows the usages of the world and is conjured 
by constructs; not from the perspective of paramdrtha. Since, in the state of 
paramdrtha there is no construct of birth, death, arising, cessation, cause, effect, 
existence, non-existence and so forth; as all dharmas are by nature in nirvana.
Opponent | Not bearing with this, the opponent brings out another implication 
and says ‘If someone who has ceased’:
If one who is blown-off in the ultimate sense 
Conventionally goes on in samsdra, 13
‘One who is blown-off’: devoid of arising or cessation, as he is empty of any 
essence. ‘In the ultimate sense’ means from the perspective of the truth of 
paramdrtha', being appeased from the beginning, as he is by nature in nirvana. 
If ‘conventionally’, from the point of view of samvrti truth, which is made of 
constructs, he ‘goes on in samsdra ’, if he is joined to birth, decay and death,
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then this great contradiction would come about: thus he says ‘in this way even a 
Buddha’ and so forth:
in this way even a Buddha would continue in sam sdra . 
Then what is the use of the practice towards awakening?
Accepting ‘in this way’, ‘even a Buddha’ who is blown-off due to the 
destruction of all obscurations, ‘would continue in s a m s d r a would undergo 
birth and so forth. Since this is the case, ‘then’, due to that reason, ‘what is the 
use of the practice towards awakening?’
Towards awakening means: towards Buddhahood. The practice is characterised 
by many hundreds of hardships, explained as giving up one’s hands, feet and 
head, and so forth. What would it be for? It would have no purpose, since, due 
what has been explained, it would yield no result. The practice is in fact resorted 
to for the purpose of making all sathsdric dharmas cease and for the obtainment 
of Buddhahood, based on a collection of all good qualities. Nevertheless, if 
there is no cessation of samsdric dharmas, what has been accomplished by 
resorting to such practice? This is what is meant.
Reply | That has already been answered: by saying ‘As long as there is an 
assemblage of conditions’, and so on. Clarifying it once more he says ‘When 
conditions’, etc.:
When conditions are not cut off 
Even an illusion is not cut off. 14 
But due to the cutting off of conditions, 
Even conventionally there is no coming about.
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‘Conditions’ means causal factors. ‘When’ they ‘are not cut off’; when they are
not destroyed. The particle hi is here used in the sense of a causal link. ‘Even
an illusion’, not only samsdra: the word ‘even’ is used in the sense of adding.
‘Is not cut off’, it does not cease. ‘But due to the cutting off’, the cessation, ‘of
conditions’, of causal factors, ‘even conventionally’, even from the point of
view of conventional usages resting on constructs, ‘there is no coming about’,
there is no movement within samsdra. [186] The cutting off of conditions,
moreover, is to be understood as coming from the cessation of ignorance and
the rest in due order, due to becoming familiar with tattva. As it has been said in
the Noble Sutra o f the Rice-Stalk:
This being spoken, Maitreya Bodhisattva, great being, said to 
Long-Lived Sariputra:
It has been said by the Blessed One, the Lord of Dharma, the 
Omniscient One: ‘Monks, one who sees dependent arising, sees the 
Dharma; one who sees the Dharma sees the Buddha’.
In this context, what is indeed dependent arising? It is this: 
formations have ignorance as their condition; consciousness has 
formations as their conditions; name and form have consciousness 
as their condition; the six entrances have name and form as their 
conditions; contact has the six entrances as its conditions; feeling 
has contact as its condition; craving has feeling as its condition; 
appropriation has craving as its condition; becoming has 
appropriation as its conditions; birth has becoming as its condition; 
decay, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, depression and 
attending troubles have birth as their condition. In this way, there is 
the arising of this mere great aggregate of suffering. In this respect: 
due to the cessation of ignorance, formations cease, (and so forth).
In this way, there is the cessation of this mere great aggregate of 
suffering. This is called dependent arising. (And so forth.) One 
who sees this dependent arising, always constant, devoid of a 
living being, as it is, undistorted, unborn, unreal, un-compounded, 
unobstructed, support-less, auspicious, fearless, not to be 
consumed, and having the nature of not coming to rest, that one 
sees the Dharma. And one who sees the Dharma in this way, 
always constant, as it is, having the nature of not coming to rest,
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that one sees the Buddha, the unexcelled Dharma-body. (And so 
forth.)
In this context, what is ignorance? In reference to these very six 
elements, it is the notion of oneness, the notion of a 
conglomeration, the notion of permanence, the notion of being 
perpetual, the notion of being eternal, the notion of happiness, the 
notion of self, the notion of a being, the notion of a life, the notion 
of a creature, the notion of one bom of Manu, the notion of a 
descendant of Manu, the notion of T  and ‘mine’. Lack of 
knowledge, manifold as described and more, is called ignorance. In 
this way, when there is ignorance, attachment, aversion and 
delusion towards objects occur.
In this context, those attachment, aversion and delusion towards 
objects are called formations, having ignorance as their condition. 
The specific cognition of a thing is called consciousness. The four 
great elements and that which depends upon them is form, once 
they are placed into one group. The four formless aggregates which 
are born together with consciousness are called name: that is name 
and form. The faculties that rest upon name and form are the six 
entrances. Contact is coming together of three dharmas. The 
experience of contact is feeling. Exertion towards feeling is 
craving. Great craving is appropriation. The karman which gives 
birth to a new existence and is bom from appropriation is 
becoming. The manifestation of the aggregates, having becoming 
as its cause, is birth. The maturation of the aggregates brought 
forth by birth is decay. The disappearance of the aggregates is 
death. When a dying person, who is foolish and has intense 
attachment, bums inside: that is grief. Speech brought about by 
grief is lamentation. The experience of harm linked to the five 
consciousnesses is suffering. The mental suffering linked to an act 
of attention towards suffering is depression. Other similar 
secondary afflictions are called attendant troubles.
In this context, ‘ignorance’ has the sense of a great darkness. 
‘Formations’ is in the sense of conception. ‘Consciousness’ is in 
the sense of cognising. ‘Name and form’ is in the sense of 
reflection. ‘Six entrances’ is in the sense of being doors to what 
comes in. ‘Contact’ is in the sense of coming into contact. 
‘Feeling’ is in the sense of experience. ‘Craving’ is in the sense of 
being thirsty for something. ‘Appropriation’ is in the sense of an 
act appropriation. ‘Becoming’ is in the sense of giving birth to a
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new existence. [187] ‘Birth’ is in the sense of making the 
aggregates appear. ‘Decay’ is in the sense of the maturation of the 
aggregates. ‘Death’ is in the sense of disappearance. ‘Grief’ is in 
the sense of grieving. ‘Lamentation’ is in the sense of lamentation 
through speech. ‘Suffering’ is in the sense of bodily torment. 
‘Depression’ is in the sense of mental torment. ‘Attendant troubles’ 
is in the sense of secondary afflictions.
And so on.
In this way, when the conditions that have been indicated are not cut off, the
entire samsdra occurs, since it is that very dependent arising in its twelve links
that has the quality of being samsdra. As said by the venerable Acdrya:
As per its projection by afflictions and karman, the continuum 
becomes gradually old
and once more goes to the next world. Thus the wheel of existence 
is beginningless.
That is dependent arising, having twelve limbs and three 
divisions.390
On the other hand, when the conditions are cut off, by all means there would be 
no continuous migration (samsarana), due to the lack of its causes. Therefore, 
that ‘even a Buddha would continue in samsdra ' does not follow.
Thus, having cast away the objections of Sautrdntikas and others, in order to 
undo the opposition of the Yogdcdra, bringing forth an objection according to 
that system he says ‘When even erring’ and so forth:
Opponent \
When even erring does not exist, 
who is to apprehend the illusion? 15
390 Abhidfiarmakosa 3.19-20
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The whole universe, having the nature of an illusion, is accepted as being empty 
of own-existence by the proponents of Maclhyamaka. Even the intellection that 
apprehends samvrti as having the nature of an illusion, according to you does 
not exist; just like what is external. In that case, ‘who is to apprehend the 
illusion?’ who is there to perceive, apart from a really existent cognition 
apprehending it? What is meant is: no-one. On the other hand, for one who 
accepts that one’s own mind only, existing ultimately, yet in error in terms of 
externality, appears in that way, there is no such flaw. This is the intended sense.
Reply | To undo all this he says ‘when an illusion is itself’, and so on:
When an illusion is itself not there for you, 
then what is to be apprehended?
When an illusion itself, as something to be apprehended occurring with the 
aspects of a horse and so forth, is not there for you, vijndnavddin, then what is 
to be apprehended, then what is here appearing? The sense is that, due to the 
non-existence of external referents, appearance parsed according to place and 
the rest, is not fit.391
Opponent | In reference to this, anticipating the other’s intent he says ‘That is’ 
and so on:
That is just an aspect of the mind itself, 
even though a different one truly exists. 16
391 This objection to the Vijffaptimatrata view is identical to that found in the Vimsatika, verse 2.
305
Here it has been said that the mind only, in error in terms of externality, appears 
in that way. Indeed, that has been said. On the other hand, even though that 
appearance, appearing as something to be apprehended parsed according to 
place and so on, is an aspect of the mind itself, of cognition itself, a different 
one, from the other aspect of an apprehending mind, exists: it is to be found, 
truly, in reality.
Reply | Even though you may have spoken accepting all of this, nevertheless it 
does not hold together: thus he says ‘when mind itself is the illusion’ and so 
forth:
When mind itself is the illusion, 
what is seen by what?
Mind itself, consciousness itself, is accepted as the one who experiences. The 
illusion is not something other: there is no other illusion apart from the 
experiencing mind. Because: it is accepted that, being identical to the latter, it 
appears as such and such. In that case, what is seen by what, what is perceived 
by what? [188] There is only seeing alone, nothing to be seen. Without 
something to be seen there could be no seeing either, since the latter depends 
upon something to be seen. Therefore, nothing is seen by anything: the whole 
universe has become blind. This is the intended sense.
Opponent | Indeed, all of what has been said would accrue, if cognition had no 
self-awareness, by which self-awareness, being aware of its own nature, it may 
experience the appearance of the illusion and so forth as non-different from that. 
On the other hand, since this condition exists, there is no flaw.
Reply | Anticipating this intent of the vijnancivadin he says:
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Also, the Protector of the World said 
that mind does not see mind.
When through reasoning it has been made understood that the entire universe is
surely empty of own-existence, then what could actually be the essence of what?
Thus, what could be the experience of what? The Blessed One also said:
All dharmas are empty: mind has the characteristic of emptiness.
All dhannas are isolated: mind has the characteristic of isolation.
Moreover: the Protector of the World, the protector and refuge of all living 
beings in the world, the Buddha, the Blessed One, also said, also told, what did 
he say? That mind does not see mind: mind does not cognise itself, because 
even in case of something really existent, it is not possible to act upon oneself. 
How is that like?
A sword-blade cannot cut itself, 
and so it is for the mind. 17
Even a very sharp sword-blade, the blade of a sword, cannot cut, cannot slice
itself, its own body, as it would cut something else, because of the impossibility
of acting upon oneself. So too it is for the mind. Like for the sword-blade, mind
also does not see itself -  this should be joined to the sentence. In the same way,
that very same cognition is not fit to have three natures of its own: something to
be experienced, something which experiences, and the experience itself. Since,
it is not fit for one part-less thing to have three natures. About that, this was said
in the Noble Ratnaciiclasutra:
Searching for the mind, he does not see a mind inside. He does not 
see a mind outside. He does not see a mind in the aggregates. He 
does not see a mind in the bases. He does not see a mind in the 
entrances. Not seeing the mind, he investigates the stream of mind:
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where from is the arising of mind? When there is a support, mind 
arises. Then, is the mind different from the support, or that very 
support is the mind itself? If the support and the mind are different, 
there would be two minds. If that very support is the mind, is it 
then that mind sees the mind? The mind surely does not see the 
mind. Just like it is not possible to cut a sword-blade with the same 
sword-blade, and it is not possible to touch a finger-tip with the 
same finger-tip, in the same way to see the mind with the same 
mind(...)
And so on.
Opponent | To this, the proponent of Mind-Only, refuting the impossibility of 
action upon oneself in order to support one’s position, brings up an example and 
says: ‘Like a light’ and so forth:
Like a light, it illumines itself. If so,
Like a light, a lamp, illumines, makes clear, itself: one’s features. A lamp is 
taken up to perceive objects like a pot and so forth when they are covered in 
darkness. It is surely not that in the same way one takes up another lamp to 
illuminate a lamp. On the other hand, while illuminating a pot and the like, it 
also illuminates itself. Similarly it should be understood for our topic, self- 
awareness. [189] And also, no impossibility is seen: this should be added 
everywhere. Therefore, just like in the case of a lamp, there is no impossibility.
Reply | If so, if you think in this way, then: you cannot say that. Why? Thus he 
says: ‘A light’ and so forth:
A light is surely not illumined, 
because it was not covered by darkness. 18
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A light is surely not illumined, is not made clear like a pot and so forth, because 
it was not covered by darkness; it was not enclosed within obscuring darkness.
Illumination is the removal of a present obscuration. Therefore, the illumination 
of a pot and the like is fit, while the illumination of what is not present is not fit, 
as it does not exist. Thus, a light is surely not illuminated. Then, due to 
dissimilarity, the example of a lamp does not prove what is to be proven.
One may say:
Opponent | By ‘itself and so on, it is not being said that a light illumines itself, 
like a pot and the like, being covered by darkness. What is being said is only 
that it has independence from others in respect to its own nature. Showing just 
this he says ‘Unlike a crystal’ and so forth:
Unlike a crystal, something blue 
does not depend on others for its blueness: 
thus, something is seen to depend on others 
and something not to. 19
The Sanskrit particle hi indicates consequentiality. A crystal stone, itself not 
blue, depends for its blueness on some other adjunct that may cause the arising 
of the quality of being blue: like a blue leaf, and so forth. Thus, in this way, 
something like a pot is seen to depend on others: to be illumined in dependence 
upon a lamp and the like. On the other hand, something like a lamp and so forth, 
is seen, is apprehended, as being independent from others: as having the nature 
of self-illumination. What we wish to say is no more than this.
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Reply | To such a specification, shown in this way by the vijnancivadin, the 
proponent of the siddhdntci, refuting what was shown as an example -  blue itself 
being independent from others in respect to its own blueness -  he says ‘Not 
being blue’ and so forth:
Not being blue, that would not 
make itself blue by itself.392
This also is not a similar example: even a blue thing, just like a crystal, is not 
independent from others. Because, for that state it depends upon one’s own 
causes and conditions. Moreover, when could it be independent? If it were to 
arise from its own cause as not blue only; and then, not depending upon others 
for that state, if it were to make itself blue on its own accord. Yet, this is not the 
case. Since: ‘not being blue’ means being devoid of the quality of being blue. 
The negative particle na denies. ‘That’ refers to the hypothetical blue object. 
‘Blue’: endowed with the quality of being blue. ‘Itself’: one’s own features. ‘By 
itself’: on its own accord. ‘Would not make’ means it could not make. As 
before, this is due to the impossibility of acting upon oneself. Therefore, even 
for a blue thing there is no independence from others in respect to its own 
blueness: just as it is for the crystal. Thus, it is not that even a crystal stone, 
having in reality certain fixed features, takes up the colour blue in the proximity 
of certain adjuncts. [190] On the other hand, it is due to being the characteristic 
of all of its appropriation. Moreover, from the cessation of prior own features of
392 Here I do not follow Vaidya’s proposed emendations, since I disagree with his statement that 
his version is confirmed by the commentary. In fact, I believe the commentary supports the 
reading anllatve na tannTlaiii kurydd dtmdnam atmana | See the following section of 
Prajnakaramati: yatah anllatve nllagunarahitatve sati \ neti nisedhayati \ tad iti mldbhimatam  
vastu | nilam nllagunayuktam dtmdnam svam pam  atmana svayam eva na kurydt na kartum 
saknoti [...] | As usual, Prajnakaramati encases the words of the verse within the commentary 
and gives glosses and expansions. Vaidya’s version, though, does not find a place in the 
commentary, as far as I can tell. Since my concern is primarily with Prajnakaramati’s 
commentary, I follow this reading: the numbering of the verses works accordingly.
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the specific helping causes which are adjuncts to blueness, another crystal stone, 
coloured with the quality of blueness, arises: this is the sicldhdnta. Therefore, for 
both things, dependence upon causes and conditions in respects to that quality is 
common: even in case of what we are concerned with, which has to be proven, 
there is 110 difference.
Opponent ] Well, what has been said is actually favourable to us:
Having the nature of being distinguished from the insentient, from one’s own 
causes and conditions, and not depending on another illumination, cognition 
arises: that very arising is called self-illumination, self-awareness. Just this has 
been established even by you, through the analysis of the nature of blue. Even 
the lamp was taken as an example in no more than this sense.
Moreover, we do not accept the self-illumination of cognition according to the
division of object, agent and action; because, for one existent thing three natures
as object and so forth are not fit. Therefore, even in case of a refutation through
the division of action and so forth, there would be no refutation for us: because
it would not harm self-illumination as being born from one’s own causes.
Therefore, in respect to self-awareness, the defects you brought forth do not
follow. As it has been said:
Consciousness is born as distinct from insentient things.
This only is its self awareness: its not being insentient.
Self awareness is not divided into action and karakas: 
as it is one without parts, it cannot have three natures.393
Reply | To this we say:
Having resorted to the sense of words as well-established through conventional 
usage in terms of the division into action and karakas, we spoke a refutation. 
Because, the word ‘self-awareness’ expresses that sense. If on the other hand,
393 Tattvcisarhgraiia 2000.1.
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fearing a flaw, even the sense of words as well-established in the world is 
abandoned, then, you will be refuted according to the world itself.
Even in this way, self-awareness is not established as an ultimate. It is as 
follows: it has been said that what is born from causes and conditions, like a 
reflected image, lacks an essence. And in this way, clearly there is no self- 
awareness of cognition, since in reality it has no essence of its own. And not 
having an essence, the self-awareness of a lotus in the sky makes no sense. 
Moreover, for a proponent of Maclhyamaka, the nature of being insentient is not 
ultimately established for anything: it is through the latter that the sentient, 
distinguished from the insentient, could exist as self-awareness. Therefore it 
would be fit to speak of this only towards others, proponents of things as real. 
Thus, due to lack of an essence, in no way whatsoever can self-awareness be 
established. Once again, we will show this elaborately later, in the section 
explaining the ‘placements of awareness’.
Presently, making understood that, even accepting the quality of self­
illumination of a lamp, self-awareness of the intellect is not fit, he says ‘A light’ 
and so on:
A light illumines: cognising this through cognition, 
it can be told. 20 
Intellect illumines: cognising this through what, 
can it be told?
A lamp might even have the quality of self illumination, and yet it is not a 
similar example to establish the self-awareness of the intellect: this is the overall 
sense. A light illumines: it shines independently from another lamp, of its own 
accord. Cognising this, understanding this, through cognition, through the
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intellect, it is told, it is made understood: because, the lamp has become an 
object of cognition. Intellect, cognition, illumines: this which is said, cognising 
this through what cognition, can it be told? [191] He asks the other.
Moreover, in this context, there is no basis for perception of the intellect: thus 
he shows that he does not suppose so. It is not that it may be perceived by a 
prior cognition: at the time of such cognition, it has not yet arisen, and thus does 
not exist. Nor may it be perceived by a cognition coming about subsequently: 
since then, being momentary, what has to be apprehended would have already 
gone. And also it may not be perceived by a cognition existing at the same time, 
since it would not in any way affect that cognition, and what does not affect 
something else cannot be an object: it has been said that ‘what is not a cause 
cannot be an object. ’ Also, it may not perceive itself by itself, since this indeed 
is the point of controversy. Therefore, we do not understand how it could be 
perceived.
In this way, when the intellect is by all means not perceived, its self-awareness 
is very much unfit: thus he says ‘Luminous or not’ and so forth:
Luminous or not luminous, 
when it is not seen by anyone, 21 
like the games of a barren woman’s daughter, 
even if it is spoken about, it is useless.
Luminous: having a luminous nature, like a light. Or not luminous: having a 
non-Iuminous nature, like a pot and so forth. The occurrence of the Sanskrit 
particle vd twice (translated as ‘or’) indicates discrete grouping. When the 
intellect is not seen by anyone, is not perceived by anyone, whether a perceiver
313
or itself. The word ‘when’ implies a subsequent ‘then’. Then, just like the 
games, the leisure or sport, of the daughter, the one bom from, a barren woman, 
one who has the quality of not giving birth; even if it is spoken about, even if it 
is recounted, it is useless. ‘It’ refers to the intellect. ‘Useless’, means fruitless. 
Since the daughter of a barren woman is not to be found, it cannot be perceived, 
therefore, its games are clearly not to be perceived: this is the intended sense.
Alternatively:
Because it is in essence neither arisen nor ceased, the intellect is similar to the 
daughter of a barren woman. Being the nature of that unperceived thing, self- 
awareness is like her games. That being unperceived, the latter is also not 
perceived. Therefore, even when it is spoken about through mere words devoid 
of reasoning, that self-awareness is useless: being something not to be taken up, 
it has no purpose.
The following may occur to the opponent:
Opponent \ Yours are mere words devoid of reasoning: on this point, we have 
the following reasoning. Thus he says ‘If there is no’ and so forth:
If there is no self-awareness, 
how is consciousness remembered? 22
If self-awareness of consciousness is not there, is not to be found, then, how is 
consciousness remembered?
Due to the non-existence of consciousness’ self-awareness, at a subsequent time 
there should be no memory. Because, the memory of something not experienced 
is not fit, as it would include too much. Therefore, since it is seen that at a
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subsequent time there is memory as the result of experience, the self-awareness 
of cognition exists: this is inferred.
Reply | This way to establish it, establishes nothing. Because, if memory were 
ascertained as an effect of self-awareness, memory could be a proof of self- 
awareness, just like smoke is a proof of fire. On the other hand, if self- 
awareness is not established by valid means, there is no apprehension of 
memory as being its effect. Because the observation of a cause-effect 
relationship is by all means due to inclusion through the observation of both 
factors.
And it is not that, just like from the eye and so forth consciousness may be 
established, even without observation memory may be established as its effect. 
Since, because when the eye is not there the cognition of blue and the like is 
also not there, one is inferred as the effect of the other. Memory, on the other 
hand, is there even without the self-awareness of cognition, as we are going to 
demonstrate: therefore, without the ascertainment of its being an effect of self- 
awareness, due to its existing even in the latter’s absence, self-awareness is not 
established.
[192] Then, you should tell how even memory, being cognition, may be 
established: as an inferential sign, which is itself not established, does not make 
known anything else. And it is not that some cognition could be the object of 
another: because just as it is for external referents, the defects of a connection 
not being established, and so on, follow. Because there is no difference in terms 
of their being different, it should be apprehended even by a memory existing 
within another mental continuum. Or if you say that it is not remembered by the 
latter because it did not experience it earlier, it was not experienced earlier even 
by a cognition falling within the same continuum, hence the same follows.
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Even a cause-effect relationship is not fit to corroborate it: the relationship of 
cause and effect is itself ultimately not existent; and also because, even if it is 
there, since it is situated within the own perception of the Omniscient Ones, it is 
impossible to apprehend it. When we accept conventional usages it is within 
constructs, and being within constructs, since all conventional usages are 
fashioned by constructs, means being within samvrti: this that is to be 
established, has been established. Therefore, self-awareness cannot be 
established with memory as the reason.
Opponent | Then, in the absence of self-awareness, how is there memory, 
according to you?
Reply 1 Thus he says ‘Due to connection’ and so forth:
Due to connection to something other being experienced, 
there is memory, as in the case of mouse poison.
When an apprehend-able thing, an object, other than cognition, has been 
experienced, memory, remembering, is bom with cognition.
Indeed, if what is experienced is something other and memory is elsewhere, 
over-implication would follow. Thus he says: due to connection. When an 
object has been experienced, the memory of that consciousness occurs due to a 
connection. Because, consciousness is connected to that in terms of being the 
one who apprehends it, therefore that consciousness is remembered, and not 
something else.
If someone says:
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Opponent \ Even if a connection is there, as what is experienced is something 
other and memory is of something else, memory should be confused.
Reply | We reply that it is not so. Being an object experienced earlier and 
remembered at a subsequent time, it is the same one qualified by experience that 
is remembered. Since, it is that one, qualified by the former, to be apprehended. 
Moreover, cognition is itself the experience of an object and nothing else. 
Therefore, due to remembering the experience of an object, being connected to 
that, remembering is spoken of in reference to a cognition; it is not that even a 
mere cognition devoid of an object is remembered. Thus, there is no flaw.
Opponent | Well, how can it be that, without the seed of the impression of 
memory placed by the self-awareness of cognition, memory may occur at a 
subsequent time?
Reply | Thus he says: ‘as in the case of mouse poison’. Just like mouse poison, 
rat’s poison, is born later due to a connection, so also is memory: this is the 
intended sense.
It is as follows:
Rat’s poison, having come to the body at some instant, once again at a 
subsequent time, obtains the thundering of clouds. Then, even without the seed 
of the impression of memory placed by self-awareness, due to its occurrence 
being brought about by mere dependent arising, at another instant it undergoes 
change. Thus, even in regards to our topic, there is no flaw -  such is the overall 
sense intended.
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Opponent \ Once again the vijnanavaclin, for the sake of establishing the self- 
awareness of cognition, shows a different procedure and says ‘Because 
someone’ and so forth:
Because someone endowed with another condition, sees it, 
it illumines itself. 23
Another condition: another causal factor. The knowledge of a fortune-teller and 
so forth, or the super-knowledge of the cognition of others’ mind and so forth; 
someone endowed with these two, a mind connected to these types of 
assemblage, sees it, it appears to consciousness, it illumines itself, it manifests 
itself. Self-awareness exists: this follows.
Because, if it is indeed by all means beyond perception in nature, how is it that 
sometimes, due to a specific assemblage, it is apprehended? Therefore, just like, 
due to a specific assemblage, the mind of others is apprehended, in the same 
way due to a condition like immediately precedent, support, and so forth, one’s 
own mind also is apprehended. Such is the overall intended sense.
Reply | Even this is no corroboration of self-awareness: thus he says ‘A pot 
seen’ and so forth:
[193] A pot seen through the application of a siddha-ointment, 
is surely not the ointment.
iSVdd/iu-ointment is either a magically prepared ointment, or, the ointment from 
a Siddha. Its application means its employment. A pot, or a treasure and the like, 
seen, perceived due to that, is surely not the ointment: it is not that a pot and the 
rest could be the ointment itself.
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When one thing is perceived due to another, the former is not itself the latter. 
Thus, through a cognition aided by the knowledge of a fortune-teller and so 
forth, another’s mind is seen, like a pot and so forth: yet, self-awareness may 
not be established by this fact. Because, even this means of establishment does 
not corroborate what is to be established.
Opponent \ Well, if knowledge were to be by nature unknown, there should also 
not be a perception of its object. Because the quality of making known would 
not be known as pertaining to cognition, it could not make its object evident. If 
that is not perceived, how could the object be?
In this way:
due to the negation of self-awareness, and;
because one distinct thing cannot apprehend another, and also;
because if it is accepted that it can apprehend that, for the perception of what is
gradually subsequent and unperceived, following another adjacent knowledge,
infinite regress follows;
then, in no way whatsoever there may be perception of the object. Therefore, 
what has been said: ‘due to connection’, and so forth -  that is unsuitable: 
because, the experience of an object is not there.
And: all this conventional usages in the world, like ‘seen’ and so forth, could 
not be there.
Reply | Thus he says ‘Things as seen’ and so on. When it is said that 
conventional usages like ‘seen’ and so forth, could not be there, is it that they 
could not be there ultimately, or in terms of samvrti? Here if you say that they 
could not be there ultimately, then this is agreeable to us. Since, for something 
within samvrti, there is no occasion to be considered as an ultimate
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(paramartha). Or, if you are referring to what is well-established within the 
world, then:
Things as seen, heard or cognised 
are not here denied. 24
Things as seen: perceived directly by the consciousness of the eye and so forth. 
Heard: from another person, or from traditional texts (dgama). Cognised: 
ascertained due to an inference bom from the three-fold inferential sign. All of 
this here, having remained within conventional usage, is surely not denied: it is 
not excluded. What and how is perceived according to the world, is accepted in 
that very manner, not analysing its nature, due to its being well-established 
within the world: but not, on the other hand, ultimately. Therefore, flaws like 
the fact that there would be no perception of an object in the absence of the self- 
awareness of cognition, are here not occasioned for one who is talking from an 
ultimate perspective.
Opponent | If ‘it is accepted just in that very manner’, then what is here denied? 
Reply | Thus he says ‘Construing as true’ and so on:
Construing as true, on the other hand, 
is here excluded: it is the cause of suffering.
As true, means: as an ultimate. Construing is superimposition. The Sanskrit 
particle tu is in the sense of ‘on the other hand’. That, on the other hand here, i.e. 
under analysis or within the siddhcinta, is excluded, is denied. Why? It is the 
cause of suffering: this expresses the reason. The sense is: since it is the cause, 
the causal factor, for suffering, therefore etc. This is because, the aggregates of
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appropriation continue in samsdra only due to causes of occurrence brought by 
constructs like existence, non-existence and so forth: and, samsdra has the 
nature of suffering. Since it has been said:
They are suffering: arising, world, a locus for views, and becoming.394
Therefore, construing as true is the cause of suffering. Therefore, here the only
wish is only to deny the insistence upon a construct superimposing the false: on
the other hand, nothing real is being denied. Thus, in this way, the self-
awareness of cognition is in no way whatsoever fit. As it has been said:
[194] Mind is not seen by the Tathdgatas 
as something to be awakened or someone who does that.
Where there is someone who awakens and something to be 
awakened,
no awakening is to be found.39:5
On the other hand, the existence of mind-only, spoken of in certain occasions 
by the Blessed One, is just like the aggregates, entrances and so forth: the 
intended sense has to be drawn out. This will be later explained.
Now, having exhausted an incidental topic, going back to the subject matter at 
hand he says ‘If illusion’, and so forth:
If illusion is not different from mind, 
or if it is construed as not identical either: 25 
if it is a reality, then how can it not be different? 
If it is not different, it does not really exist.
39,1 Abiiiclhannokosa 1,8
395 Bodhicittavivamna
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Thus, the illusion may be: different from mind, or not different, or having the 
nature of both alternatives, or having the nature of neither. These are the four 
possible alternatives.
Among these, the first cannot then be the case. When it is also accepted that it is 
different from mind, there would be a contradiction to the sidclhanta of one who 
accepts the world as being only mind. In regards to the second position, on the 
other hand, the flaw has already been explained, by the section starting with 
‘When an illusion is itself not there for you’. And the third way does not hold 
together, because, two mutually contradictory qualities cannot exist in the same 
locus.
The fourth hypothesis also, does not hold together. Taking it up, he says 
‘illusion is not different from mind’ to deny difference. If it is not different, then 
‘not identical either’ denies identity as well. If the position of both is construed, 
is laid out, that too is not fit: for two mutually exclusive things, the negation of 
one is included within the assertion of the other, because the two cannot exist in 
the same locus -  thus, the fourth hypothesis too does not hold.
Moreover:
If it is a reality: if that illusion is really existent, how is it not different from 
mind? how is it not apart from it? Or, if it is not different, if mind is itself the 
illusion, then it does not really exist, is not ultimately to be found: since they are 
in nature identical, there is only mind alone. In this case, what accrues has been 
said earlier: ‘When an illusion is itself not there for you, then what is to be 
apprehended?’
Now, having taken care of the subject matter at hand, and to sum up a 
conclusion, he says ‘Like an illusion’ and so forth:
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Like an illusion, though non-existent, can be seen, 
so too is for the one who sees, the mind. 26
Non-existent: the illusion which can be apprehended, like a horse and so forth, 
is really not existent by nature. Just like even such an illusion can be seen, can 
be an object of sight, so too is for the one who sees, the mind. That illusion, 
non-existent and yet to be seen, is itself the example: it is in the same way that 
the mind, even by nature not ultimately existent, may be capable of seeing. In 
this way, what had been said earlier by the opponent: ‘When even erring does 
not exist’, and so forth, is taken care of. He shows it, by summing up a 
conclusion.
Again, referring to an opponent’s stratagem to prove, in one more way yet, that 
consciousness ultimately exists, he says ‘If samsdra and so forth:
If samsdra must be based on something real, 
it should then be something other, like space,
Opponent | Thus: affliction and purification are two things to be properly 
engaged with: as something to be abandoned and something to be taken up. In 
that respect, a mind covered by the stains of desire and so forth, is called 
‘afflicted’. And these occur based on the mind, and adventitious, because they 
arise from the force of false superimposition. Samsdra originates as a continuity 
of successive births, from karman produced due to those.
That mind itself:
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ultimately luminous by nature; 
not adventitious;
empty of the impressions coming from insistence upon the superimposition of 
two things, like something to be apprehended and another who does it, brought 
up by false misconstruction; 
by nature without those two; 
free from adventitious stains;
due to a revolution of the basis, it is called ‘purification’.
Thus, without mind as something really occurring, no establishment of affliction 
and purification can be accomplished.
[195] This is what the opponents think, as samsdra and nirvana are clhannas of 
mind. Since, there is a quote:
Only mind is afflicted; only mind is purified.
The following, describes no more than such an opponent opinion:
A real thing itself, mind itself as really existent, is its basis: such a thing is said 
to be ‘based on something real’.
Reply | If samsdra is laid out to be so, then samsdra should be something other, 
should be other than mind. Being different from what is real, it should be unreal: 
because only mind is real. What does it then resemble? It is like space, like the 
sky.
This samsdra, which is said to be based on mind; is it real or unreal? And even 
if it is real, is it mind, or is it different from the latter?
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In this regards, if it is real and is mind itself, then it is not that there is samsdra, 
different from the mind and based on the latter: it is mind itself. And mind is not 
something to be abandoned, because it is in essence purification, being 
luminous by nature. Or, if it is different from mind, then by accepting 
something else apart from mind, one’s siddhanta is harmed.
Or, it is something unreal: then, there is nothing going by the name of samsdra, 
just like in the case of a hare’s horn. For this very reason he says ‘like space’. 
Just like space, merely a conceptual existence, is not existent, is nowhere 
capable of purposeful activity, so too samsdra would be, according to you. 
Alternatively, it is ‘like space’ due to lack of essence, and thus you enter into 
our own siddhanta.
One may say:
Opponent | Although it is unreal, nonetheless it will be capable of purposeful 
activity by taking a really existent mind as its basis.
Reply | Thus he says ‘By taking something real’, and so forth:
By taking something real as its basis, 
how could something non-existent gain activity? 27
For something non-existent there cannot be any basis whatsoever, because the 
relationship of basis and based upon has the nature of cause-effect. And, non­
existence is not an effect of anything, because it does not have any specificity 
that could be brought about. Let even that be the case; still, by taking something 
real as its basis, by taking as its basis a really existent mind, how could 
something non-existent, something itself not existing, gain activity, gain
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efficacy in respect to purposeful activity? The question implies that this is never 
fit. Otherwise, it would have the nature of being existent: capacity is the 
defining trait of existence. Because it has been said that
Lack of all capacity, is the defining trait of non-existence.
What now? That is what you are brought to ponder about. Thus he says ‘Mind 
for you’ and so on:
Mind for you has surely become 
one, with non-existence for company.
Non-existence itself, a non-existent thing, is its company: thus, with non­
existence for company. The Sanskrit particle hi, is in the sense of ascertainment. 
One, indeed without a second, mind has surely become: for you, who propound 
mind as the only ultimate.
Opponent | Well, we have surely said that: mind is free from aspects like 
something to be apprehended and another who does that, by definition without 
those two. Therefore, explanation in terms of mind being one alone is not 
something we would not accept.
Reply | It is unfit for you to say so: you also asserted the reality of affliction; as 
something to be abandoned. Then how could mind be the one and only real?
Let it even be so: even still, there would be no liberation from what binds. Thus 
he says ‘When mind’, and so forth:
When mind is free from something to be apprehended, 
then, all are Tathdgatas. 28
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Free from something to be apprehended, implies more: it should also be 
understood as free from someone who apprehends and so forth. Alternatively: 
being someone who apprehends is dependent upon something to be 
apprehended: in the absence of the latter, the former does not exist. And when 
there is no-one who apprehends, due to the non-existence of something to be 
expressed, fashioned by it, nothing to be expressed exists. He says ‘free from 
something to be apprehended’ to represent all of the above.
When the mind of the whole world is bereft of the aspects of apprehended and 
apprehender and so forth, and is by nature without the two, then: since that mind 
is included in the continuum of each and every living being, all living beings 
within samsdra have now become Tathdgatas, Blessed Buddhas. [196] There 
should be no ordinary person. It thus would follow that the cultivation of the 
Noble Path for the destruction of afflictions should be futile: and such is not the 
case. Therefore, even when there is lack of apprehended and apprehender, since 
one attached to existence remains within that, there is no complete destruction 
of afflictions. With this intent he says ‘And in this way’, and so forth:
And in this way, what good is got, 
even when mind-only has been conceived of?
The phrase ‘and in this way’ is used in the sense of ‘such being the case’. ‘And’ 
means: even. Even having accepted in this way, what good is got? None 
whatsoever. Even when mind-only, even when cognition-only, has been 
conceived of, has been superimposed through a construct. Since, even in the 
presence of through cognition of tattva as the absence of the two, desire and the 
rest remain within the continuum of each and every living being.
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Opponent | Well, this is the same even for you who propound essencelessness: 
bringing on that this is a refutation that applies to both, he says ‘Even when’, 
and so forth:
Even when similarity to an illusion is cognised, 
how can the affliction stop? 29
Even when similarity to an illusion, having the nature of an illusion, on the part 
of the world, is cognised, how can the affliction stop, how can the host of desire 
and so forth be destroyed? Thus he asks.
What is here the reason for the impossibility of destruction - that makes you ask? 
Thus he says ‘When, towards an illusory woman’ and so forth:
When, towards an illusory woman, 
desire is born even in its maker.
Here, this is the seed of the impossibility of destruction: when, towards an 
illusory woman, towards a woman fashioned by an illusionist, desire, having a 
desirous mind, is born, arises. In whom does it arise? Even in its maker. Not 
only is it bom in those for whose deception she has been fashioned, but it is 
born even in the maker, in the one who fashioned that illusory woman: this is 
the sense of the word ‘even’.
To make others’ minds confused, some illusionist, very expert in fashioning 
such shapes, displays some miss-universe. She is concocted by the capacity of 
mantras and herbs, and is complete in the traits and portions of each and every
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limb; endowed with a wealth of splendour, from fresh youth, she has a clear and 
attractive complexion, and is exceedingly beautiful.
Then indeed, it is not that only other people, having observed her, have their 
minds distressed by the many blows from Love’s arrows. On the other hand, 
even he who fashioned that longing shape skilled in the arts of Love, that wealth 
of desirable beauty; he who knows well her nature, knowing that T myself made 
her’; even he, obtaining the ultimate condition through Love’s craft, is incapable 
of holding his own mind together in any way. In which case: how, even when 
similarity to an illusion has been ascertained, could there be the cutting off of 
the continuum of samsdral
Reply | Wishing to put all this argument away, he says ‘Because the impression’, 
and so forth:
Because the impression of affliction from something cognisable 
is not destroyed in her maker, 30 
therefore, at the time of seeing that, 
the impression of the empty, is weak in him.
The Sanskrit particle hi is in the sense of ‘because’.
This refutation does not stick on us. Because, ‘it is not destroyed’: not stopped. 
In her maker, in the one who fashioned that illusory woman. What is not 
destroyed? The impression of affliction from something cognisable: due to 
superimposition of the quality of having an essence, attachment and so forth; or, 
the superimposition of reality. This means the obscuration of something 
cognisable.
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From beginning-less samsdra, in one birth after another, false constructs have 
been repeated again and again. A mental continuum occurs, being bom as its 
seed; placing formations within that, is its ‘impression’: due to the fact that the 
latter has not been destroyed.
[197] Opponent | Well, this is the same system as that of the vinanavadin. For 
him also, even if tatt\>a exists as the absence of the two, because the impression 
of adventitious afflictions has not been destroyed, not everyone is a Tathdgata.
Reply | No, this is not the same, because, stains not existent by nature and 
devoid of any efficacy, cannot possibly be an obscuration: this has indeed been 
explained. In our case though, what is without essence is both something to be 
born and that which gives birth to it: so, it is not the same.
Because that is not destroyed, therefore: due to that reason. At the time of 
seeing that: the seeing, apprehending, of that quality of having an essence on the 
part of something cognisable; at that time. Alternatively: at the time of seeing, at 
the time of apprehending, that illusory woman. In him: in the seer, whose 
impression from afflictions has not been destroyed. The impression of the 
empty is weak can be either explained as: of the empty tattva, or, of emptiness. 
In order to respect the metre, an elision of the generalising suffix has been made 
and ‘empty’ is what is mentioned. The impression is the placing of formations. 
That is weak, bereft of capacity, due to seeing something superimposed. 
Therefore, at that time the impression of existence is strong.
Opponent | How, then, does that stop?
Reply | Thus he says ‘By placing’, and so on:
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By placing the impression of emptiness, 
the impression of existence wanes.31
The impression of emptiness: of essencelessness, by nature like an illusion. Its 
placing is its casting: thus, making steady through repeated practice. By that 
opposing condition, it wanes, it stops: just like cold touch, by placing fire 
nearby. What stops? The impression of existence: the impression determined by 
apprehending things as real, practiced from beginning-less samsdra. Because: 
the former has an authentic referent, and it is the own nature of things; while the 
latter is false and adventitious.
Opponent \ Well, whether it is attachment to existence or attachment to
emptiness, there is no difference whatsoever in respect to its being attachment:
since the second type also, does not go beyond the nature of being a construct.
As it has been said:
Emptiness has been explained by the wise 
as the departure of all views.
But those for whom emptiness is a view,
He said, are hopeless.396
Reply | To answer this he says ‘And by practicing’ and so forth:
And by practicing that ‘nothing is there’, 
that too, later, wanes away.
Nothing: existence, or emptiness. Is there, is to be found. The word ‘and’ is to 
make a whole, distinct from what comes before. And, by practicing in this way,
396 Mulamadhyamakakarika 23.8
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after the destruction of the impression of existence, that too, the impression of 
the empty also, wanes away, stops.
This is what is intended: casting ‘emptiness’, being the opposing factor against
attachment to existence, is a means for the latter’s abandonment. And once the
means have been realised, later, since it is similar to a raft, one takes care to
abandon the means as well. In this very sense it has been said:
The teaching of the ambrosia of emptiness is to vanquish all mental 
constructs.
If one has grasping even for that, you set him aside.397 
One may say:
Opponent | By practicing in one’s mind that ‘nothing is there’, abandonment of 
the impression of emptiness may indeed occur. Nevertheless, the construct of 
non-existence that comes about due to such practice, cannot be made to cease. 
And in this way, what enters the cheek comes out from the eye’s pupil: it is 
tough to stay in such condition of yours.
Reply | To this he says ‘When existence’, and so forth:
[198] When existence is not obtained, 
which one may construe as cit is not there’, 32 
then how could non-existence, without a basis, 
remain before the mind?
Even what you mentioned, under analysis, does not remain. Existence, which 
one may construe as ‘it is not there’: existence, of which one may make a 
negation. If that, when analysed, due to its essencelessness, is not obtained: is
397 LokatTtcistciva 2 1
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not got, like a cluster of hair apprehended by someone with an eye-disease. 
Then, without a basis: for someone who misconstrued existence, when what is 
connected to it is not there, how could non-existence, without a support, a form 
displayed by constructs, remain before his mind? How could it, under analysis, 
appear to his intellect? On its own accord, when existence has no essence, it 
stops.
Alternatively: the opponent attacks us in another way:
Opponent | By placing the influence of emptiness, there may even be a cessation 
of the impression of existence. But in the absence of its negation, what is going 
to prevent attachment to non-existence?
Reply | Therefore he says, ‘When existence’, and so forth. The rest can be 
entirely explained as in the first explanation.
This is here the overall sense:
The emptiness of all dharmas is indeed taken up to abandon attachment to 
existence. That emptiness also, after facing emptiness directly, wanes away. 
And whichever construct of existence may somehow be born, that also ceases 
through an immediately subsequent analysis. Therefore, for the cessation of the 
net of all these constructs, in the Blessed Perfection of Wisdom, eighteen types 
of emptiness, starting with inner emptiness, have been elaborately explained.
And it is not that emptiness is apart from existence: because, it is the nature of
existence itself. Otherwise, emptiness being separate from existence, clharmas,
would not lack an essence. Essencelessness is their nature: this has been proved
earlier. And this has been said in the Perfection of Wisdom:
Moreover, Subhuti, a Bodhisattva, great being, practicing in the 
Perfection of Wisdom, through mental acts linked to the 
knowledge of all aspects, observes in this way: it is not that form is
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empty of the emptiness of form: form itself is empty, emptiness 
itself is form. It is not that feeling is empty of the emptiness of 
feeling: feeling itself is empty, emptiness itself is feeling. It is not 
that notion is empty of the emptiness of notion: notion itself is 
empty, emptiness itself is notion. It is not that formations are 
empty of the emptiness of formations: formations themselves are 
empty, emptiness itself is formations. It is not that consciousness is 
empty of the emptiness of consciousness: consciousness itself is 
empty, emptiness itself is consciousness.
And so forth.
It has also been said that
You consider dependent arising as emptiness itself.
‘There is no autonomous existence’, is your unmatched lion roar.398
Thus, emptiness is not apart from a dharma. Therefore, one should not become 
attached even to emptiness.
In this way, by throwing away all constructs, comes about freedom from all 
obscurations. Showing this fact, he says ‘When neither’ and so forth:
[199] When neither existence nor non existence 
remains before the mind, 33 
then, as there is no other go, 
support-less, it is pacified.
When neither existence: an ultimately existent essence remains before, in front 
of, the mind, the intellect. Nor, non-existence: non-existence, whose defining 
trait is to be bereft of existence, remains before the mind. Then, as there is no 
other go, because there is no other go apart from assertion and negation: the 
positions of both and neither are made of the pair of assertion and negation;
398 LokdtTtastava 20
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hence, as they are not separate from them, they are also included once the first 
two have been included. Thus, without a basis, not being joined to the support 
of either something existent or something non-existent, the intellect becomes 
pacified, becomes extinct. This means that, due to the extinction of all 
constructs, like fire without fuel, it reaches cessation.
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Reproduction of a Devanagan manuscript containing Nagarjuna’s 
Lokatltastava, together with an anonymous commentary:
Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project,
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